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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, PUNE BENCH “B”, PUNE
Before: SHRI INTURI RAMA RAO & SHRI S. S. VISWANETHRA RAVI
ORDER
PER INTURI RAMA RAO, AM:
This is an appeal filed by the assessee directed against the order of ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-11, Pune [‘the CIT(A)’] dated 25.05.2023 for the assessment year 2014-15.
The appellant raised the following grounds of appeal :- “1. On the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case and as per the provisions and the scheme of the Act it be held that it be held that the disallowance made of Rs. 2,19,348/- u/s 14A r.w. rule 8D(2)(iii) of Income Tax Rules is not in accordance with provisions of the Act, the additions so made be deleted.
2. On the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case and as per the provisions and the scheme of the Act it be held that it be held that the disallowance made of Rs. 2,79,725/- made on account of depreciation on cars is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the disallowance so made be deleted.
3. The appellant prays to be allowed to add, amend, modify, rectify, delete, and raise any grounds of appeal at the time of hearing.”
3. Briefly, the facts of the case are as under :- The appellant is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It is engaged in the business of manufacturing of Iron and Steel Products. The Return of Income for the assessment year 2014-15 was filed on 24.11.2014 declaring total income of Rs.3,94,02,930/-. Against the said return of income, the assessment was completed by the Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-10, Pune (‘the Assessing Officer’) vide order dated 26.12.2017 passed u/s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) at a total income of Rs.4,19,88,957/- after making the following disallowances/additions :- (i) Addition on account of belated deposit of employees contribution towards PF and ESI of Rs.30,557/-. (ii) Addition on account of reconciliation of 26AS details of Rs.1,46,835/-.
(iii) Disallowance on account of interest on TDS & Service Tax of Rs.12,715/-. (iv) Disallowance of expenditure u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D of Rs.21,16,195/-. (v) Disallowance of depreciation on cars of Rs.2,79,725/-.
Being aggrieved by the above disallowances/additions, an appeal was filed before the ld. CIT(A), who vide impugned order confirmed the disallowance on account of belated deposit of employees contribution towards PF and ESI following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services P. Ltd. & Ors. vs. CIT & Ors. (2022) 448 ITR 518 (SC). The ld. CIT(A) also confirmed the disallowance u/s 14A considering the Explanation inserted vide Finance Act, 2022 has retrospective effect as well as on placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble ITAT, Hyderabad Bench in the case of DCIT vs. Madava Holdings P. Ltd., 143 taxmann.com 172 (Hyderabad Tribunal).
5. Being aggrieved by the above order of the ld. CIT(A), the appellant is in appeal before us in the present appeal.
6. It is contended that the ld. CIT(A) ought not to have confirmed the disallowance u/s 14A in the absence of any exempt Finance Act, 2022 to section 14A has retrospective effect as held by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd., 141 taxmann.com 289 (Delhi). It is further submitted that the ld. CIT(A) had failed to adjudicate the additional ground of appeal
raised before him challenging the disallowance of depreciation on the car on the ground that the car is registered in the name of one of the directors of the assessee-company.
7. On the other hand, ld. Sr. DR submits that the order of the ld. CIT(A) confirming the disallowance u/s 14A is reasoned one and requires no interference. As regards to the ground of appeal challenging the disallowance of depreciation on the car, he submits that no additional ground of appeal was raised before the ld. CIT(A), therefore, it cannot be raised for the first time before the Tribunal.
8. We heard the rival submissions and perused the material on record. The first ground of appeal relates to the disallowance u/s 14A in the absence of any exempt income, the ld. CIT(A) considering the submissions made before him following the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of HDFC Bank Ltd. vs. DCIT, 49 taxmann.com 335 (Bombay) and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of South India Bank Ltd. vs. CIT, 130 taxmann.com 178 (SC) held that since the interest free funds are more than the investments made, no disallowance u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D(2)(ii) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (‘the Rules’) can be made. Further, the ld. CIT(A) had rejected the contention of the appellant that in the absence of any exempt income, no disallowance u/s 14A can be made placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble ITAT, Hyderabad Bench in the case of Madava Holdings P. Ltd. (supra). Thus, the ld. CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D(2)(ii). However, there is no dispute about no exempt income was earned by the assessee company. It is settled position of law that no disallowance u/s 14A can be made, if the assessee had not any exempt income. Reference in this regard, can be made to the following catena of High Court judgements :- (i) Redington (India) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT, 392 ITR 633 (Mad); (ii) CIT vs. Celebrity Fashion Ltd., 428 ITR 470 (Mad); (iii) CIT vs. Chettinad Logistics Pvt. Ltd., 80 taxmann.com 221 (Mad) (Against which the SLP filed by the Department was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Chettinad Logistics P. Ltd., 95 taxmann.com 250 (SC); (iv) CIT vs. Continuum Wind Energy (India) Pvt. Ltd., 430 ITR 52 (Mad); (v) PCIT vs. Kohinoor Project Pvt. Ltd., 425 ITR 700 (Bom.); (vi) Cheminvest Ltd. vs. CIT, 378 ITR 33 (Delhi); (vii) MAN Infraprojects Ltd. (ITA No.259 of 2017 dated 09.04.2019) (Bom.).
However, a change in law has been brought about the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2022 to section 14A by inserting a non obstante clause and an Explanation after proviso. The amendment is reproduced below :- “Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the provisions of this section shall apply and shall be deemed to have always applied in a case where the income, not forming part of the total income under this Act, has not accrued or arisen or has not been received during the previous year relevant to an assessment year and the expenditure has been incurred during the said previous year in relation to such income not forming part of the total income.”
10. This memorandum of Finance Bill, 2022 reveals that it explicitly stipulates that the amendment made to section 14A w.e.f. 01.04.2022 and will apply in relation to the assessment year 2022-23 and subsequent assessment years. The said amendment was interpreted by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. (supra) to have prospective application and cannot be presumed to be retrospective if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood. The relevant paragraphs of the judgement of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. (supra) are reproduced herein : - “5. However a perusal of the Memorandum of the Finance Bill, 2022 reveals that it explicitly stipulates that the amendment made to section 14A will take effect from 1st April, 2022 and will apply in relation to the assessment year 2022-23 and subsequent assessment years. The relevant extract of Clauses 4, 5, 6 & 7 of the Memorandum of Finance Bill, 2022 are reproduced hereinbelow: "4. In order to make the intention of the legislation clear and to make it free from any misinterpretation, it is proposed to insert an Explanation to section 14A of the Act to clarify that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the provisions of this section shall apply and shall be deemed to have always applied in a case where exempt income has not accrued or arisen or has not been received during the previous year relevant to an assessment year and the expenditure has been incurred during the said previous year in relation to such exempt income.
This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2022.
It is also proposed to amend sub-section (1) of the said section, so as to include a non-obstante clause in respect of other provisions of the Income-tax Act and provide that no deduction shall be allowed in relation to exempt income, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act.
This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2022 and will accordingly apply in relation to the assessment year 2022-23 and subsequent assessment years." (emphasis supplied) 6. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. v. CIT [2005] 149 Taxman 352/279 ITR 310 has held that a retrospective provision in a tax act which is "for the removal of doubts" cannot be presumed to be retrospective, even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: '9. The High Court did not refer to the 1999 Explanation in upholding the inclusion of salary for the field break periods in the assessable income of the employees of the appellant. However, the respondents have urged the point before us.
In our view the 1999 Explanation could not apply to assessment years for the simple reason that it had not come into effect then. Prior to introducing the 1999 Explanation, the decision in CIT v. S.G. Pgnatale [(1980) 124 ITR 391 (Guj.)] was followed in 1989 by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in CIT v. Goslino Mario [(2000) 241 ITR 314 (Gau.)]. It found that the 1983 Explanation had been given effect from 1-4- 1979 whereas the year in question in that case was 1976-77 and said: (ITR p. 318) "[I]t is settled law that assessment has to be made with reference to the law which is in existence at the relevant time. The mere fact that the assessments in question has (sic) somehow remained pending on 1-4-1979, cannot be cogent reason to make the Explanation applicable to the cases of the present assessees. This fortuitous circumstance cannot take away the vested rights of the assessees at hand. "
The reasoning of the Gauhati High Court was expressly affirmed by this Court in CIT v. Goslino Mario [(2000) 10 SCC 165 : (2000) 241 ITR 312] . These decisions are thus authorities for the proposition that the 1983 Explanation expressly introduced with effect from a particular date would not effect the earlier assessment years. 12. In this state of the law, on 27-2-1999 the Finance Bill, 1999 substituted the Explanation to Section 9(1)(ii) (or what has been referred to by us as the 1999 Explanation). Section 5 of the Bill expressly stated that with effect from 1-4-2000, the substituted Explanation would read: "Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the income of the nature referred to in this clause payable for— (a) service rendered in India; and (b) the rest period or leave period which is preceded and succeeded by services rendered in India and forms part of the service contract of employment, shall be regarded as income earned in India." The Finance Act, 1999 which followed the Bill incorporated the substituted Explanation to Section 9(1)(ii) without any change. 13. The Explanation as introduced in 1983 was construed by the Kerala High Court in CIT v. S.R. Patton [(1992) 193 ITR 49 (Ker.)] while following the Gujarat High Court's decision in S.G. Pgnatale [(1980) 124 ITR 391 (Guj.)] to hold that the Explanation was not declaratory but widened the scope of Section 9(1)(ii). It was further held that even if it were assumed to be clarificatory or that it removed whatever ambiguity there was in Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act, it did not operate in respect of periods which were prior to 1-4-1979. It was held that since the Explanation came into force from 1-4-1979, it could not be relied on for any purpose for an anterior period.
In the appeal preferred from the decision by the Revenue before this Court, the Revenue did not question this reading of the Explanation by the Kerala High Court, but restricted itself to a question of fact viz. whether the Tribunal had correctly found that the salary of the assessee was paid by a foreign company. This Court dismissed the appeal holding that it was a question of fact. (CIT v. SR Patton [(1998) 8 SCC 608] .) 15. Given this legislative history of Section 9(1)(ii), we can only assume that it was deliberately introduced with effect from 1-4- 2000 and therefore intended to apply prospectively [See CIT v. Patel Bros. & Co. Ltd., (1995) 4 SCC 485, 494 (para 18) : (1995) 215 ITR 165]. It was also understood as such by CBDT which issued Circular No. 779 dated 14-9-1999 containing Explanatory Notes on the provisions of the Finance Act, 1999 insofar as it related to direct taxes. It said in paras 5.2 and 5.3. "5.2 The Act has expanded the existing Explanation which states that salary paid for services rendered in India shall be regarded as income earned in India, so as to specifically provide that any salary payable for the rest period or leave period which is both preceded and succeeded by service in India and forms part of the service contract of employment will also be regarded as income earned in India. 5.3 This amendment will take effect from 1-4-2000, and will accordingly, apply in relation to Assessment Year 2000-2001 and subsequent years".
The departmental understanding of the effect of the 1999 Amendment even if it were assumed not to bind the respondents under section 119 of the Act, nevertheless affords a reasonable construction of it, and there is no reason why we should not adopt it.
As was affirmed by this Court in Goslino Mario [(2000) 10 SCC 165 : (2000) 241 ITR 312] a cardinal principle of the tax law is that the law to be applied is that which is in force in the relevant assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. (See also Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT [(1980) 1 SCC 139 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 67].) An Explanation to a statutory provision may fulfil the purpose of clearing up an ambiguity in the main provision or an Explanation can add to and widen the scope of the main section [See Sonia Bhatia v. State of UP., (1981) 2 SCC 585, 598 : AIR 1981 SC 1274, 1282 para 24]. If it is in its nature clarificatory then the Explanation must be read into the main provision with effect from the time that the main provision came into force [See Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24 (para 44); Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das v. CIT, (1997) 1 SCC 352, 354; CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 482, 506]. But if it changes the law it is not presumed to be retrospective, irrespective of the fact that the phrases used are "it is declared" or "for the removal of doubts".' (emphasis supplied) 7. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in M.M. Aqua Technologies Ltd. v. CIT [2021] 129 taxmann.com 145/282 Taxman 281/436 ITR 582. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:— "22. Second, a retrospective provision in a tax act which is "for the removal of doubts" cannot be presumed to be retrospective, even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood. This was stated in Sedco Forex International Drill Inc. v. CIT, (2005) 12 SCC 717 as follows : 17. As was affirmed by this Court in Goslino Mario [(2000) 10 SCC 165] a cardinal principle of the tax law is that the law to be applied is that which is in force in the relevant assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. (See also Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT [(1980) 1 SCC 139].) An Explanation to a statutory provision may fulfil the purpose of clearing up an ambiguity in the main provision or an Explanation can add to and widen the scope of the main section [See Sonia Bhatia v. State of UP., (1981) 2 SCC 585]. If it is in its nature clarificatory then the Explanation must be read into the main provision with effect from the time that the main provision came into force [See Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24; Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das v. CIT, (1997) 1 SCC 352; CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 482]. But if it changes the law it is not presumed to be retrospective, irrespective of the fact that the phrases used are "it is declared" or "for the removal of doubts".
There was and is no ambiguity in the main provision of section 9(1)(ii). It includes salaries in the total income of an assessee if the assessee has earned it in India. The word