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The Supreme Court held that Section 139(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is not applicable because the revised returns were not filed due to an omission or wrong statement, but rather due to the time taken to obtain sanction for the schemes of arrangement and amalgamation from the NCLT. It was an impossibility for the assessee companies to file the revised returns before the due date of 31.03.2018, as the NCLT granted approval and sanction only on 22.04.2018 and 01.05.2018. The Court found that Section 119(2)(b) is not applicable in this scenario where an assessee has restructured their business with NCLT approval. The Court also held that in view of Section 170(1) of the Income Tax Act, the Department is required to assess the income of the appellants (successor companies) after taking into account the revised returns filed after the amalgamation. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court was set aside, and the Single Judge's decision was restored. The Department was directed to receive the revised returns and complete the assessment for AY 2016-17 considering the sanctioned schemes.
The tribunal held that the revised returns were permissible under the scheme of arrangement and amalgamation, as it was impossible to file them within the statutory deadline due to NCLT proceedings. Section 119(2)(b) was deemed not applicable in this scenario.
The Supreme Court held that Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as applicable at the relevant time, pertains to the recovery of duties not levied, not paid, short-levied, or short-paid. However, the present case falls under the dispensation of Rule 9B of the 1944 Rules, which deals with provisional assessment. The appellant cannot approbate and reprobate by inviting the High Court to pass an interim order stipulating the execution of bonds under Rule 9B and filing monthly RT-12 returns with endorsements indicating provisional assessment, and then later claiming they had not submitted to provisional assessment due to the lack of a specific order. The Court found that the appellant voluntarily submitted to the process of provisional assessment by executing bonds in Form B-13 and furnishing bank guarantees. The High Court's order disposing of the writ petitions did not extricate the appellant from this process. Therefore, it was not a case of duty not levied or paid, nor was it an order undoing the obligation accepted by executing the bonds. The authorities acted in accordance with law for the period between May 25, 1981, and May 13/14, 1985. The appeal was dismissed.
The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not resile from the provisional assessment procedure they voluntarily submitted to by executing bonds and filing RT-12 returns. The court found that the appellant had submitted to the provisional assessment process and could not later claim it was invalid due to lack of a specific order.
The Supreme Court held that Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was not attracted. For Section 53A to apply, the transferee must have taken possession in part performance of the contract and performed or be willing to perform their part. The court found that the permission granted to the builder to construct was a license, not 'possession' in the legal sense required by Section 53A, which denotes control over the land. Therefore, Section 53A was not attracted. Regarding Section 2(47)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the court clarified that the expression 'enabling the enjoyment of' must take colour from 'transferring', implying a de facto transfer where the owner's rights are extinguished. Initially, on the date of the agreement, the owner's rights were intact. However, upon a perusal of the compromise deed and the ITAT's finding that all cheques were encashed, the court concluded that the assessee's rights in the property were extinguished upon receipt of the last cheque. Thus, the compromise deed constituted a transaction with the effect of transferring the immovable property, falling under Section 2(47)(ii) and (vi) of the Income Tax Act. The appeal was dismissed.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court was correct in refusing to entertain the writ petition due to the availability of an alternative statutory remedy. The Court refrained from deciding the substantive issues regarding Section 115QA.
The Supreme Court held that the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was premature as no adjudication had taken place. It further noted that writ petitions are generally not entertained against mere show cause notices.
The Supreme Court held that the excise law is a complete code and it is generally inappropriate for a writ court to entertain a petition against a mere show cause notice. Objections should be raised before the issuing authority. The Court found that the internal order dated March 15, 2006, was not a determination under Section 11A(10) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, but rather an opinion formed in compliance with the High Court's direction. Therefore, it was not an appealable order. The Appellate Authority and the Tribunal erred in appreciating this distinction. The Court set aside the appellate order and the order under appeal, directing that proceedings pursuant to the show cause notice dated March 21, 2006, be taken to their logical conclusion. The Respondent was granted three weeks to file its response to the show cause notice.
The Supreme Court held that the Chartered Accountant was the authorized representative and agent of the company, and service on him was valid. The grounds for recall, including the claim of mistaking the notice and the timing of the surgery, were found to lack credibility.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was not sustainable. The Court found that Section 48(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, prescribes a period of 90 days for filing a revision but does not expressly exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act. By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, apply to special or local laws unless expressly excluded. The Court observed that the scheme of the Act of 2005, including provisions like Section 45(4) which allows for condoning delay in appeals, does not indicate an implied exclusion of the Limitation Act. The Court distinguished the present case from previous decisions relied upon by the High Court, noting that those cases involved specific statutory provisions that explicitly or by necessary implication excluded the Limitation Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings under Section 48 of the Act of 2005. The delay in filing the revision was condoned, and the impugned judgments were set aside, remitting the cases to the High Court for examination on merits.
The Supreme Court held that Mr. Sanjeeva Narayan, being the admitted power of attorney holder for the applicant-company for AY 2009-10, was an agent of the assessee-company. Therefore, notice could be validly served on him as the agent. The Court found Mr. Narayan's claim that he believed the dasti notice from the Supreme Court to be "some Income Tax Return documents" to lack credibility. It was also held that his explanation regarding his cataract surgery was not worthy of credence, as the notice was served on December 13, 2018, well before his surgeries on January 4 and 23, 2019. During this period, Mr. Narayan had sufficient time to inform the applicant-company and had, in fact, appeared before Income Tax Authorities on behalf of the company and its sister concerns on multiple dates after receiving the notice and before his surgery. Consequently, the Court was satisfied that the applicant-company was duly served through its authorized representative and had sufficient opportunities to appear. The grounds for recalling the judgment were deemed devoid of merit. The Miscellaneous Application was dismissed.
The Supreme Court held that filing Form 18 with the ROC is not sufficient intimation of address change to the AO. The AO was justified in sending notices to the address in the PAN database as the assessee failed to update it. Therefore, the notices were considered validly issued within the limitation period.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not right in concluding that the penal provisions of the Black Money Act were made retrospectively applicable by the notification dated July 1, 2015. The Court reasoned that Section 1(3) of the Act originally provided for its commencement on April 1, 2016. However, Section 59 allowed for declarations of undisclosed foreign assets to be made on or after the commencement date but before a notified date (September 30, 2015), with tax and penalty payment by December 31, 2015. If Section 1(3) remained April 1, 2016, the declaration and payment periods would have lapsed before the Act commenced, creating an anomaly. To resolve this, Section 1(3) was amended to July 1, 2015, specifically to allow assessees to benefit from Section 59. The Court clarified that the Assessing Officer could charge taxes only from the assessment year commencing on or after April 1, 2016, and the asset valuation was to be as per the previous year. The change in date was solely to facilitate the Section 59 declaration. Penal provisions under Sections 50 and 51 would only apply if an assessee failed to make a declaration or pay tax and penalty. Given the assessment year 2019-2020, the interim order was not sustainable and was quashed. The High Court was directed to decide the writ petition on its merits, uninfluenced by these observations.
The Supreme Court held that the imported items, including embedded software and services, constituted a complete 'Head End' system and were rightly classified and valued together. The tribunal's decision to include the value of software and services as part of the importation was affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that appeals concerning the violation of conditions of an exemption notification are not maintainable under Section 130 of the Customs Act. Such appeals should be considered by the High Court, not directly by the Supreme Court under Section 130E.
The Supreme Court, in a split decision, delivered two separate judgments. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul allowed the appeal, finding that the partition deed, though dated prior to the cut-off date of September 26, 1970, was registered on the same day. He noted that the elder daughters, who were beneficiaries of the partition, did not challenge the subsequent orders that deprived them of their rights, which lent credence to the State's argument that the partition was a sham. He concluded that the properties allotted to the elder daughters were liable to be found as held by Vithaldas. Justice K.M. Joseph dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the High Court's upholding of the Tribunal's order. He emphasized that the legal representatives of Vithaldas could only raise contentions available to him and that the elder daughters' failure to challenge the orders indicated the partition was not genuine. The matter was referred to a Larger Bench due to the difference of opinion.
The Supreme Court held that supporting manufacturers stand on a completely different footing from direct exporters. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme for claiming deductions under Section 80HHC(1A) read with Section 80HHC(3A) for supporting manufacturers is entirely different from the scheme for exporters under Section 80HHC(1) read with Section 80HHC(3). The Court found that the provisos to sub-section (3) which provide for increased profits are absent in sub-section (3A), indicating a stricter application of provisions for supporting manufacturers. Consequently, the Court overruled the decision in C.I.T. v. Satish Kumar Gupta (C.A. No. 6437/2012) and distinguished the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram v. Baby Marine Exports, Kollam. The appeals in Civil Appeal Nos. 4590, 4591, 4592 and 4603 of 2018 were allowed in favour of the Revenue, setting aside the impugned judgments. For Civil Appeal Nos. 4593, 4594, 4595, 4596, 4597, 4598 and 4599 of 2018, the impugned judgments were set aside, and these matters were remanded to the Appellate Tribunal to allow the respondents to show they are also direct exporters.
The Supreme Court held that while the Tribunal was correct in finding that the Assessing Officer breached mandatory CBDT instructions by not referring the matter to the TPO, it should have remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer should now take appropriate steps as per the CBDT instructions.
The Supreme Court held that Section 292BB of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cures defects in the service of notice if the assessee participates in proceedings, but it does not validate the complete absence of a notice. Since no notice under Section 143(2) was ever issued, the High Court and Tribunal's findings were correct.
The Supreme Court held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (SPIL) after amalgamation is void ab initio. The court emphasized the importance of certainty and consistency in tax litigation, following its previous decision for AY 2011-12.
The Supreme Court held that the amounts deposited with the assessee-company by way of subscriptions are capital receipts as they are to be repaid with interest to depositors as per the scheme. Treating these subscriptions as income would violate the Companies Act. The Court distinguished the case from those where deposits were forfeited and the company became the full owner. The Court found that the "theoretical" aspect of the transaction, where the assessee treated subscription receipts as income, was superseded by the "business" aspect, which, when viewed as a whole, led to the inevitable conclusion that the receipts were capital in nature. The Court reiterated that mere bookkeeping entries are not decisive of the true nature of receipts and that there can be no estoppel against a settled position in law. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The operative direction is that the appeal is allowed, and the subscription amounts are to be treated as capital receipts. The Court expressly noted that any amount/subscription forfeited mid-way would become income, but found no such forfeiture in the impugned assessment years.
The Supreme Court held that subscription receipts, in the nature of capital receipts, cannot be taxed as income, irrespective of how the assessee accounts for them. Bookkeeping entries are not determinative of the true nature of receipts.
The Supreme Court held that Rule 6(4)(m)(i) read with Explanation III of the KST Rules, 1957, is not unconstitutional and does not expand the scope of Section 5B of the KST Act, 1957. The Court reasoned that Section 5B is the charging provision for sales tax on the transfer of property in goods in works contracts, allowing tax on goods in any form. Rule 6(4)(m)(i), however, is a deduction provision. It allows for deductions of the value of goods that have already suffered taxation and are used in the execution of a works contract, provided they substantially retain their original identity. Explanation III clarifies that if goods are transformed into a different commodity and then used in a works contract, the deduction benefit cannot be availed. The Court found no variance between the rule and the charging section, stating that the rule merely clarifies the conditions for claiming deductions. The Court also noted that tax provisions granting exemptions or concessions must be strictly construed. Regarding the procedural issue of provisional assessment, the Court held that the eligibility under Rule 6(4)(m)(i) is a question of fact to be determined in the assessment proceedings, and it was not advisable for the Supreme Court to delve into it at that stage. The appeal was dismissed, allowing the assessing authority to proceed with the assessment.
The Supreme Court held that interest is payable on the differential excise duty from the date of removal of goods, as the retrospective price escalation determines the true value at the time of removal. The court concurred with the views in the SKF India Ltd. and International Auto Ltd. cases.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not follow the mandatory procedure under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act by not framing substantial questions of law. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, and the case was remanded.
The Supreme Court held that the amendment to Section 73 regarding share trading was prospective from April 1, 2015, and did not apply to the assessment year in question. Therefore, share trading losses could not be set off against futures and options profits.
The Supreme Court held that the loss from the assessee's share trading business, which was a speculation loss, could not be set off against the profits earned from trading in futures and options. This is because, for Assessment Year 2008-2009, the profits from futures and options trading did not constitute profits and gains of a speculative business as defined under Section 73 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that while Section 43(5) was amended effective April 1, 2006, to exclude derivatives trading from speculative transactions, a corresponding amendment to the Explanation to Section 73 regarding trading in shares was only brought in with effect from April 1, 2015. The Court found no reason to consider the amendment to Section 73 as clarificatory or retrospective, emphasizing that Parliament stipulated a specific prospective effective date. Therefore, the loss from speculation business (share trading) could only be set off against profits from another speculation business, which was not the case with futures and options profits in the relevant assessment year. The appeal was dismissed.
The Supreme Court held that the Customs Valuation Rules were not applied sequentially as mandated. The authorities should have first exhausted Rules 3 to 5 before resorting to Rules 7 to 9 for valuation.
The Supreme Court found that the ITAT had not correctly appreciated the findings and reasoning of the lower authorities. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court and ITAT orders and remanded the case back to the ITAT for a fresh decision on merits.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Section 260A by not framing substantial questions of law. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision.
The Supreme Court held that Dharmada, being an optional payment made voluntarily by the buyer for charitable purposes and not in consideration for the goods, cannot be included in the transaction value or assessable value for excise duty.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the Revenue's appeal in limine. The court found that substantial questions of law did arise and set aside the High Court's order.
The Supreme Court held that 'Mobile Crane Wire Ropes' are chargeable to tax at 4% under Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The Court applied the test laid down in M/s Annapurna Carbon Industries vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi vs. Insulation Electrical Private Limited, which states that a thing is a part of another if the other is incomplete without it or cannot function without it. The Court found that mobile cranes are not complete and cannot function effectively without wire ropes. Therefore, wire ropes are an essential part of mobile cranes. The Court noted that the expression 'including parts thereof' was inserted in Entry 155 effective May 9, 2006, indicating that parts became chargeable at 4% on and after that date. The Court examined the literature and specifications provided by the respondent, confirming that wire ropes are integral to the operation of mobile cranes. Consequently, the appeal filed by the State (CTO) was found to be devoid of merit and was dismissed. The Court clarified that it examined only the taxability of wire ropes in the context of their use in mobile cranes.
The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 142(2C), as they stood prior to the amendment effective April 1, 2008, did not preclude the Assessing Officer (AO) from exercising jurisdiction and authority to extend the time for the submission of an audit report directed under Section 142(2A), without an application from the assessee. The Court reasoned that the power to direct an audit under Section 142(2A) necessarily includes the incident of power under Section 142(2C) to fix and extend time for submission. The proviso to Section 142(2C) was intended to provide a remedy for the assessee but not to restrict the AO's inherent authority to extend time for good and sufficient reasons, even without an application. The amendment was considered clarificatory in nature, intended to remove ambiguity. The Court overruled the Delhi High Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v Bishan Swaroop Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd. The principle established is that the AO's authority to fix time for audit report submission includes the authority to extend it suo motu, subject to the overall 180-day limit, and this principle was operative even before the 2008 amendment. The appeals were allowed, and related matters were restored to the respective authorities for decision on merits.
The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 142(2C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as they stood prior to April 1, 2008, did not preclude the Assessing Officer (AO) from exercising jurisdiction and authority to extend the time for the submission of a special audit report without an application from the assessee. The Court declared that the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2008, which inserted the expression "suo motu," was intended to remove an ambiguity and was clarificatory in nature. The reasoning was based on interpreting the statutory context, legislative history, and the purpose of the amendment, aligning with the views of several High Courts. The Court found no substance in the assessee's argument that this interpretation would enable the AO to extend the limitation period for assessments under Section 153B, as the exclusion of time for audit purposes would still apply based on the date the report was required to be furnished, whether originally fixed or extended. Consequently, the judgment of the Delhi High Court was overruled. The appeals were restored to the respective appellate authorities for decision on merits.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by not framing substantial questions of law and by dismissing the appeal without deciding the core issue. The matter was remanded for fresh consideration.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed an error by not framing any substantial question of law as required under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, despite hearing the appeal. Furthermore, the High Court dismissed the appeal without deciding any of the issues, including the main issue concerning the applicability of Section 35-D of the Act to the respondent-Bank, stating it was not necessary. The Court found this approach legally unsustainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remanded the appeal back to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits. The High Court is directed to frame proper substantial questions of law and decide the appeal accordingly, along with any other pending appeals on the same issue, uninfluenced by any prior observations. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the case.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the appeal as infructuous. It failed to consider relevant provisions of the Companies Act and Income Tax Act concerning dissolved companies.
The Supreme Court held that the additional sugarcane purchase price paid by the assessee, exceeding the minimum statutory price (SMP) fixed under Clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, and the State Advisory Price (SAP)/additional purchase price determined under Clause 5A, contains a component of profit. The Court referred to the Bhargava Commission's recommendations for a 50:50 profit sharing basis between growers and factories. It clarified that only the profit component within the SAP/additional purchase price determined under Clause 5A would be considered an appropriation of profit. The entire difference between the SMP and SAP cannot be treated as profit. The AO must undertake an exercise to determine the actual profit component by examining the assessee's accounts, balance sheet, and material supplied for fixing the final price. The rest of the amount paid above the SMP, after identifying the profit component, is deductible as expenditure. The matters were remitted to the AO for this exercise, with an opportunity for the assessee to be heard. The impugned orders were quashed and set aside.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a jurisdictional error by modifying the Settlement Commission's order based on a subsequent order that had been set aside. The case was remanded to the Settlement Commission for fresh adjudication.
The Supreme Court held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act to prove the identity, credit-worthiness, and genuineness of the investors. The Court found that many investor companies were non-existent or lacked the financial capacity to invest.
The Supreme Court held that the deduction under Section 80HH is to be calculated on 'profits and gains' before deducting depreciation and investment allowance. The Court overruled its earlier decision in Motilal Pesticides (I) Pvt. Ltd. and stated that Section 80AB, introduced later, does not apply retrospectively.
The Supreme Court held that the exemption notification's emphasis on aggregate value of clearances was clear and that individual clearances below the limit did not exempt the entire aggregate if it exceeded the threshold. The liability for duty attaches to the aggregate value of clearances.
The Supreme Court found that the High Court's order lacked reasoning and failed to frame substantial questions of law. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision.
The Supreme Court held that the buyer's claim for refund was time-barred. The Court reiterated that the buyer's right to claim a refund is distinct from the manufacturer's right and must comply with the provisions of Section 11B, including the limitation period.
The Supreme Court held that the buyer's claim for refund was time-barred. The Court reiterated that the buyer's right to claim a refund is distinct from the manufacturer's right and must comply with the provisions of Section 11B, including the limitation period.
The Supreme Court held that the buyer's claim for refund was time-barred. The Court reiterated that the buyer's right to claim a refund is distinct from the manufacturer's right and must comply with the provisions of Section 11B, including the limitation period.
The Supreme Court held that the buyer's claim for refund was time-barred. The Court reiterated that the buyer's right to claim a refund is distinct from the manufacturer's right and must comply with the provisions of Section 11B, including the limitation period.
The Supreme Court held that the buyer's claim for refund was time-barred. The Court reiterated that the buyer's right to claim a refund is distinct from the manufacturer's right and must comply with the provisions of Section 11B, including the limitation period.
The Supreme Court held that if substantial expansion is carried out, the year of expansion becomes a new 'initial assessment year', allowing for another period of 100% deduction. This is subject to the overall 10-year limit for exemption.