Supreme Court Judgments — 2026

The Supreme Court held that the impugned notice dated 31.03.2015, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for initiating reassessment for AY 2008-09 and AY 2009-10, was valid. The Court reasoned that the 'reason to believe' under Section 147 requires cause or justification supported by tangible material having a rational connection or live link with the belief that income escaped assessment. The sufficiency of reasons is not a justiciable issue at the notice stage. The Court clarified that a 'change of opinion' requires a conscious application of mind and formation of an opinion during original assessment proceedings. In the case of Mr. Chetan Sabharwal, the assessment order for AY 2008-09 was a bare acceptance of returned income, and the assessment order for AY 2009-10 did not discuss the long-term capital gains. The Investigation Unit's report, which formed the basis for reopening, was prepared after the original assessments. Therefore, no 'change of opinion' was established, and the reasons for reopening were based on tangible material with a rational nexus to the AO's belief. The appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the absence of a notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is not a curable procedural irregularity and vitiates the reassessment proceedings. The Court affirmed the ITAT's and High Court's decisions. Firstly, Section 292BB does not preclude an assessee from raising the objection of non-issuance of a Section 143(2) notice, even if they appeared and cooperated, as it does not validate the complete absence of a mandatory notice. Secondly, an assessee requesting their earlier return be treated as the return for a Section 148 notice does not absolve the Revenue of its obligation to issue a Section 143(2) notice. Thirdly, a letter issued by the Assessing Officer under Section 142(1) during reassessment proceedings, asking for explanations, does not satisfy the mandatory requirement of a Section 143(2) notice, which is a sine qua non for reassessment proceedings. The ratio is that the mandatory requirement of Section 143(2) notice cannot be dispensed with, and its absence renders the assessment void. The appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal, setting aside the impugned High Court order. The Court found that the High Court's premise for interference, that goods were admittedly removed and excise duty was payable, was contrary to the record. The AO had committed a factual error by disallowing Rs. 69,91,983/- under Section 43B and adding it to the closing stock and taxable income. The Court reasoned that (i) the assessee followed the mercantile system but had not routed the disputed entry through the Profit and Loss Account without actually paying the excise duty; (ii) Section 43B allows expenses only in the year of payment; and (iii) the actual payment on accrual method, even if paid after March 31st but before the Tax Return date, is allowable. Since the amount was neither paid nor treated as payable in the accounts, except for the Tax Auditor's remark, there was no basis for disallowance. The AO failed to show how the assessee claimed the allowance in its books. The Court also found the unreported judgment in ITA No. 4297 of 2009 to be on all fours with the present case, considering the interplay between Sections 43B and 145A.

The Supreme Court held that the activity of bleaching, dyeing, and processing undertaken by respondent No.1 on fabrics received from powerloom and handloom industries on a job work basis does not constitute 'manufacture' under Section 5A of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963. The Court reasoned that it is not safe or permissible to adopt the connotation of 'manufacture' as defined in another statute, especially when the Act itself does not define the term. The word 'manufactured' in Section 5A must be understood in its common parlance. Respondent No.1's activity was viewed as supplementary and ancillary to the manufacturing of textiles by the powerloom industry, which is expressly exempted from textile cess under the proviso to Section 5A. Therefore, respondent No.1's units do not undertake 'textile manufactured' and cannot be subjected to textile cess. The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the Civil Appeal is barred by limitation. The Court clarified that for appeals to the Supreme Court under Section 62 of the IBC, the limitation period of 45 days, extendable by a further 15 days (total 60 days), commences from the date the order is pronounced by the NCLAT, not from the date of receipt of the certified copy. The Court referred to Rule 91 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016, which mandates pronouncement of orders in open court, making that the date from which knowledge and limitation commence. The Court also applied Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, stating that only the "time requisite" for obtaining a copy (period between application and readiness) is excluded, and any period of inaction before applying for the copy cannot be excluded. In this case, the NCLAT order was pronounced on 02.08.2023. The Appellant applied for a copy on 06.09.2023 (35 days after pronouncement), and received it on 11.10.2023. Even with exclusion of the time taken to obtain the copy, the appeal filed on 21.11.2023 was beyond the 60-day outer limit. The preliminary objection was sustained, and the appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the electricity subsidy received by the appellant was a revenue receipt. The Court reasoned that the subsidy's immediate and direct effect was to reduce the electricity cost incurred in the manufacturing process, which is an operational expense. The scheme did not require the subsidy to be applied towards the acquisition of plant, machinery, construction of the factory, or any other capital asset. The Court distinguished this case from those where subsidies were found to have a capital purpose, such as facilitating the establishment of capital-intensive projects. The broader object of fostering industrial growth could not, in isolation, determine the character of the receipt; the operative provisions of the scheme, which provided a quantified concession against electricity charges incurred after production commenced, were determinative. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the Assessing Officer, CIT (Appeals), ITAT, and High Court that the subsidy was operational assistance and therefore revenue in character. The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the Assessee's appeals. On the nature of receipt, the Court held that consideration from the sale of export quota permits is not income "derived" from exports, as the immediate source is a domestic transaction. Regarding Sections 28(iiia) to (iiie), the Court found them inapplicable because quota permits are not issued under the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, and quota earnings do not constitute cash assistance or duty drawback. The Court clarified the status of the CBDT O.M., reiterating the principle from CCE, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries that administrative circulars contrary to statutory provisions or judicial declarations have no force in law and are not binding on courts. The Court reasoned that the CBDT O.M. creates a legal fiction by equating export quota premium with items in Section 28(iiia) to (iiic), which is impermissible as the sale of quota does not involve receipt of foreign exchange. The Court found that the provisos to Section 80HHC(3) specifically refer to Sections 28(iiia), (iiib), and (iiic) and cannot be extended by analogy to residuary business income. Consequently, the CIT correctly exercised powers under Section 263. The Assessee's argument to enforce the CBDT O.M. was rejected. The Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.

The Supreme Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) lacked the jurisdiction to issue a reassessment notice under Section 148 for AY 2006-07 after a settlement order had been passed by the Income Tax Settlement Commission (ITSC) under Section 245D(4). The Court reasoned that Section 245-I of the Income Tax Act, 1961, makes an ITSC settlement order conclusive on the matters stated therein, and strictly bars reopening such matters in any proceeding under the Act. While Section 245D(6) allows the ITSC to reopen an order obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, this recourse is available to the ITSC itself, not to the regular assessment machinery. The Revenue's recourse to challenge a settlement order based on fraud or misrepresentation must be through the mechanism provided under Section 245D(6) before the ITSC, not by initiating regular reassessment proceedings. The Court emphasized that the settlement mechanism under Chapter XIX-A is designed to provide finality, and allowing the AO to reassess matters covered by a settlement order would defeat this purpose. The Court noted that the Revenue had the option to move under Section 245D(6) but did not do so effectively. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings initiated by the AO were held to be without jurisdiction. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that penalties imposed on the appellant for late deposit of FTT in 6 instances cannot be sustained. The Court reasoned that the appellant's contention that the delays were not deliberate and that the authorities overlooked provisions for condoning delay and the discretionary nature of penalty imposition were valid. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the principle of 'no reformatio in peius', stating that a litigant should not be placed in a worse position by approaching an appellate forum. The significant increase in penalty after remand, from Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 71,29,140, was found to be a grave error. Consequently, the penalties imposed for late deposit of FTT were set aside. The High Court's order, the revisional order, the order-in-appeal, and the de novo order-in-original concerning the penalty for late deposit of FTT on 6 occasions were quashed. Any amount paid as penalty was to be refunded with interest at 9% per annum. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Supreme Court held that the Notification dated 11.10.2000, issued by the Commissioner of Customs (Import) under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, approving the Mumbai Port Trust as the custodian, was valid. The Court reasoned that Section 45(2) imposes statutory duties on any person having custody of imported goods, irrespective of the legal source of that custody, including duties to maintain records and prevent unauthorized removal. Pilferage is a breach of these obligations. Section 45(3) fastens the liability to pay customs duty on pilfered goods upon the approved custodian because the pilferage occurs while the goods are in their statutory custody under Section 45. The Court found no conflict between Section 45 of the Customs Act and Sections 42 and 43 of the Major Port Trusts Act. It clarified that while Section 23 of the Customs Act deals with remission of duty on lost or destroyed goods, Section 13 and Section 45(3) specifically address pilferage. The saving clause in Section 45(1) can be construed to exclude the operation of the Major Port Trusts Act only for loss or destruction of goods simpliciter, not for pilferage, which is specifically dealt with by the Customs Act. Therefore, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to issue the notification for the purpose of collecting customs duty on pilfered goods. The High Court's decision to quash the notification was set aside. However, the appeal regarding the show cause-cum-demand notices pertaining to the period prior to 11.10.2000 was not pressed by the appellants, as no liability under Section 45(3) could arise without prior approval under Section 45(1).

The Supreme Court held that the referral charges obtained by the appellant from banks (HDFC Bank & ICICI Bank) and the Oriental Insurance Company, for customers availing motor vehicle loans and insurance policies, are indeed taxable as Business Auxiliary Service. The Court noted the agreements with these institutions, which showed the appellant promoting and marketing their services. The appellant acted as a link in the economic activity of the banks and insurance companies. Regarding the penalty, the Court observed that the tax liability was satisfied by the appellant prior to the issuance of the show cause notice. Citing Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, which mandates that if tax liability is satisfied before notice, the department should desist from issuing a show cause notice, the Court found that the penalty imposed under Section 78 should be set aside. The Tribunal had already set aside the penalty under Section 76. Therefore, the appeal was partly allowed, with penalties set aside.

The Supreme Court held that the issue of valuation is inextricably linked to the value of goods for assessment. The assessee's liability to include the 10% profit in the valuation of the chassis, which was already paid duty on, is unassailable when computing the assessable value of the completed motor vehicle. This is because this 10% is part of the cost of the vehicle on which excise duty was paid and credit utilized. However, the Court found that the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A could not be invoked. The manufacturer cleared the chassis at 110% of its manufacturing cost, which was known to the Department. The omission by the job worker to add the 10% profit when computing duty at the time of clearance, when the facts were known to both parties, did not constitute wilful suppression or misstatement with intent to evade duty. Therefore, the Show Cause Notice dated 30.04.2008, issued beyond the one-year period provided under Section 11A(1) for the demand period 01.11.2004 to 31.03.2007, was beyond the normal period of limitation. The Tribunal's order affirming the original and appellate authorities' orders was set aside. The demand was not leviable for the subject period due to limitation.

The Supreme Court held that the imported laser imagers are not diagnostic apparatus in their own right, as they lack independent diagnostic skills and require input from other diagnostic equipment. They function as accessories that transfer diagnostic data onto films. Therefore, they cannot be classified under CTH 9018 90 19, which applies to 'other diagnostic instruments and apparatus'. The Court found merit in the Revenue's argument that Rule 2(b) of Chapter 90 Notes, which allows classification of parts and accessories with machines of the same tariff heading, is not applicable here. This is because the laser imagers are compatible with machines falling under different tariff headings (CTH 9018 and CTH 9022). According to Rule 2(c), accessories suitable for use with machines falling under different tariff headings must be classified under the residuary CTH 9033 00 00. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the CESTAT's interpretation.

The Supreme Court held that the CESTAT had not committed any error in setting aside the demands confirmed by the Commissioner of Service Tax. The Court reasoned that the contracts executed by the respondent-assessee were indivisible turnkey contracts involving the supply, installation, and commissioning of ATMs for a composite consideration. During the period from July 2003 to April 2006, the Finance Act, 1994, did not authorize the artificial segregation or 'vivisection' of such contracts to isolate and tax the installation and commissioning component under the taxable category of 'commissioning or installation' (Section 65(105)(zzd)). The Court affirmed that in the absence of statutory authority permitting such artificial segregation, the Revenue was not entitled to levy service tax by attributing a notional percentage of the total contractual consideration. This conclusion was consistent with the statutory scheme of the Finance Act, 1994, and the law declared by the Supreme Court in Larsen and Toubro Limited (supra). The CESTAT's finding that installation and commissioning were merely integral incidents of the execution of the contracts as a whole was upheld. The appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the activity undertaken by the Assessee did not amount to 'manufacture' under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's findings that the Revenue had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the activity was manufacturing. The Court noted that the Assessee imported goods under Tariff Heading 8471 (automatic data processing machines) and paid customs duty accordingly. The Court found that the activity was essentially 'kitting' – pinning and plugging different parts together to make a complete set as per customer specifications. The Court further held that Note 6 to Section XVI of the CE Tariff Act was not attracted because the goods were imported, classified, and cleared as complete machines under Heading 8471, and no process was performed on them in the warehouse. The Revenue could not treat the same goods as complete machines for customs duty and as incomplete articles for excise duty. The Court also observed that the Revenue had not inspected the Assessee's premises and had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the photocopier was a product of change rather than a result of 'kitting'. The Tribunal's findings, which were considered brief and correct, were based on the entirety of the record, including depositions and documents, and were not perverse. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. The Court found it difficult to confine the meaning of 'carriage' as attributed by the Assessing Officer, who insisted that movement must be from place A to place B. The Appellate Authority and the Tribunal, being competent to examine facts, held that SLL's activity did not fall outside the expression of 'carriage' as per Section 44B. The Court noted that the possibility of passengers de-boarding at intermediate ports was not considered by the AO. The Court reasoned that providing ancillary services on a voyage does not detract from the meaning of 'carriage' under Section 44B. The AO's restrictive meaning was deemed inappropriate for the facts. The Court was satisfied that Section 44B was attracted to the estimated income of SLL for the assessment years in question and did not warrant interference. The appeals were dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower authorities and the High Court.

The Supreme Court held that the activities of BPCL and HPCL in relation to the sale of CNG at their outlets constituted 'Business Auxiliary Service' under the Finance Act, 1994. The Court found that no buying and selling of CNG took place between MGL and BPCL/HPCL. BPCL/HPCL did not acquire the goods with the authority to resell them for profit as if the CNG belonged to them. Instead, they acted as agents for MGL, facilitating the sale of CNG to vehicle users at prices fixed by MGL. The relationship was determined to be one of 'Principal and Agent'. The Court reasoned that BPCL/HPCL provided promotional services for the marketing and sale of MGL's goods, squarely covered under Section 65(19) as 'Business Auxiliary Service'. They were considered 'commission agents' as per Explanation (a) of the definition. Therefore, the services rendered were 'taxable services' under Section 65(105). The impugned order of CESTAT was set aside, and the Orders-in-Original confirming the service tax demand were upheld.

The Supreme Court held that an appeal from an order of the Appellate Tribunal concerning the determination of any question relating to the rate of excise duty or value of goods for assessment lies before the Supreme Court, not the High Court, under Section 35G of the Act, 1944. However, this exclusion is not absolute and applies only to questions with a direct and proximate relationship to assessment. The Court clarified that the question of excisability is a precursor to determining the rate or value of duty and thus falls within the scope of Section 35G. Regarding the 'manufacture' issue, the Court held that the process of cutting and grooving ACPs does not result in a distinct product with new characteristics or use. Such superficial changes, which do not alter the fundamental properties of the goods, do not constitute 'manufacture'. The Court reiterated that for excise duty to be levied, the marketability of the manufactured goods must be proven, and the burden of proof lies with the Revenue. The Court found that the Revenue had not discharged this burden. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside.

The Supreme Court held that the levy of GST on actionable claims arising from betting and gambling transactions is constitutionally valid, falling within the legislative competence of Article 246A of the Constitution and consistent with the CGST Act, 2017. The challenges to the constitutional and statutory validity of Sections 2(31), 2(52), 7, 9, and 15 of the CGST Act, 2017, and Rules 31A and 31B of the CGST Rules, 2017, were rejected. The Court found the amendments by the Central Goods and Services Tax (Amendment) Act, 2023, to be clarificatory and explanatory, operating retrospectively. Organized online gaming, including fantasy sports and similar formats with pooled stakes, were held to constitute actionable-claim supplies exigible to GST under the betting and gambling framework. For casino transactions, while pre-amendment recourse to Rule 31 and best judgment was permissible in the absence of complete records, the ultimate taxable value is now governed by Rule 31C. Pending show cause notices and demands will be decided based on Rules 31B and 31C and the judgment's findings. The High Court of Karnataka's judgment was set aside, restoring show cause notices, and the Bombay High Court's judgment was set aside to the extent it excluded certain transactions from taxable supply. The appeals and petitions were disposed of accordingly, with directions for time extensions for replies and appeals.

The Supreme Court held that the imported product 'n-Hexane' is to be classified under Customs Tariff Heading 2901.10 and Central Excise Tariff Heading 2901.90 as a pure hydrocarbon existing as a separate chemical compound. The Court reasoned that the initial burden of proof was not discharged by the Revenue, as they failed to provide sufficient evidence to classify n-Hexane as Motor Spirit under Chapter 27. The Court emphasized the importance of HSN Notes, which specifically mention Hexane under Chapter 29, indicating it as a separate chemically defined compound. Furthermore, a Policy Circular dated July 14, 2004, issued by the DGFT, categorically clarified that the import of Hexane falls under Chapter 29 of the Customs Tariff Act, and this decision is binding on the authorities. The Court also noted that the duty payable under Chapter 29 is generally lower than under Chapter 27, and misclassification can lead to unjust enrichment of the Revenue. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Appellant-Revenue was dismissed, affirming the order of CESTAT.

The Supreme Court held that the reopening of assessment for AY 2008-09 was valid, dismissing Civil Appeal No. 9107 of 2012. The Court found that even excluding extraneous documents, the reasons recorded for reopening were sufficient. Regarding the taxability of income for AY 2008-09 and AY 2009-10, the Court held that the amount accrued to SPPL from the AOP, based on Clause 7 of the AOP Agreement, was taxable in the hands of SPPL. A plain reading of Clause 7, supported by the SPPL's Director's statement, indicated an intention to share revenue, not profits. SPPL was entitled to 35% of gross sale proceeds upfront, with expenses borne by the remaining 65% share of RKC. This 35% was considered an income in SPPL's hands and a diversion for the AOP due to an overriding title. The Court distinguished this from an obligation to pay a portion of one's own income, citing Sitaldas Tirathdas. The SPPL's share was not contingent on AOP's profit and attached to gross receipts at accrual. Therefore, the High Court and ITAT erred in holding otherwise, and Civil Appeal No. 19487 of 2017 filed by the Revenue was allowed. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its view. The Court agreed with the ITAT's interpretation of Section 36(1)(iii). The Court referred to its decision in Sharp Business System v. CIT, which analyzed Section 36(1)(iii) and held that the transfer of borrowed funds should be examined from the point of view of commercial expediency, not solely whether the amount was advanced for earning profits. In that context, it was held that the assessee was entitled to claim interest on borrowed funds invested in a sister concern for acquiring controlling interest. The Supreme Court concluded that the composite nature of the assessee's business, as found by the ITAT, was crucial, and the ratio of its earlier judgments squarely applied. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to a deduction for the interest paid on capital borrowed for the purposes of its business. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside.

The Supreme Court held that the appellant's reliance on the Dalmia Power Ltd. judgment was misplaced. The Court noted that in Dalmia Power Ltd., the Income Tax Department had been issued notice and had not raised objections, whereas in the present case, the State of Kerala was not issued notice during the amalgamation proceedings. The Court found no statutory requirement under the Companies Act, 1956, for issuing notice to the State Government, nor was such notice issued. Therefore, the principle in Dalmia Power Ltd., which was based on the Income Tax Department's lack of objection after notice, did not apply. The Court also observed that the appellant failed to refer to any provision under the Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1991, that would permit the set-off of losses suffered by the amalgamating company against the income of the amalgamated company, beyond relying on Clause 14.2 of the scheme, which was rejected. Additionally, the Court acknowledged the High Court's factual finding that the losses pertained to a period beyond the eight-year carry-forward limit prescribed by Section 12 of the Kerala Act, a finding for which no specific ground was raised in the petitions before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the appellant should succeed both on merit and on limitation. The Court reasoned that the appellant had furnished requisite particulars to the central excise authorities, and the availing of exemption was dependent on the interpretation of statutory notifications, which the Court upheld. It was emphasized that the appellant, a public sector undertaking, receives subsidies, making the entire exercise revenue neutral. In such revenue-neutral situations, invoking the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act is not permissible, as established in the case of Nirlon Limited. The Court found that the appellant had no intention to evade excise duty. Consequently, the impugned orders-in-original dated 27.01.2010 and 04.02.2010, and the CESTAT's order dated 27.03.2012, were set aside. The appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 21441 of 2013 was rendered academic and disposed of accordingly. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Supreme Court held that 'Sharbat Rooh Afza' is classifiable under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the UPVAT Act as a fruit drink/processed fruit product and is exigible to VAT at the concessional rate of 4%. The Court reasoned that the product contains declared fruit juice and derives its essential beverage identity from fruit-based constituents. Entry 103 was found to be illustrative and inclusive, without a quantitative threshold for fruit content. The Court also noted that regulatory or licensing classifications do not control fiscal entry interpretation. The Revenue failed to discharge its burden of proving the product falls outside Entry 103 and within the residuary entry. The Court emphasized that resort to the residuary entry is impermissible where classification under a specific entry is reasonably and sustainably possible. The existence of similar VAT entries in other states, classifying 'Sharbat Rooh Afza' at concessional rates, further supported the appellant's interpretation as bona fide and commercially recognized. The Court set aside the impugned judgments affirming classification under the residuary entry and the levy at 12.5%, directing consequential relief including refund or adjustment of excess tax paid.

The Supreme Court upheld the NCLT and NCLAT's decisions, stating that orders under the Benami Act cannot be questioned before authorities under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The IBC cannot be used to bypass or override proceedings under special statutes like the Benami Act.

The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant, considering the prolonged period of incarceration and the bail granted to a co-accused. The Court emphasized the need for trial courts to inform accused of their right to legal representation.

The Supreme Court held that the booking agents were not providing event management services to the appellant. The contracts were for booking speakers, not for organizing the event itself, and thus did not fall under the definition of event management services.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was correct in upholding the AAR's ruling. The court emphasized the importance of treaty provisions aligning with domestic laws and the need for safeguards in international tax treaties to prevent abuse and protect tax sovereignty.

The Supreme Court held that where shares held as stock-in-trade are substituted by shares of an amalgamated company, and these new shares are realisable and have a definite market value, it constitutes a taxable business income under Section 28. The matter was remitted for factual determination.

The Supreme Court held that the mushroom growing apparatus does not qualify as agricultural machinery. The aluminium shelves do not contribute to the operation of the machines but merely serve as a surface, thus failing to qualify as parts of agricultural machinery.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Gujarat High Court's 2019 judgment was unsustainable. The Court found that the Gujarat High Court's 2015 judgment, which declared that customs duty could not be levied on electrical energy cleared from an SEZ to the DTA, was not confined to a particular notification or period but established a broader legal principle. This principle was based on the absence of a lawful charging event under Section 12 of the Customs Act, the limited scope of Section 25 of the Customs Act, the parity requirement of Section 30 of the SEZ Act, and constitutional constraints under Articles 14 and 265. The subsequent notifications (Notification No. 91/2010-Cus. and Notification No. 26/2012-Cus.) did not create a new levy but merely continued the same levy in an altered form. The Court stated that a co-ordinate bench of the High Court was bound to follow the 2015 decision or refer the matter to a larger bench if it doubted its correctness. The appellant's 2016 writ petition was a valid sequel seeking enforcement of the prior declaration. The Court declared the levy of customs duty on electrical energy cleared from the appellant's SEZ unit to the DTA, as sought to be enforced through the mentioned notifications, to be without authority of law. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the respondents were directed to refund amounts deposited under protest by the appellant for the period September 16, 2010, to February 15, 2016, without interest. No further demands were to be enforced for the period covered by the appeal.