103 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal held that since the substantive issues in law and facts were sub-judice before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, it was not appropriate for the Tribunal to adjudicate the matter. The appeals were remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to await the High Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that since the substantive issues in law and facts were sub-judice before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, it was not appropriate for the Tribunal to adjudicate the matter. The appeals were remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to await the High Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that since the substantive issues in law and facts were sub-judice before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, it was not appropriate for the Tribunal to adjudicate the matter. The appeals were remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to await the High Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that since the substantive issues in law and facts were sub-judice before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, it was not appropriate for the Tribunal to adjudicate the matter. The appeals were remanded back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to await the High Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that in cases of ex-parte orders due to non-compliance, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for denovo adjudication to ensure principles of natural justice are followed.
The Tribunal allowed one final opportunity to the assessee to present evidence for the condonation of delay. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to decide on the delay first and then, if condoned, proceed to decide the appeal on its merits. The order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's gross negligence in filing rectification petitions and appeals after inordinate delays, often exceeding 9 years, was not condonable. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities which had dismissed the appeals on grounds of delay.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's gross negligence in filing rectification petitions and appeals after inordinate delays, often exceeding 9 years, was not condonable. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities which had dismissed the appeals on grounds of delay.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's gross negligence in filing rectification petitions and appeals after inordinate delays, often exceeding 9 years, was not condonable. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities which had dismissed the appeals on grounds of delay.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's gross negligence in filing rectification petitions and appeals after inordinate delays, often exceeding 9 years, was not condonable. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities which had dismissed the appeals on grounds of delay.
The Tribunal, following its previous decisions and principles of natural justice, set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(Appeals). The matter was remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for a fresh adjudication on merits, providing one final opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may have a strong legal ground, the CIT(Appeals) must adjudicate on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the ex-parte orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may have a strong legal ground, the CIT(Appeals) must adjudicate on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the ex-parte orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may have a strong legal ground, the CIT(Appeals) must adjudicate on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the ex-parte orders were set aside.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) found that the CIT(A) acted arbitrarily by not conducting an independent inquiry or verifying the assessee's explanations. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's detailed business model explanation, noting that cash deposits were made throughout the year, not just during demonetization, and originated from disclosed business sources. The ITAT, applying principles from CIT vs. P.K. Noorjahan and CIT vs. H.R. Karandikar & Ors., concluded that the addition under Section 69A was not justified.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that the right to appeal is a valuable substantive right that should be viewed liberally. It noted that the CIT(A) failed to provide a specific opportunity of being heard before dismissing the appeal on limitation. The ITAT, therefore, set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard regarding the delay condonation and subsequently on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 73 days in filing the appeal. The Tribunal also noted that additional evidences were admitted by the CIT(A)/NFAC without following Rule 46A(3) of the IT Rules, 1962, and without giving the AO an opportunity to examine them. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication after obtaining a remand report from the AO.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeals on merits and dismissed them in a casual manner without proper adjudication. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to apply its mind to the issues and was not empowered to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may have a strong legal ground, the CIT(Appeals) must adjudicate on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the ex-parte orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had demonstrated that there was no loss to the revenue regarding the sale of the car, as the transaction was recorded in the return and offered to tax. The Tribunal also noted that the revised returns were valid and the revenue's findings were based on suspicion without corroborative evidence. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 27 days, accepting the reasons provided due to illness and considering the interest of substantive justice. An application to admit additional evidence was also pressed.
The Tribunal held that an ex-parte order passed due to non-compliance by the assessee should be set aside. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeals on merits and dismissed them in a casual manner without proper adjudication. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to apply its mind to the issues and was not empowered to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeals on merits and dismissed them in a casual manner without proper adjudication. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to apply its mind to the issues and was not empowered to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may have a strong legal ground, the CIT(Appeals) must adjudicate on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the ex-parte orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may have a strong legal ground, the CIT(Appeals) must adjudicate on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the ex-parte orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee may have a strong legal ground, the CIT(Appeals) must adjudicate on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the ex-parte orders were set aside.
The ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision. The tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not obtained a remand report from the AO and had not conducted an independent inquiry into the genuineness of the transactions, merely relying on the amalgamation order to delete the addition.
The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee had satisfactorily established the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the share capital transaction, including the 'source of the source' as required by the proviso to Section 68. The AO's addition was based on suspicion and insufficient inquiry, failing to rebut the evidence provided.
The tribunal held that an unsigned and blank notice issued under Section 143(2) is violative of Section 282A(1) of the Act, rendering it invalid and void ab initio. Consequently, the Assessing Officer lacked valid jurisdiction to complete the assessment under Section 143(3).
The tribunal allowed the appeal regarding depreciation and donation expenses, finding the disallowances arbitrary and bad in law due to proper logbook maintenance and binding CBDT circulars. However, the tribunal dismissed the appeal concerning fine and penalty expenses, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to remand the matter to the AO for verification.
The tribunal, noting the ex-parte dismissal and the absence of evidence for deliberate non-compliance, decided to remand the cases back to the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. This was done to provide a final opportunity to the assessee, ensuring compliance with natural justice principles.
The tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication, directing the CIT(Appeals) to provide a final opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to comply with future hearing notices.
The tribunal, noting the ex-parte dismissal and the absence of evidence for deliberate non-compliance, decided to remand the cases back to the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. This was done to provide a final opportunity to the assessee, ensuring compliance with natural justice principles.
The ITAT held that the right to appeal is a valuable substantive right and should be viewed liberally. It found that the CIT(A) might not have provided a specific opportunity of being heard before rejecting the delay condonation. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back for a fresh decision on the delay condonation application after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The ITAT held that the right to appeal is a valuable substantive right and the CIT(A) should have provided a specific opportunity to the assessee to file a delay condonation application. The tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back for fresh consideration of the delay condonation application.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to dispose of appeals on merits and not merely for non-prosecution, citing Section 250(6) and 251 of the Act. The cases were remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing adequate opportunity to the assessee.
The ITAT held that the CIT(A) is obligated to dispose of appeals on merits and is not empowered to dismiss them solely for non-prosecution, citing Section 250(6) and 251 of the Act. The tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and remanded the cases for fresh adjudication on merits after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity to be heard.
The tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matter back, granting the assessee a final opportunity to explain the 'good and sufficient cause' as per the proviso to Section 271DA. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to adjudicate the matter on merits after considering the assessee's explanation.
The tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) erred by changing the section for addition from 69 to 69A without affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing. It set aside the CIT(Appeals) order and remanded the matter for de novo adjudication, ensuring the assessee is given adequate opportunity to make submissions on the applicability of Section 69A.
The tribunal, noting the ex-parte dismissal and the absence of evidence for deliberate non-compliance, decided to remand the cases back to the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. This was done to provide a final opportunity to the assessee, ensuring compliance with natural justice principles.
The tribunal noted that the issue of bogus purchases by rice millers is sub-judice before the jurisdictional High Court in several similar cases. Therefore, the tribunal set aside the CIT(Appeals)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(Appeals) to await the High Court's decision before adjudicating de novo.
The tribunal found merit in the Revenue's contention that the AO should be given another opportunity to submit a remand report. Therefore, the tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after allowing the AO to submit the report.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was invalid due to being mechanical and based on borrowed satisfaction, thus vitiating the subsequent assessment order. Any proceedings based on such an invalid approval are considered non-est in law.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was invalid due to being mechanical and based on borrowed satisfaction, thus vitiating the subsequent assessment order. Any proceedings based on such an invalid approval are considered non-est in law.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was invalid due to being mechanical and based on borrowed satisfaction, thus vitiating the subsequent assessment order. Any proceedings based on such an invalid approval are considered non-est in law.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was invalid due to being mechanical and based on borrowed satisfaction, thus vitiating the subsequent assessment order. Any proceedings based on such an invalid approval are considered non-est in law.
The tribunal noted that the issue of bogus purchases by rice millers was sub-judice before the jurisdictional High Court in several similar cases. Therefore, following a consistent approach, the tribunal set aside the CIT(Appeals) order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(Appeals) to await the High Court's decision before fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition based solely on self-serving documents without considering the evidence from the search operation and the statement of Shri Praveen Rastogi. It found that rejection of books under Section 145(3) is not a mandatory condition for invoking Section 69C. The case was remanded to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal condoned a 397-day delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It held that the CIT(A) is not empowered to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and must decide it on merits. Therefore, the case was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits.