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139 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal held that since the excess stock was directly related to the assessee's jewelry business and no other activities were detected, it should be taxed as business income, not as an unexplained investment. The Tribunal also reversed the CIT(A)'s partial relief on certain expense disallowances.
The Tribunal held that the late fees under Section 234E should be calculated only from June 1, 2015, onwards, as the provision was introduced with effect from that date. The matter was restored to the Jurisdictional TDS Officer for recalculation.
The Tribunal held that the late fees under Section 234E should only be calculated from June 1, 2015, onwards, as the provision was introduced with effect from that date. The matter was restored to the Jurisdictional TDS Officer for recalculation.
The Tribunal determined that the total salary expense of Rs.41,27,199/- claimed by the assessee was correct and allowable. It directed the Assessing Officer to re-compute the deduction under Section 80IA by apportioning the salary expenses between the power generation unit and the share trading business based on their respective turnovers, considering this a scientific method.
The Tribunal held that the late fees under Section 234E should be calculated only from June 1, 2015, onwards, as the provision was introduced with effect from that date. The matter was restored to the Jurisdictional TDS Officer for re-calculation.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had misinterpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Lachmandas Mathuradas vs. CIT. Upon proper examination, the Supreme Court had held that interest on arrears of sales tax is compensatory in nature and thus an allowable expenditure. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the amount of Rs.4,92,606/- debited as interest on VAT expenses.
The Tribunal held that there was a clear typographical error in the return of income filed by the assessee. This was evidenced by Form 16, issued by PAO Artillery Nashik, which showed the salary income as Rs. 4,67,790, and Form 26AS, which also reflected the same salary figure. The return of income, however, erroneously reported the salary as Rs. 46,77,900. The Tribunal noted that even the highest-ranked army officer would not have drawn such a high salary during the relevant financial year. The ld. DR also conceded that it was a typographical mistake. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to consider the gross total income of the assessee at Rs. 4,67,790 instead of the amount calculated in the order under section 143(1). The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that interest earned by a co-operative society from deposits in co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P. It followed its own prior decision in the assessee's own case and decisions of various High Courts.
The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing appeals, emphasizing that substantial justice is more important than procedural delays. It set aside both the assessment and penalty orders for *de novo* adjudication by the Assessing Officer, instructing the assessee to file all necessary details and ensuring an opportunity of hearing, to prevent double taxation on arrear salary and address other claims.
The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing appeals, emphasizing that substantial justice is more important than procedural delays. It set aside both the assessment and penalty orders for *de novo* adjudication by the Assessing Officer, instructing the assessee to file all necessary details and ensuring an opportunity of hearing, to prevent double taxation on arrear salary and address other claims.
The Tribunal noted that the issue of 12A registration was already restored for de novo adjudication by a coordinate bench. Consequently, it set aside the Ld. CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the AO for re-assessment de novo, contingent on the fresh decision regarding 12A registration. The Tribunal further clarified that only net profit, not gross receipts, can be taxed even if section 12A registration is not available.
The Tribunal held that for notices issued under section 148 after three years from the end of the assessment year, approval must be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. Since the approval was obtained from an incorrect authority, the reassessment notice and consequential order are invalid.
The Tribunal, noting the Ld. DR's concession that the issue was covered by previous decisions, held that interest income earned by a Co-operative Credit society from investments in Co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i)/80P(2)(d). It ruled that such income is attributable to the society's business and that co-operative credit societies are distinct from co-operative banks, hence not hit by Section 80P(4) or the Totgars decision. The impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC was set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the 448-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), taking a justice-oriented approach and noting the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason. As the CIT(A) had not decided the issues on merits, the Tribunal remitted the case back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication in accordance with law, granting the assessee an opportunity to adduce evidence.
The Tribunal granted the appellant's request for withdrawal. Since the Ld. DR had no objection, the appeal was accordingly dismissed as 'withdrawn'.
The Tribunal granted permission for the withdrawal of the appeal, noting that the Ld. DR had no objection to the submission. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as 'withdrawn'.
The Tribunal granted the assessee permission to withdraw the appeal, as the Revenue's representative had no objection. Accordingly, the appeal filed before the ITAT, Pune, was dismissed as 'withdrawn'.
The Tribunal held that the CPC lacked the power to make a prima-facie adjustment denying deductions under Chapter VIA (including section 80P) for delayed filing of returns for the assessment year 2018-19. This power was conferred upon the CPC by the Finance Act, 2021, effective from 01.04.2021, through the insertion of section 143(1)(a)(v). Since the adjustment was made prior to this effective date, the CPC had exceeded its jurisdiction, and thus the impugned disallowance was set aside.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had not granted an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(1)(c), which introduced the levy of late fees under Section 234E, is prospective in nature, effective from 01.06.2015. Therefore, late fees can only be calculated for the period from 01.06.2015 until the actual filing date of the TDS return/statement. The case was remitted back to the Jurisdictional TDS Officer for re-calculation of the late fees accordingly.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(1)(c), which introduced the levy of late fees under Section 234E, is prospective in nature, effective from 01.06.2015. Therefore, late fees can only be calculated for the period from 01.06.2015 until the actual filing date of the TDS return/statement. The case was remitted back to the Jurisdictional TDS Officer for re-calculation of the late fees accordingly.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the lower authorities and remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment. The AO is directed to provide a fresh opportunity of hearing, and the assessee is to provide all necessary evidence to support her contention that the bank deposits belonged to the partnership firm. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148, issued after April 1, 2021, for AY 2015-16, was bad in law due to a concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the notice and the subsequent assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the 170-day delay in filing the appeals, finding a reasonable cause for the delay. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals in limine without addressing the merits, citing a Bombay High Court judgment emphasizing the obligation to dispose of appeals on merits. Consequently, both the quantum and consequential penalty appeals were remitted back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for de novo adjudication on merits.
The ITAT condoned the delay, finding 'reasonable cause' based on the Supreme Court's *Mst. Katiji & Ors.* judgment. It remitted both the quantum addition and the consequential penalty issues back to the CIT(A) for a *de novo* adjudication on merits, noting the Tribunal's limited jurisdiction over grounds not addressed by the first appellate authority.
The Tribunal noted that the assessment and appeal proceedings were ex-parte due to the assessee's non-compliance. Considering the assessee had raised multiple grounds, the Tribunal decided to set aside the orders of the lower authorities and remit the issue back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by not properly addressing the AO's findings and by not ensuring effective inquiry. The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication with a direction to pass a speaking order.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative credit society from funds deposited with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) as it is considered business income. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued after a lapse of three years from the end of AY 2017-18. As per Section 151(ii) of the Act, approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or Chief Commissioner of Income Tax was required in such cases, not just the Principal Commissioner. Therefore, the notice was quashed.
The ITAT condoned the delay, finding 'reasonable cause' based on the Supreme Court's *Mst. Katiji & Ors.* judgment. It remitted both the quantum addition and the consequential penalty issues back to the CIT(A) for a *de novo* adjudication on merits, noting the Tribunal's limited jurisdiction over grounds not addressed by the first appellate authority.
The Tribunal, noting no objection from the Ld. DR, allowed the assessee's application for withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as having been withdrawn, as the underlying grievance had already been resolved by the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal observed a fundamental 'cut and paste error' in the CIT(A)'s order, where it referred to irrelevant facts concerning a different assessment year and addition amount. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to pass a fresh assessment order after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing and for the assessee to produce all relevant submissions and evidence.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 322 days, finding reasonable cause for the delay. It remitted the case back to the CIT (Exemption) for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing and instructing the appellant to be vigilant in compliance.
The ITAT, relying on a Bombay High Court judgment, held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merits and does not have the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication on merits, providing the assessee an opportunity to present documents.
The Tribunal condoned the 170-day delay in filing the appeals, finding a reasonable cause for the delay. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals in limine without addressing the merits, citing a Bombay High Court judgment emphasizing the obligation to dispose of appeals on merits. Consequently, both the quantum and consequential penalty appeals were remitted back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for de novo adjudication on merits.
Citing its own precedents, the Tribunal held that a mere selection of the wrong sub-clause is a technical error and should not be fatal. It set aside the CIT(E)'s order, remanding the case with directions to allow the appellant to file the correct application and then decide the matter de novo on its merits after giving due opportunity.
The Tribunal, relying on the Bombay High Court's ruling in Pr. CIT vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra, held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide an appeal on merits and lacks the power to dismiss it for non-prosecution. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for de-novo adjudication on all grounds, including legal grounds, after providing the assessee an opportunity to present necessary documents.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order, finding merit in the assessee's arguments that the Assessing Officer failed to provide evidence, show impounded documents, or allow cross-examination. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to reframe the assessment after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing and allowing for the submission of relevant documents and evidence.
The Tribunal, following a Bombay High Court judgment, held that a penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied when the addition to income is based on an estimation rather than specific concealment or inaccurate particulars. Since the penalty in this case was imposed on income derived from an estimated gross profit, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO to delete the penalty.
The Tribunal held that since the audit report in Form 10CCB was filed before the processing of the return, the assessee cannot be denied the deduction. The filing of the form is considered a procedural aspect, and its late submission before processing does not invalidate the claim.
The Tribunal held that the accumulated amount was utilized within the 6th year (immediately following the 5-year period), and the amendment to Section 11(3) is prospective. Therefore, the addition made by the CPC was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the principle of mutuality was not applicable to interest earned on bank fixed deposits. However, it allowed a deduction of 5% of the interest income towards expenditure incurred for earning it, considering the principle of consistency and a coordinate bench decision.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had committed fraud by misreporting income to evade tax, and the penalty levied by the Assessing Officer and upheld by the CIT(A) was justified. The assessee's claim for immunity under section 270AA was not considered as it was not filed.
The Tribunal observed contradictory facts in the Ld. CIT(A)'s order, as the appeal was dismissed for non-compliance while also acknowledging and reproducing the assessee's written submission. Concluding that the Ld. CIT(A) had not applied his mind, the Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal, noting the assessee's submission of miscommunication and willingness to submit requisite details, restored the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC. The CIT(A)/NFAC is directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its case and decide the issue as per law and facts, with a strict direction to the assessee not to seek adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the cooperative credit society from its deposits is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) as it is considered business income. The Assessing Officer was directed to delete the addition.
The Tribunal condoned the 413-day delay in filing the appeal, recognizing the assessee's senior citizen status and medical ailments. Citing the Bombay High Court, the Tribunal ruled that the CIT(A) does not have the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and must decide it on merits. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the case was remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal, in the interest of justice, set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the AO for de novo assessment on merits. The assessee was directed to provide all necessary documentation and explanations. The Revenue's appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that since the quantum appeal, which is the foundational basis for the penalty order, is still pending before the CIT(A), the impugned penalty order should be set aside. The matter was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication after the quantum appeal is decided, ensuring proper opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal found that the assessee is a primary credit cooperative society and was entitled to the deduction u/s 80P(2) for interest income from other cooperative banks, noting that the claim under 80P(2)(f) instead of 80P(2)(d) was a typographical error. Citing jurisdictional ITAT decisions, the Tribunal held that the AO's original order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the PCIT's order passed u/s 263.