ITAT Pune Judgments — January 2026

The Tribunal held that the levy of penalty is dependent on the quantum addition. Since the quantum addition on which the penalty was based had been deleted by the same Tribunal in a separate appeal, there was no basis for the penalty.

The Tribunal held that the transfer of property is complete as per Section 2(47) of the Act even without registration of the sale deed, and therefore, the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 54B if the conditions are otherwise met. The assessee had paid the consideration and obtained possession within the stipulated period.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee had filed two appeals against the same impugned penalty order, one manually and one electronically. Considering the prayer made by the learned counsel for the assessee to withdraw the instant (manually filed) appeal, the Tribunal dismissed it as infructuous.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 582 days, finding a reasonable cause for the late filing. While the assessee did not appear before the ITAT, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee another opportunity to present evidence before the CIT(A) due to the circumstances, including pandemic restrictions.

The Tribunal noted that since the underlying original assessment order, which the Section 154 rectification order pertained to, had already been set aside by the CIT(A), the rectification order itself became infructuous. Consequently, the present appeal challenging the rectification order was rendered without substance. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal as infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to show sufficient cause for the inordinate delays in filing appeals at both the CIT(A) and ITAT levels. Relying on Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the law of limitation, the Tribunal found no merit in condoning the delays.

The Tribunal condoned a 313-day delay in filing the appeal and restored the matter to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO). The JAO is directed to provide the assessee a proper opportunity to challenge the DVO's observations, consider any other submitted valuation reports, and then decide the matter afresh in accordance with the law.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to show sufficient cause for the inordinate delays in filing appeals at both the CIT(A) and ITAT levels. Relying on Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the law of limitation, the Tribunal found no merit in condoning the delays.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to show sufficient cause for the inordinate delays in filing appeals at both the CIT(A) and ITAT levels. Relying on Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the law of limitation, the Tribunal found no merit in condoning the delays.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to show sufficient cause for the inordinate delays in filing appeals at both the CIT(A) and ITAT levels. Relying on Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the law of limitation, the Tribunal found no merit in condoning the delays.

The Tribunal found that neither the entire addition nor the assessee's claim of sufficient cash was fully acceptable. Considering the nature of the business and the demonetization period, the Tribunal estimated 50% of the deposited cash as available to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the waiver of debentures is not taxable under Section 28(iv) or Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, following Supreme Court precedents. The Tribunal also directed the Assessing Officer to allow the set-off of brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation.

The Tribunal found that the Ld. Addl. / JCIT(A) had failed to consider the assessee's detailed computation, which argued for a significantly lower disallowance (less than Rs.2 lakhs, as opposed to the Rs.34.51 lakhs upheld). Considering similar issues for previous assessment years were remanded, the Tribunal restored the matter to the Ld. Addl. / JCIT(A) for fresh adjudication after allowing the assessee an opportunity to be heard.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's failure to examine the allowability of the Section 80P deduction in light of Section 80AC and relevant CBDT circulars rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to revenue. Therefore, the PCIT's revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 was valid.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued on 23.07.2022 for AY 2015-16 is bad in law and liable to be quashed. This is because the notice was issued after the permissible time limit as per Supreme Court decisions.

The Tribunal, considering the assessee's explanation of illness of the mother and relying on Supreme Court precedents emphasizing substantial justice, directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the 125-day delay. The matter is remitted to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a decision on merits, after providing the assessee due opportunity to be heard.

The ITAT allowed the appeal, reversing the CIT(A)'s findings. For the additions under section 41(1), the Tribunal found that the liabilities had not ceased and were still active, supported by evidence including a bank's confirmation of an outstanding loan. For the addition under section 68 regarding share application money, the Tribunal held that no fresh amount was received during the year, and the amount was an opening balance, thus section 68 was not applicable.

The Tribunal held that the addition of demonetized cash was unjustified since the AO admitted it belonged to the society's members, directing its deletion based on ITAT Pune's precedent. Regarding interest income from bank deposits, the Tribunal, relying on High Court judgments which distinguished the Supreme Court's *Totgar's* decision, ruled that such income is attributable to the business of providing credit facilities and is eligible for deduction under section 80P of the Act. Thus, the disallowance of interest income for both assessment years was deleted.

The Tribunal, relying on decisions from the Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts, held that Co-operative Banks are considered Co-operative Societies for the purpose of Section 80P. Thus, the interest and dividend income from such banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d), and the addition for A.Y. 2017-18 was directed to be deleted. For A.Y. 2018-19, the issue of deduction under section 80P(2)(c) was set aside to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication with an opportunity for the assessee to provide necessary details.

The Tribunal held that the AO's attempt to re-evaluate the scope of provisions for adjusting book losses under Section 115JB was a debatable issue. Therefore, it was not a mistake apparent from the record that could be rectified under Section 154.

The Tribunal held that the addition of demonetized cash was unjustified since the AO admitted it belonged to the society's members, directing its deletion based on ITAT Pune's precedent. Regarding interest income from bank deposits, the Tribunal, relying on High Court judgments which distinguished the Supreme Court's *Totgar's* decision, ruled that such income is attributable to the business of providing credit facilities and is eligible for deduction under section 80P of the Act. Thus, the disallowance of interest income for both assessment years was deleted.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided documentary evidence including purchase bills, lorry receipts, sales details, and proof of payments made via account payee cheque in subsequent years. The assessee's sales were undisputed, books not rejected, and gross profit rates consistent. Despite the lack of quantitative details, the Tribunal estimated the suppressed profit on the alleged purchases at 6%, sustaining an addition of ₹1,88,748 and deleting the remaining disallowance.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued u/s 148 for A.Y. 2016-17 on 27.07.2022 was invalid because the income escaping assessment (₹49,01,630/-) was less than ₹50 lakhs, and the notice was issued beyond the three-year period from the end of the assessment year. Furthermore, the approval for issuing the notice was obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, whereas after the lapse of three years, approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax was mandatorily required. Consequently, the assessment order passed under sections 147 r.w.s 144 was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order violated Section 250(6) of the Act by not stating the points for determination and the reasons for the decision. Therefore, the order was set aside.

The Tribunal, acknowledging the assessee's request for withdrawal due to the duplication of appeals and the Department's consent, granted permission for the withdrawal. Accordingly, the electronically filed appeal was dismissed as withdrawn by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal, relying on High Court precedents, held that interest income earned by a credit cooperative society from depositing its surplus funds in permitted banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act. It emphasized that the character of the income does not change when prudently invested in this manner. Consequently, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the deduction.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147/148 were bad in law because the Assessing Officer had no tangible material to prima facie conclude escapement of income, merely stating that information 'needs to be investigated further,' which amounts to reasons to suspect, not believe. The AO also failed to pass a speaking order on the assessee's objections. Furthermore, the addition of Rs. 2,74,000/- was unsustainable as the assessee had offered the entire stamp value for taxation, and the Revenue failed to demonstrate that the assessee had actually claimed this amount as an expenditure.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was invalid because the information was obtained from search proceedings at a third party's premises, making Section 153C the applicable provision. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal condoned the 157-day delay in filing the appeal, finding reasonable cause. It observed that the Assessing Officer had not properly examined the assessee's uploaded Tax Audit Report and audited financials. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, directing a reasonable opportunity of hearing for the assessee to explain the source of cash deposits.

The Tribunal condoned the delay and set aside the AO's order for de novo adjudication, observing that the AO failed to consider co-ownership and cost of acquisition despite being aware of multiple owners. It also directed the AO to provide reasons and approval for the section 148 notice, citing a Bombay High Court judgment.

The Tribunal upheld the disallowance, stating that the assessee did not discharge the onus to prove that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act. The submitted invoices were found to be unreliable, lacking proper details and signatures, and the payment was not reflected in the payee's income or the assessee's bank statements.

The Tribunal, relying on decisions from the Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts, held that Co-operative Banks are considered Co-operative Societies for the purpose of Section 80P. Thus, the interest and dividend income from such banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d), and the addition for A.Y. 2017-18 was directed to be deleted. For A.Y. 2018-19, the issue of deduction under section 80P(2)(c) was set aside to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication with an opportunity for the assessee to provide necessary details.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided documentary evidence including purchase bills, lorry receipts, sales details, and proof of payments made via account payee cheque in subsequent years. The assessee's sales were undisputed, books not rejected, and gross profit rates consistent. Despite the lack of quantitative details, the Tribunal estimated the suppressed profit on the alleged purchases at 6%, sustaining an addition of ₹1,88,748 and deleting the remaining disallowance.

The Tribunal held that the AO's attempt to re-evaluate the scope of provisions for adjusting book losses under Section 115JB was a debatable issue. Therefore, it was not a mistake apparent from the record that could be rectified under Section 154.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC, finding no infirmity in their decision. The Tribunal concurred that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of the payment made for professional/consultancy/technical services to M/s Vibgyor Enterprises, stating that the primary onus to prove expenses was not discharged.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's persistent non-compliance with the statutory notices issued by the CIT(E). Upholding the CIT(E)'s decision, the Tribunal found no reason to take a contrary view, thus confirming the rejection of the 80G approval. The appeal filed by the assessee was consequently dismissed.

The Tribunal accepted the request for withdrawal from the assessee's counsel, as the Ld. DR had no objection. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as 'withdrawn' by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal observed that a previous Tribunal order in the assessee's own case for the same assessment year had already deleted the original addition made by the Assessing Officer. Since the very foundation for levying the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) no longer existed due to the deletion of the underlying addition, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the penalty.

The Tribunal held that the document relied upon by the AO was a 'dumb document' as it was illegible, lacked specific details linking it to the assessee, and was not properly confronted. The Tribunal also noted the denial of cross-examination and the failure to invoke Section 153C.

The Tribunal observed that the issue concerning the deduction claimed under Section 80IC had already been decided in the assessee's favor by an earlier CIT(A) order dated 20.06.2018, leading to the dropping of penalty proceedings. Consequently, the subsequent CIT(A)/NFAC order dated 14.07.2025, which dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution on the same issue, was deemed infructuous and set aside. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the 639-day delay in filing the appeal, accepting the reasons provided in the affidavit as 'reasonable cause'. The matter was remitted back to the CIT (Exemption) for de novo consideration of the application, with directions to provide the appellant a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The appellant was instructed to update contact details and remain vigilant in future proceedings.

The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's consultant's inadvertent error in citing the wrong sub-clause for provisional registration. Recognizing the need to assess the application on merits, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the CIT (Exemption) to provide the assessee with another opportunity to present its case for regular approval under section 80G(5), ensuring a reasonable hearing.

The Tribunal, after considering the assessee's affidavit and contentions, found no contrary material. It held that only the net profit on the sales turnover should be added as income, not the entire purchase amount. Applying Section 44AD (presumptive taxation), the Tribunal estimated a turnover of Rs.20.00 lakh per annum and adopted a net profit of 8%, sustaining an addition of Rs.1.60 lakh instead of the original Rs.12,06,959/-.

The ITAT found the assessee had a 'reasonable cause' for the delay, which was not intentional, and condoned the delay. Following Supreme Court precedents, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and remanded the appeals back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, ensuring the assessee is given a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal granted permission to the appellant to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee stands dismissed as withdrawn.

Following judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that for reassessment notices issued after three years for A.Y. 2017-18, with an alleged escapement of less than ₹50 lakhs, approval under section 151 must be granted by the Principal Chief Commissioner. As the approval in this case was taken from the Principal Commissioner, the notice issued under section 148 was invalid. Consequently, all subsequent assessment proceedings were quashed.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to furnish proper details to the AO or the Tribunal explaining why the interest was initially capitalized and why it should now be allowed as an expenditure. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication, directing to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the CPC lacked jurisdiction to levy late fees under Section 234E for TDS statements processed prior to 01.06.2015. The enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) authorizing such levy came into force only from 1st June 2015, as per the Finance Act, 2015. The Tribunal relied on several coordinate bench decisions and High Court judgments, setting aside the orders of the CIT(A) and deleting the impugned fees and consequential interest.

The Tribunal held that the CPC lacked jurisdiction to levy late fees under Section 234E for TDS statements processed prior to 01.06.2015. The enabling provision (Section 200A(1)(c)) authorizing such levy came into force only from 1st June 2015, as per the Finance Act, 2015. The Tribunal relied on several coordinate bench decisions and High Court judgments, setting aside the orders of the CIT(A) and deleting the impugned fees and consequential interest.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee had presented a prima facie case with sufficient details and supporting documents for both the section 80C deduction and the source of funds for the car purchase. However, as these details were not verified by the lower authorities, the Tribunal remitted the case back to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for thorough verification and re-adjudication on merits.