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Facts
The assessee, Matsyodari Shikshan Sansthas, filed TDS returns late for assessment years 2013-14 to 2016-17, resulting in the levy of late filing fees and interest under Sections 234E and 200A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC dismissed the assessee's appeals for AY 2014-15 to 2016-17 due to an inordinate delay of 1572 days. The assessee subsequently filed appeals before the Tribunal with further delays of 1307 days for some appeals and 178 days for AY 2013-14, seeking condonation of delay.
Held
The Tribunal, after examining the assessee's reasons and various judicial precedents on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, found that the assessee failed to demonstrate 'sufficient cause' for the inordinate and repeated delays. It concluded that the delays were attributable to the assessee's inaction and negligence, and thus, the appeals were not admissible for condonation.
Key Issues
Whether the inordinate and unexplained delays in filing appeals before the CIT(A) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal against intimations levying late filing fees and interest under sections 234E and 200A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, should be condoned based on 'sufficient cause'.
Sections Cited
Income Tax Act, 1961: Section 234E, Income Tax Act, 1961: Section 200A, Income Tax Act, 1961: Section 249(2), Income Tax Act, 1961: Section 249(3), Income Tax Act, 1961: Section 270AA, Limitation Act: Section 5, Limitation Act: Section 3
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, PUNE BENCH “A”, PUNE
Before: SHRI R. K. PANDA & Ms. ASTHA CHANDRA
, 879 & 880/PUN/2025 filed by the assessee are directed against the separate orders dated 06.08.2021 of the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC, Delhi relating to assessment years 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 respectively. filed by the assessee is directed against the order dated 14.11.2024 of the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC, Delhi relating to assessment year 2013-14. For the sake of convenience, all the 4 appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. for assessment year 2014-15 as the lead case. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the assesse had furnished TDS returns for different quarters in Form No.24Q relating to assessment year 2014-15. The said TDS returns were processed and late filing fee was charged u/s 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for default in Quarter No.1 in assessment year 2014-15, late fees u/s 234E, interest on short payment of Rs.9,240/- and late fees of Rs.88,000/-, for Quarter No.2 short payment of Rs.28,000/-, interest on short payment of Rs.11,340/-, interest on late payment of Rs.3,720/- and late fees of Rs.90,000/-, for Quarter No.3, short payment of Rs.90,000/-, interest on short payment of Rs.29,700/- and late fees of Rs.90,000/- and for Quarter No.4 short payment of Rs.63,720/-, interest on short payment of Rs.12,342/- and late fees of Rs.59,200/- were levied. The assessee was held to have defaulted in filing TDS returns, hence late filing fees were levied under section 234E of the Act while sending intimation under section 200A of the Act.
Since there was a delay of 1572 days in filing of the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC, the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC dismissed the appeal on account of delay by observing as under:
Aggrieved with such order of the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal by raising the following ground: Ld. A.O. erred raised demand through intimation without any authority of law u/s 200A and late fees u/s 234E. Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CIT[A]) had also erred while confirming late fees demanded u/s 200A of Income Tax Act, 1961.
5. Identical ground has been raised by the assessee in & 880/PUN/2025.
There is a delay of 1307 days each in filing of the above 3 appeals before the Tribunal for which the assessee has filed a condonation application along with an affidavit explaining the reasons for such delay. The contents of the condonation application read as under:
The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that in the interest of justice, the delay in filing of the appeal before the Tribunal should be condoned and the appeal be decided on merit. Referring to the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Vijay Vishin Meghani vs. DCIT reported in (2017) 398 ITR 250 (Bom), he submitted that the Hon’ble High Court in the said decision has held that where the assessee filed appeal before the Tribunal with a delay of 2984 days by taking a plea that he was wrongly advised by his Chartered Accountant earlier not to file appeal, in view of fact that the assessee produced an affidavit of the Chartered Accountant in support of his plea and said affidavit was not contested by revenue authorities, the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to condone delay in filing the appeal.
So far as the merit of the case is concerned, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee relying on various decisions submitted that the provisions of section 200A of the Act were amended to enable computation of fee payable under section 234E at the time of processing of the return and said amendment came into effect from 1-6- 2015, thus, intimations issued under section 200A dealing with fee for belated filing of TDS returns for period prior to 1-6-2015 were invalid. He accordingly submitted that the Tribunal should condone the delay and decide the issue in favour of the assessee.
The Ld. DR on the other hand strongly objected to the arguments advanced by the Ld. Counsel for the assessee. He submitted that despite delay in filing of the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC for which he has dismissed the appeal on account of delay, the assessee has again made default in filing of the appeal before the Tribunal with a delay of 1307 days. The contents of the condonation application shows that the assessee has not shown any sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within time and therefore, the assessee is not entitled to the condonation of delay. He submitted that since condoning the delay in filing of the appeal is as per the the discretion of the Bench, therefore, in absence of any sufficient cause, the delay should not be condoned and the appeal should be liable to be dismissed.
We have heard the rival arguments made by both the sides, perused the orders of the CPC / Assessing Officer and the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC and the paper book filed on behalf of the assessee. We have also considered the various decisions cited before us. We find the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on account of delay in filing of the appeal by 1572 days. The reasons of the same have already been reproduced in the preceding paragraphs. Despite the dismissal of the appeal on account of delay, the assessee again filed the appeal before the Tribunal with a delay of 1307 days and has not given any reasonable cause for filing of such appeal before the Tribunal with a delay of more than 3 ½ years. Under these circumstances, we have to see as to whether the delay in filing of the appeal can be condoned under the facts and circumstances of the case.
11. We find the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by L.Rs. & Ors vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) vide Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, order dated 08.04.2024 has laid down certain parameters while condoning the delay by observing as under: “6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by limitation. 7. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are mortals. 8. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a right not exercised or the remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist. This is one way of putting to an end to a litigation by barring the remedy rather than the right with the passage of time. 9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. 10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced hereinbelow: “3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”
Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors., it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors., this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree- holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.
In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors., it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”
This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.
It is in the light of the above legal position that now we have to test whether the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal ought to be condoned or not in this case.
The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that in somewhat similar situation, delay in filing appeal for the enhancement of compensation had been condoned by this Court. He placed reliance upon the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. In this case, delay in filing appeal was condoned as in other appeals compensation awarded at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. was upheld and the proposed appellants were also held entitled to the same benefit of compensation at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. instead of Rs.101/- per sq. yd. as awarded but with the rider that they will not be entitled for interest for the period of delay in approaching the High Court.
The other decision relied upon in this regard is the case of Imrat Lal & Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. In this case also the matter was regarding determination of compensation for the acquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days in filing the appeal for enhancement of compensation. Despite findings that no sufficient cause was shown in the application for condoning the delay, this Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal as a large number of similarly situate persons have been granted relief by this Court.
The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).
Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted on the basis of additional documents that in connection with the land acquisition in some other Special Leave Petitions, delay was condoned taking a lenient view and the compensation was enhanced with the rider that the claimants shall not be entitled for statutory benefits for the period of delay in approaching this Court or the High Court. The said orders do not clearly spell out the facts and the reasons explaining the delay in filing the appeal(s) but the fact remains that the delay was condoned by taking too liberal an approach and putting conditions which have not been approved of by this Court itself. In the absence of the facts for getting the delay condoned in the referred cases, vis-à-vis, the facts of this as, it cannot be said that the facts or the reasons of getting the delay condoned are identical or similar. Therefore, we are unable to exercise our discretionary power of condoning the delay in filing the appeal on parity with the above order(s).
Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this case, has not found it fit to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. There is no occasion for us to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the High Court for the reasons recorded. First, the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed appeal. Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision of the reference court. Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision, they could have applied for procedural review which they never did. Thus, there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing the matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court is justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
In the above situation, we do not deem it proper and necessary to interfere with the decision of the High Court refusing to condone the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal.
The Special Leave Petition, as such, lacks merit and is dismissed.”
Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Dabra vs. Pyare Ram & Ors vide SLP (C) No.15793 of 2019 and Ajay Dabra vs. Sunder Singh & Anr vide SLP (C) No.15848 of 2019, order dated 31.01.2023. Since in the instant case despite knowing the fact that the appeal filed before the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC was dismissed on account of delay in filing of the appeal by 1572 days, still the assessee did not file appeal before the Tribunal within the prescribed due date and filed the appeal with a delay of 1307 days. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the arguments of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee that the delay should be condoned and the appeal be admitted. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals filed vide 879 & 880/PUN/2025 on account of delay in filing of the appeals without any reasonable cause. for assessment year 2013-14 is concerned, there is delay of 178 days in filing of the appeal before the Tribunal.
14. A perusal of the order of the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC shows that he has dismissed the same on account of non-prosecution as well the delay of about 22 months in filing of the appeal. Although the Ld. Counsel for the assessee argued that this appeal should not be dismissed on account of delay in filing of the appeal since here the delay is only 178 days, however, the same in our opinion cannot be accepted. Once the assessee was aware that its appeal was dismissed by the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC on account of delay, the assessee should have been vigilant in filing the appeal before the Tribunal to show its bonafide cause. However, the assessee has failed to do so. In view of the above discussion and following our observation in as per the preceding paragraphs, we dismiss this appeal also on account of delay. The grounds raised by the assessee are accordingly dismissed.
15. To sum up, all the appeals filed by the assessee are dismissed.
Order pronounced in the open Court on 12th January, 2026.