ITAT Pune Judgments — January 2026

The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to decide the appeal afresh after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to respond to notices and produce all necessary documents without seeking adjournments.

The Tribunal remitted the issues back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing the assessee to furnish all relevant evidence regarding the property's title problems and lower valuation. The assessee was also instructed to provide details of any addition made in the hands of the co-owner. The Ld. CIT(A) was directed to pass a speaking order after granting a fair hearing, with the possibility of seeking a remand report from the JAO if new evidence is filed.

The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A). It directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay, considering the reasons provided (mistake by office staff and CA's affidavit), and to decide the appeal on merits as per facts and law. The assessee was also directed to cooperate by responding to notices and producing all relevant documents without seeking adjournments.

The Tribunal condoned the 552-day delay in filing the appeal, accepting the reasons provided by the assessee as sufficient cause. Considering that the assessee's 12A registration matter had already been remitted for fresh adjudication, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order rejecting the 80G application and remitted the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing due opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the present appeal. It set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing, and the assessee was instructed to cooperate without seeking adjournments.

The Tribunal held that the requirement to file Form No. 67 is directory and not mandatory, and a delay in its submission should not be the sole ground for denying the FTC. Relying on High Court precedents, the Tribunal condoned the delay in filing Form No. 67 and directed the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer to allow the FTC claim after due verification. Consequently, the impugned order denying the FTC was set aside.

The Tribunal noted that the CBDT had already condoned the delay in filing Form 10CCB under section 119(2)(b) of the IT Act. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, directing the AO to verify the claims made in Form 10CCB after providing due opportunity to the assessee.

The tribunal held that the addition was based solely on an uncorroborated third-party statement and a diary entry, without allowing cross-examination or considering that the alleged signatures did not match the assessee's. Finding no evidence to prove the cash transaction, the tribunal concluded the addition was based on surmises and conjectures and directed its deletion.

The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer failed to specifically verify the claim in light of the provisions of Section 80JJAA and the previous year's allowance by CIT(A). Therefore, the issue was remitted back to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for specific verification of the deduction claim as per Section 80JJAA provisions and the CIT(A)'s finding for AY 2022-23, to allow the claim if found correct.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a Co-operative Credit Society from deposits in co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), distinguishing the Totgar's case. It also ruled that when an assessment is reopened for a specific issue and no addition is made on that issue, the AO cannot make additions on other issues not specified in the notice, thus quashing the assessment order for one year.

The Tribunal observed that both the AO and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order to be in violation of section 250(6) of the Act as it confirmed the AO's addition without going into the merits. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication on merits, providing the assessee an opportunity to present supporting evidence.

The Tribunal, applying principles from the Supreme Court and High Courts regarding condonation of delay, found that the assessee had sufficient cause for the delay. It ruled that substantial justice should prevail over procedural technicalities and that the assessee showed no malafide intention or negligence. Consequently, the delay was condoned, and the case was remanded to the CIT(A) for a de-novo adjudication on the merits of the appeal.

The Tribunal observed that the levy of penalties under sections 271(1)(c) and 271B is contingent upon the final adjudication of the quantum appeal by the ld. CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal restored both penalty issues back to the file of the ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after the resolution of the pending quantum appeal, directing that the assessee be given a reasonable opportunity.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte without adjudicating on merits, which violates Section 250(6) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication on merits, with directions for the assessee to provide necessary support and remain vigilant.

The Tribunal found sufficient cause for the delay, citing judicial precedents emphasizing substantial justice over procedural delays. It condoned the delay and set aside the CIT(A)'s order, remanding the case for de-novo adjudication on merits. Ground No.3 related to condonation of delay was allowed for statistical purposes, and other grounds related to book profit were dismissed as unadjudicated, to be decided by the CIT(A) after remand.

The Tribunal condoned a delay in filing the appeal and observed that the CIT(A)/NFAC had dismissed the assessee's appeal for non-prosecution. Recognizing the assessee as a small primary credit co-operative society, the Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision on merits after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It held that the CIT(A) violated Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act by dismissing the appeal ex-parte without adjudicating on merits. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, with instructions for the assessee to cooperate and be vigilant with notices.

The Tribunal, citing Supreme Court precedents emphasizing substantial justice over technical considerations, set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order. It directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the 136-day delay and restore the matter for a fresh decision on merits after providing the assessee a due opportunity of hearing. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal ruled that while an ex-parte assessment under section 144 is the correct remedy for non-compliance with section 142(1) notices, repeated penalties under section 272A(1)(d) for the same default of non-compliance with a second notice are not justified. Consequently, the Tribunal restricted the penalty to Rs. 10,000 for the first default, setting aside the CIT(A)'s order confirming the full Rs. 20,000.

The Tribunal held that the sustainability of the penalties is dependent on the outcome of the quantum appeal. Therefore, both penalty issues under sections 271(1)(c) and 271B were restored to the ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after the quantum appeal is decided, directing the CIT(A) to provide a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Without delving into the merits, it set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication, directing to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing and requiring the assessee to respond to notices and submit evidence.

The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the co-operative society from deposits in another co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i), distinguishing the *Totgars* case based on High Court precedents. It also ruled that the assessment order for A.Y. 2016-17 was quashed because once the AO accepted the assessee's explanation for the issue on which the case was reopened (cash deposits), he could not make additions on other issues. Additionally, section 143(1)(a)(v) was deemed not applicable for A.Y. 2016-17, and thus all grounds of appeal for both years were allowed.

The Tribunal determined that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal on a technicality, as the assessee's appeal was intended against the assessment order under section 147, not the preliminary order under section 148A(d). Recognizing the mistake in the appeal form, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, ensuring proper opportunity for the assessee.

The tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without adjudicating the grounds of appeal on merit, contrary to the Bombay High Court's ruling that a CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merit and cannot dismiss them for non-prosecution. Furthermore, the assessee had specifically chosen not to receive notices via email. Consequently, the tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case for *de novo* adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had a reasonable cause for the non-compliance, given his background and reliance on the consultant. Invoking Section 273B, the Tribunal deleted the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(b) and set aside the CIT(A)'s order, thus allowing the appeal.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and found that the assessee's written submission was not considered by the CIT(A). Without deciding on merits, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that no disallowance under section 14A is warranted if the assessee has not earned any exempt income in the relevant assessment year. It relied on various High Court and ITAT decisions, including Cheminvest Ltd. (Delhi HC) and Kohinoor Project (P.) Ltd. (Bombay HC), and confirmed that the Bombay High Court's decision, being binding, superseded the CBDT Circular No.05/2014.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, affirming that disallowance under section 14A cannot be sustained if the assessee has not earned any exempt income during the relevant assessment year. Relying on binding precedents from the Hon'ble Bombay High Court and other ITAT benches, the Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals, concluding that no disallowance was called for.

Following precedents set by the Karnataka High Court and Sikkim High Court, the Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits with other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the deduction of Rs. 33,18,277/-.

The Tribunal, interpreting Section 80G(5) provisos in light of legislative intent and Supreme Court precedents, clarified that the 'six months from commencement of activities' clause applies to newly formed trusts that had not yet begun activities. It concluded that the assessee's application was valid and maintainable, setting aside the CIT(E)'s order for de novo adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the present appeal. It set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, directing the CIT(A) to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to cooperate and provide necessary documents without seeking adjournments.

The Tribunal accepted the assessee's application for admitting additional evidences, considering the interest of justice. The matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to pass a fresh assessment order after providing the assessee due opportunity to produce additional evidences and supporting documents.

The Tribunal noted that the AO had already passed an order on 13.03.2025 regarding the related party payments, making no additions. For the bad and doubtful debts issue, the Tribunal found that in the immediately preceding assessment year, the AO had specifically queried and made no additions on the same issue. Citing consistent views of co-ordinate benches of the Tribunal that the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 36(1)(viia) for provisions including standard assets, and relying on its own order for the preceding year which quashed similar 263 proceedings, the Tribunal quashed the PCIT's order.

The tribunal, citing Supreme Court and High Court decisions (including *Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal* and *Deepak Steel & Power Ltd.*), held that the notice under section 148 issued after 01.04.2021 for A.Y. 2015-16 was time-barred and bad in law. Consequently, the assessment order was declared void ab initio.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal remanded both the Revenue's appeal (against the deletion of the u/s 68 addition) and the assessee's appeal (against the u/s 115BBC addition) back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The AO is directed to re-verify the issues, provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing, and allow the submission of all relevant documents and evidences.

The ITAT dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition. The Tribunal found that the interest income was legitimate, arising from delayed payments by debtors in the assessee's agency business model where the assessee guarantees payments. The ITAT concluded that the AO had incorrectly disregarded the agency nature of the transactions, and the sales and debtors were reflected in the principal's books.

The Tribunal determined that both issues lacked clarity and required further verification. Consequently, it set aside the CIT(A)'s order for both the Revenue's and the assessee's appeals and remanded the entire matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment with directions to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing and consider all submitted evidence.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had failed to verify the assessee's claim of double taxation and the details provided in Form No. 35. With the Revenue's consent, the Tribunal set aside both the assessment and penalty orders to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to furnish necessary details.

The Tribunal noted the assessees had filed an earlier application within the due date which was technically rejected. As the CIT(Exemption) had not reviewed the genuineness of the trusts' activities, the Tribunal decided to remand the cases back to the CIT(Exemption) for fresh consideration, directing them to review the original application and the trusts' activities, and provide a fair hearing.

The Tribunal found that one of the assessee's applications was initially filed within the prescribed time but was rejected due to a technical error (wrong clause selection). Emphasizing that technicalities should not impede genuine cases, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(E). The CIT(E) is directed to reconsider the application afresh, taking into account the original application and the trusts' activities, after providing a fresh opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remanded the case back to him. The CIT(A) is directed to decide the appeal afresh on merits, ensuring a reasonable opportunity of hearing is provided to the assessee, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) failed to verify the assessee's claims of double taxation, despite the assessee providing details in Form No. 35. Consequently, both the assessment order and the penalty order were set aside to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication, with directions to provide the assessee a proper opportunity to submit necessary details.

The Tribunal, relying on its own previous decision for the assessee's AY 2014-15 and a Delhi High Court judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court, held that the interest provision constituted an ascertained liability. It set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction of Rs.2,42,00,000/- for interest on the loan.

The Tribunal found that the assessee successfully established the identity, creditworthiness of FMPL, and genuineness of the transactions, noting that FMPL had adequate reserves and that a substantial portion of the advances was refunded due to property title disputes. The Tribunal also held that the assessee met all conditions for LTCG exemption under Section 10(38) for the share sale, emphasizing that the transaction was genuine, occurred on a recognized stock exchange, and involved STT payment, while rejecting the AO's basis of mere suspicion. Consequently, all additions made by the AO under Section 68 and for the capital gain and commission were deleted, leading to the deletion of the consequential penalty under Section 271(1)(c).