ITAT Pune Judgments — September 2025

The Tribunal held that the disallowance u/s. 14A should be restricted to the extent of exempt income earned, which was Rs. 3,68,177, deleting the remaining amount. For car-related expenses, the Tribunal allowed the claim, as the cars were used for business purposes and appeared in the fixed assets, despite not being registered in the company's name.

The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are not entitled to deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) but interest income attributable to business and earned on investments with other cooperative banks is deductible u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) respectively, as cooperative banks are also cooperative societies.

The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not valid in law due to the issuance of a consolidated satisfaction note for multiple assessment years (2012-13 to 2018-19). The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Chitra Narendra Parmar vs. ACIT, wherein it was held that a consolidated satisfaction note vitiates the entire assessment proceedings. The Tribunal also noted that the Supreme Court had dismissed the Revenue's SLP in the case of DCIT vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma, which upheld the Karnataka High Court's view that a satisfaction note is required for each assessment year. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings. As the assessee succeeded on this legal ground, the grounds challenging the additions on merit were not adjudicated, being academic in nature. The appeals for both assessment years were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not valid in law due to the issuance of a consolidated satisfaction note for multiple assessment years (2012-13 to 2018-19). The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Chitra Narendra Parmar vs. ACIT, wherein it was held that a consolidated satisfaction note vitiates the entire assessment proceedings. The Tribunal also noted that the Supreme Court had dismissed the Revenue's SLP in the case of DCIT vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma, which upheld the Karnataka High Court's view that a satisfaction note is required for each assessment year. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings. As the assessee succeeded on this legal ground, the grounds challenging the additions on merit were not adjudicated, being academic in nature. The appeals for both assessment years were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC's order was in violation of Section 250(6) of the Act for failing to state points of determination and reasons for the decision. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order and restored the issue to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient opening cash in hand and had received capital contribution from an incoming partner, Mr. Popatlal Shah, whose identity, creditworthiness, and transaction genuineness were established. Therefore, the cash deposit was explained.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding 'reasonable cause'. Following the jurisdictional High Court decision in *Prabhakar Nerulkar Vs. PCIT*, it was held that the notice u/s.148 was invalid because the Assessing Officer obtained approval from the PCIT instead of the JCIT, as mandated by Section 151 for AY 2015-16 prior to 01.04.2021. Consequently, the re-assessment proceedings were quashed due to lack of valid jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance was made by the CPC solely based on the Tax Audit Report. Since the assessee had prepared a single balance sheet for individual and business affairs, and the income and capital receipt items were correctly shown, the addition was not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of almost 13 years in filing the appeal. The reasons provided, such as the death of the CA and lack of awareness of the demand, were found to be insufficient and unsubstantiated.

The Tribunal held that the legal issue raised regarding the applicability of Section 153C versus Section 147 was a valid ground for admission at the Tribunal stage, despite not being raised before the lower appellate authority. The Tribunal noted that the lower appellate authority had not dealt with this legal ground.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter back to his file. The CIT(A) is directed to adjudicate the issue afresh on merits, including the legal ground challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings, after granting one final opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the order of the Additional/Joint CIT(A). The matter was restored to the file of the Additional/Joint CIT(A) to decide the issue afresh on merits after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after considering the reasons provided by the assessee and legal precedents. The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC, directing it to grant an opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its case.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on the interest income earned from co-operative banks and nationalized banks. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) erred in invoking Section 80P(2)(d) when the assessee had claimed deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal referred to the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Court's decision in Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd., which distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Totagars Cooperative Sale Society and held that interest on fixed deposits with banks is to be treated as profits and gains of business attributable to the main activity. The Tribunal also referenced the Kerala High Court's decision (post-Totagars) which held that the character of income does not change and interest earned from deposits in permitted banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P. The Tribunal emphasized the principle of judicial discipline and consistency, noting that the CIT(A) failed to follow the jurisdictional ITAT's decisions and the assessee's own case for AY 2017-18. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) on the interest earned, allowing the grounds of appeal.

The Tribunal noted that the legal grounds regarding the validity of the notice u/s 148 were raised for the first time. While admitting these grounds, the Tribunal restored the entire appeal, including the legal issues, back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting the assessee's circumstances and lack of sufficient opportunity. The issues were remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee an opportunity to present details of landholding and agricultural income.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal restored the appellant's initial application dated 05.09.2023 for regular registration under Section 12A to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, giving the appellant an opportunity to furnish required details. ITA No. 1214/PUN/2025 was dismissed as infructuous, and ITA No. 1215/PUN/2025 and 1216/PUN/2025 were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal restored the appellant's initial application dated 05.09.2023 for regular registration under Section 12A to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, giving the appellant an opportunity to furnish required details. ITA No. 1214/PUN/2025 was dismissed as infructuous, and ITA No. 1215/PUN/2025 and 1216/PUN/2025 were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, dismissing the assessee's appeal. It noted that the assessee failed to appear before the Tribunal and did not submit any documentary evidence, despite repeated opportunities, to substantiate their claim for exemption or challenge the rectification order.

The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Ld. Addl. / JCIT(A) to grant an opportunity to the assessee to substantiate his case by filing the requisite details and decide the issue.

The Tribunal restored the appellant's initial application dated 05.09.2023 for regular registration under Section 12A to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, giving the appellant an opportunity to furnish required details. ITA No. 1214/PUN/2025 was dismissed as infructuous, and ITA No. 1215/PUN/2025 and 1216/PUN/2025 were allowed for statistical purposes.

The ITAT condoned the 125-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), acknowledging the assessee's genuine reasons. Consequently, the substantive issue concerning the addition of Rs. 13,53,643/- was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with a directive to grant proper hearing opportunity and pass a speaking order. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that the amendment empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, which came into effect from 01.06.2015, is prospective. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults occurring prior to this date. Consequently, the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, acknowledging a reasonable cause for the delay. The Tribunal restored the issues to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing the assessee to cooperate and provide all necessary details.

The Tribunal held that as per Section 246 and 246A of the Income Tax Act, appeals against penalty orders passed by the Assessing Officer should be filed before the JCIT(A)/CIT(A) and not the ITAT. Therefore, the appeal filed before the Tribunal was not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that since the return was e-filed before the due date and Section 80P is a beneficial provision, strict compliance regarding e-verification date should be dispensed with. The assessee is eligible for the deduction.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is legally obligated to decide appeals on merit and cannot dismiss them for non-prosecution. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication, and the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(E) and restored the issue to the file of the CIT(E) with a direction to grant one final opportunity to the appellant to explain and substantiate its case.

The Tribunal condoned the 930-day delay in filing the appeal, finding it unintentional. It also held that the cash deposits and bank credits were part of business receipts, and the AO erred in making separate additions for them.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and restored the issue to the CIT(E)'s file. A final opportunity is granted to the assessee to furnish requisite details and substantiate its case.

The Tribunal acknowledged a delay in filing the appeals, which was condoned based on a reasonable cause shown in an affidavit. The impugned orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the issues were restored to the file of the CIT(E) for a final opportunity to the appellant.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating on merits, violating Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. The CIT(A) should have provided a speaking order.

The Tribunal acknowledged a delay in filing the appeals, which was condoned based on a reasonable cause shown in an affidavit. The impugned orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the issues were restored to the file of the CIT(E) for a final opportunity to the appellant.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) wrongly dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution, as the law does not empower the CIT(A) to do so and the appeal must be decided on merits. The Tribunal further emphasized that the CIT(A) should have adjudicated the legal grounds raised by the assessee, including the non-issuance of notice u/s. 143(2) and the lack of providing reasons for reopening.

The Tribunal held that the impugned issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by a series of decisions from various judicial forums, including the Jurisdictional Pune Tribunal. It was consistently held in these precedents that interest income earned from co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) or Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act, as it is attributable to the business of the assessee society. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A)/NFAC disallowed the deduction based on specific High Court decisions, but the assessee presented a compilation of numerous favourable judgments. The Departmental Representative fairly conceded that the issue was covered in favour of the assessee. Respectfully following the cited decisions and in the absence of any contrary material from the revenue, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and allowed the deduction claimed by the assessee under Section 80P(2)(a)(i)/80P(2)(d) of the Act. The grounds of appeal were accordingly allowed. For AY 2020-21, the facts and grounds were identical, and the decision was applied mutatis mutandis.

The Tribunal held that the rejection solely based on a technical error in selecting a sub-clause was unjustified, especially when the assessee had filed the correct details and demonstrated bona fide intent. The Tribunal followed a coordinate bench's decision in a similar case.