278 orders · Page 2 of 6
The Tribunal held that while the levy of fees under Section 234E was valid for defaults occurring from June 1, 2015, onwards, any fees levied for delays prior to this date should be deleted. The issue was restored to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal found that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from effectively prosecuting the appeal and deserved another opportunity. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(Exemption)'s order and remanded the matter for de novo adjudication, directing the CIT(Exemption) to provide due opportunity to the assessee to file necessary documents and prove its case on merits.
The Tribunal held that while the levy of fees under Section 234E was valid for defaults occurring from June 1, 2015, onwards, any fees levied for delays prior to this date should be deleted. The issue was restored to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal held that while the levy of fees under Section 234E was valid for defaults occurring from June 1, 2015, onwards, any fees levied for delays prior to this date should be deleted. The issue was restored to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal held that while the levy of fees under Section 234E was valid for defaults occurring from June 1, 2015, onwards, any fees levied for delays prior to this date should be deleted. The issue was restored to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition, agreeing that the omission of Section 92BA(i) by the Finance Act, 2017, was applicable and rendered the original addition invalid. Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271AA was also deleted.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) (NFAC) has no power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and must decide the appeal on its merits. The Tribunal quashed the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the case back for de novo adjudication, with an opportunity to the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal held that while the levy of fees under Section 234E was valid for defaults occurring from June 1, 2015, onwards, any fees levied for delays prior to this date should be deleted. The issue was restored to the AO for verification.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's application to withdraw the appeal, as the Ld. DR had no objection. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, finding sufficient cause. It noted that the CIT(A) had not dealt with the merits of the case and decided to restore the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, finding sufficient cause. It noted that the CIT(A) had not dealt with the merits of the case and decided to restore the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the addition made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A). The assessee failed to provide satisfactory evidence to prove the source of the cash deposits or to correlate them with the affidavits filed later.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing Supreme Court precedents emphasizing substantial justice over technical considerations. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC, with a direction to grant the assessee one final opportunity to substantiate its case and decide the issue on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, finding sufficient cause. It noted that the CIT(A) had not dealt with the merits of the case and decided to restore the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 56F was a procedural default and not fatal to the substantive claim for deduction under Section 10AA, especially since the assessee had fulfilled other conditions and the delay was condoned. The decision relied on High Court and ITAT precedents.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the rejection was due to an inadvertent mistake by the assessee's consultant. Considering the new rules and the dependency of assessees on consultants, the Tribunal decided to give the assessee another opportunity.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, finding sufficient cause. It noted that the CIT(A) had not dealt with the merits of the case and decided to restore the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the ex-parte order was due to the previous consultant not forwarding the notices. Considering the interest of justice and that a new consultant has been appointed, the Tribunal decided to set aside the CIT's order.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the delay might be unintentional and decided to afford the assessee one more opportunity by remitting the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had not opted for the new tax regime for the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the denial of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was incorrect.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the need for substantial justice over technical considerations. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for a final opportunity to the assessee to present their case, with a stern warning against seeking further adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the deduction u/s 80P cannot be allowed if the return of income is not filed within the time limit prescribed u/s 139(1) of the IT Act, especially in light of the amended Section 80AC. The order passed by the PCIT u/s 263 was confirmed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution, especially when notices were not served on the correct email address. The matter was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the cost of acquisition needs to be determined as per Section 49 of the Income Tax Act, considering the previous owner's cost. The AO and CIT(A) erred in rejecting the assessee's valuation report without proper reasons and in not allowing the indexed cost of acquisition.
The Tribunal held that the CIT's order was passed ex-parte due to an inadvertent error by the assessee in missing the last notice. The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order and remanded the matter back to the CIT to decide the application afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, finding sufficient cause. It noted that the CIT(A) had not dealt with the merits of the case and decided to restore the appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 121 days after considering the assessee's affidavit and relevant judgments, adopting a justice-oriented approach. The Tribunal restored the issue of regular registration to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, providing one more opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the delay might be unintentional and decided to afford the assessee one more opportunity by remitting the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Considering the medical reasons cited by the assessee for not responding to notices and the interest of justice, the tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT and remanded the matter back for fresh consideration. The CIT was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee and decide the application afresh.
Given that the basis for initiating penalties (the quantum assessment) was already set aside for fresh adjudication, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to also remit the penalty issues to the learned Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication. Consequently, the impugned penalty orders were set aside, and the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's objects were charitable and its activities, running an approved school, were genuine and aligned with its objectives. The CIT(E) had not presented any evidence of violation of law or non-genuineness of activities.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals and, while acknowledging the assessee's non-compliance before the CIT(A), decided to grant one more opportunity for proper adjudication. The appeals were remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have decided the appeal on merits even in an ex-parte order, following a High Court precedent. The Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for proper adjudication after providing the assessee an opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(E) rejected the application on the ground of delay without discussing the merits. The assessee provided evidence of commencement of activities and a donation made, which was not filed before the CIT(E). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2) of the IT Act, following a previous coordinate bench decision. The Revenue's appeals challenging this deduction were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2) of the IT Act, following a previous coordinate bench decision. The Revenue's appeals challenging this deduction were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) failed to consider the elaborate submissions of the assessee and erroneously included information pertaining to another assessee. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2) of the IT Act, following a previous coordinate bench decision. The Revenue's appeals challenging this deduction were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2) of the IT Act, following a previous coordinate bench decision. The Revenue's appeals challenging this deduction were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2) of the IT Act, following a previous coordinate bench decision. The Revenue's appeals challenging this deduction were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted the difficulties faced during the Covid-19 pandemic and the extension of limitation period. For the interest of justice, the issue was restored to the file of the AO for denovo assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals and, while acknowledging the assessee's non-compliance before the CIT(A), decided to grant one more opportunity for proper adjudication. The appeals were remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had successfully explained the sources of payment for the credit card dues for all three banks. The cash payments for IndusInd Bank and Syndicate Bank credit cards were linked to the brother's business expenses, and the ICICI Bank payment was covered by the assessee's declared income.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have decided the appeal on merits even in an ex-parte order, following a High Court precedent. The Tribunal restored the issues to the CIT(A) for proper adjudication after providing the assessee an opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, holding that the assessee had sufficient cause and the delay was not intentional. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate the penalty issue on merits, as the CIT(A) had not dealt with the case's merits.
The Tribunal allowed the additional grounds of appeal raised by the assessee. It noted that the satisfaction note was recorded on April 26, 2018. Following the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Shalimar Town Planners (P.) Ltd. ([2024] 161 taxmann.com 306 (SC)), which held that notices under section 153C are valid for a period of six years from the end of the financial year preceding the date on which satisfaction was recorded, the Tribunal found that Assessment Year 2011-12 falls beyond this six-year period. Consequently, the notice issued under section 153C and the consequential assessment order were held to be bad in law. The Tribunal did not need to decide on the merits of the additions made under section 69C as the assessment itself was quashed on procedural grounds.
Given that the basis for initiating penalties (the quantum assessment) was already set aside for fresh adjudication, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to also remit the penalty issues to the learned Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication. Consequently, the impugned penalty orders were set aside, and the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
Given that the basis for initiating penalties (the quantum assessment) was already set aside for fresh adjudication, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to also remit the penalty issues to the learned Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication. Consequently, the impugned penalty orders were set aside, and the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.