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282 orders · Page 3 of 6
The Tribunal allowed the appeal for AY 2014-15, deleting the addition as the AO erred in taxing the same transaction in two assessment years. For AY 2012-13, the case was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, specifically to consider the application of provisos to Section 56(2)(vii)(b) and the Fair Market Value as on 25.05.2007 for LTCG calculation, ensuring a speaking order and proper opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was granted one more opportunity to provide all requisite details and documentary evidence to substantiate its application, without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, as it is an integral part of the society's business. The Tribunal followed various judicial precedents, including decisions of the High Court and ITAT.
The Tribunal held that substantial justice is more important than procedural technicalities. Grave injustice was caused to the assessee by not condoning the delay. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 68 was not maintainable as the assessee provided complete details of the members who deposited the SBN. The Tribunal relied on previous decisions where similar additions were deleted.
The Tribunal noted that in the assessee's own case for the same Assessment Year, the ITAT had deleted the addition made under Section 43CA. Consequently, the penalty, which was consequential to the addition, was also held to be not maintainable.
The tribunal held that the principles of natural justice were violated as the remand report was not confronted to the assessee. The tribunal deemed it appropriate to set aside the issue back to the CIT(A) with a direction to provide the remand report and an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to make submissions before the CIT(A)/NFAC despite multiple opportunities, leading to the dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution. The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC, granting one final opportunity to the assessee to present evidence.
The Tribunal noted the recent statutory amendment in the Finance Act, 2023, which inserted Section 155(19) into the Income Tax Act, 1961, providing relief to cooperative sugar factories on this issue. Since the assessee has already filed an application under this new section, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer to decide the application in accordance with the amended provisions.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) decided the case based on facts available on record as no details were filed by the assessee. However, it was noted that the appeal was initially filed in physical form, and the documents might not have been uploaded after migration to NFAC.
The Tribunal held that the surcharge was wrongly levied by the CPC. Based on a Special Bench decision, surcharge is leviable only when income exceeds Rs. 50,00,000, and the 37% rate applies if income exceeds Rs. 5 crore. Since the assessee's income was only Rs. 3,48,040, no surcharge was leviable.
The Tribunal held that the interpretation of 'within six months of commencement of its activities' should avoid absurdity and apply to trusts that had not started activities before provisional registration. The application was considered valid and maintainable.
The Tribunal held that while appellate authorities can entertain new claims, the assessee must still be eligible for the deduction as per Section 80A(5), which requires the claim to be made in the return of income. Since the CIT(A) did not adjudicate this specific aspect, the issue was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated beyond the time limit, following the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal and Delhi High Court rulings. Consequently, the notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d) were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the activity of earning commission from MSEDCL and earning interest from deposits akin to the society's main objects, are eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, following High Court and Tribunal precedents.
The Tribunal noted that while the 'Karar Nama' (agreements) were furnished, the revenue authorities doubted the transactions due to the absence of registered sale deeds, bank statements, and the CIT(A) failed to conduct inquiries from transacting parties. Therefore, the Tribunal remitted the issue back to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for a de-novo assessment, directing proper verification of documents, transactions, land holding, and agricultural income, while ensuring a fair opportunity for the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders. Therefore, to provide a fair opportunity to the assessee, the case was remanded to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing on merits, with directions to provide a reasonable opportunity to present the case.
The Tribunal acknowledged the CIT(Exemption)'s dissatisfaction with the submissions. In the interest of justice, and considering the assessee's request for further opportunity, the Tribunal restored both matters (Section 12A registration and Section 80G approval) to the file of the CIT(Exemption) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(Exemption) was directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its case.
The Tribunal noted that the Departmental Representative had no objection to the withdrawal of the appeal. Consequently, the Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal, and the grounds of appeal were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal, in the interest of justice, restored the issue to the file of the CIT(Exemption). It directed the CIT(E) to grant the assessee one final opportunity to submit the requisite details and substantiate its case, with the CIT(E) then deciding the issue as per fact and law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemption) erred in rejecting the application without providing proper opportunity to the assessee and without considering the submissions made. The order of the CIT(Exemption) was set aside for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) does not have the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution, citing a Bombay High Court judgment. The CIT(A) is obliged to decide the appeal on its merits after providing an opportunity to the assessee.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to dispose of the appeal on merits, even in an ex-parte order, and did not pass a speaking order. Therefore, the case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication.
The Tribunal acknowledged the CIT(Exemption)'s dissatisfaction with the submissions. In the interest of justice, and considering the assessee's request for further opportunity, the Tribunal restored both matters (Section 12A registration and Section 80G approval) to the file of the CIT(Exemption) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(Exemption) was directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its case.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal under section 249(4)(b) as the assessee had filed a return of income in response to a notice under section 148, and the AO had considered this return valid. The CIT(A) should have invoked section 249(4)(a).
The Tribunal granted permission to the appellant (assessee) to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the assessee's submission that they had opted for the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, and had filed the relevant form. The revenue did not object to this request. The Tribunal's decision allows the assessee to withdraw the appeal with the liberty to revive it if the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax declines to issue a Final Certificate under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, for any reason. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
The tribunal found that the Rs. 10,03,384/- was a double disallowance as the assessee had already accounted for it in its return, and thus directed its deletion. Regarding the Section 10AA deduction, the tribunal held that merely because a different accounting treatment (Ind-AS 16) was given in the books, it could not deprive the assessee of its statutory claim. It directed the AO to allow the full deduction of Rs. 8,54,21,181/- under Section 10AA by deleting the restricted amount of Rs. 1,15,98,511/-.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order to be contradictory regarding sundry creditors and cryptic regarding bad debts. Therefore, both issues were restored to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee an opportunity to substantiate its case.
The Tribunal granted permission to withdraw the appeal as it was found to be a duplicate filing. The grounds of appeal were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The grounds of appeal were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear for the hearing. Considering the assessee's past attempt to opt for the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme and non-compliance with notices, the Tribunal decided to remit the issue back to the CIT(A) for a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal, in the interest of justice, decided to grant one more opportunity to the appellant to submit the required details for registration, setting aside the CIT(E)'s order.
The ITAT found that the Assessing Officer failed to provide the assessee with the reasons recorded for issuing the Section 148 notice and the competent authority's approval for it, which is mandatory. Citing a Bombay High Court decision, the ITAT set aside the AO's order for denovo adjudication, directing the AO to provide these documents and allow the assessee to file objections.
The Tribunal, in the interest of justice, restored the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) and granted the assessee one more opportunity to present their case. The Ld. CIT(A) is directed to grant a reasonable opportunity and pass a speaking order.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without delving into the merits. Following the Bombay High Court's ruling, the Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee to provide evidence and directing the CIT(A) to pass a speaking order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It was held that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal without adjudicating on merit, which is contrary to Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, both appeals were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merit.
The Tribunal, considering the assessee's prayer and no objection from the DR, decided to remit the issues on merits back to the Assessing Officer for de-novo adjudication after providing a reasonable opportunity. The grounds of appeal are allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted the property was jointly owned by the assessee and 5 others, and the re-assessment status of co-owners was unclear. As the issue of re-assessment validity was raised for the first time before the Tribunal, and in the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC for re-adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to consider all facts and law, including the validity of re-assessment proceedings and provide due opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) had erroneously rejected the application. It noted that the assessee had submitted a copy of the registration and that the CIT(E) himself had granted the registration earlier.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte assessment order and restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for re-adjudication, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had failed to consider the submissions made by the assessee despite being provided with an opportunity. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Departmental Representative did not object to the assessee's request for withdrawal. The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal, and consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found that the error in mentioning the section code was a curable defect and that there were no adverse findings on merits by the CIT. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT and remanded the matter back with a direction to consider the application afresh, treating it as filed under the correct section, after providing an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal, noting no objection from the Departmental Representative, allowed the withdrawal request and dismissed the appeal as 'Withdrawn'. It also clarified that the assessee could move a Miscellaneous Application to recall the appeal if the VSVS application is rejected.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without considering the grounds on merit. The issues were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, considering the granted registration and relevant CBDT circulars.
The Tribunal, relying on the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Telangana's decision in *Vavveru Co-operative Rural Bank Ltd.* and previous ITAT Pune rulings, held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits in cooperative/scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under sections 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d). The *Totagars* case was distinguished based on the nature and source of funds. The Assessing Officer was directed to allow the deduction for the interest amount of Rs.6,72,033/-.
The Tribunal held that payments of interest by a cooperative bank to its members, including nominal members, do not require TDS deduction as per Section 194A(3)(v). Therefore, the disallowance made by the AO was not justified.
The Tribunal held that Co-operative Banks are essentially Co-operative Societies, and therefore, interest and dividends earned from them are eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). They affirmed a consistent view taken in previous decisions.
The Tribunal, considering the assessee's prayer and no objection from the DR, decided to remit the issues on merits back to the Assessing Officer for de-novo adjudication after providing a reasonable opportunity. The grounds of appeal are allowed for statistical purposes.