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199 orders · Page 4 of 4
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application solely on the ground of limitation was not sustainable. It directed the CIT(E) to re-adjudicate the application afresh, considering it as filed within the statutory time limit and verifying the assessee's eligibility on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemption) rightly rejected the assessee's application for 80G(5) registration. The assessee failed to fulfill the prerequisite conditions for the application, including providing necessary documentation.
The Tribunal held that a rectification under Section 154 cannot be made for a debatable issue or a change of opinion. The CIT(A)'s order quashing the rectification was confirmed.
The Tribunal held that the addition was not justified as there was no evidence of on-money payment or invocation of Section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). The rectification deed did not alter the original purchase date, making the addition for the subsequent assessment year invalid.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate their case. The assessee was directed to appear and submit details without seeking adjournments.
The Tribunal held that since the original order of the CIT(A) was already set aside by the ITAT for de novo adjudication, the subsequent order passed under Section 154 r.w.s. 250 becomes non-est. Therefore, the appeal becomes academic.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned based on the Supreme Court's directions regarding the exclusion of the limitation period due to the pandemic. The case was restored to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A)'s file, directing him to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to present their case. The assessee was warned against seeking further adjournments.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investments with a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Pr. CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction to disallow this claim.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC had travelled beyond the assessment order by focusing on Section 80P eligibility instead of the Section 69A addition. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the assessee was prevented from appearing before the AO, necessitating a remand.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by the assessee on deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). It also held that interest income from nationalized/other banks also qualifies for Section 80P deduction.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merits and cannot dismiss them for non-prosecution. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obligated to decide appeals on merits and cannot dismiss them for non-prosecution. The CIT(A) must provide sufficient opportunities for hearing.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A)'s file, directing him to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to present their case. The assessee was warned against seeking further adjournments.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC. The assessee was granted one final opportunity to substantiate its case with requisite details.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without condoning the delay. The Tribunal found that e-filing was mandatory prior to the Faceless Appeal Scheme, and the CIT(A) confused the two. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(Exemptions) denied the registration without properly considering the material filed by the assessee, possibly due to miscommunication. Therefore, the case was remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC had travelled beyond the assessment order by focusing on Section 80P eligibility instead of the Section 69A addition. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the assessee was prevented from appearing before the AO, necessitating a remand.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 143(1)(a)(iv) was invalid as the expenditure was not indicated in the audit report for disallowance. Consequently, the assessee's cross-objection was allowed, and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed as academic.
The Tribunal held that the CPC travelled beyond the scope of its adjustment powers under Section 143(1) by invoking Section 44ADA when the assessee had declared income under Section 44AD. The adjustment made by the CPC was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC is obliged to decide an appeal on merits, even if dismissed for non-prosecution, citing a Bombay High Court judgment. Therefore, the matter was remanded for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society on fixed deposits with cooperative banks and scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, following a coordinate bench decision. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the exemption.
The Tribunal held that the CPC should have considered the audit report filed before the extended due date. Therefore, the intimation passed under Section 143(1) denying exemption was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC should have been condoned due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC should have been condoned due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC should have been condoned due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee's total income was declared as 'NIL' and accepted by the AO, there was no liability to pay advance tax. Therefore, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of non-payment of advance tax.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order was cryptic and lacked specific reasoning for levying penalty under Section 270A, particularly failing to specify the applicable sub-clauses of Section 270A(9). The AO did not establish how the assessee had mis-reported income.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) did not adjudicate on the merits of the case. In the interest of justice, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) did not address the merits of the case. In the interest of justice, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that no income had actually accrued to the assessee in the relevant year. Citing a Supreme Court judgment, it stated that only reasonable certainty gives rise to taxable income, which was absent in this case.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in not referring the matter to the Valuation Officer (DVO) as envisaged under Section 43CA read with Section 50C. The matter was therefore remanded back to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC is obliged to decide an appeal on merits, even in case of ex-parte orders, and cannot dismiss it for non-prosecution. The impugned order was found to be contrary to settled law.
The Tribunal held that the interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act is not taxable. It followed the jurisdictional High Court's decision that such interest is part of the compensation and not income from other sources.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a registered cooperative society engaged in providing credit facilities, is entitled to the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal also relied on judicial pronouncements to allow deduction on interest income derived from investments in cooperative banks.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal, noting a recent CBDT circular permitting fresh applications for registration even if previously rejected for late filing.
The Tribunal restored the issue of TDS credit disallowance back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The assessee is responsible for proving its case in the consequential proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred in assessing the entire sale consideration and invoking Section 50C, as the assessee's share was only 1/5th and there was no difference between the sale price and stamp value.
The Tribunal held that since the sole beneficiary is a minor and the income is accumulated until majority, the beneficiary's share is determinate. Therefore, section 164 is not applicable, and taxing the income at the maximum marginal rate was an error.
The Tribunal dismissed the additional ground regarding the validity of the Section 148 notice. However, it set aside the CIT(A)'s order for not properly considering the assessee's comparables and directed the CIT(A) to re-adjudicate the appeal.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed a return and had contractual receipts with a declared net profit. While the cash deposits were not sufficiently explained, the Tribunal held that they should be assessed as business receipts. The addition was restricted to 10% of the net profit, amounting to Rs. 2,35,000/-, to meet the larger interest of justice.
The tribunal held that the NFAC's order was passed without impleading a legal representative, leading to gross injustice. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication after deciding the issue of legal representation.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC ought to have condoned the delay of 118 days, given the assessee's illness and lack of contrary evidence. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order.
The Tribunal held that the compliance with filing Form-67 within the due date for filing the return under Section 139(1) is directory, not mandatory. Therefore, the denial of FTC solely on this ground was incorrect.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the NFAC and the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The case was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC's order was passed without providing sufficient cause or cogent reason, and without adjudicating the appeal on merits. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative society is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income derived from investments made with a cooperative bank, as a cooperative bank is still considered a cooperative society. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had taken a plausible view, and the Principal CIT erred in exercising revisional jurisdiction.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order did not decide the substantive grounds of appeal on merits. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not referring the valuation of the flats to the Valuation Officer as mandated by section 50C(2) when the assessee disputed the valuation. The matter was therefore set aside.