104 orders · Page 1 of 3
The Tribunal addressed the grounds concerning the eligibility for deduction under Section 80IB(10). The Revenue contended that the project was not completed by 31.03.2009, violating Section 80IB(10)(a)(ii), and also pointed to violations of clause (c) (area limit) and clause (f) (sale to family members). The assessee maintained that the projects were distinct and eligible. The Tribunal noted that the initial layout plan was approved on 06.07.2004, and the Revenue argued that the completion should be calculated from this date, making the project ineligible. The assessee presented evidence of separate building plan approvals and completion certificates for different phases. The Tribunal also considered the issue of cash expenses, where the Revenue argued the assessee failed to establish the nexus. The judgment indicates a detailed analysis of the commencement certificates and occupancy certificates issued by the Pune Municipal Corporation. The Tribunal's decision on the Section 80IB(10) deduction hinges on whether the projects are considered separate or a single entity and adherence to the stipulated conditions. The Tribunal also examined the assessee's claim for deduction of cash expenses against cash receipts.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had not challenged the original intimation dated 22.12.2013. The subsequent order was merely consequential, involving interest. Therefore, the appeal was not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the receipt register maintained by the assessee did not meet the requirements of Rule 6F of the Income Tax Rules for a medical professional. Therefore, the cash receipts were considered undisclosed income not recorded in the prescribed books of account or other documents.
The Tribunal held that interest income derived by a cooperative society from its investments with a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed its own prior decisions and High Court rulings that supported this view.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in excluding companies engaged in processing and export of ready-to-eat seafood from the comparables list, as the assessee was only involved in trading. The Tribunal also directed that the arm's length price (ALP) should be computed as per Rule 10CA, specifically sub-rule (7), using the weighted average of the profit level indicator of the remaining comparables.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC's order dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution was illegal as there was no clear evidence of sufficient opportunities of hearing being granted to the assessee. The matter was restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the NFAC's ex-parte decision, while understandable due to the lack of response, was not in consonance with Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of share transactions and unsecured loans, considering them fraudulent and void ab initio. The NFAC's order was reversed.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order was passed prematurely, before the disposal of the quantum appeal and before the ITAT's order in the quantum appeal. Therefore, the matter requires remission to the Assessing Officer to revise the penalty order.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal recalled its earlier order to re-examine the taxability of ICT charges under the DTAA, specifically considering amendments to Article 12(4). It found that the inclusion of payment for use of industrial equipment as royalty was omitted from the DTAA effective April 1, 1998.
The tribunal held that while a penalty under Section 271(1)(b) is leviable for non-compliance with notices, it can only be imposed once for each distinct failure, not for each notice issued. Therefore, multiple penalties for multiple notices for the same default are not permissible.
The tribunal held that while a penalty under Section 271(1)(b) is leviable for non-compliance with notices, it can only be imposed once for each distinct failure, not for each notice issued. Therefore, multiple penalties for multiple notices for the same default are not permissible.
The Tribunal held that the issue was covered by previous decisions of the co-ordinate bench, which had quashed similar revisionary orders. The Tribunal found that the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue's interest, as the AO had taken a plausible view supported by judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal held that in the case of an unabated assessment, without any incriminating material unearthed during search and seizure, no addition can be made. By converse analogy, a fresh claim unrelated to undisclosed income found during search and seizure proceedings cannot be allowed in proceedings under Section 153A. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. and the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT vs. Gurinder Singh Bawa, which held that Section 153A cannot be used for a second inning of assessment by either the revenue or the assessee. The Rajasthan High Court in Jai Steel (India) vs. ACIT also held similarly. Since the claim for exemption under Section 10(37) did not form part of the material unearthed during the search, it could not be allowed in the Section 153A proceedings. The Tribunal clarified that this decision would not prevent the assessee from pursuing other remedies available under the Act. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal found that the case required further factual verification. The assessee's contention regarding the cancellation deed dated 30/10/2014, which appeared to be executed on the same date as the payment receipt and substantial payment, raised questions about human probability. The Tribunal noted that the revenue authorities had not brought out conclusive evidence regarding the cancellation deed, particularly concerning its date, and had presumed it to be 28/10/2014. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the seized paper showed Shri Janardhan Kamble's signature, but the declaration deed indicated that both Row Houses belonged to M/s. Gangami Industries & Construction Ltd., represented by Shri Ranjeet Padmakar Mulay, whose signature was absent on the seized document. The Tribunal held that these issues went to the root of the matter and needed detailed verification. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A)'s file for detailed verification of all the observed issues. The CIT(A) was directed to decide the case as per law after bringing out the facts through clear examination and complying with the principles of natural justice. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in the case of an unabated assessment, without any incriminating material unearthed during search and seizure, no addition can be made. By converse analogy, a fresh claim unrelated to undisclosed income found during search and seizure proceedings cannot be allowed in proceedings under Section 153A. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. and the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT vs. Gurinder Singh Bawa, which held that Section 153A cannot be used for a second inning of assessment by either the revenue or the assessee. The Rajasthan High Court in Jai Steel (India) vs. ACIT also held similarly. Since the claim for exemption under Section 10(37) did not form part of the material unearthed during the search, it could not be allowed in the Section 153A proceedings. The Tribunal clarified that this decision would not prevent the assessee from pursuing other remedies available under the Act. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the employee's contribution to PF/ESIC must be deposited within the statutory due dates to be eligible for deduction, as per the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services P. Ltd. Furthermore, the deduction under Section 80JJAA is not allowable if the return of income is filed beyond the due date specified under Section 139(1).
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The tribunal held that while a penalty under Section 271(1)(b) is leviable for non-compliance with notices, it can only be imposed once for each distinct failure, not for each notice issued. Therefore, multiple penalties for multiple notices for the same default are not permissible.
The tribunal held that while a penalty under Section 271(1)(b) is leviable for non-compliance with notices, it can only be imposed once for each distinct failure, not for each notice issued. Therefore, multiple penalties for multiple notices for the same default are not permissible.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct necessary inquiries into the expenses claimed by the trust, making the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was justified.
The Tribunal held that the gains arising from the conversion of a capital asset into stock-in-trade are taxable only in the year the stock-in-trade is sold, as per Section 45(2). The issue of whether the land was agricultural and beyond municipal limits at the time of conversion remained unadjudicated.
The Tribunal held that the transactions were not in the nature of loans or deposits taken or accepted by the assessee. The amounts were payments made on behalf of others or rent/salary credits, thus not attracting Section 269SS.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to refute the facts on record or establish that the HUF was the owner of the money deposited, and that the assessee was not the owner. The Tribunal noted that the applicability of Section 69A does not depend on whether the assessee maintains books of account. Since the department unearthed that the assessee was the owner of money for which the source was not explained satisfactorily, it would be deemed income. The Tribunal found that the assessee could not establish the source of the money or whether it belonged to the HUF, nor did they prove the claim of agricultural income. The bank account was in the assessee's name, and no income-tax return was filed by the HUF. Therefore, the additions made under Section 69A were considered correct. The Tribunal also rejected the plea that details of cash deposits were not provided, stating the assessee had access to his bank account and investment details. However, an arithmetical error in the total cash deposited was noted, and the AO was directed to verify the facts and arrive at the correct total, providing an opportunity to the assessee. Thus, the addition of cash deposits was confirmed in principle, but set aside for recalculation. Grounds related to agricultural income were dismissed for lack of proof. The CIT(A)'s power to invoke Section 69A was upheld, citing the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs Kanpur Coal Syndicate.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was given an unreasonably short period to respond, violating principles of natural justice. The order of the CIT (Exemption) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the grounds of appeal concerning the defective satisfaction and invalidity of the section 153C notice (Grounds 2, 4, and 5) were rejected. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to establish that the HUF was the owner of the money deposited and that the assessee was not the owner. The bank account was in the assessee's name, and the assessee did not explain the source of the cash deposits satisfactorily. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the powers of the appellate authority are coterminous with that of the AO, and the CIT(A) was justified in invoking section 69A instead of section 68. The assessee's plea that no opportunity was given by the CIT(A) before invoking section 69A was rejected, as the assessee was present through counsel and aware of the proceedings. The Tribunal also rejected the plea that cash deposit details were not provided, stating the assessee had access to bank account and investment details. The claim of agricultural income was rejected due to lack of documentary evidence, including 7/12 extracts. Consequently, the additions made under section 69A were upheld. The Tribunal adopted the reasoning from a co-ordinate bench decision in the case of Sukhdeo Navale (IT(SS)A No.30/PUN/2019).
The Tribunal held that as per Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, deduction for taxes is allowed only in the year of actual payment. Since the service tax liability was paid in earlier financial years, it was rightly disallowed for AY 2016-17.
The Tribunal held that the grounds of appeal concerning the defective satisfaction and invalidity of the section 153C notice (Grounds 2, 4, and 5) were rejected. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to establish that the HUF was the owner of the money deposited and that the assessee was not the owner. The bank account was in the assessee's name, and the assessee did not explain the source of the cash deposits satisfactorily. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the powers of the appellate authority are coterminous with that of the AO, and the CIT(A) was justified in invoking section 69A instead of section 68. The assessee's plea that no opportunity was given by the CIT(A) before invoking section 69A was rejected, as the assessee was present through counsel and aware of the proceedings. The Tribunal also rejected the plea that cash deposit details were not provided, stating the assessee had access to bank account and investment details. The claim of agricultural income was rejected due to lack of documentary evidence, including 7/12 extracts. Consequently, the additions made under section 69A were upheld. The Tribunal adopted the reasoning from a co-ordinate bench decision in the case of Sukhdeo Navale (IT(SS)A No.30/PUN/2019).
The Tribunal held that the grounds of appeal concerning the defective satisfaction and invalidity of the section 153C notice (Grounds 2, 4, and 5) were rejected. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to establish that the HUF was the owner of the money deposited and that the assessee was not the owner. The bank account was in the assessee's name, and the assessee did not explain the source of the cash deposits satisfactorily. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the powers of the appellate authority are coterminous with that of the AO, and the CIT(A) was justified in invoking section 69A instead of section 68. The assessee's plea that no opportunity was given by the CIT(A) before invoking section 69A was rejected, as the assessee was present through counsel and aware of the proceedings. The Tribunal also rejected the plea that cash deposit details were not provided, stating the assessee had access to bank account and investment details. The claim of agricultural income was rejected due to lack of documentary evidence, including 7/12 extracts. Consequently, the additions made under section 69A were upheld. The Tribunal adopted the reasoning from a co-ordinate bench decision in the case of Sukhdeo Navale (IT(SS)A No.30/PUN/2019).
The Tribunal held that the short notice period violated the principles of natural justice, as it was less than the minimum 15 days stipulated by CBDT SOP. The order of the CIT, Exemption was set aside.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee consistently failed to substantiate its claimed expenses with supporting documents. However, to allow for proper verification, the matter was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for examination of all supporting bills and vouchers.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal concerning the disallowance of PF contribution, granting relief for the amount deposited before the due date. The penalty appeal was allowed as it was based on a retrospective amendment and the penalty order lacked specific grounds.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal concerning the disallowance of PF contribution, granting relief for the amount deposited before the due date. The penalty appeal was allowed as it was based on a retrospective amendment and the penalty order lacked specific grounds.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment under Section 143(1)(a)(vi) was not permissible as the assessee had declared income under Section 44AD and the gross receipts declared were not omitted or understated compared to Form 26AS. The CBDT's instruction clarified that differences in receipts under presumptive schemes should be excluded from such adjustments.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC failed to adjudicate crucial grounds of appeal related to the merits of the case. Therefore, the order of the NFAC was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s order lacked clarity on certain aspects, particularly regarding the assessee's prior registration under Section 12AA. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication to ensure compliance with natural justice principles.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the NFAC due to non-compliance with principles of natural justice. The matter was remanded back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee a final opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal found the reasons for the assessee's absence before the CIT(A) to be satisfactory. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and remanded the matter back for adjudication on merits. This was done in the interest of justice to ensure the assessee's rights and liabilities are determined substantially.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee consistently failed to substantiate its claimed expenses with supporting documents. However, to allow for proper verification, the matter was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for examination of all supporting bills and vouchers.
The Tribunal held that the adjustment under Section 143(1)(a)(vi) was not permissible as the assessee had declared income under Section 44AD and the gross receipts declared were not omitted or understated compared to Form 26AS. The CBDT's instruction clarified that differences in receipts under presumptive schemes should be excluded from such adjustments.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had submitted a reply which was not considered by the CIT(Exemption). Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(Exemption) for a fresh decision after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.