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112 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal held that Section 234E, which allows for the levy of late fees, was inserted with effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, the fee can only be levied for defaults committed after this date.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E, which allows for the levy of late fees, was inserted with effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, the fee can only be levied for defaults committed after this date.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E, which allows for the levy of late fees, was inserted with effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, the fee can only be levied for defaults committed after this date.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was not maintainable as it did not fall under the exceptions provided in the CBDT circular. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had a reasonable cause for not filing the return within the prescribed time due to the shifting of its operations and records between cities, leading to confusion. Therefore, Explanation 3 to section 271(1)(c) was not applicable, and in the absence of any additions or disallowances, no penalty could be imposed.
The Tribunal held that income-tax is charged on income, not gross receipts. The AO's action of taxing gross receipts without considering expenses was incorrect, even if exemption under Section 11 was not available.
The Tribunal held that only investments yielding exempt income should be considered for calculating the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(iii). The matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for re-computation.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E, which allows for the levy of late fees, was inserted with effect from June 1, 2015. Therefore, the fee can only be levied for defaults committed after this date.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were initiated beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 275(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the cancellation of the penalty by the CIT(A) was justified.
The Tribunal held that the provision for interest on overdue fixed deposits should be computed considering the individual overdue period for each deposit, not a blanket rate on the total outstanding amount. The disallowance made by the tax authorities was based on an incorrect calculation.
The Tribunal held that the opportunity of hearing provided by the CIT(Exemption) was inadequate. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(Exemption) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the opportunity of hearing provided by the CIT(Exemption) was inadequate. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(Exemption) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to decide the appeal afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The ITAT found that the NFAC did not follow the principles of natural justice by giving insufficient opportunities to the assessee, especially considering the COVID-19 pandemic period. The matter was remanded back to the NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC, as a quasi-judicial authority, should adopt a justice-oriented approach rather than a hyper-technical one. The non-filing of a condonation petition was considered a curable defect, and the assessee deserved an opportunity to present its case on merits.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not get a proper opportunity to explain before the AO and the CIT(A) did not give a clear finding on the assessee's contentions. Therefore, the issue was remanded back to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal regarding the on-money addition. For the Revenue's appeal, the Tribunal remitted the issue of interest expenditure to the CIT(A) for de novo consideration and also remitted the issue of unsecured loans for de novo consideration due to procedural lapses.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of on-money consideration, finding that the assessee had admitted to receiving it during survey operations and that the retraction of the statement was not supported by cogent material.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal regarding the on-money addition. For the Revenue's appeal, the Tribunal remitted the issue of interest expenditure to the CIT(A) for de novo consideration and also remitted the issue of unsecured loans for de novo consideration due to procedural lapses.
The Tribunal, following its own previous orders in similar cases, remanded the issue of provision for obsolescence of inventory back to the AO for fresh consideration. The Tribunal also partly allowed the appeal regarding foreign travel expenses, restricting the addition to Rs. 2,00,000.
The Tribunal held that the corrigendum was necessary as the appeal was against an order passed pursuant to DRP directions, not the CIT(A). Therefore, the DRP and Pr.CIT were the correct recipients.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. It ruled that the claim for deduction under Section 36(1)(va) for employee contributions to provident funds was not allowable as the remittance was made after the withdrawal of the grace period and the online facility meant the EPF office was not closed.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal to be remitted to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration based on additional evidence filed by the assessee. The lower authorities had doubted the assessee's business claims.
The tribunal found the rejection of additional evidence by the appellate authority to be hyper-technical and unreasonable. The matter was set aside and remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that it is sufficient if the assessee invests sale proceeds in a new asset on or before the due date for filing the return of income. Proportionate exemption is to be allowed after verification.
The Tribunal held that the AO's action of enlarging the scope of scrutiny without prior approval from the concerned authority, as mandated by CBDT circulars, rendered the assessment void. Therefore, the addition made beyond the limited scrutiny scope was directed for deletion.
The Tribunal found that the order of the NFAC was based on a proper appreciation of facts and material on record. The levy of interest under Sections 234A to 24D was consequential.
The Tribunal held that a statement recorded during a survey under Section 133A without administering an oath has no evidentiary value and cannot be the sole basis for cancelling registration. The cancellation order was therefore found to be untenable.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC's dismissal was not in accordance with Section 250(6) of the Act, which requires a speaking order. Therefore, the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not provide assistance before the NFAC and the issue required documentary evidence. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee another opportunity to present their case before the NFAC.
The Tribunal held that an order passed under Section 139(9) is not specifically listed as an appealable order under Section 246A. Therefore, the appeal filed before the CIT(A) was not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC's rejection of additional evidence on a technical ground, without a proper application, violated principles of natural justice. The matter was set aside to the NFAC for reconsideration of the additional evidence.
The tribunal observed that the NFAC failed to discuss the facts and issues on merits. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the NFAC for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that since the unsold properties were treated as stock-in-trade by the assessee, they were not liable for deemed rent under Section 23(4). The CIT(A)'s confirmation of the AO's addition was deemed unjustified.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A can only be made to the extent of exempt income earned. Following precedents, the disallowance was restricted to the actual amount of tax-free dividend income received by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that a statement recorded during a survey under Section 133A, without administering an oath, has no evidentiary value. Therefore, the cancellation of registration based solely on such a statement, without any corroborative evidence of 'specified violations', is untenable.
The Tribunal held that disallowance under Section 14A can only be made to the extent of exempt income earned. Following precedents, the disallowance was restricted to the actual amount of tax-free dividend income received by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that since the excess stock was offered as business income and credited to the profit and loss account, it should be taxed as business income under normal rates, not as unexplained investment under Section 69B or taxed at higher rates under Section 115BBE.
The Tribunal held that since the excess stock was offered as business income and credited to the profit and loss account, it should be taxed under the head 'business income' at normal rates, not as unexplained investment under Section 69B and taxed under Section 115BBE.
The Tribunal held that interest paid on delayed TDS is not a business expenditure and thus not deductible. The issue of RBI penalty was remanded for fresh adjudication. The ESOP expenses and broken period interest were held to be allowable business expenditures.
The Tribunal held that since the excess stock was offered as business income and credited to the profit and loss account, it should be taxed under the head 'business income' at normal rates, not as unexplained investment under Section 69B and taxed under Section 115BBE.
The Tribunal held that interest paid on delayed TDS is not a business expenditure and thus not deductible. The issue of RBI penalty was remanded for fresh adjudication. The ESOP expenses and broken period interest were held to be allowable business expenditures.
The Tribunal held that interest paid on delayed TDS is not a business expenditure and thus not deductible. The issue of RBI penalty was remanded for fresh adjudication. The ESOP expenses and broken period interest were held to be allowable business expenditures.
The Tribunal held that the Income Tax Act is a welfare legislation and the appellant deserves one more opportunity to rectify the shortcomings. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal found that the AO had not considered the assessee's submissions and erroneously presumed agreement for the disallowance. Therefore, the order of the AO was set aside for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessees failed to provide necessary records and evidence to substantiate their claim that the payees had offered the income to tax. The assessees' contention was rejected for want of corresponding evidence.
The Tribunal held that the assessees failed to provide necessary records and evidence to substantiate their claim that the payees had offered the income to tax. The assessees' contention was rejected for want of corresponding evidence.
The tribunal held that the NFAC should have decided the appeal on merits, even in case of non-prosecution. The matter was remanded back to the NFAC for a decision on merits.
The National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) dismissed the assessee's appeal without proper consideration of the facts and submissions. The tribunal found the NFAC's order to be unsustainable due to a perfunctory approach.
The tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s rejection was unjustified as the assessee was not given a reasonable and effective opportunity to present its case and evidence. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(E).