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285 orders · Page 4 of 6
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the assessees are entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) on interest income, following previous decisions of the Pune Benches. The impugned orders of the PCIT were not sustained.
The Tribunal held that initiating reassessment proceedings solely to verify bank transactions, without a belief that income had escaped assessment, lacks jurisdictional validity. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings and the consequential order were set aside.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(Exemption) had not adequately verified the objects and activities of the assessee, nor the status of the amended Trust Deed with the Charity Commissioner. Therefore, the case was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal granted permission to the assessee to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was in possession of a valid completion certificate as on March 31, 2012, as the cancellation was later revoked and validated. It is not for the Income Tax Department to question certificates issued by Municipal Authorities.
The Tribunal held that corpus donations are also subject to Section 115BBC if the identity of the donors (name and address) is not maintained. However, the AO's approach of making additions for donors whose addresses were provided was improper.
The Tribunal, following its own precedent, held that a cooperative society is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) on interest income earned from deposits with cooperative banks. The insertion of section 80P(4) does not affect this eligibility.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) is not empowered to dismiss an appeal in limine, even if the assessee does not appear. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh disposal on merits.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back for fresh disposal. The assessee was granted an opportunity to present their case and lead fresh evidence.
The Tribunal held that unsold flats treated as stock-in-trade should be taxed as business income, not income from house property. It also found that the PCIT failed to provide material to justify disallowing the provision for future common area expenses, thus the PCIT's revisionary order was not justified.
The tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal. The Departmental Representative did not object to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that since the AO accepted the revised return of income without any variation, the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) was not justified. Therefore, the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative society is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from deposits with other cooperative societies, even after the insertion of Section 80P(4). The PCIT's order was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in assuming revisionary powers. Since the case was selected for limited scrutiny on specific issues, the AO was not required to examine issues outside the scope of that limited scrutiny.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, allowing the pro-rata deduction under Section 80IB(10) based on previous years' decisions for the assessee. It also upheld the deletion of deemed rent addition, stating the relevant amendment was not applicable and no provision existed for taxing unsold stock as rental income.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request for withdrawal and, with no objection from the Revenue, allowed the withdrawal.
The Tribunal upheld the denial of exemption under Section 11. It found that the payments to trustees, the purchase of a Mercedes Benz, and foreign travel expenses constituted a diversion of trust funds for the benefit of interested persons, violating Section 13(1)(c) and 13(2)(c). Consequently, the entire income of the trust was liable to be taxed at the Maximum Marginal Rate.
The Tribunal held that the expenditure on replacing damaged print heads was a current repair and not a capital expenditure, thus eligible for deduction. It also held that writing off bad debts in the books of account is sufficient for claiming deduction under Section 36(1)(vii).
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide sufficient evidence for the payment of Rs. 7,95,000/- to the architect. However, considering the welfare nature of the Income-Tax Act, the matter was remanded for detailed factual verification.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal, upholding the order of the CIT(A). Regarding Ground No. 1, the Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear before the Tribunal and did not provide any written submissions or adjournment letters. It found no evidence on record to rebut or controvert the additions confirmed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s reasoning that the cash payments of Rs. 64,66,000 were disallowable under Section 40A(3) as the assessee could not demonstrate that the payments were covered under any exception mentioned in Rule 6DD. The CIT(A) had also held that the assessee's argument of genuine payments was not acceptable and that the disallowance made by the AO invoking Section 40A(3) was in order. For Ground No. 2, the Tribunal also found merit in the CIT(A)'s order, which held that the assessee failed to explain the source of investment of Rs. 89,66,000, and that the burden of proof lay on the assessee. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's observation in CIT Vs. K.Y.Pilliah that if the Tribunal fully agrees with the lower appellate authority and has no other grounds, it does not act illegally by not repeating the grounds. Therefore, both grounds of appeal were dismissed.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT's order and remanded the case for de novo adjudication. The assessee was directed to submit all relevant documents to the CIT(Exemption), who was also instructed to provide a hearing.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative society is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from deposits with other cooperative societies, even after the insertion of Section 80P(4). The PCIT's order was found to be unjustified.
The Tribunal found that neither the assessee nor the revenue could clearly establish under which object clause the artificial insemination activity was being carried out. Therefore, a proper analysis of the objects and activities was required.
The Tribunal held that mere filing of documentary evidence is insufficient to discharge the onus of proving identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of loans. The creditors failed to explain the source of the loans, thus affirming the addition.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the disallowance, citing judicial consistency and identical facts to prior favorable rulings for the assessee. The Assessing Officer's disallowance was noted to be for keeping the issue alive.
The Tribunal partially allowed the assessee's appeal. It reversed the Pr. CIT's directions regarding Section 14A/Rule 8D disallowance and Section 56(2)(vii) applicability. However, it upheld the Pr. CIT's directions concerning Section 36(1)(iii) interest disallowance and deemed rent computation.
The Tribunal restored the issue of computing the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) to the Assessing Officer. The AO was directed to allow netting if proportionate interest expenditure is disallowed, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(Exemption)'s order and remanded the case for de novo adjudication. The assessee was directed to file all relevant documents before the CIT(Exemption), who was also instructed to provide an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) is bound to satisfy himself about the genuineness of the trust's objects and activities. Since the assessee failed to provide the necessary documents, the case was set aside for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that employees' contributions to Provident Fund and ESIC must be deposited before the statutory due dates to be eligible for deduction. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services (P) Ltd., the Tribunal found that the disallowance was justified.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT failed to pinpoint any specific default by the Assessing Officer. The assessment order was found to be neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue's interest, as the Assessing Officer had conducted necessary inquiries.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had conducted sufficient inquiries and recorded findings regarding the cash withdrawals and payments. Therefore, the PCIT's revision direction was not justified as the assessment was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 54F restricting the deduction to one residential house was prospective and not applicable to purchases made before April 1, 2015. It also upheld the disallowance of payments made to sisters as they were not proven to be for acquisition or improvement of the capital asset.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, stating that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the genuineness of creditors. The assessee was provided opportunities for cross-examination and rebuttal, which were not utilized effectively.
The Tribunal held that the departmental authorities failed to determine the correct cost of acquisition as per the provisions of the Act. The CIT(A) also erred in not complying with the statutory provisions regarding the computation of capital gains.
The Tribunal held that the DRP cannot set aside issues for further enquiry to the Assessing Officer as per Section 144C(8). The DRP's direction to set aside the issue was quashed.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to restrict the Section 14A disallowance to Rs. 50,000 for each assessment year. The Tribunal also affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the disallowance of accrued interest income on NPAs, following previous orders.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to restrict the Section 14A disallowance to Rs. 50,000 for each assessment year. The Tribunal also affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the disallowance of accrued interest income on NPAs, following previous orders.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to restrict the Section 14A disallowance to Rs. 50,000 for each assessment year. The Tribunal also affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the disallowance of accrued interest income on NPAs, following previous orders.
The Tribunal held that the failure of the Assessing Officer to specify the limb under section 271(1)(c) in the show cause notice vitiates the penalty proceedings. Relying on a jurisdictional High Court decision, the penalty was deleted on this ground alone.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in invoking Section 263 as the Assessing Officer had applied his mind to the issue of interest earned on the capital grant and taken a plausible view based on the restrictions on its utilization. The revisionary order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the complete absence of a Section 143(2) notice in reassessment proceedings renders the assessment invalid, and Section 292BB only cures infirmities in service, not the absence of notice. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was upheld.