64 orders · Page 1 of 2
The Tribunal permitted the assessees to withdraw their appeals. The Revenue's representative did not object to this request.
The Tribunal permitted the assessees to withdraw their appeals. The Revenue did not object to the withdrawal applications.
The Tribunal permitted the assessees to withdraw their appeals. The Revenue did not object to the withdrawal applications.
The Tribunal held that Section 115BBE is not applicable as the disclosed income was from business and offered under the head 'income from business'. The Tribunal also held that this income should be included in book profits for computing partner's remuneration.
The Tribunal permitted the assessees to withdraw their appeals. The Revenue did not object to the withdrawal applications.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request to withdraw the appeals. The Revenue representative had no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request to withdraw the appeals. The revenue representative reported no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request for withdrawal. The Revenue reported no objection to the withdrawal of the appeals.
The Tribunal held that royalty is not a tax and therefore Section 43B is not attracted. It also held that the conversion charges paid were for removing a restriction and were revenue in nature, not capital expenditure. The issue of suppression of sales was not explicitly detailed in the provided text but the overall outcome suggests it was also decided in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not get an opportunity to present its case before the CIT(A). Therefore, the issue was remanded to the AO for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee to submit evidence.
The Tribunal held that the Pr. CIT was justified in invoking Section 263 as the AO had not examined the issues pointed out by the Pr. CIT. Consequently, the assessment order was set aside as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.
The Tribunal held that royalty is not a tax and therefore Section 43B is not attracted. It also held that the conversion charges paid were for removing a restriction and were revenue in nature, not capital expenditure. The issue of suppression of sales was not explicitly detailed in the provided text but the overall outcome suggests it was also decided in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that royalty is not a tax and therefore Section 43B is not attracted. It also held that the conversion charges paid were for removing a restriction and were revenue in nature, not capital expenditure. The issue of suppression of sales was not explicitly detailed in the provided text but the overall outcome suggests it was also decided in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that it is a settled principle that only investments yielding exempt income should be considered for computing expenditure related to exempt income. The AO's disallowance was confirmed by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request for withdrawal of all the appeals. The Revenue did not object to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request for withdrawal of all appeals. The Revenue reported no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that for claiming deduction on employee's contribution to PF/ESI, it must be deposited on or before the due date specified under the respective statutes. Failure to do so disentitles the assessee to the deduction.
The Tribunal found that the AO's methodology for disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) needed reconsideration. The issue was remanded to the AO to consider only those investments that yielded exempt income.
The Tribunal found that there was no clear basis for the AO's valuation and that both parties agreed the matter required fresh examination by the AO. Therefore, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the payments made for ore analysis charges were for services utilized for earning income from a source outside India. Therefore, these payments fell within the exclusionary clause of Section 9(1)(vii)(b) and were not taxable in India, meaning no TDS was required.
The Tribunal held that the issue of eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) or 80P(2)(d) for interest earned on investments with cooperative banks is covered by judicial precedents in favour of the assessee. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) and also under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Since the issue was covered by judicial precedents in favour of the assessee, the assessment order could not be considered erroneous.
The Tribunal found that the AO's methodology for disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) needed reconsideration. The issue was remanded to the AO to consider only those investments that yielded exempt income.
The ITAT held that the Pr. CIT had the jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 154, as the issue of non-levy of capital gains under Section 45(4) was indeed raised in the original Section 263 proceedings. Therefore, the assessee's grounds failed.
The Tribunal, following its own precedent, remanded the issues concerning forward contracts and forward premium expenses back to the Assessing Officer for verification and re-computation.
The CIT(A) was justified in not allowing 100% of certified export profits as this claim was not part of the original assessment order. The tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was not maintainable due to low tax effect, as per the CBDT circulars. However, the Revenue was given liberty to apply for revival if exceptions were found later.
The Tribunal, following its own precedent, remanded the issues concerning forward contracts and forward premium expenses back to the Assessing Officer for verification and re-computation.
The Tribunal held that the issue of eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) or 80P(2)(d) for interest earned on investments with cooperative banks is covered by judicial precedents in favour of the assessee. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the issue of eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) or 80P(2)(d) for interest earned on investments with cooperative banks is covered by judicial precedents in favour of the assessee. Therefore, the revision order by the PCIT was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) and also under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Since the issue was covered by judicial precedents in favour of the assessee, the assessment order could not be considered erroneous.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided party-wise details of brokerage payments, and the rate of brokerage paid was reasonable and consistent with previous years where similar deductions were allowed. Therefore, the disallowance was unjustified.
The Tribunal held that for an unabated assessment year, no addition can be made under section 153A if no incriminating material is found during the search. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was upheld.
The Tribunal held that for an unabated assessment year, no addition can be made under section 153A if no incriminating material is found during the search. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was upheld.
The tribunal held that it would be just and fair to set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the Principal CIT for passing a fresh revisionary order after providing the assessee with an opportunity of hearing and considering their submissions.
The Tribunal held that the Pr.CIT's presumption of undisclosed income was not justified, especially since the assessee provided a detailed explanation for lower expenses which the AO accepted. The AO's view was not legally or factually unsustainable.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back for a fresh decision. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 143(2) was issued beyond the prescribed time limit. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were invalid, and the assessment order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 143(2) was issued beyond the prescribed time limit. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were invalid, and the assessment order was set aside.
The Tribunal, following the decision of a coordinate bench and various High Courts, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society on surplus funds invested with scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal remitted the issue of interest income from associate members to the Assessing Officer for verification of state legislature provisions regarding 'member' definition. For interest income from surplus investments, the Tribunal allowed the deduction, following the view that it partakes the character of business income eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits made with co-operative banks and scheduled banks qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The reasoning of the lower authorities was found unacceptable.
The Tribunal, following the decision of a coordinate bench and various High Courts, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society on surplus funds invested with scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal, following the decision of a coordinate bench and various High Courts, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society on surplus funds invested with scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.