64 orders · Page 2 of 2
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that late fees under Section 234E could only be levied prospectively from June 1, 2015, as the mechanism for levying such fees under Section 200A was introduced on that date. Therefore, the levy of late fees for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was without authority of law.
The Tribunal held that deduction under section 36(1)(va) is allowable only if the employees' share is deposited before the due date stipulated under the respective Acts, and the due date for filing the return of income is not relevant for this purpose. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services P. Ltd., the disallowance was upheld.
The Tribunal held that deduction under section 36(1)(va) is allowable only if the employees' share is deposited before the due date stipulated under the respective Acts, and the due date for filing the return of income is not relevant for this purpose. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services P. Ltd., the disallowance was upheld.
The Tribunal held that newspaper publication is considered manufacturing for the purpose of additional depreciation. It further ruled that machinery acquired and installed after March 31, 2005, is eligible for additional depreciation, irrespective of whether it was installed in the year of acquisition or a subsequent year.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The lower authorities' reasoning for denial was found to be without merit.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer lacked the jurisdiction to disallow the Section 80P deduction at the processing stage under Section 143(1)(a)(v) for returns filed belatedly, as the relevant amendment enabling such disallowance came into effect later. Therefore, the disallowance was set aside.
The Tribunal held that Section 80AC, which disentitles claims for late filing, was not applicable for AY 2017-18. Regarding the cash deposits, the Tribunal found that the assessee had not presented the substantiating documents to the lower authorities and remanded the issue for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC's order was not in consonance with Section 250(6) of the Act, which requires stating points for determination, decision, and reasons. The matter was remanded for de-novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that while Section 234E was effective from July 1, 2012, the enabling provision under Section 200A(1)(c) for levying such fees came into force only on June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees levied for defaults prior to this date were unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned from surplus business funds, even if categorized as 'Income from Other Sources', should be included in book profit for calculating partner remuneration deduction under Section 40(b)(v). This is because the net profit in the profit and loss account, which forms the basis of book profit, includes all incomes.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer lacked the jurisdiction to disallow the Section 80P deduction at the processing stage under Section 143(1)(a)(v) for returns filed belatedly, as the relevant amendment enabling such disallowance came into effect later. Therefore, the disallowance was set aside.