ITAT Nagpur Judgments — September 2026

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had travelled beyond the reasons for reopening the assessment. The reassessment proceedings were initiated to examine cash deposits and withdrawals. However, the Assessing Officer, while satisfied with the explanation for cash deposits/withdrawals, eventually made a disallowance under Section 80P(2) of the Act. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the jurisdictional Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., which states that if an Assessing Officer accepts the assessee's contention regarding the initial reason for reopening, it is not open for him to independently assess some other income without issuing a fresh notice under Section 148. The Tribunal also referred to Gujarat High Court's approval of the Jet Airways decision and the Delhi High Court's view that for every new issue, a fresh notice under Section 148 would be required. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the reassessment proceedings as invalid and bad in law because no fresh notice under Section 148 was issued for the disallowance on a new issue not raised in the original notice. The finding of the learned CIT(A) was set aside, and the assessee succeeded on the legal issue. Dealing with the remaining grounds on merit was deemed academic.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had travelled beyond the reasons for reopening the assessment. The reassessment proceedings were initiated to examine cash deposits and withdrawals. However, the AO eventually made a disallowance under Section 80P of the Act, which was not part of the original reasons recorded for reopening. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the jurisdictional Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., which states that if an AO accepts the assessee's contention regarding the escaped income that formed the basis for reopening, it is not open for the AO to independently assess some other income without issuing a fresh notice under Section 148. The Tribunal also referred to the Gujarat High Court's approval of the Jet Airways decision and other High Court decisions, emphasizing that the AO cannot conduct a roving inquiry into unrelated items of income. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed as invalid and bad in law, and the findings of the CIT(A) were set aside. The remaining grounds on merit were deemed academic. The same decision was applied mutatis mutandis to AY 2019-20.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had travelled beyond the reasons for reopening the assessment. The reassessment proceedings were initiated to examine cash deposits and withdrawals. However, the AO eventually made a disallowance under Section 80P of the Act, which was not part of the original reasons recorded for reopening. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down by the jurisdictional Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., which states that if an AO accepts the assessee's contention regarding the escaped income that formed the basis for reopening, it is not open for the AO to independently assess some other income without issuing a fresh notice under Section 148. The Tribunal also referred to the Gujarat High Court's approval of the Jet Airways decision and other High Court decisions, emphasizing that the AO cannot conduct a roving inquiry into unrelated items of income. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed as invalid and bad in law, and the findings of the CIT(A) were set aside. The remaining grounds on merit were deemed academic. The same decision was applied mutatis mutandis to AY 2019-20.

The Tribunal held that the addition for rental income and disallowance of salary expenses were not justified, as these issues were already decided in favour of the assessee for a prior assessment year. The Tribunal also found that the interest paid at 18% on unsecured loans was reasonable and commercially expedient, deleting the disallowance.

The Tribunal found that the transaction was duly explained, involving VAT payment and facilitation charges. The assessee's past conduct of making e-payments for others was also considered.

The Tribunal held that Section 167B of the Income Tax Act, which prescribes the MMR, is not applicable to charitable trusts serving the public at large. Therefore, the assessee's income should be taxed at the normal rates applicable to AOPs.

The Tribunal held that providing less than seven days to reply to a notice under Section 148A(b) is a violation of mandatory provisions. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were deemed void ab initio, and the penalty was deleted as it was dependent on the addition.

The Tribunal held that penalty proceedings under Section 271D are invalid if not initiated after recording proper satisfaction during assessment proceedings. Since no assessment proceedings were initiated and no valid satisfaction was recorded by the Assessing Officer, the penalty was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the addition was based solely on uncorroborated third-party data without independent investigation or evidence of payment. It also found a serious violation of natural justice due to the denial of cross-examination opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, the addition for bogus/unaccounted purchases was deleted.

The Tribunal held that the penalty order was indeed passed beyond the prescribed limitation period. Consequently, the penalty levied was deleted, and the appeal was allowed on this legal ground.

The Tribunal held that providing less than seven days to reply to a notice under Section 148A(b) is a violation of mandatory provisions. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were deemed void ab initio, and the penalty was deleted as it was dependent on the addition.

The Tribunal admitted additional grounds regarding the invalidity of the Section 143(2) notice and remitted this legal issue back to the CIT(A) for adjudication. The Tribunal also ruled in favor of the assessee on the applicability of Section 115BBE, stating it was not retrospective. Merits of other grounds were also remitted to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice was invalid as it was based on 'borrowed satisfaction' and lacked independent application of mind by the AO. Furthermore, the disallowance of purchases was erroneous due to the lack of corroborative evidence and the denial of the assessee's right to cross-examine the third-party informant.

The Tribunal found that one of the properties was owned by a company, not the assessee. The other property was jointly owned, but the assessee had not contributed to its purchase. Therefore, the assessee was considered to own only one house property at the relevant time.

The Tribunal held that since the assessee exercised the option under Section 115BAC in the prior year and filed the return for the impugned assessment year before the due date, they are eligible for the new tax regime. The CIT(A)'s confirmation of the CPC's action was deemed an error.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of the appeal on merits even in an ex-parte order. Therefore, the issues were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for necessary adjudication.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by credit cooperative societies from investments in nationalized banks, made for business purposes like liquidity and safety of funds, is part of their business income. Therefore, it is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).

The Tribunal held that the restructuring of MSEB into MSEDCL, beyond the assessee's control, should not disentitle the assessee from claiming benefits available to State Government employees. The assessee is entitled to the full exemption for gratuity and leave encashment.

The Tribunal held that the amount received by BSNL employees under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019, is in the nature of retrenchment compensation and is a capital receipt exempt from tax under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cash in hand from withdrawals from their disclosed bank accounts prior to the investment date, thus explaining the source of the investment. Consequently, the addition for unexplained investment was deleted.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding a reasonable cause. The Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remit the issue back for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee an opportunity to present their case.

The Tribunal held that the assessee society is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act for interest income from Cooperative Banks. The finding of the CIT(A) was reversed.

The Tribunal held that the amount received by BSNL employees under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019, is in the nature of retrenchment compensation and is a capital receipt exempt from tax under Section 10(10B) of the Act. The orders of the CIT(A) were set aside.

The Tribunal held that since M/s. Manikgarh Cement was the manufacturer and seller of the goods, and they paid the actual freight to the truck operators, the assessee was not liable to deduct TDS on the freight charges included in the goods invoice.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 774 days, citing the principle of substantial justice over technical considerations. The case was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal noted that the sale deed was executed in December 2016, falling in AY 2017-18, not AY 2016-17 as considered by the AO. Furthermore, evidence suggested cash receipts were prior to the amendment of Section 269SS, thus no penalty was leviable for the year under consideration.

The Tribunal held that the initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271D without prior assessment proceedings and without recording a valid satisfaction by the Assessing Officer is not valid. Following judicial precedents, the Tribunal found that the penalty proceedings were not in accordance with the law.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and allowed the appeal for statistical purposes, setting aside the penalty order. The Assessing Officer can take action based on fresh adjudication of quantum proceedings.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cash in hand from withdrawals from their disclosed bank accounts prior to the investment date, thus explaining the source of the investment. Consequently, the addition for unexplained investment was deleted.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proving his claim of being a commission agent with credible documentary evidence. Therefore, the estimation of income at 8% of total credits by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) was upheld.

The Tribunal noted that the issue leading to the appeal was resolved by a subsequent rectification order passed by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the appeal was rendered infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proving his claim of being a commission agent with credible documentary evidence. Therefore, the estimation of income at 8% of total credits by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) was upheld.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's medical condition. It held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence to prove the construction of the residential house within the stipulated time frame, fulfilling the conditions of Section 54F.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned from scheduled banks, including private sector banks like ICICI Bank, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) as it is derived from utilizing funds for business purposes and maintaining liquidity/safety.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had complied with the third proviso to Section 44AB by getting its accounts audited under another law before the specified date. Therefore, the penalty levied for the delay in furnishing the tax audit report was deleted.

The Tribunal confirmed the penalty for concealment of income, stating the assessee had offered less income despite being aware of the transactions and the need for presumptive taxation. However, the penalty for non-maintenance of books of account was deleted as income was estimated under Section 44AD, which does not mandate regular books.

The Tribunal confirmed the penalty for concealment of income, stating the assessee had offered less income despite being aware of the transactions and the need for presumptive taxation. However, the penalty for non-maintenance of books of account was deleted as income was estimated under Section 44AD, which does not mandate regular books.

The Tribunal held that the penalty order was passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 275 of the Act, even considering the extensions granted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the penalty order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the allegations made by the PCIT did not constitute any of the specified violations as defined in the Explanation to Section 12AB(4) of the Income Tax Act. It further noted that the conditions for provisional registration did not mention the alleged violations as grounds for cancellation.

The Tribunal held that interest earned by a co-operative society on its business funds kept as deposits with banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal followed previous decisions of the ITAT and jurisdictional High Court on this matter.

The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted sufficient inquiries and accepted a plausible view regarding the loan transaction. The PCIT's revisionary powers under Section 263 were not justified as the AO's order was not demonstrably erroneous or prejudicial to revenue.

The Tribunal held that the CBDT circular, with retrospective effect, mandates that appeals with a tax effect below Rs. 60.00 lakh should not be pressed or should be withdrawn. Therefore, the appeal was not maintainable.

The Tribunal found that the AO had made relevant inquiries and the assessee had provided detailed responses. The revisionary authority's conclusion of an erroneous assessment was based on suspicion without further investigation, thus the assessment orders were not erroneous.

The Tribunal found that the AO had made relevant inquiries and the assessee had provided detailed responses. The revisionary authority's conclusion of an erroneous assessment was based on suspicion without further investigation, thus the assessment orders were not erroneous.

The Tribunal found that the AO had made relevant inquiries and the assessee had provided detailed responses. The revisionary authority's conclusion of an erroneous assessment was based on suspicion without further investigation, thus the assessment orders were not erroneous.

The Tribunal held that the income from the sale of developed plots was already taxed in the hands of the developer, thus taxing the assessee's share again would be double taxation. Regarding Section 40A(3), the Tribunal found peculiar circumstances where cash was deposited into the seller's loan accounts, and considering judicial precedents, deleted the disallowance.

The Tribunal held that the income from the sale of developed plots was already taxed in the hands of the developer, thus taxing the assessee's share again would be double taxation. Regarding Section 40A(3), the Tribunal found peculiar circumstances where cash was deposited into the seller's loan accounts, and considering judicial precedents, deleted the disallowance.

The Tribunal held that the income from the sale of developed plots was already taxed in the hands of the developer, thus taxing the assessee's share again would be double taxation. Regarding Section 40A(3), the Tribunal found peculiar circumstances where cash was deposited into the seller's loan accounts, and considering judicial precedents, deleted the disallowance.

The Tribunal found that the AO had made relevant inquiries and the assessee had provided detailed responses. The revisionary authority's conclusion of an erroneous assessment was based on suspicion without further investigation, thus the assessment orders were not erroneous.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT cannot assume jurisdiction under Section 263 merely by asserting that the AO could have taken a different view. The PCIT must establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law or that the AO's findings are not probable, which requires some minimal inquiry.