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173 orders · Page 3 of 4
The assessee brought to the tribunal's notice a subsequent rectification order under Section 154 of the Act, where the CPC accepted the assessee's original claim, rendering the earlier order obsolete. The tribunal noted that the Revenue's appeal was against the Commissioner's remand order and not the original assessment.
The Tribunal referred to a jurisdictional High Court ruling (Tulsidas Gopalji Charitable Trust) which held that a return filed belatedly under Section 139(4), along with the necessary documentation for claiming deductions, satisfies the requirements. The Tribunal found the assessee's case similar.
The tribunal noted that the issue of whether the assessee was given an opportunity of being heard was not denied by the Revenue. Considering the peculiar facts, the tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision, ensuring a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted acknowledgments for filing some documents, indicating it wasn't a complete non-compliance. The issue required a proper adjudication.
Given the settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The Tribunal, however, granted liberty to the assessee to seek recall of this order if the dispute is not finally settled.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's lack of compliance but also recognized that the issue under section 80P appeared to be in favor of the assessee. Considering the Covid-19 period and the facts, the case was remanded for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the case was not entirely about bogus purchases and that the sale of these purchases was not disputed. To reduce litigation and for substantial justice, the addition was restricted to 5% over the Gross Profit already shown.
The Tribunal noted that the AO and the Commissioner had not explicitly rejected the belatedly filed return of income and the supporting documents. The Tribunal observed that the facts and circumstances, including the documentation submitted by the assessee regarding sales and a loan for purchase of shop/godown, needed proper examination.
While acknowledging the assessee's latches, the Tribunal decided to remand the issues back to the CIT(A) for proper adjudication due to peculiar facts and circumstances. This was to ensure substantial justice, given that the issues had not been adjudicated in the right perspective.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 446 days as it was found to be for a reasonable cause. The Tribunal noted that notices were sent to an incorrect email address, preventing the assessee from participating. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 49 days, noting that the Commissioner (Appeals) had not adjudicated the case on its merits. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for a decision on merit.
The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is unsustainable. The reasoning is based on the binding judicial precedents of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh v/s ACIT and the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in PCIT v/s Times Global Broadcasting. These judgments held that a notice under section 271(1)(c) read with section 274 of the Act is invalid if it does not specify whether the penalty proceedings are initiated for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars. Since the penalty was found to be unsustainable on a legal aspect, the Tribunal refrained from delving into the merits of the case, considering it a futile exercise. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
While acknowledging the assessee's latches, the Tribunal decided to remand the issues back to the CIT(A) for proper adjudication due to peculiar facts and circumstances. This was to ensure substantial justice, given that the issues had not been adjudicated in the right perspective.
While the CIT(E) correctly rejected the applications due to lack of relevant details provided after the impugned orders, the Tribunal, considering the assessee's long-standing involvement in social activities and prior benefits under section 11, decided to remand the appeals.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-compliance but, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances and the need for proper adjudication, decided to remand the case back to the Ld. Commissioner. This remand is subject to the assessee depositing ₹11,000/-.
The assessee's appeal was liable to be dismissed as withdrawn due to the intention to settle the dispute under the VSV Scheme and having paid the determined tax amount.
The Tribunal noted that the mention of the wrong provision was likely an inadvertent mistake. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and remanded the case back for a fresh decision on the same application.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 379 days subject to the deposit of ₹11,000, noting the reasons provided by the assessee appeared bona fide. However, on the merits, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had failed to comply with four opportunities and provide necessary documents, leading to an ex-parte decision by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the addition was unsustainable as it was based on a third-party statement that was not confronted to the assessee. The assessee had provided documentary evidence, including sale deeds and cheque payments, to establish the source of funds for the land purchase, which was registered in the name of Shri Asad Idris. The Tribunal also noted that the addition made in the case of Shri Asad Idris was on a substantive basis, not protective.
The Tribunal observed that Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction for interest income earned by a cooperative society from investments with other cooperative societies. The AO's reliance on Section 80P(4) was considered misplaced as it applies to cooperative banks, not societies investing in them. Citing various judgments, including those from coordinate benches and the Supreme Court's principle of favoring the assessee in case of ambiguity, the Tribunal held the deduction to be allowable.
While the CIT(E) correctly rejected the applications due to lack of relevant details provided after the impugned orders, the Tribunal, considering the assessee's long-standing involvement in social activities and prior benefits under section 11, decided to remand the appeals.
The assessee's appeal was dismissed as withdrawn because they wished to settle the dispute amicably. The Tribunal granted liberty to the assessee to seek recall of the order if the dispute is not settled.
The Tribunal held that the addition was made without sufficient corroborative evidence and relied solely on a seized document, violating principles of natural justice. The CIT(A) took a diametrically opposite view to that of the seller in similar transactions, indicating a miscarriage of justice.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order to be laconic and not critically examining the assessee's eligibility for exemption based on the Apex Court's ruling. The assessee also failed to effectively participate in the proceedings.
The tribunal found that the issue needed proper adjudication, especially in the absence of documentary evidence from the assessee to explain the nature and source of a certain amount. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had a valid provisional registration and the mistake in mentioning the sub-section was inadvertent. The Commissioner should have considered the application under the correct provision instead of rejecting it outright.
The Tribunal held that the payment of commission by a medical practitioner for referring patients is against public policy and not an allowable expense. Furthermore, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was outside the scope of the limited scrutiny for which the case was selected, and the appellate authority had not addressed this jurisdictional issue.
The Tribunal found that the Assessee had not violated its objects and had utilized more than 85% of its total gross receipts, including the foreign contribution. Consequently, the addition made by the lower authorities was deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, thereby deleting the addition.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's medical condition supported by documentary evidence. Observing that the lower authorities passed ex-parte orders not on merit, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal observed that due to the absence of relevant documents and submissions, the issue needed to be adjudicated properly. Therefore, the case was remanded back to the Commissioner.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide necessary documents. However, considering the peculiar facts, the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the CIT(E) subject to payment of Rs. 5,500 by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that Section 80P(4) is a proviso that excludes cooperative banks which function like commercial banks from claiming deduction under Section 80P, but it does not disallow deduction for a cooperative society earning interest from investments in other cooperative banks. Relying on Supreme Court and other Tribunal decisions, it was held that as long as the interest income is derived by a cooperative society from its investments with another cooperative society, the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) is allowable.
The Tribunal considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Despite the Departmental Representative's contention that the Commissioner erred in law by setting aside the assessment order under section 251(1)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal noted that the assessee made no compliance during the assessment proceedings, leading the Assessing Officer to make an assessment under section 144.
The Tribunal held that it is the duty of the Ld. Commissioner to decide appeals on merit, regardless of assessee's compliance. Since the Ld. Commissioner failed to do so, the case is remanded for a fresh decision after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal observed that once an appeal is dismissed on the grounds of delay or limitation, the merits of the case should not be examined. Citing various High Court judgments, it was held that proceeding to decide on merits after rejecting the delay is an error and without jurisdiction. The Tribunal found that the Ld. Commissioner, by examining the merits, effectively condoned the delay.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's non-compliance but also that the CIT(E) could not properly decide the application due to lack of documents. To ensure substantial justice, the Tribunal granted one more opportunity to the assessee to furnish the required documents, subject to a deposit of ₹11,000.
The assessee's appeal is liable to be dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to settle the dispute through the VSV Scheme or rectification. The dismissal of the appeal will not impede the disposal of the VSV Scheme application or the rectification application.
The Tribunal found no perversity or impropriety in the CIT(A)'s decision to set aside the assessment order and remand the matter to the AO for fresh consideration. The CIT(A) had rightly concluded that the issue needed fresh examination by the AO after considering the assessee's submissions. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal, relying on CBDT circulars and a precedent from the Mumbai bench, held that appeals with a tax effect below the revised monetary limit of Rs. 60,00,000, even if based on audit objections, are liable to be dismissed as withdrawn.
Citing CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., the Tribunal held that if the initial grounds for reopening under Section 147/148 are not sustained, the AO cannot independently assess other income without issuing a fresh notice under Section 148. Consequently, the addition made under Section 40A(3) without a fresh notice was unsustainable and deleted.
The CIT(A) decided the appeal ex-parte and confirmed additions of ₹ 3,93,995 u/s 69A and ₹ 40,24,234 u/s 40A(3) by dismissing the appeal. The Tribunal, considering the facts and circumstances, inclined to set aside the impugned order and remand the case.
The Tribunal held that both appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed. For ITA No. 383/NAG/2023, the Tribunal noted that the tax effect on the disputed amount was Rs. 50,07,8096/-, which is below the revised monetary limit of Rs. 60 lakhs as per CBDT Circular No. 09 of 2024. The Tribunal clarified that this limit applies to pending appeals. Therefore, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed on this ground. The Revenue was granted liberty to seek recall if the appeal falls under any exceptions in the circular. For ITA No. 384/NAG/2023, the Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A)'s findings. The CIT(A) had observed that Document B-6 was a loose paper, appearing to be rough calculation workings, and lacked explicit mention or evidence of the appellant receiving cash amounts. There were no customer signatures confirming cash payments, no revenue stamps, and no corroborative evidence that the document materialized into transactions. The CIT(A) also noted that the presumption under Section 132(4A) applies to the person from whom documents are seized, and the documents here were seized from a third party, making it illegal to raise a demand on the appellant based on such presumption. The Tribunal agreed that the AO failed to make meaningful investigation with customers and cross-link receipts with sale deeds, rendering the penalty unsustainable. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the penalty was justified.
The Tribunal held that both appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed. For ITA No. 383/NAG/2023, the Tribunal noted that the tax effect on the disputed amount was Rs. 50,07,8096/-, which is below the revised monetary limit of Rs. 60 lakhs as per CBDT Circular No. 09 of 2024. The Tribunal clarified that this limit applies to pending appeals. Therefore, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed on this ground. The Revenue was granted liberty to seek recall if the appeal falls under any exceptions in the circular. For ITA No. 384/NAG/2023, the Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A)'s findings. The CIT(A) had observed that Document B-6 was a loose paper, appearing to be rough calculation workings, and lacked explicit mention or evidence of the appellant receiving cash amounts. There were no customer signatures confirming cash payments, no revenue stamps, and no corroborative evidence that the document materialized into transactions. The CIT(A) also noted that the presumption under Section 132(4A) applies to the person from whom documents are seized, and the documents here were seized from a third party, making it illegal to raise a demand on the appellant based on such presumption. The Tribunal agreed that the AO failed to make meaningful investigation with customers and cross-link receipts with sale deeds, rendering the penalty unsustainable. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the penalty was justified.
The Tribunal held that an assessment made in the name of a deceased person without substituting the legal heir is null and void. The Tribunal also found that the cash deposits were reasonably explained and substantiated by documentary evidence, considering the age and background of the deceased assessee.
The Tribunal found that the assessee trust was indeed registered under Section 12A from the financial year 2017-18 onwards, and had obtained provisional registration from 2022-23 to 2026-27. The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s conclusions were baseless and not in line with the facts on record, as the CIT(E) did not refer to office records before dismissing the application.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is a senior citizen with past accumulated savings from agricultural activities, which are exempt. The evidence presented indicated that the source of cash deposit was adequately explained. The lower authorities erred in making the addition without proper notice or verification, and the proceedings were ex-parte.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided sufficient and reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal. The Tribunal disagreed with the CIT(A)'s decision to not condone a previous delay, which had led to the dismissal of the appeal at the first appellate level.
The Tribunal held that additions based solely on uncorroborated 'dumb documents' found during a search are unsustainable. The Assessing Officer failed to provide any corroborative evidence or conduct independent inquiries to validate the notations.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under section 153D of the Act were vitiated due to the lack of valid approval. The Tribunal found that the approvals were mechanical and template-driven, failing to demonstrate any substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material by the Approving Authority. The Tribunal emphasized that section 153D approval is a mandatory judicial function requiring independent and judicious scrutiny, not a mere administrative formality. The fact that the draft assessment order was submitted for approval before the conclusion of investigations, as indicated by subsequent notices issued to the assessee, further underscored the procedural infirmity. Applying the principles from Supreme Court judgments in Chhugamal Rajpal and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, the Tribunal concluded that the absence of valid approvals under section 153D renders the assessment orders void ab initio, as this defect is substantive and incurable. Consequently, the assessment orders for all respective assessment years were quashed, and the appeals filed by the assessees were allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were rendered infructuous and dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under section 153D of the Act were vitiated due to the lack of valid approval. The Tribunal found that the approvals were mechanical and template-driven, failing to demonstrate any substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material by the Approving Authority. The Tribunal emphasized that section 153D approval is a mandatory judicial function requiring independent and judicious scrutiny, not a mere administrative formality. The fact that the draft assessment order was submitted for approval before the conclusion of investigations, as indicated by subsequent notices issued to the assessee, further underscored the procedural infirmity. Applying the principles from Supreme Court judgments in Chhugamal Rajpal and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, the Tribunal concluded that the absence of valid approvals under section 153D renders the assessment orders void ab initio, as this defect is substantive and incurable. Consequently, the assessment orders for all respective assessment years were quashed, and the appeals filed by the assessees were allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were rendered infructuous and dismissed.