ITAT Nagpur Judgments — June 2025

The Tribunal held that the affidavits filed by the revenue to prove due application of mind for approval under Section 153D were not acceptable as they were secondary evidence and self-serving. The Tribunal found no corroborative evidence to support the claim of application of mind by the approving authority.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional CIT under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind. The approval was granted without proper verification of seized materials or satisfaction notes, rendering the assessment invalid.

The Tribunal held that the invocation of Section 147 was erroneous because the assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C read with Section 153A, given that the information originated from a search and seizure action on a related entity. The AO failed to apply the correct provision for assessment.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax (Addl.CIT) under Section 153D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid due to a lack of application of mind. The Tribunal found that the Addl.CIT granted approval mechanically, on the same day the AO sought it, and in a batch of 35 cases. This was evidenced by the fact that the AO also passed assessment orders and prepared demand notices on the same day, which is practically impossible within a few hours. The Tribunal relied on its own finding in paragraph 36 of its order, which stated that the approval was "namesake" and given in a "mechanical manner" without verifying records. The Tribunal cited various judicial pronouncements, including those from the Delhi High Court and Orissa High Court, emphasizing that approval under Section 153D requires due application of mind and cannot be a mere rubber-stamping exercise. Consequently, the assessment orders passed without valid approval under Section 153D were deemed to be void. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions made by the AO.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under Section 153A/153C read with Section 143(3) were invalid due to the lack of proper approval under Section 153D of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the approving authority, the Joint CIT, failed to apply its mind judiciously as required by law. The judgment noted that the forwarding letters from the Assessing Officer only contained assessment records, and there was no evidence that the Joint CIT had perused the seized material, appraisal reports, or other relevant documents before granting approval. The Tribunal emphasized that Section 153D approval is a quasi-judicial function, not a mere formality, and requires the approving authority to verify the incriminating material, the AO's assessment, and adherence to proper procedures. Citing the case of Sanjay Duggal v. ACIT, the Tribunal concluded that the approval was invalid because it was granted without application of mind to the necessary material. Consequently, the impugned assessments were deemed non est and a nullity. The appeals were allowed on this legal ground.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under Section 153D of the Act were without valid approval, constituting an incurable defect that rendered the assessment orders void ab initio. The Tribunal found that the approvals were mechanical and template-driven, failing to show substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material. The Approving Authority had no occasion to examine new facts that emerged after the draft order was submitted, as evidenced by subsequent notices issued to the assessee. The Tribunal emphasized that Section 153D approval is a mandatory judicial function requiring independent scrutiny, not a mere administrative formality. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal quashed the assessment orders for all respective assessment years. Consequently, the appeals filed by the assessee were allowed, and the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed as infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Department under Section 153D was invalid as it lacked independent application of mind and was based on self-serving affidavits without corroborative evidence.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional CIT under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind. This rendered the assessment orders invalid.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under section 153D of the Act were vitiated due to the lack of valid approval. The Tribunal found that the approvals were mechanical and template-driven, failing to demonstrate any substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material by the Approving Authority. The Tribunal emphasized that section 153D approval is a mandatory judicial function requiring independent and judicious scrutiny, not a mere administrative formality. The fact that the draft assessment order was submitted for approval before the conclusion of investigations, as indicated by subsequent notices issued to the assessee, further underscored the procedural infirmity. Applying the principles from Supreme Court judgments in Chhugamal Rajpal and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, the Tribunal concluded that the absence of valid approvals under section 153D renders the assessment orders void ab initio, as this defect is substantive and incurable. Consequently, the assessment orders for all respective assessment years were quashed, and the appeals filed by the assessees were allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were rendered infructuous and dismissed.

The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made solely based on WhatsApp conversations or electronic data without corroborative evidence. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the addition.

The Tribunal held that the affidavits filed by the revenue authorities were not sufficient to prove that the approval under section 153D was granted with due application of mind. The tribunal found the affidavits to be self-serving and lacking corroborative evidence.

The Tribunal held that the affidavits filed by the revenue authorities were not acceptable as evidence to prove due application of mind for granting approval under Section 153D. The Tribunal found the approvals to be in a template format and lacking corroborative evidence of actual review of draft orders.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D lacked application of mind and was not based on an independent examination of the relevant material. Consequently, the assessment orders were deemed invalid.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under section 153D of the Act were vitiated due to the lack of valid approval. The Tribunal found that the approvals were mechanical and template-driven, failing to demonstrate any substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material by the Approving Authority. The Tribunal emphasized that section 153D approval is a mandatory judicial function requiring independent and judicious scrutiny, not a mere administrative formality. The fact that the draft assessment order was submitted for approval before the conclusion of investigations, as indicated by subsequent notices issued to the assessee, further underscored the procedural infirmity. Applying the principles from Supreme Court judgments in Chhugamal Rajpal and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, the Tribunal concluded that the absence of valid approvals under section 153D renders the assessment orders void ab initio, as this defect is substantive and incurable. Consequently, the assessment orders for all respective assessment years were quashed, and the appeals filed by the assessees were allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were rendered infructuous and dismissed.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had a justifiable and unintentional cause for the delay. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order, directed condonation of the delay, and remanded the case for adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of WhatsApp conversations without corroborative evidence. Relying on judicial precedents and Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the addition.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under section 153D of the Act were vitiated due to the lack of valid approval. The Tribunal found that the approvals were mechanical and template-driven, failing to demonstrate any substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material by the Approving Authority. The Tribunal emphasized that section 153D approval is a mandatory judicial function requiring independent and judicious scrutiny, not a mere administrative formality. The fact that the draft assessment order was submitted for approval before the conclusion of investigations, as indicated by subsequent notices issued to the assessee, further underscored the procedural infirmity. Applying the principles from Supreme Court judgments in Chhugamal Rajpal and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, the Tribunal concluded that the absence of valid approvals under section 153D renders the assessment orders void ab initio, as this defect is substantive and incurable. Consequently, the assessment orders for all respective assessment years were quashed, and the appeals filed by the assessees were allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were rendered infructuous and dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under section 153D of the Act were vitiated due to the lack of valid approval. The Tribunal found that the approvals were mechanical and template-driven, failing to demonstrate any substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material by the Approving Authority. The Tribunal emphasized that section 153D approval is a mandatory judicial function requiring independent and judicious scrutiny, not a mere administrative formality. The fact that the draft assessment order was submitted for approval before the conclusion of investigations, as indicated by subsequent notices issued to the assessee, further underscored the procedural infirmity. Applying the principles from Supreme Court judgments in Chhugamal Rajpal and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, the Tribunal concluded that the absence of valid approvals under section 153D renders the assessment orders void ab initio, as this defect is substantive and incurable. Consequently, the assessment orders for all respective assessment years were quashed, and the appeals filed by the assessees were allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were rendered infructuous and dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the affidavits filed by the revenue authorities were not acceptable as evidence to prove the application of mind for granting approval under Section 153D. The affidavits were considered self-serving and lacked corroborative evidence of a proper review process.

The Tribunal held that the affidavits filed by the revenue authorities were not acceptable as they constituted secondary evidence and lacked corroborative proof of application of mind. The Tribunal found that the approvals under Section 153D appeared to be mechanical and not based on a proper review of draft orders.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the approving authority under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked due application of mind. Citing the Indore Tribunal's decision in ITA Nos. 38 to 40/Ind/2020 and the Pune Tribunal's decision in SMW Ispat (P) Ltd v. ACIT, which in turn relied on the Orissa High Court's judgment in Serajuddin & Co., the Tribunal found that the approving authority failed to examine the relevant materials in detail before granting approval. The judgment notes that in the case of SMW Ispat (P) Ltd, the approval was granted within a day, indicating a mechanical exercise. The Tribunal concluded that such mechanical approval, without proper verification of evidence, documents, and statements, vitiates the assessment orders. Therefore, the appeals filed by the assessees challenging the validity of these approvals are allowed, and the assessment orders are set aside. The appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed under Section 153D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were void ab initio due to the lack of valid approval. The Court found that the approvals were granted without proper application of mind, as evidenced by the mechanical and template-driven nature of the approvals, which failed to reflect substantive engagement with the draft assessment orders or seized material. The Tribunal noted that the draft assessment order was submitted for approval before the conclusion of investigations, and subsequent notices were issued to the assessee, indicating a procedural infirmity. Relying on precedents like Serajuddin & Co., Shreelekha Damani, Chhugamal Rajpal, and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, the Tribunal concluded that the absence of valid approvals under Section 153D is a substantive and incurable defect. Consequently, all assessment orders under consideration were quashed, and the appeals filed by the assessees were allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were rendered infructuous and dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 153D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not valid in the manner it was obtained. The Tribunal found that while the revenue submitted affidavits indicating discussions and reviews, these did not demonstrate a clear, independent application of mind by the approving authority for each assessment year. The Tribunal emphasized that Section 153D requires a judicial function, involving a thorough and judicious examination of the draft assessment order and relevant documents for each specific assessment year. The affidavits, while stating that discussions occurred, did not provide sufficient evidence of distinct deliberations for each year. Consequently, the Tribunal found the approval process to be flawed, leading to the invalidity of the assessment orders passed under Section 153A/153C r.w.s. 143(3). The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the additions made by the Assessing Officer, as the primary issue was the validity of the assessment proceedings themselves.