ITAT Mumbai Judgments — May 2026

The Tribunal held that the AO's findings were based on suspicion and conjectures, not concrete evidence. The transactions were conducted through registered brokers on an online stock exchange platform, and sale consideration was received through banking channels. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition made by the Assessing Officer. It found that the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions, and the Assessing Officer failed to bring contrary material on record.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (Dena Bank, post-amalgamation) is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued for AY 2015-16 after April 1, 2021, was time-barred as per the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions, including banking channels and TDS. The Assessing Officer failed to disprove the genuineness of the loans, especially since a major part was accepted, and the 'source of source' was not a requirement for the assessee. The additions were therefore unsustainable.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal regarding the taxability of IT recharge fees for AY 2011-12 and 2012-13, holding that it was not taxable as fees for technical services. For AY 2011-12, interest under section 234B was deleted, and for AY 2013-14, the issue of interest under section 234B was set aside for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the Inland Haulage Charges (IHC) are inextricably linked with the transportation of cargo in international traffic and constitute an integral and incidental part of the overall shipping operation. The movement of containers inland is not an independent domestic activity but forms part of a continuous international transportation arrangement connected with the carriage of goods by sea. The contractual obligation of the assessee is not complete until delivery to the customer within India. The Tribunal emphasized that clause 2(b) of Article 8 of the India-Taipei DTAA, which deals with profits from the use or rental of containers, provides an exception for containers used solely within the other territory. The use of the expression 'unless' indicates that only activities entirely confined within the source territory fall outside the protective ambit of Article 8. Since IHC receipts retain a direct and proximate nexus with the operation of ships in international traffic, they cannot be regarded as arising from containers 'used solely within the other territory'. Therefore, the exception in clause 2(b) does not apply, and these receipts continue to fall within the scope of Article 8 of the India-Taipei DTAA. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Safmarine Container Lines NV and the coordinate bench decision in Delmas S.A.S. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the revenue for both AYs were dismissed.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal regarding the taxability of IT recharge fees for AY 2011-12 and 2012-13, holding that it was not taxable as fees for technical services. For AY 2011-12, interest under section 234B was deleted, and for AY 2013-14, the issue of interest under section 234B was set aside for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the income attributable to the PE should be determined at a prescribed percentage of gross receipts, and if the marketing fees paid to the Indian subsidiary exceed this attributed income, no further income is taxable in India. The AO's computation on a gross basis without deductions was found contrary to precedent.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (Dena Bank, post-amalgamation) is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent, amalgamated entity is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions, including banking channels and TDS. The Assessing Officer failed to disprove the genuineness of the loans, especially since a major part was accepted, and the 'source of source' was not a requirement for the assessee. The additions were therefore unsustainable.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal regarding the taxability of IT recharge fees for AY 2011-12 and 2012-13, holding that it was not taxable as fees for technical services. For AY 2011-12, interest under section 234B was deleted, and for AY 2013-14, the issue of interest under section 234B was set aside for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions, including banking channels and TDS. The Assessing Officer failed to disprove the genuineness of the loans, especially since a major part was accepted, and the 'source of source' was not a requirement for the assessee. The additions were therefore unsustainable.

The Tribunal held that the cash deposits during demonetization were sufficiently explained by prior withdrawals and deleted the addition. It also directed the AO to apply the regular business income tax rate instead of the enhanced rate under Section 115BBE, as the addition was deleted. The disallowance of brought forward losses was to be considered based on the outcome of pending appellate proceedings.

The Tribunal held that the Inland Haulage Charges (IHC) are inextricably linked with the transportation of cargo in international traffic and constitute an integral and incidental part of the overall shipping operation. The movement of containers inland is not an independent domestic activity but forms part of a continuous international transportation arrangement connected with the carriage of goods by sea. The contractual obligation of the assessee is not complete until delivery to the customer within India. The Tribunal emphasized that clause 2(b) of Article 8 of the India-Taipei DTAA, which deals with profits from the use or rental of containers, provides an exception for containers used solely within the other territory. The use of the expression 'unless' indicates that only activities entirely confined within the source territory fall outside the protective ambit of Article 8. Since IHC receipts retain a direct and proximate nexus with the operation of ships in international traffic, they cannot be regarded as arising from containers 'used solely within the other territory'. Therefore, the exception in clause 2(b) does not apply, and these receipts continue to fall within the scope of Article 8 of the India-Taipei DTAA. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Safmarine Container Lines NV and the coordinate bench decision in Delmas S.A.S. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the revenue for both AYs were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (Dena Bank, post-amalgamation) is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (Dena Bank, post-amalgamation) is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (Dena Bank, post-amalgamation) is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (Dena Bank, post-amalgamation) is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existent entity (Dena Bank, post-amalgamation) is bad in law and void ab initio. This decision was based on Supreme Court and High Court precedents regarding jurisdictional issues.

The Tribunal held that once the transactions between the Indian entities and the assessee were found to be at arm's length price (ALP) through transfer pricing analysis, no further profit attribution to the PE could be made. The AO's addition was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal held that the fertilizer subsidy was a capital receipt, not chargeable to tax, as its dominant purpose was industrial growth and long-term development. It also ruled that the subsidy should be excluded when computing book profits under Section 115JB.

The Tribunal held that the fertilizer subsidy was a capital receipt, not chargeable to tax, as its dominant purpose was industrial growth and long-term development. It also ruled that the subsidy should be excluded when computing book profits under Section 115JB.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its primary onus by providing sufficient evidence to prove the identity, capacity, and genuineness of the lenders. The AO failed to controvert this evidence or point out specific deficiencies.

The Tribunal held that the rejection was due to a technical error in uploading documents and not a deliberate default. The assessee should be given another opportunity to present the documents.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel pointed out that the present appeal was inadvertently filed for the second time, as another appeal for the same assessment year and on the same issue (ITA No. 6285/Mum/2025) had already been adjudicated by a Coordinate Bench on 08.04.2026, allowing the assessee's appeal. The assessee's counsel demonstrated the exactness of the issue raised and dealt with by the Coordinate Bench. In light of this, the assessee's counsel submitted to withdraw the present appeal as infructuous, to which the Revenue raised no objection. The Tribunal perused the records and, considering the circumstances, dismissed the present appeal of the assessee as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was withdrawn.

The Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of hearing both parties and decided to allow the assessee one last opportunity to represent their case.

The Tribunal held that the re-opening of assessment was invalid as it violated Section 149(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, because the escaped income was less than Rs. 50 lakhs and the proceedings were initiated after 3 years. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the absence of an express irrevocability or dissolution clause in the trust deed is not a valid ground for rejecting registration under section 12AB. It also noted that the online utility compelled the assessee to answer 'Yes' to the irrevocability query.

The Tribunal held that the land retained its agricultural character based on revenue records and its location beyond specified municipal limits. The absence of agricultural income or operations did not automatically convert it into a capital asset.

The Tribunal upheld the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A). The assessee failed to provide satisfactory evidence to prove the loan was genuine and outstanding from earlier years.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had submitted new evidence, including client confirmations, which warranted further examination. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh verification and adjudication.

The Tribunal, following its own precedents and High Court decisions, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society on deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The deduction was allowed, subject to verification.

The Tribunal, following its own precedents and High Court decisions, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society on deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The deduction was allowed, subject to verification.

The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision to restrict the addition for bogus purchases to 12.5% and delete the disallowance under Section 40A(3) as the payment was made by cheque.

The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer (AO) had not properly examined the assessee's contentions. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the AO for a fresh assessment.

The Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of hearing both parties and decided to allow the assessee one last opportunity to represent their case.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of explaining the nature and source of the sum credited. The claim of acting as a "conduit" for money transfer was not substantiated with documentary evidence, hence the addition was rightly treated as unexplained.

The Tribunal held that both reassessment and appellate proceedings were ex-parte due to extraordinary circumstances like liquidation of a subsidiary and loss of access to records. It emphasized that substantial issues should be decided on merits after a fair opportunity.

The Tribunal held that the rectification order was unsustainable as the original assessment order had attained finality due to the immunity granted under Section 270AA. The Tribunal also found that the original addition was erroneously characterized as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C.

The Tribunal held that trade margins are not commission, ESOP taxation arises on exercise, and interest on delayed payments to MSMEs is not covered under Section 194A. Therefore, the assessee is not an 'assessee in default'.

The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). A co-operative bank retains the character of a co-operative society, and Section 80P(4) does not prevent a co-operative society from claiming deduction on interest received from a co-operative bank.

The Tribunal held that trade margins are not commission, ESOP taxation arises on exercise, and interest on delayed payments to MSMEs is not covered under Section 194A. Therefore, the assessee is not an 'assessee in default'.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing Form 10B, allowing the assessee to claim exemption under Section 11. However, the allowability of the claimed expenses requires factual verification by the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal held that the difference between the actual consideration and the DVO's valuation was less than 10%, falling within the permissible safe harbor limit. It further noted that the 10% safe harbor amendment is curative and retrospective.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond the surviving period of limitation, making the reassessment proceedings and the consequent order void. Therefore, the entire reassessment was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the rejection was due to a technical error in uploading documents and not a deliberate default. The assessee should be given another opportunity to present the documents.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) who had deleted the addition. The Tribunal noted that the issue with identical facts had been consistently decided in favour of the assessee by appellate authorities in previous years, and that the Revenue's appeals were pending before the High Court.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond the permissible time limit, citing Supreme Court decisions. Consequently, the notice and the reassessment order were quashed as void ab initio.