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594 orders · Page 8 of 12
The Tribunal noted that the assessee requested video conferencing, but it was unavailable, and their submissions were not considered. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) to decide the issues afresh, providing one more opportunity to the assessee to represent their case. The assessee was also allowed to raise additional grounds.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee did not maintain any books of accounts, the penalty under Section 271B for not getting accounts audited would not apply. The court cited the Allahabad High Court decision in CIT vs. Bisauli Tractors.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding reasonable and sufficient cause. It held that the impugned issues, including the disallowance under Section 40A(3) for cash payments and the non-granting of TDS/TCS credit collected in the husband's name, required a fresh examination by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the matters were restored to the AO to decide afresh after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) to decide the issues afresh, providing one more opportunity to the assessee to represent their case. The assessee was also allowed to raise additional grounds.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act and the consequential order passed under Section 148A(d) are invalid due to the lack of sanction from the specified authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that for Assessment Year 2018-19, the notice was issued on April 7, 2022, which is beyond a period of three years from the end of the assessment year. Therefore, according to Section 151(ii) of the Act, the sanctioning authority should have been the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT). The proviso to Section 151, which was inserted with effect from April 1, 2023, was held to be not applicable to the present case, as it does not have retrospective effect. The Tribunal relied on multiple judgments of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, including Vodafone India Limited, Siemens Financial Services Private Limited, and Mystique Media Pvt. Ltd., which quashed similar notices and orders for being issued without the requisite sanction. Consequently, the assessment order passed in consequence of the invalid notice was also held to be invalid. The Tribunal found it unnecessary to delve into the merits of the case. The ratio decidendi is that a notice under Section 148 issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year requires sanction from the PCCIT/Principal Director General, and a sanction from a lower authority renders the notice and subsequent assessment invalid, especially when the proviso to Section 151 is not yet in effect for the period in question.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to grant depreciation on income from letting out furniture and fixtures, which was treated as 'Income from Other Sources'. Therefore, the grievance on this issue was resolved.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal, noting that the DR did not object. The request was allowed, and the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the principle of substantial justice over technicalities. The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) to provide the assessee with an effective opportunity to be heard, subject to a cost of Rs. 5,000/-. The decision was not to be construed as a reflection on the merits of the dispute.
The tribunal held that the notice issued u/s 148 and the order passed u/s 148A(d) are invalid due to lack of proper sanction from the specified authority as per Section 151(ii) of the Act. The assessment order passed consequently is also invalid.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals. The primary reasoning for setting aside the addition of ₹2,00,000/- was the lack of corroborative material and the reliance solely on the statement of a builder and an excel sheet found from a third party. The Tribunal noted that the AO failed to bring any independent evidence on record to prove the payment of 'on-money' by the assessee, especially when the assessee consistently denied such payment. The Tribunal emphasized that electronic evidence, like the excel sheet, is not admissible without compliance with Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Furthermore, the Tribunal found a breach of the principles of natural justice as the assessee was not provided with the alleged incriminating material, nor was an opportunity for cross-examination of the persons whose statements were relied upon granted. The Tribunal cited several precedents, including CIT vs. P.V Kalyana Sundaram, Monika Anand Gupta, Mrs. Mamta Sharad Gupta, Andaman Timber Industries vs. CCE, and H.R. Mehta vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Mumbai, to support its decision that additions made solely on third-party information without proper corroboration and denial of cross-examination are bad in law. The additions for AY 2018-19 and 2020-21 were also allowed as the facts were identical. The issue regarding the notice under Section 153C without DIN was not explicitly decided but was subsumed within the overall allowance of the grounds.
The Tribunal held that the addition was not sustainable as it was based solely on third-party information without corroboration and without providing the assessee an opportunity for cross-examination. The Tribunal also noted issues with the admissibility of electronic evidence.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the CIT(A) was not sustainable. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the assessee failed to produce documentary evidence, such as sale/purchase deeds and maintenance records, despite several opportunities. However, the Tribunal noted that the impugned order did not mention any statutory notices issued by the AO asking for these documents. Furthermore, the documents that the assessee failed to furnish before the lower authorities were filed in the paper book before the Tribunal. The Tribunal concluded that dismissing the appeal in the absence of necessary documents and without affording an opportunity for an effective hearing to the assessee by the CIT(A) and AO resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the AO for deciding the matter afresh after considering the documents filed in the paper book. The assessee was directed to represent its case before the AO within 60 days. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding reasonable and sufficient cause. It held that the impugned issues, including the disallowance under Section 40A(3) for cash payments and the non-granting of TDS/TCS credit collected in the husband's name, required a fresh examination by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the matters were restored to the AO to decide afresh after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed in the name of M/s. Prism TV Pvt. Ltd. is invalid and void ab initio. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had duly intimated the fact of amalgamation of M/s. Prism TV Pvt. Ltd. with M/s. Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd. to the authorities. The erstwhile AO transferred the records to the present AO, who acknowledged the amalgamation in the assessment order itself. Despite repeated intimations from the assessee about the merger and its successor status, the AO proceeded to pass the assessment order in the name of the non-existent entity, M/s. Prism TV Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from the Mahagun case relied upon by the Revenue, stating that in Mahagun, the assessee had not informed the Revenue about the amalgamation and represented itself as the assessee, whereas in this case, the assessee had duly informed the Revenue. Therefore, the Tribunal found the Commissioner's decision dismissing the legal ground to be devoid of merit. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed as invalid and void ab initio. The Cross Objection filed by the assessee was allowed. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed as infructuous because the foundation of the additions and disallowances (the assessment order) was quashed.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals, setting aside the orders of the lower authorities. The Tribunal found that the addition of ₹2,00,000/- on account of 'on-money' was made solely on the basis of an Excel sheet allegedly found from a third party (Mr. Imran Ansari) and statements of the builder's employees. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had consistently denied making any cash payment and had provided evidence of payments through banking channels, with stamp duty paid as per the market value determined by the Stamp Duty Authority. Crucially, the Tribunal highlighted that the assessee was not provided with the alleged Excel sheet, nor was an opportunity for cross-examination of the persons whose statements were relied upon granted. The Tribunal relied on several precedents, including *CIT vs. P.V Kalyana sundasram*, *Anand Timber Industries vs. CCE*, *CIT vs. Odeon Builders Pvt. ltd.*, and *H.R. Mehta vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax*, which emphasize the necessity of corroborative material and the right to cross-examination for the admissibility of evidence and adherence to principles of natural justice. The Tribunal concluded that the addition was not sustainable in law due to the lack of independent corroboration, failure to comply with Section 65B of the Evidence Act for electronic evidence, and the breach of natural justice. The addition was directed to be deleted for all the assessment years under appeal.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer made the addition merely on general information about penny stock cases and did not consider the documentary evidence provided by the assessee, such as contract notes, broker ledgers, and bank statements. The assessee had claimed a business loss, not long-term capital gains, and the transactions were through a recognized stock exchange.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the principle of substantial justice over technicalities. The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) to provide the assessee with an effective opportunity to be heard, subject to a cost of Rs. 5,000/-. The decision was not to be construed as a reflection on the merits of the dispute.
The Tribunal held that the AO had indeed examined the claim for deduction under Section 80G, even if not explicitly mentioned in the assessment order. Therefore, the conditions for invoking Section 263, particularly Explanation 2, were not met.
The Tribunal held that the capital gain on the sale of the helicopter, even though a depreciable asset, should be treated as a long-term capital gain for the purpose of tax rates and set-off against long-term capital losses, following jurisdictional High Court precedents. The disallowance under Section 14A was also an issue.
The Tribunal held that while F&O income is business income, losses from delivery-based share trading are speculative. Therefore, such speculative losses cannot be set off against business income from F&O transactions.
The Tribunal held that the rejection by the CIT(E) was a breach of the rule of consistency, as the assessee had similar objects and had previously been granted registration under Section 12A and approval under Section 80G.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals for want of prosecution. The judgment notes that the case was listed for hearing on multiple dates, including 15.5.2025, 1.5.2025, 19.8.2025, and finally 1.10.2025. On all these dates, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant (assessee), nor was any letter of adjournment filed. The Learned Departmental Representative (DR) relied on the orders of the lower authorities. Consequently, after perusing the orders of the lower authorities and the grounds of appeal, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeals for want of prosecution. No specific finding was given on the merits of the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue failed to prove that the appellant received an accommodation entry, as the appellant's name was not found in the relevant investigation wing list. Furthermore, the Revenue did not challenge the CIT(A)'s quashing of the reopening notice.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notices issued for penalty proceedings were defective as they did not specify whether the penalty was for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. This ambiguity, particularly in mandatory provisions like Section 271(1)(c), vitiates the penalty proceedings.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 3,50,00,000/- as unexplained cash credit, finding that the assessee failed to discharge its onus under Section 68. The admission of the group's key person, coupled with the lack of genuine loan documentation and the profile of the creditors, was considered decisive.
The Tribunal held that based on a Special Bench decision in the case of Union Bank of India, the provisions of Section 115JB are not applicable to banks constituted as 'corresponding new banks' under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. Therefore, MAT is not applicable to such banks.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had made out sufficient cause for condonation of the 33-day delay in filing the application for regular registration. The Tribunal noted that the provisional registration was valid until AY 2024-25 and that the assessee, being an old entity, was entitled to regular registration by applying six months before the expiry of the provisional approval, which would have been September 30, 2024. The application filed on August 3, 2024, was therefore considered within the time limit, despite an affidavit admitting the lapse on March 31, 2024, which was deemed a misinterpretation. The Tribunal acknowledged the recent amendment to Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) of the Act, empowering the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to condone delays with reasonable cause. The Tribunal also considered the steps taken by the assessee to amend its Memorandum of Association to remove provisions for spending funds outside India, deeming this a valid rectification. The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(E) for de novo consideration on merits, directing verification of the amendments to the objective clauses. The Tribunal decided the first issue in the affirmative, allowing condonation of delay, and the second issue implicitly in favour of the assessee by directing the CIT(E) to consider the amendments. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the revision order passed by the PCIT under section 263 of the Act was not sustainable as the PCIT lacked jurisdiction. The Tribunal referred to the provisions of section 35D, which requires expenses to be incurred before commencement of business or after commencement but in connection with extension of an undertaking or setting up of a new unit. It found that these conditions were not fulfilled in the present case. The Tribunal cited the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT vs. Gabrial India Ltd. and the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Max India Ltd., emphasizing that an order cannot be termed erroneous unless it is not in accordance with law. The Tribunal stated that the power under section 263 cannot be exercised by substituting the Commissioner's judgment for the AO's, especially when the AO has conducted inquiries and applied their mind. If two views are possible and the AO has taken one, the order cannot be treated as erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue unless the AO's view is unsustainable in law. The Tribunal concluded that the PCIT had erred in invoking section 263, as the AO had taken a reasonable view by allowing the deduction under section 37(1). Consequently, the revision order was quashed, and the assessee's grounds of appeal were allowed. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is in the regular business of buying and selling real estate. The sale of the flat was correctly treated as stock-in-trade and the gains as business income. The renovation and professional expenses incurred for the new property, which is also stock-in-trade, are directly related to the business and should be allowed as revenue expenditure.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It set aside the orders of the CIT(A) for both assessment years and restored the matters to the CIT(A)'s file for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It set aside the orders of the CIT(A) for both assessment years and restored the matters to the CIT(A)'s file for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the DRP's deletion of the ad-hoc addition of 10% of commission expenses was justified. The Tribunal noted that the DRP had followed the decision of the Tribunal for the preceding Assessment Year 2009-2010, which itself relied on earlier decisions deleting similar disallowances in the case of Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd. The Tribunal found that in identical facts and circumstances, the ad-hoc disallowance was not accepted by the DRP in the prior year. Therefore, the revenue's appeal on this ground was dismissed. Regarding the AMP expenses, the Tribunal noted the assessee's reliance on the decision in 'Vodafone India Ltd.' and the Delhi High Court's ruling in 'Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v/s. CIT'. The Tribunal observed that in the 'Maruti Suzuki' case, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that the existence of an international transaction in AMP expenditure must be established independently of the bright line test, and the onus is on the AO to bring forth facts and circumstances to support such an existence. The Tribunal found that the TPO had characterized the assessee as a distributor without proper justification and that the bright line method was applied without establishing functional similarities. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee denied the existence of an international transaction for AMP expenses. The Tribunal's decision on this issue is not fully recorded in the provided extract, but it appears to lean towards the assessee's arguments based on the cited precedents.
The Tribunal held that the purchases were indeed bogus, following the jurisdictional High Court's decisions. Since the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the genuineness of the purchases with basic evidence, the entire amount of purchases was confirmed as an addition.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the initial onus by establishing the identity and genuineness of the transaction, and the lender's capacity through financial statements. Relying on coordinate benches' decisions, the Tribunal found no merit in the addition.
The Tribunal, in a majority decision, held that F&O income is business income, but losses from delivery-based share trading are speculative. Therefore, such speculative losses cannot be set off against business income from F&O transactions.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should not be penalized for an inadvertent mistake in quoting the wrong provision. The intention of seeking regular approval was clear. The rejection resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals for want of prosecution. The judgment notes that the case was listed for hearing on multiple dates, including 15.5.2025, 1.5.2025, 19.8.2025, and finally 1.10.2025. On all these dates, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant (assessee), nor was any letter of adjournment filed. The Learned Departmental Representative (DR) relied on the orders of the lower authorities. Consequently, after perusing the orders of the lower authorities and the grounds of appeal, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeals for want of prosecution. No specific finding was given on the merits of the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The Tribunal found that the reasons for reopening the assessment differed from the grounds for making the addition. It observed that the AO failed to properly investigate the documentary evidence submitted by the assessee regarding the genuineness and creditworthiness of the loan from M/s Omrim Securities Ltd., and noted that the proviso to Section 68 regarding 'source of source' was introduced later and not applicable to the relevant assessment year. Consequently, the addition made by the AO under Section 68 was deemed unsustainable.
The Tribunal deleted the transfer pricing adjustment related to advertisement expenses, following a previous decision in the assessee's own case. The Tribunal also directed the AO to verify and grant credit for TDS and MAT as per law, and disposed of the interest under Section 234B as consequential.
The Tribunal, in a majority decision, held that F&O income is business income, but losses from delivery-based share trading are speculative. Therefore, such speculative losses cannot be set off against business income from F&O transactions.
The Tribunal noted that the grounds raised were not previously adjudicated by revenue authorities. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee to raise these grounds.
The Tribunal, in a majority decision, held that F&O income is business income, but losses from delivery-based share trading are speculative. Therefore, such speculative losses cannot be set off against business income from F&O transactions.
The Tribunal noted that the grounds raised were not previously adjudicated by revenue authorities. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee to raise these grounds.
The Tribunal noted that the grounds raised were not previously adjudicated by revenue authorities. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee to raise these grounds.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had not committed any legal infirmity or perversity in deleting the addition made by the AO. The Tribunal noted that for the relevant assessment year, the assessee was not required to prove the source of the source of the funds advanced as unsecured loans. The revenue had not brought to the Tribunal's notice any inquiry conducted into the cases of the creditors if it doubted the source of the money lent by them to the assessee. The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) had rightly deleted the addition made by the AO. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and found no merit in the grounds raised by the revenue questioning the credibility of the lenders. The Tribunal relied on the principle that an assessee is only required to explain the source of the credit, not the source of the source, and that the three ingredients of identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction were sufficiently proved by the assessee. The addition made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the grounds raised were not previously adjudicated by revenue authorities. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee to raise these grounds.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred by dismissing the appeal on grounds of limitation without granting a reasonable opportunity to explain the delay or addressing the merits. It condoned the 98-day delay, deeming the explanation bona fide and sufficient, and remanded the case to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While acknowledging the appellant's non-compliance, the Tribunal decided to give one last opportunity to present their case before the CIT(A) due to the company being closed and facing disputes. The matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While acknowledging the appellant's non-compliance, the Tribunal decided to give one last opportunity to present their case before the CIT(A) due to the company being closed and facing disputes. The matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.