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594 orders · Page 12 of 12
The ITAT found that the CIT(A) had decided the issues based on the assessee's version without giving the AO an opportunity to rebut. The tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the AO for de novo assessment, directing the assessee to furnish relevant details.
The Tribunal noted that there was no discussion of the specific claims for HRA, transport allowance, and professional tax deductions by the lower authorities. In the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the jurisdictional AO to consider and verify these claims.
The Tribunal held that the grounds challenging the reopening were not adjudicated as the appellant requested to keep that ground open. The Tribunal further held that the CIT(A)'s disallowance of the gross profit element of unaccounted purchases was reasonable, as the appellant did not dispute the authenticity of the seized material. Grounds related to the denial of cross-examination and ignoring affidavits were also dismissed.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order, holding that it was contrary to Section 250(6) as the CIT(A) is mandated to dispose of appeals on merits. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a de novo decision, with an expectation of the assessee's cooperation.
The Tribunal held that the grounds challenging the reopening were not adjudicated as the appellant requested to keep that ground open. The Tribunal further held that the CIT(A)'s disallowance of the gross profit element of unaccounted purchases was reasonable, as the appellant did not dispute the authenticity of the seized material. Grounds related to the denial of cross-examination and ignoring affidavits were also dismissed.
The Tribunal decided that the suo-motu disallowance offered by the assessee for Section 14A was not accepted by the AO, and the CIT(A) had directed the AO to consider investments held as stock-in-trade for computing the disallowance. The Tribunal, in its composite order, addressed the disallowance under Section 14A. It noted that the assessee relied on the decision in Maxopp Investment Ltd. v. CIT, arguing that no disallowance was warranted when securities were held as stock-in-trade. The AO, however, observed a mixed portfolio and the need for apportionment. The Tribunal's reasoning on this issue is not fully detailed in the provided excerpt, but the outcome indicates a decision on the Section 14A disallowance. Regarding ESOP expenses, the Tribunal held that the law on the subject is unanimous, with various tribunals following the decision in Biocon Ltd. (Karnataka High Court), deciding the issue in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the ESOP scheme was part of the Annual Report and details were disclosed to the AO. The expenses were claimed at the time of actual exercise of options. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not err in law or fact by deciding this issue in favour of the assessee. The departmental appeals on this ground were dismissed. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals and dismissed the Revenue's appeals.
The Tribunal held that the addition for deemed dividend income of Rs. 23,21,000/- was not justified as it was paid against salary payable. The Tribunal also deleted the addition of Rs. 18,75,000/- for unexplained cash credit, stating that the assessee had discharged its onus and the AO failed to bring contrary evidence.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) in deleting the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had claimed bad debts in the first year of its business operations and had furnished requisite details. The disallowance was made by the AO as he was not satisfied with the response. The Tribunal found that the mere disagreement of the AO with the assessee's claim, especially when supported by judicial pronouncements like CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. (322 ITR 588 SC) and CIT Vs Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. [2013] 259 ITR(Bom), cannot be the sole reason for levying a penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars. The fact that the assessee could not file an appeal against the assessment order in time due to liquidation proceedings was also considered a peculiar circumstance. The Tribunal did not find any reason to interfere with the deletion of the penalty by the CIT(A). No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was the sole tenant, and the consent agreement clearly established this. Therefore, the entire consideration received for the surrender of tenancy rights is taxable as capital gains in the hands of the assessee, irrespective of a part being paid to his son.
The Tribunal held that the issue of prior period expenses was not properly considered by the CIT(A) and remitted it back for fresh adjudication. For the Section 14A disallowance, following Supreme Court and High Court decisions, the addition was deleted as no exempt income was earned.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not sustainable when the addition itself is made merely on an estimation basis, relying on a Bombay High Court decision. The penalty levied was accordingly deleted.
The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to confirm additions on purchases from certain parties where the assessee had not denied transactions. However, for parties where the assessee denied any transactions, the tribunal set aside the appellate order and directed the AO to delete the addition.
The Tribunal held that denying the exemption solely based on a procedural lapse (filing in the wrong form) would cause hardship and goes against the principles of equity and justice, especially when there is no dispute regarding the substantive eligibility for exemption. The doctrine of substantial compliance was invoked.
The Tribunal found that the assessee is a cooperative credit society, not a bank holding an RBI license, and pays interest only to its members, not the public. Relying on various judicial pronouncements, including CBDT Circular No. 19/2015, the Tribunal held that interest paid to members by a cooperative society (other than a cooperative bank) is not liable for TDS under Section 194A(3)(v).
The Tribunal held that the lease rentals are not taxable in India as per Article 8 of the India-Ireland DTAA, as the assessee does not have a PE in India. The penal interest for delayed payments is also not taxable in India as it is an integral part of the lease income taxable under Article 8.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to adjudicate the appeal on merits and had passed an ex-parte order in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice and fair play, contrary to the mandate of Section 250(6) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that none of the issues raised in the grounds of appeal were adjudicated. Considering the interest of natural justice and fair play, the Tribunal decided to set aside the appellate order and restore the entire matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for passing a fresh appellate order de novo. The assessee was granted a final opportunity to advance arguments and provide necessary details and evidence. The Tribunal explicitly stated that this decision did not reflect on the merits of the dispute, which would be adjudicated independently by the CIT(A). A cost of Rs. 2,000/- was imposed on the assessee for non-compliant behavior during proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that both assessee's appeals (ITA Nos. 1555 and 1573/MUM/2025) involved the issue of disallowance under Section 14A for AY 2019-20 and 2020-21, with similar facts and only figurative variations. The Tribunal considered the facts of AY 2019-20 and stated the decision would apply to AY 2020-21. The assessee claimed exempt income and offered a suo-motu disallowance, arguing that investments held as stock-in-trade should not attract disallowance under Section 14A r.w.r. 8D, citing Maxopp Investment Ltd. The AO, however, observed a mixed portfolio of securities (stock-in-trade and investments) and opined that apportionment of expenses was necessary. The AO also noted that Section 14A read with Rule 8D is mandatory and requires identification and disallowance of expenditure related to exempt income. The AO rejected the assessee's argument that no expenditure was incurred, stating that managing investments requires expertise and staff, thus incurring expenses. The judgment does not explicitly state what the Tribunal decided on these issues, but it details the arguments and the AO's reasoning. The provided text ends abruptly without the Tribunal's final decision or operative directions.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in rejecting the rectification application by treating it as a review. Section 154 allows for rectification of apparent mistakes. The Tribunal found sufficient merit in the assessee's contention that the return was filed on October 31, 2018, with the acknowledgment delayed by approximately 4 minutes and 55 seconds due to heavy server load and technical issues, which was not attributable to the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the verification part of the return showed completion on October 31, 2018. Furthermore, the timely filing of Forms 10 and 10B on the due date also indicated the assessee's bonafide intention. The Tribunal relied on the principle of substantial compliance as laid down by the Supreme Court in Dilip Kumar, emphasizing that procedural lapses should not override substantive benefits, especially when it causes genuine hardship. The Tribunal concluded that the CIT(A) took a hyper-technical view without properly considering the assessee's submissions and the evidence. The appellate order of the CIT(A) was set aside, directing the AO to allow the claim of exemption under Sections 11 and 12, subject to the satisfaction of other provisions of the Act. The issue regarding the rectification application was implicitly addressed by allowing the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A (issues 1 & 2), the Tribunal noted that the matter had been decided in favour of the assessee in preceding years by appellate authorities, including a coordinate bench. The CIT(A) had allowed the appeal on this issue. The Tribunal found that the AO's reasoning for a mixed portfolio requiring apportionment was not accepted in earlier years. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not erred in facts and law concerning the Section 14A disallowance, and the departmental appeals on this ground were dismissed. Regarding ESOP expenses (issue 3), the Tribunal observed that the issue had been consistently decided in favour of the assessee by various tribunals, following the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CIT Vs. Biocon Ltd. The Tribunal noted that the ESOP scheme was part of the Annual Report and details were disclosed to the AO. The expenses were claimed at the time of actual exercise of options. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the law on the subject was unanimous in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not erred in allowing ESOP expenses as allowable business expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Act, and the departmental appeals on this ground were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the grounds challenging the reopening were not adjudicated as the appellant requested to keep that ground open. The Tribunal further held that the CIT(A)'s disallowance of the gross profit element of unaccounted purchases was reasonable, as the appellant did not dispute the authenticity of the seized material. Grounds related to the denial of cross-examination and ignoring affidavits were also dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the lease rentals are not taxable in India as per Article 8 of the India-Ireland DTAA, as the assessee does not have a PE in India. The penal interest for delayed payments is also not taxable in India as it is an integral part of the lease income taxable under Article 8.
The Tribunal held that the assessees have failed to satisfy the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) as per Article 6 and 7 of the MLI. The Tribunal noted that the DRP's reasoning that the onus on the revenue to show PPT non-satisfaction is based only on reasonableness and not strictly evidence-based, and that the India-Ireland DTAA does not provide an LOB clause, making certain precedents inapplicable, was persuasive. The Tribunal also agreed with the DRP that the ratios of precedents like UOI v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, Tiger Global International III Holdings v. AAR, and Vodafone International Holdings BV v. UOI are no longer applicable due to the inclusion of PPT in tax treaties. Consequently, the benefits of Articles 8, 12, and 7 of the India-Ireland DTAA can only be allowed after the PPT is satisfied. The Tribunal further upheld the DRP's finding that the leasing of aircraft constitutes a finance lease and that the aircraft operated in India represents a Permanent Establishment (PE) of the assessee. The Tribunal found that the assessees satisfied the relevant tests for PE, including ownership, location, permanence, situs, disposal, control, and quiet enjoyment. Therefore, the lease payments are taxable in India. The issue of interest under section 234B and other technical grounds were not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt.
The Tribunal held that the deletion of disallowance of depreciation on goodwill by the NFAC was correct. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in DIT (IT) vs. HSBC Asset Management (I)(P) Ltd., the Tribunal noted that depreciation was first claimed in AY 2017-18 and accepted without adverse inference. The Tribunal found no error in the NFAC's findings, stating that once depreciation was allowed in an earlier year and the AO accepted the opening written down value, the AO cannot dispute it in subsequent years without disturbing the earlier order. Therefore, this ground was dismissed. Regarding CSR expenses, the Tribunal followed the consistent view of co-ordinate benches in cases like Motilal Oswal Securities Ltd., Allegis Services India Pvt. Ltd., IMS Mining Pvt. Ltd., and Elan Pharma (India) Pvt. Ltd., which held that CSR expenditure can be claimed as a deduction under Section 80G. Accordingly, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the NFAC's findings and dismissed this ground as well. The appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the lease rentals are not taxable in India as per Article 8 of the India-Ireland DTAA, as the assessee does not have a PE in India. The penal interest for delayed payments is also not taxable in India as it is an integral part of the lease income taxable under Article 8.
The Tribunal held that the deletion of the addition made by the AO on account of disallowance of depreciation on goodwill was justified. The Tribunal noted that depreciation on goodwill was first claimed in AY 2017-18 and accepted by the AO without any adverse inference. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in DIT (IT) vs. HSBC Asset Management (I)(P) Ltd. [2014] 47 taxmann.com 286 (Bombay), which held that if depreciation was allowed in earlier years, the AO cannot dispute the opening written down value in subsequent years, the Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s findings. This ground was dismissed. Regarding CSR expenses, the Tribunal found that co-ordinate benches have consistently held that CSR expenditure can be claimed as a deduction under Section 80G. Citing cases like Motilal Oswal Securities Ltd. and Allegis Services India Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal respectfully followed these precedents and found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings. This ground was also dismissed. Consequently, both appeals by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the lease rentals are not taxable in India as per Article 8 of the India-Ireland DTAA, as the assessee does not have a PE in India. The penal interest for delayed payments is also not taxable in India as it is an integral part of the lease income taxable under Article 8.
The Tribunal held that Section 50C of the Income Tax Act is applicable only when an immovable property or a right in immovable property is transferred. Since the appellant received cash compensation for a delay and not from the transfer of property, Section 50C was not applicable. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was therefore incorrect.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,20,00,000/- under Section 68. The assessee had discharged the onus by providing loan confirmations, lender's returns, bank statements, and financial statements. The Tribunal noted that similar issues concerning loans from the same parties were decided in favour of the assessee by the Co-ordinate Bench for AY 2012-13 and AY 2013-14, upholding the genuineness of the loans. The Tribunal also held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition under Section 43CA. Citing the ratio from a previous decision regarding Section 50C, the Tribunal held that the tolerance band of 10% for the difference between sale consideration and stamp duty value, introduced by a curative amendment, has retrospective effect from April 1, 2003. Since the difference in the assessee's case was 7.7%, which is less than 10%, Section 43CA was not applicable. The Tribunal did not explicitly address the additions under Section 69C and the other Section 68 addition related to commission, but by dismissing the Revenue's appeal on the primary grounds, it implicitly upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of these amounts as well.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A), holding that the reopening of assessment was invalid. The Tribunal found that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion, that reasons were not properly communicated, and that it was initiated after the expiry of the statutory period without valid justification.
The Tribunal deleted the transfer pricing adjustment, finding that the transaction was at arm's length, especially considering the consistency with prior year's DRP directions and contractual arrangements. Issues related to TDS credit and interest under Section 234C were restored to the AO for de novo consideration, while penalty proceedings were dismissed as premature.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A of the Act should be decided in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2019-20 and 2020-21, the assessee offered a suo-motu disallowance. The AO made a disallowance as per Rule 8D, considering investments held as stock-in-trade. The CIT(A) partially deleted the disallowance. The Tribunal, referring to the assessee's own case and other precedents, held that when securities are held as stock-in-trade, no disallowance under Section 14A is warranted. The Tribunal also noted that the issue of ESOP expenses had been decided in favour of the assessee in preceding years by the Tribunal, following decisions of the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Biocon Ltd. and other High Courts and Tribunals. The Tribunal found the law on ESOP expenses to be unanimous in favour of the assessee, allowing them as deductible expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals on this ground. The Tribunal also dismissed the Revenue's grounds related to Section 14A disallowance and CSR donations, stating they were adjudicated in previous appeals.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO u/s 68 was not called for. The assessee had provided evidence of sales, and the impugned amount was already included in the total sales, meaning a further addition would amount to double taxation. The assessee's sales documentation was not doubted by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was invalid as there was no 'error' that was 'prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue'. The Tribunal relied on several decisions of coordinate benches which held that deduction under Section 80G is allowable even if it forms part of CSR expenditure.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessee made no effective compliance despite opportunities. However, due to the Ld. Commissioner's inability to decide the issue due to lack of submissions, the case was remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessee made no effective compliance despite opportunities. However, due to the Ld. Commissioner's inability to decide the issue due to lack of submissions, the case was remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the additions without calling for a remand report from the AO, despite the assessee filing additional evidence during the appellate proceedings. The AO was not given an opportunity to examine or oppose these additional evidences.
On the issue of disallowance under Section 14A, the Tribunal noted that the assessee offered a suo-motu disallowance. The AO, however, made a disallowance as per Rule 8D, considering investments held as stock-in-trade. The assessee relied on decisions like Maxopp Investment Ltd. and its own case before the Bombay High Court. The AO argued that Section 14A read with Rule 8D mandates disallowance, even if the assessee claims no expenditure was incurred, and that apportionment is necessary for mixed portfolios. The judgment does not explicitly state the Tribunal's final decision on this specific issue in the provided excerpt, but it indicates that the grounds related to Section 14A in ITA No. 2259/MUM/2025 (AY 2019-20) were dismissed by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal's decision in ITA No. 2258/MUM/2025 (AY 2020-21) would apply mutatis mutandis. On the issue of ESOP expenses, the Tribunal held that the law on the subject is unanimous, with various tribunals following the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Biocon Ltd. and other precedents. The Tribunal found that ESOP expenses are allowable as business expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Act. The CIT(A) had correctly decided this issue in favour of the assessee. Therefore, the departmental appeals on this ground were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order lacked specific findings on the materials submitted and that all bank credits may not represent turnover. The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh examination on merits, allowing the assessee one final opportunity to provide explanations and reconciliations.
The Tribunal held that the two transactions were independent and the benefit of the proviso to Section 56(2)(vii)(b) could not be applied. The contention of non-monetary consideration was also rejected. However, the Tribunal directed the AO to determine any loss on the cancellation of the first flat.
The Tribunal held that depreciation on goodwill arising from amalgamation is allowable to the assessee. The valuation of goodwill was not disputed, and it was established that the goodwill arose from the amalgamation itself, with no prior goodwill in the books of the amalgamating company.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the death of the appellant's Chartered Accountant. While hearing the matter on merits, the appellant's AR conceded that certain facts were not presented to the AO and requested the matter be remitted. The Tribunal agreed to remit the issue to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to provide one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The decision was based on the principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the AO had rightly allowed the deduction as the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Tribunal followed the coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case and various High Court judgments. The revisionary order passed by the PCIT under section 263 was quashed.
The Third Member, agreeing with the Accountant Member, held that the learned CIT(A) was justified in partly allowing the appeal of the assessee. However, upon further analysis by the Division Bench (as indicated by the Third Member's reference to the majority view and the subsequent order), it was found that the CIT(A) had failed to appreciate the evidence for the specific assessment year under appeal (AY 2013-14) and had merely followed his predecessor's order. The Tribunal noted that there is no res judicata in income tax proceedings and the rule of consistency does not permit lower authorities to decide issues based on earlier orders without considering the specific facts and evidence of the current year. The AO's order indicated that documents for proving genuineness were not submitted for AY 2013-14, and the CIT(A)'s order did not demonstrate consideration of these evidences or a remand report. Therefore, the Tribunal held that all issues required readjudication de novo by the CIT(A) with a speaking order, considering the assessee's submissions and documentary evidence on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, remanding the issues back to the CIT(A).