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564 orders · Page 7 of 12
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeals for want of evidence without affording adequate opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the learned Counsel for the assessee fairly conceded that the proceedings before the learned CIT(A) were not attended, which led the learned CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal for want of documentary evidence. The learned Counsel for the assessee prayed for another opportunity before the learned CIT(A). The Tribunal, considering that the assessee should get one more opportunity to defend its case and present necessary documentary evidence, and in the interest of justice and fair play, decided to remit the matter back to the file of the learned CIT(A). The assessee was directed to attend the appellate proceedings. The learned CIT(A) was directed to decide the issues on merits of the case and on the facts available before him. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was given on the merits of the additions of jewellery and cash. The issue of the validity of the appellate order due to the assessee's illness was implicitly addressed by granting a fresh opportunity.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeals for want of evidence without affording adequate opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal, relying on a Special Bench decision, held that for private discretionary trusts whose income is chargeable at the maximum marginal rate, the surcharge must be computed with reference to the slab rates prescribed in the Finance Act under the heading 'surcharge on income tax', not at the highest applicable rate.
The Tribunal held that Section 70 of the Income Tax Act does not prescribe a hierarchy for setting off losses. The assessee is entitled to choose the most beneficial set-off method. The AO was directed to accept the assessee's computation.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for and completed the process under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, leading to a full and final settlement of tax arrears. Therefore, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's prayer.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the principle of substantial justice over technicalities and the explanation provided by the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted due inquiry and applied his mind to the claim for deduction under Section 80G in respect of CSR expenditure. Since there were two plausible legal views on the issue, and the AO had adopted one such view, the revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 was not warranted. The PCIT's order was set aside.
The Tribunal agreed that the cash deposits were from the milk distribution business but found no proper basis for the profit estimation by the lower authorities, who overlooked the industry's low-profit margins and previous assessment records. Therefore, the case was remitted to the AO to redetermine the profit margins and taxable income after giving the assessee a fair hearing.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order did not sufficiently address the nature and relevance of documents submitted by the assessee for additional evidence. The application for additional evidence was rejected without proper reasoning, causing prejudice to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee has opted for the VSVS scheme and the proceedings are pending. Considering this, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal followed its earlier decision in the assessee's own case, holding that the rental income was assessable as 'Income from Business'. Consequently, the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting it was due to a bonafide mistake. The Tribunal held that the matter should be verified and revisited at the CIT(E)'s level.
The Tribunal held that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Pr. CIT) had assumed jurisdiction based on a wrong appreciation of facts. The assessee had purchased the impugned property on 03/08/2021, which falls within the financial year 2021-22, relevant to Assessment Year (AY) 2022-23. However, the assessment order under challenge was for AY 2021-22. Therefore, the Pr. CIT's apprehensions regarding the non-application of Section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) or Section 50C were relevant for AY 2022-23 and not for the assessment year under consideration (AY 2021-22). Since the assumption of jurisdiction by the Pr. CIT was based on a factual error, the Tribunal found no hesitation in setting aside the Pr. CIT's order dated 27/03/2025 and restoring the assessment order passed by the AO dated 26/12/2022. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) suffered from procedural impropriety as it was passed without due consideration of the assessee's submissions and without affording a proper opportunity of hearing, thus denying natural justice.
The Tribunal condoned the 56-day delay in filing the appeal, noting it was not intentional. It also condoned the 31-day delay in filing Form 10B, relying on High Court and Tribunal decisions that allow audit reports filed later. The matter was restored to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer to verify the facts and allow appropriate relief for income application under Section 11.
The Tribunal condoned the 56-day delay in filing the appeal, noting it was not intentional. It also condoned the 31-day delay in filing Form 10B, relying on High Court and Tribunal decisions that allow audit reports filed later. The matter was restored to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer to verify the facts and allow appropriate relief for income application under Section 11.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was not sustainable in law. Regarding the deduction of CSR expenses claimed under Section 80G, the Tribunal found that the issue was open for adjudication before the AO, and the assessee had disclosed the facts. The AO, after taking note of these facts, preferred to allow the claim. The Tribunal considered this a plausible view taken by the AO. Citing the Supreme Court in Malabar Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2000) 243 ITR 83, the Tribunal stated that for the revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 to be exercised, the order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The Tribunal noted that the AO had examined the issue and allowed the claim, which was a permissible view. It distinguished between 'lack of inquiry' and 'inadequate inquiry', stating that only a 'lack of inquiry' would justify Section 263 action. The Tribunal found that the AO had made necessary inquiries and applied his mind, thus the assessment order was not erroneous. The Tribunal also referred to CIT vs. Gabriel India Ltd. (1993) 203 ITR 108 (Bom) and CIT vs. Sun Beam Auto (2011) 227 CTR 113 (Delhi) to support its reasoning that the PCIT cannot substitute his judgment for that of the AO if the AO has applied his mind and taken a plausible view. The judgment did not explicitly address the ESOP expenses, the opportunity of being heard, or the audit objection as separate issues but subsumed them within the broader discussion of the Section 263 invocation. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of whether CSR expenditure is allowable under Section 80G, as it found the PCIT's revision order unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that since the assessment order dated 27.02.2021, which was the foundation for the revisionary proceedings under Section 263, had been annulled by a previous ITAT order and had not been stayed by any competent court, the revisionary proceedings ceased to exist. Therefore, the impugned revisionary order passed by the PCIT could not be sustained.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence, finding it vital for determining the controversy. Since these documents were not verified by the AO, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh verification and assessment.
The Tribunal held that while furnishing the audit report is mandatory, the mode and stage of filing is a procedural aspect. Since Form 10DA was available before the processing of the return of income and well before the filing of the return, the delay in e-filing was not fatal to the claim.
The Tribunal held that the AO's action of reopening the assessment was in violation of the directions of the Bombay High Court in Asian Paints Ltd. and the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts Ltd., as the assessment order was passed without observing the mandatory period after disposing of objections. Therefore, the reassessment order was considered bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT wrongly invoked Section 263. The Assessing Officer had made inquiries regarding the donation and CSR expenditure, and the assessee provided explanations and documents. The Tribunal found that Section 80G and Section 37 (related to CSR disallowance) operate independently, and the claim under Section 80G was allowable.
The Tribunal held that the SEBI report did not find any manipulation in the trading of M/s. Splash Media & Infra Ltd. shares. Based on this and decisions in similar cases, the Tribunal concluded that the transactions were genuine and deleted the additions made under Section 68 of the Act.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear despite repeated summons and notices, indicating a lack of interest in prosecuting the appeal. However, to ensure justice, the matter was restored to the file of the AO with a nominal cost of Rs. 2000/- imposed on the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had not adequately dealt with the assessee's contention about the prior disallowance. The Tribunal set aside the order to the extent of the disputed adjustment and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for re-examination.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had successfully explained the source of cash deposits, providing complete details of realization from debtors with supporting evidence, which were reflected in the regular books of accounts. The AO's sole reason for addition was that the assessee should not have accepted SBNs after 08/11/2016 as they were not legal tender. The Tribunal found no merit in this accusation, noting that if SBNs were not legal tender for the assessee, they were also not legal tender for the banks, yet the banks accepted them. The Tribunal followed the Division Bench decision in TamilNadu State Marketing Corporation Ltd. vs. ACIT, which held that merely violating RBI notifications or demonetization schemes does not automatically entitle the Revenue to make additions under Section 69 or 69A if the assessee provides a satisfactory explanation for the nature and source of the investment, and the amounts are recorded in the books of accounts. The Tribunal found that the source of deposits was not disputed and was created out of ordinary business sales, duly credited to the books of accounts and profits included in the return. Therefore, additions under Section 69A were not justified. The issue regarding personal hearing was not expressly decided but the appeal was allowed on merits.
The Tribunal held that the dividend paid to IFC should be reduced from the total dividend amount for the purpose of calculating DDT. This is because IFC enjoys statutory immunity from taxation in India, and levying DDT indirectly on the dividend disbursing company would violate this legislative intent.
The Tribunal decided on Ground No. 1 concerning agriculture income. The AO had made an addition of Rs.22,85,200/- by estimating agricultural income at Rs.12,00,000/- against the assessee's claim of Rs.34,85,200/-, based on unrealistic gross receipts and suppressed expenses, and a field verification report. The CIT(A) deleted this addition, noting that while the AO's observations about the assessee not conducting operations personally and low expenses were made, there was no dispute regarding land holding and crops grown. The CIT(A) also noted that the assessee sold crops in a grain mandi and filed sale bills, and the only reason for the AO's doubt was the non-filing of evidence regarding entry of goods in the mandi compound. Since sales through the mandi were undisputed, the receipts could not be doubted. The Tribunal, after hearing both parties and perusing the material, noted that the CIT(A) had considered the facts and deleted the addition. The judgment does not record the Tribunal's final decision on this ground or any other grounds.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal concerning the disallowance under Section 40A(3), finding that the genuineness of the transactions was proved and the intent of the section was not to restrict business activities. The issue of interest expenses was remanded to the Assessing Officer for factual verification.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in invoking Section 263. The Assessing Officer had conducted necessary inquiries, and the issues raised by the PCIT were either not applicable to the assessment year or based on a misinterpretation of facts.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the adjustment for payment of management support services and global corporate client services, as similar findings were rendered in the assessee's own case for subsequent assessment years. Grounds 1-3 of the Revenue's appeal were dismissed. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A, the Tribunal held that the appellate authority can entertain a fresh claim even if not made in the return, overturning the CIT(A)'s reliance on Goetze India Ltd. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow the exemption of dividend income. The computation of disallowance under Section 14A r.w. Rule 8D was restored to the AO for fresh consideration, taking into account the assessee's submissions regarding investments yielding exempt income and proportionate composite administration expenditure. Revenue's Ground 4 and Assessee's CO Grounds 2-4 were allowed for statistical purposes. Assessee's CO Ground 1 regarding the validity of the assessment order was not pressed and left open.
The Tribunal held that both appeals should be allowed for statistical purposes. Regarding the rejection of registration under Section 12AB due to alleged violation of Section 11, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had not actually applied any income outside India and had offered to amend the MOA. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had misinterpreted Section 11 by conflating 'actual application' with 'provision for application'. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the issue of grant of registration under Section 12AB to the file of the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, directing the assessee to file its amended objects. On the issue of delay in filing Form 10AB, the Tribunal acknowledged the medical reasons cited by the assessee and, following the precedent set by a coordinate bench in Narke Green Foundation Charitable Institution (ITA No. 1864/Mum/2025), decided to restore the application for seeking registration under Section 12AB to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication on the delay. As the issue of Section 12AB registration was remanded, the rejection of Section 80G registration was also set aside and the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh decision. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the issue of delay in filing the application for regularization of provisional registration under Section 12AB should be restored to the file of the learned CIT(E) for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal, following the principles of natural justice and a pragmatic approach to procedural laws as advocated by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and observed by a coordinate bench in the case of Narke Green Foundation Charitable Institution, found that the delay was marginally delayed due to medical reasons of the main Trustee and President. The CIT(E) was directed to consider the application for condonation of delay in accordance with law. Consequently, as the issue of grant of registration under Section 12AB was remanded, the order of the learned CIT(E) rejecting the application for registration under Section 80G was also set aside and the matter was restored to the file of the learned CIT(E) for deciding it afresh. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive merits of the Section 11 violation.
The Tribunal held that the approval for issuing the notice u/s 148 was obtained from the incorrect authority under Section 151(i) of the new regime, instead of the higher authority specified under Section 151(ii). This non-compliance affected the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had himself accepted via a rectification order that no depreciation on goodwill was claimed by the assessee in the return. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s decision disallowing depreciation was unwarranted.
The Tribunal held that the business model of the assessee and its claim to have legally collected deposits from members and the general public were not sufficiently dealt with by the lower authorities. The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission of a list of depositors with PAN numbers and an application to file affidavits due to the accountant's hospitalization. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case before the AO. The assessee is directed to submit necessary material to the AO to prove that the money deposited on November 10, 2016, was lawful and legal, and that the assessee was entitled to deposit it within the parameters of the law. If the AO is satisfied, they will decide the matter afresh. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the AO for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeals for both assessment years. The Tribunal reasoned that the amendment to Section 2(24)(xviii) by the Finance Act, 2015, effective from April 1, 2016, was intended to bring all forms of government assistance, subsidies, grants, cash incentives, waivers, concessions, or reimbursements, by whatever name called, within the tax net to avoid litigation. The Tribunal found that the deferred sales tax liability, which the assessee was allowed to retain for ten years as an incentive to set up industry in a backward area, constituted a benefit or concession. Prepaying this liability at NPV resulted in a lower payment than the original deferred amount, representing a 'concession' and an 'incentive' under the scheme of the Maharashtra State Government. The Tribunal noted that the assessee itself treated the gain of Rs. 90,22,491/- on waiver of deferred sales tax liability as 'miscellaneous income' in its audited accounts. The Tribunal held that the waiver of deferred sales tax liability was a benefit accrued to the assessee arising out of its business and held the character of revenue, taxable under Section 2(24)(xviii) and Section 28(iv) of the Act. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the reliance on pre-amendment decisions like Sulzer India and Balkrishna Industries was not applicable to the facts of the case post-amendment.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal, with the liberty to file a fresh appeal as per law.
The Tribunal held that CSR expenditure, even if mandatory, can be eligible for deduction under Section 80G if the other conditions of the section are met. The mandatory nature of CSR expenditure does not preclude it from being considered for deduction under Section 80G.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by passing an ex-parte order without adjudicating the appeal on merits, violating principles of natural justice. While the assessee has a duty to cooperate, the CIT(A) failed to provide a sufficient opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication. This was done without prejudice to the merits of the case, considering that relevant documents, including assessment orders from other years with identical facts where no additions were made, were not initially filed before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the AO had applied his mind to the CSR expenditure claim, and the mere absence of specific mention in the assessment order does not render it erroneous. Relying on various judicial precedents, the Tribunal found that the PCIT's revisionary order under Section 263 was unjustified.
The Tribunal held that the AO's estimation of turnover was not substantiated and lacked proper verification from the books of the new entity. The sales figures of the new entity for the relevant dates were higher than the AO's estimation, rendering the assessment exercise illogical.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal without considering the merits or the proviso to Section 12A(2). Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal found that Section 253 of the Income Tax Act does not provide a right to appeal against orders passed under Section 10(25)(iv). The assessee's counsel could not demonstrate the maintainability of the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not consider the assessee's submissions and dismissed the appeal without adjudicating the grounds on merits. The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the impugned order, restoring the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions, finding that the assessee's transactions were genuine, conducted through banking channels, Demat account, and BSE, with STT paid. It noted that the shares were obtained via merger, not direct purchase of the 'penny stock,' and that similar transactions for the assessee's brother were accepted by the department. The Tribunal found no new evidence from the revenue to overturn the CIT(A)'s decision.
The Tribunal held that the Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) under Section 115-O of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is a tax on the distribution of profits by the company, and not on the income of the shareholder. The Tribunal noted that Section 115-O(1) states that the company paying dividend shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, be liable to pay to the Central Government by way of DDT an amount calculated at the rate of 15% on the amount of dividends declared, distributed or paid. The Tribunal further observed that the immunity granted to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) under Section 9 of Article VI of the IFC Act, 1958, is from all taxation on its assets, property, income, operations, and transactions. However, DDT is levied on the company distributing the dividend, irrespective of the status of the shareholder. Therefore, the immunity granted to IFC does not extend to the company's liability to pay DDT. The Tribunal found that the AO was justified in rejecting the refund claim as the DDT was a liability of the assessee company. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the dividend paid to IFC should be reduced from the total dividend amount for the purpose of calculating DDT. This is because IFC enjoys statutory immunity from taxation in India, and levying DDT indirectly on the dividend disbursing company would violate this legislative intent.