564 orders · Page 8 of 12
The Tribunal quashed the reassessment order, finding that the reasons recorded were undated and based on incorrect facts, indicating a non-application of mind by the AO. It held that the gifts were completed transactions before the relevant section became applicable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus cast upon him under Section 68 of the Act by producing relevant documents. There was no adverse order or penalty against the assessee, and no role was established regarding rigging of shares. The Tribunal noted that the purchase and sale of shares were conducted through the stock exchange via registered brokers, with payments made through banking channels and Security Transaction Tax (STT) paid. The AO had not criticized the documentation. The Tribunal also referred to decisions of coordinate benches in similar cases involving the same scrip (M/s. JMD Telefilms Limited) and the same issue, where additions were deleted. Following the principle of consistency, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were deleted, and the assessee's claim under Section 10(38) was allowed. The Tribunal expressly left no issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the current provisions of Section 143(1) allow adjustments on debatable issues, distinguishing it from older provisions. However, since the merits of the adjustment were not addressed by the CIT(A), the assessee was granted liberty to file a fresh appeal against the Section 143(1) intimation.
The Tribunal held that the current provisions of Section 143(1) allow adjustments on debatable issues, distinguishing it from older provisions. However, since the merits of the adjustment were not addressed by the CIT(A), the assessee was granted liberty to file a fresh appeal against the Section 143(1) intimation.
The Tribunal held that the existence of an arrangement between the deduction-seeking unit and its associated enterprise is a pre-condition for invoking Section 80IA(10). Since the AO failed to prove such an arrangement, the transfer pricing analysis and subsequent adjustments were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that TDS credit should be granted to the assessee as the income was offered by it, and the agent had not claimed the credit. The strict procedural requirements of Rule 37BA were considered secondary to the spirit of Section 199(1) of the Act.
The Tribunal noted the repeated non-compliance by the assessee before the lower authorities and the Tribunal. It emphasized that it is the assessee's duty to diligently pursue appeals and comply with notices. The Tribunal found the assessee's failure to respond to notices from the AO and CIT(A) to be gross negligence and indifference. The Tribunal stated that principles of natural justice operate both ways, requiring taxpayers to cooperate. Due to the assessee's casual approach and indifference, the Tribunal imposed a cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the assessee, to be deposited with the Income Tax Department within 15 days. Considering the facts and the non-compliant attitude of the assessee, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the matter should be revisited at the level of the Ld. CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, applying the principles of natural justice and affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to both sides. The Tribunal accordingly remanded the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that income from royalty and FTS should be taxed on a receipt basis, following previous decisions of the Bombay High Court and the Tribunal. Transfer pricing adjustments were deleted as the Tribunal found the assessee's benchmarking to be compliant with the arm's length principle.
The Tribunal held that for Section 43CA, the stamp duty value on the date of allotment should be considered if sale consideration was received earlier. For Section 43B, if taxes were paid before the due date of return filing, disallowance is not warranted.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 on April 19, 2022, was barred by limitation as it was issued after the expiry of the period prescribed by the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b). Consequently, the reassessment proceedings and the assessment order were deemed bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the advance payment written off was a business loss incurred for commercial expediency and thus allowable as a deduction. The Tribunal also allowed the prior period expenses as they crystallized during the relevant year and were genuine business expenses.
The Tribunal held that the SBN deposit was part of business turnover and already subjected to net profit rate addition, thus deleting the addition under Section 69A to avoid double taxation. The Tribunal also directed the AO to consider a net profit rate of 4% on the adjusted total credits as business income.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee. It held that assessment under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is to be made in case of search or requisition, and additions can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during such search or requisition. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not refer to any seized material or incriminating material found during a search. The documents relied upon were found during a survey action under Section 133A, which is distinct from a search. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs Abhihsar Build Well (P) Ltd., which held that no additions can be made under Section 153A when the assessment is framed dehors incriminating material found during search. Therefore, since no incriminating material was found during the search in this case, no additions under Section 153A were warranted. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions. As the additional ground was allowed and additions deleted, other grounds were not adjudicated. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the procedural breach concerning the borrowing from trustees was a curable defect and not material for achieving the trust's objectives. The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(E) had not adequately considered the trust's actual activities and objectives. The Tribunal decided to set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the issue of claiming CSR expenditure under Section 80G is highly debatable. The AO's view in the original assessment was a plausible view, and the Pr. CIT's differing opinion constituted a change of opinion, which does not warrant assuming jurisdiction under Section 263.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E)'s revisionary order under Section 263 was not sustainable. This was based on a coordinate bench's decision which held the assessee to be a charitable institution and that the proviso to Section 2(15) was not applicable, thus validating the exemption claim.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s action to be inexplicable and restored the issue to the AO. The AO is directed to recompute the tax liability after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the disallowances. For commission, the recipient's denial and lack of evidence on services rendered were key. For vehicle and miscellaneous expenses, the assessee failed to prove they were wholly and exclusively for business, especially without a logbook for vehicles.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. Commissioner rightly decided the appeal ex-parte due to the assessee's non-compliance. However, to provide substantial justice, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to accept the net short-term capital gains as offered by the assessee and to grant the benefit of set-off for brought-forward short-term capital losses. The additional demand raised by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to accept the net short-term capital gains as offered by the assessee and to grant the benefit of set-off for brought-forward short-term capital losses. The additional demand raised by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was bad in law as the evidence relied upon by the Assessing Officer was already available at the time of the original assessment and no new tangible material was brought on record. The Tribunal found that this constituted a change of opinion.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order, denying the assessee a reasonable opportunity to present evidence. The Tribunal held that the matter deserved to be remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration and specific examination of the purchase claim.
The Tribunal held that the discounts provided by the assessee to its dealers were in the nature of trade discounts and not commission. The relationship between the assessee and its dealers was on a principal-to-principal basis, and there was no element of agency required for Section 194H to apply.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided evidence of the agreement date and substantial part payment in 2009. The addition made by the Assessing Officer under section 56(2) was found to be covered by exceptions, and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for verification.
The Tribunal found that the first piece of information from DDIT (Inv.) did not link the mentioned parties to the assessees. The second piece of information describing fund transfers between related parties was deemed self-explanatory and did not warrant reopening for additions under Section 68 of the Act.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeals, noting that the respondent did not raise any objection. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeals, noting that the respondent did not raise any objection. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that rejecting the applications on technical grounds without providing a reasonable opportunity for compliance was unsustainable. It found that the appeals for registration and approval should have been considered on merits, especially since provisional registration was already granted.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. Commissioner rightly decided the appeal ex-parte due to the assessee's non-compliance. However, to provide substantial justice, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal considered the factual matrix, noting the discrepancy between gross contractual receipts in Form 26AS and the assessee's books of account, totaling Rs. 4,83,89,206/-. The assessee conceded that credit notes were issued but the corresponding TDS was claimed. The Revenue argued that there was no evidence of refund and that the CIT(A)'s relied-upon precedents were distinguishable. The Tribunal acknowledged that the precedents cited by the CIT(A) were indeed distinguishable. However, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's reliance on the decisions in Sohan Lal Aggarwal and Purna Chandra Rout, which were factually similar. These cases supported the principle that only the embedded profit in suppressed receipts should be added, not the entire amount. The Tribunal also noted the assessee's own profitability rates for the relevant and preceding assessment years. Consequently, the Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A)'s observation and conclusion, confirming the addition at Rs. 43,55,028/- (9% of the differential turnover). The grounds raised by the Revenue were dismissed. The cross-objection filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found that the issue of allowing CSR expenditure as a donation under Section 80G is highly debatable, with co-ordinate benches consistently taking a view in favour of allowing it. The Tribunal concluded that the Pr. CIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 amounted to a mere change of opinion on a plausible view taken by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the Pr. CIT's order was set aside, and the original assessment order was restored.
The Tribunal held that rejecting the applications on technical grounds without providing a reasonable opportunity for compliance was unsustainable. It found that the appeals for registration and approval should have been considered on merits, especially since provisional registration was already granted.
The Tribunal held that rejecting the applications on technical grounds without providing a reasonable opportunity for compliance was unsustainable. It found that the appeals for registration and approval should have been considered on merits, especially since provisional registration was already granted.
The Tribunal held that rejecting the applications on technical grounds without providing a reasonable opportunity for compliance was unsustainable. It found that the appeals for registration and approval should have been considered on merits, especially since provisional registration was already granted.
The Tribunal held that the Assessee's ground regarding the rejection of the hierarchy of set-off of short-term capital losses was valid. The Tribunal found that Section 70 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, deals with the set-off of losses, and it does not prescribe a specific hierarchy for setting off short-term capital losses against short-term capital gains, particularly when dealing with transactions subjected to Securities Transaction Tax (STT) and those not subjected to STT. The Tribunal noted that the Assessee's approach of setting off STCL (STT paid) against STCG (non-STT) first, and then against STCG (STT paid), was a permissible method. The Tribunal disagreed with the Assessing Officer's view that separate computations were mandatory, stating that the 'similar computation' condition in Section 70(2) was met. The Tribunal also observed that the Assessee's method did not result in STCG of INR 2,67,46,584 being taxed at a lower rate than it should have been, but rather it was a consequence of the set-off mechanism. The Tribunal directed the AO to re-examine the set-off of losses in light of its observations. The issue of jurisdiction was not explicitly decided as the matter was decided on merits.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) summarily dismissed the condonation application on a technical ground without appreciating the facts and that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., the Tribunal found sufficient cause for delay.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) summarily dismissed the condonation application on a technical ground without appreciating the facts and that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., the Tribunal found sufficient cause for delay.
The Tribunal held that procedural delays, when reasonably explained, should not defeat substantive justice. Relying on the Gujarat High Court's decision in Rajendrakumar Maneklal Shah (HUF) vs CIT, the Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to condone the delay and adjudicate the matter afresh.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not granted adequate opportunity to respond to the additions proposed by the AO. The limited time given and the closure of the e-submission portal prevented the assessee from filing submissions. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the AO for a fresh examination.
The Tribunal allowed grounds 1 to 7 concerning the re-computation of net Short Term Capital Gains (STCG) tax liability and the set-off of brought forward short-term capital losses. The Assessing Officer was directed to accept the net STCG as offered by the Assessee in the return of income and to grant the benefit of set-off of brought forward short-term capital loss. The additional demand raised on account of re-computation of capital gains was deleted. The Tribunal held that the hierarchy of set-off adopted by the Assessee was correct, allowing STT-paid losses to be set off against non-STT gains first, as Section 70 of the Act does not prescribe a specific hierarchy. The reasoning was that Sections 111A and 115AD provide for tax determination, not computation of gains, and the 'similar computation' condition in Section 70(2) was met. Grounds 8 and 9 regarding interest under Section 234B and 234C were disposed of as consequential. Ground 10 regarding penalty under Section 270A was dismissed as premature. The operative direction was to delete the additional demand and re-compute tax liability accordingly. The issue of surcharge rate and TDS credit were implicitly addressed by directing acceptance of the Assessee's computation.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 148 was not justified. Regarding the information from DDIT (Inv.), Kolkata, the Tribunal found that the seven parties mentioned had no connection to the assessee, and there was no mention of any transactions between them and the assessee. Concerning the second piece of information, the Tribunal observed that the AO himself was explaining the identity and source of the creditor through the described RTGS transactions between related parties. The Tribunal failed to understand how the AO could allege escaped income based on this information, especially when none of the parties involved in the second set of transactions were identified as accommodation entry providers. The transactions were between related parties and were self-explanatory. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the notice under Section 148 and quashed the reassessment order. The merits of the case were not examined as the reassessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal ex-parte, affirming the Ld. Commissioner's order. It was held that the provisional registration was not applicable for the relevant assessment year, and the assessee failed to produce any material to challenge this finding. The dismissal was, however, with liberty for the assessee to seek recalling of the order upon substantiating a plausible ground for non-appearance.