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564 orders · Page 11 of 12
The Tribunal dismissed the grounds related to transfer pricing adjustments as withdrawn. Regarding the provision for bad and doubtful debts, the Tribunal noted the assessee's reliance on the Vijaya Bank case for actual write-off, but the AO argued that this does not apply to Section 115JB.
The Tribunal dismissed the grounds related to transfer pricing adjustments as withdrawn due to an Advanced Pricing Agreement. The Tribunal allowed the appeal concerning the addition of provision for bad and doubtful debts to book profit, following High Court decisions.
The Tribunal held that if the disallowance under Section 14A is reduced below the suo-moto disallowance made by the assessee due to legal interpretations, the assessee should be allowed the benefit. The revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's cross objections were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds concerning the set-off of short-term capital losses. It held that Section 70 of the Act does not provide a hierarchy for set-off, and that short-term capital losses incurred on transactions subjected to STT can be set off against short-term capital gains on transactions not subjected to STT. The Tribunal found that the assessee's methodology for computing capital gains was acceptable and directed the AO to accept it. Consequently, grounds related to the set-off of losses were allowed. Regarding the short credit of taxes deducted at source, the issue was restored to the AO with a direction to grant credit after necessary verification, as a rectification application was pending. The grounds related to arithmetical errors in the computation sheet were allowed for statistical purposes, directing the AO to recompute income in light of the Tribunal's directions. The grounds concerning levy of interest under Sections 234B, 234C, and 234D were deemed consequential and not requiring separate adjudication. The ground pertaining to the initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 270A was dismissed as premature. The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) did not provide sufficient opportunity to the assessee to be heard, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned due to a genuine misunderstanding by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's methodology for computing capital gains, specifically the set-off of short-term capital losses, was correct. It directed the AO to accept the assessee's approach. Consequently, grounds related to the set-off of short-term capital losses were allowed. Regarding arithmetical errors in the computation sheet and the grant of credit for taxes deducted at source, the Tribunal restored these issues to the AO for correct computation and verification, allowing these grounds for statistical purposes. The ground concerning the initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 270A was dismissed as premature. The Tribunal noted that interest levies under Sections 234B, 234C, and 234D were consequential and did not require separate adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had previously held the Section 263 order to be bad in law. Consequently, the order passed by the AO under Section 143(3) r.w.s. 263, which was a result of the Section 263 order, could not survive. Therefore, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s decision.
The Tribunal held that the interest rate should be determined by the currency in which the loan is to be repaid, not by the domestic interest rates of either party's country. The case was remanded to determine the repayment currency.
The Tribunal held that while the moratorium bars proceedings against the corporate debtor, it does not prevent the company itself from initiating actions. The Tribunal modified the CIT(A)'s finding, allowing for the revival of the appeal after the moratorium period expires.
The Tribunal held that the reopening under Section 147 was not justified when the basis of the action stemmed from search and seizure materials, making Section 153A/153C applicable. Consequently, the notice and assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the provision for furnishing the audit report with the return is procedural and directory, not mandatory. Substantial compliance is sufficient, and delay can be condoned if a reasonable cause is shown.
The Tribunal noted that the revenue had only contested the deletion of Rs. 38,35,590/-, implying the deletion of Rs. 2,41,46,999/- was final. The tax on the amount in dispute was less than Rs. 60,00,000/-, making it dismissible in light of CBDT circular No. 09 of 2024.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It held that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations and granted the assessee one further opportunity to furnish the required documents.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause. It held that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations and granted the assessee one further opportunity to furnish the required documents.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal ex-parte without adjudicating the grounds on merit, despite the assessee seeking adjournments. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits after allowing reasonable opportunity.
The Tribunal held that interest expenditure incurred on borrowed funds for business purposes, including capital contribution to partnership firms, is allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The absence of direct interest income from all such investments does not bar the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) as the interest was earned from investments with co-operative banks, and Section 80P(4) does not exclude such income for a co-operative society. The decision of the Supreme Court favoring the assessee in case of ambiguity was also considered.
The Tribunal held that interest expenditure incurred on borrowed funds for business purposes, including capital contribution to partnership firms, is allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The absence of direct interest income from all such investments does not bar the deduction.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(E), directing the assessee to furnish all required details. The CIT(E) was instructed to examine the details and decide the issue afresh after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had rejected the applications for registration under Section 12A and Section 80G because the assessee did not comply with the queries raised, despite opportunities. However, before the Tribunal, the assessee's counsel requested one more opportunity to furnish the required details. Based on this assurance and concession, the Tribunal decided to remit the issues back to the file of the CIT(E). The assessee is directed to furnish all supporting details for its claims for registration under Sections 12A and 80G without fail. The CIT(E) is further directed to examine these details and decide the issues afresh after providing the assessee with a reasonable and adequate opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal allowed both appeals for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal directed the AO to allow full credit of TDS supported by physical certificates after verifying the correct facts, following jurisdictional High Court pronouncements.
The Tribunal held that for computing disallowance under Rule 8D(2) based on average investment, only investments yielding exempt income should be considered. The Tribunal found no factual distinction from a previous identical case and upheld the first appellate authority's decision.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had another appeal pending and requested the current appeal be dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to pursue the other appeal. The Departmental Representative did not object.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in upholding certain additions. Specifically, an addition for commission was directed to be deleted, and additions related to other share transactions were set aside to the AO for proper computation.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in assuming jurisdiction under Section 263, as the issues raised were already examined by the AO during the original assessment and reassessment proceedings, and no new facts were brought on record. This constituted a change of opinion, making the PCIT's order bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority's order was cryptic and non-speaking, and dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution was against the statutory mandate. The Tribunal condoned the delay, set aside the impugned order, and restored the case for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the date of allotment, not the sale deed date, determines the acquisition of property for capital gains. Following the Bombay High Court's dictum and CBDT circulars, the Tribunal decided that the Assessee acquired the property on the allotment date.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn, granting liberty to the parties to seek recalling of the order if the dispute is not settled finally under the scheme.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 30 days in filing the appeal, finding that it was not intentional or deliberate. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had explained the reason for the delay through an affidavit, citing an inadvertent mistake in furnishing the email address in Form 35, which prevented the receipt of hearing notices from the CIT(A). The Tribunal emphasized the principle of preferring substantial justice over technical considerations, especially when the assessee is not seeking undue benefit from the delay. On the merits of the case, the Tribunal observed that the assessment order was passed ex-parte under section 144 r.w.s. 147. The addition of Rs. 52,00,000/- was made by treating the stamp duty valuation of an immovable property sale as income from other sources, as the assessee failed to disclose capital gains. The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee had not availed a reasonable opportunity of hearing before the lower authorities. Considering the substantial rights involved and the ex-parte nature of the orders, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for passing a fresh assessment order. The CIT(A) was directed to allow a reasonable opportunity to the assessee, and the assessee was permitted to file requisite evidence before the Assessing Officer to substantiate the transaction of sale of the asset. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not provided an effective opportunity of hearing to the assessee, which is against the principle of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that while three notices were issued during the COVID-19 period when communication was adversely affected, and adjournment was sought for two subsequent notices, the last notice dated March 20, 2025, gave only five days for filing a reply, and there was no evidence of its service. The Tribunal referred to Section 250(2)(a) of the Act, emphasizing that hearing is not a formality but an effective one. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee to present its case within 60 days. The appeal was allowed in these terms for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of grounds 2, 3, 4, and 5.
The Tribunal held that for 5 out of 7 property transactions, the difference between sale consideration and stamp duty value was less than the 10% tolerance band provided under Section 43CA, making the Assessment Order not erroneous for these transactions. However, for the remaining 2 transactions, the difference exceeded the tolerance band, and the Assessing Officer's failure to examine Section 43CA was deemed erroneous.
The Tribunal, following the decision of a coordinate bench for AY 2012-13, dismissed the revenue's grounds related to interest disallowance and foreign exchange fluctuation losses. The Tribunal also found that the AO erred in disallowing prior period expenses that were crystallized in the relevant year, upholding the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal, following the decision of a coordinate bench for AY 2012-13, dismissed the revenue's grounds related to interest disallowance and foreign exchange fluctuation losses. The Tribunal also found that the AO erred in disallowing prior period expenses that were crystallized in the relevant year, upholding the CIT(A)'s order.
The tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal as withdrawn, acknowledging the assessee's election to opt for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. The dismissal is conditional, allowing the assessee the liberty to restore or revive the appeal if the application under the scheme does not materialize or is not accepted by the department.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal, noting that the Departmental Representative had no objection. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes. On the primary issue of indexation for long-term capital gains, the Tribunal held that the letter of intent dated February 14, 2011, fulfilled the requirements of an allotment letter, binding the assessee to pay the full consideration irrespective of the sale agreement's execution. The Tribunal found the DRP confused between the right to hold and the right to acquire. Citing settled legal principles and precedents, including a coordinate bench decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2019-20 concerning similar flats in the same property, the Tribunal held that the date of acquisition for indexation purposes should be reckoned from the date of the letter of intent, i.e., February 14, 2011 (FY 2010-11). The Tribunal also noted that the AO was bound to follow the ITAT's order even if an appeal was pending before the High Court, citing the Allahabad High Court's decision in K. N. Agarwal vs. CIT. The Tribunal directed the AO to consider the date of the letter of intent for computing capital gains. Grounds relating to miscellaneous and transfer charges were also restored to the AO for consideration in accordance with law.
The Tribunal, relying on previous Co-ordinate Bench decisions, found the error to be a technical mistake. It set aside the Ld. CIT(E)'s order and remanded the case, directing the CIT(E) to treat the application as if filed under the correct section (Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii)) and to decide the matter on its merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It found that the assessee had filed her return, and the sources of investment were explained by the maturity of fixed deposits. The addition under Section 56(2)(viib) was found inapplicable as the provision was not retrospective and the property was not acquired without consideration.
The Tribunal allowed the deduction for consultancy fees paid to Dilip Ravatkar, holding it was for the execution phase of a project and not in-house research. The deduction for travel expenses was dismissed due to lack of supporting documents. The expenditure for the advisory firm was held to be capital in nature, and the Assessee was directed to claim depreciation.
The Tribunal held that it is a mandatory duty of the appellate authority to provide an opportunity of being heard to the appellant before deciding a statutory appeal. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the provision for warranty, in this case, cannot be considered contingent in nature. The assessee had demonstrated that the provision was made in a systematic manner, based on technical evaluation and past experience, and was reassessed annually based on past trends and industry averages. The provision varied from 0.42% to 0.71% of the sales turnover for various years and was expected to be utilized within a year. The Tribunal noted that the amount charged to the Profit and Loss account for the subsequent year was net of the excess provision carried forward from the previous year. Following the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rotork Controls India Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, the Tribunal found that the warranty provision was based on relevant data, was reasonable, and satisfied the accrual system of accounting and the matching concept. The Tribunal concluded that the provision was an ascertained liability and an allowable deduction under Section 37 of the Act. Accordingly, the appellate order affirming the disallowance was set aside, and the AO was directed to delete the addition. Ground No. 5, regarding double taxation, was rendered inconsequential as the primary claim was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the rate of surcharge for private discretionary trusts, whose income is taxed at the maximum marginal rate, should be computed with reference to the slab rates prescribed in the Finance Act under the heading 'surcharge on income tax'. Therefore, a 10% surcharge was applicable as the assessee's income exceeded Rs. 50 lacs but did not exceed Rs. 1 crore.
The Tribunal held that the rate of surcharge for private discretionary trusts, whose income is taxed at the maximum marginal rate, should be computed with reference to the slab rates prescribed in the Finance Act under the heading 'surcharge on income tax'. Therefore, a 10% surcharge was applicable as the assessee's income exceeded Rs. 50 lacs but did not exceed Rs. 1 crore.
The Tribunal remanded the case back to the Ld. Commissioner for a de novo decision, subject to the assessee depositing Rs. 5,000/- in the Revenue Department within 15 days. The Ld. Commissioner is directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and the assessee must file all necessary documents.
The Tribunal held that FTC is a vested right under Section 90 of the Income Tax Act and DTAA, which cannot be denied merely due to procedural non-compliance when Form 67 is filed with a revised return. The AO was directed to verify Form 67 and allow the FTC.
The Tribunal noted that a co-ordinate bench had already adjudicated similar issues for AY 2015-16 and remanded them to the AO for fresh consideration. The Tribunal also considered the penalty levied by the AO and decided to remit the penalty matter back to the AO for re-computation.
The tribunal held that the case was reopened without proper sanction from the authorized authorities as required by Section 151(ii) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the notice and assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that a co-ordinate bench had already adjudicated similar issues for AY 2015-16 and remanded them to the AO for fresh consideration. The Tribunal also considered the penalty levied by the AO and decided to remit the penalty matter back to the AO for re-computation.
The Tribunal held that interest income from co-operative banks, which are akin to co-operative societies, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act, unless such banks require a license from the RBI under the Banking Regulation Act. As there was no specific finding from lower authorities that the banks in question required such a license, the disallowance was deleted.
Relying on the Bombay High Court judgment in Jetair (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal held that if the income forming the initial reason for reopening under Section 147 is found not to have escaped assessment, it is not open to the AO to independently assess other income. Since the additions were not based on the original reason for reopening, the assessment order passed under Section 148 was quashed.