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630 orders · Page 4 of 13
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee's activities were for a charitable purpose of General Public Utility and did not intend to generate profit. It was held that the assessee was not hit by the proviso to Section 2(15) and was entitled to exemption under Section 11.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after considering the bonafide reasons provided by the assessee. The Tribunal also found that the assessee did not get an adequate opportunity to represent its case before the CIT(A) and thus restored the matter back for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that brokerage expenses are selling costs and not part of work-in-progress, aligning with IND AS-2. The AO's observation that no income was disclosed was factually incorrect.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear and did not provide necessary documentation or a proper application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the order of the CIT(A) and upheld it.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence, including cash books, balance sheets, and bank statements, demonstrating sufficient funds to explain the cash deposit. The lower authorities erred by making the addition based on assumptions without considering the provided documents.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after considering the bonafide reasons provided by the assessee. The Tribunal also found that the assessee did not get an adequate opportunity to represent its case before the CIT(A) and thus restored the matter back for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear, did not file an application for condonation of delay, and also failed to submit the assessment order. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal.
The Tribunal held that for claiming deduction of bad debts under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2) of the Act, it is sufficient if the debt is written off as irrecoverable in the books of accounts and the conditions of Section 36(2) are met, without needing to prove the specific reason for irrecoverability.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the additions made by the AO. Regarding Hundi Kanika, the Tribunal noted that it is impractical to obtain individual donor details. The explicit mention on the Hundi that the donation is for the Corpus of the Samsthan, coupled with the tradition and practice of the Samsthan and the acceptance by the Department in earlier years, implicitly indicated the donor's specific direction. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the appellate order and upheld it. The same reasoning was applied to the 'Moolnidhi' or 'Padapooja Kanika' donations. The Tribunal observed that the offerings made in a specific platter, clearly marked for 'Moolanidhi' (Corpus Fund), implicitly indicated the donor's specific direction. The consistent treatment of these donations as corpus by the assessee and acceptance by the Department in earlier years, along with the lack of prescribed method for specific directions in the Act, supported the CIT(A)'s decision. The Tribunal upheld the appellate order, allowing the grounds of appeal of the assessee. The AO was not justified in treating these donations as income of the assessee trust. The principle of consistency, as per the Supreme Court decision in Radhasoami Satsang Vs. CIT, was also considered.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee has a duty to diligently pursue proceedings, the principles of natural justice require adequate opportunity of hearing. Since the CIT(A) dismissed the appeals without adjudicating on merits, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the cases for de novo consideration, imposing a cost on the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently demonstrated the receipt of intra-group services with supporting documentation. It was also held that the necessity or commercial benefit of an expense cannot be questioned by tax authorities when transactions are genuine and for business purposes, and the Benefit Test is not a statutory requirement. The adjustment made on account of disallowance of intra-group charges was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee has a duty to diligently pursue proceedings, the principles of natural justice require adequate opportunity of hearing. Since the CIT(A) dismissed the appeals without adjudicating on merits, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the cases for de novo consideration, imposing a cost on the assessee.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee has a duty to diligently pursue proceedings, the principles of natural justice require adequate opportunity of hearing. Since the CIT(A) dismissed the appeals without adjudicating on merits, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the cases for de novo consideration, imposing a cost on the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the interest payments were in the nature of cost-to-cost reimbursement without any income element. Therefore, the assessee was not liable to deduct TDS under Section 194A.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid and bad in law because the approval for its issuance was not obtained from the specified authority as per Section 151 of the Act, given that the notice was issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Consequently, the reopening proceedings and the reassessment order were quashed.
The Ld. Commissioner deleted the addition, finding that the assessee had discharged the onus by furnishing sufficient evidence. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Ld. Commissioner, concluding that it did not suffer from any perversity, impropriety, or illegality.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee's activities were for a charitable purpose of General Public Utility and did not intend to generate profit. It was held that the assessee was not hit by the proviso to Section 2(15) and was entitled to exemption under Section 11.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order and remanded the case back to the Commissioner for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need to provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) had wrongly applied the CBDT Circular. Considering the circumstances and the applicability of the circular extending the due date, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant the registration.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal found no impropriety, perversity, or illegality in the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition. Consequently, the Tribunal sustained the impugned order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue Department.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after considering the bonafide reasons provided by the assessee. The Tribunal also found that the assessee did not get an adequate opportunity to represent its case before the CIT(A) and thus restored the matter back for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals after considering the bonafide reasons provided by the assessee. The Tribunal also found that the assessee did not get an adequate opportunity to represent its case before the CIT(A) and thus restored the matter back for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the AO's action in invoking Rule 8D without recording satisfaction about the incorrectness of the suo-motu disallowance, based on an examination of the accounts, was unsustainable. The Tribunal noted that the AO's observation that the suo-motu disallowance was not commensurate with the exempt income was a general observation and not a specific finding on the inadequacy or incorrectness of the assessee's detailed workings. Respectfully following the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench in the assessee's own case for AY 2017-18, the Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the disallowance under Section 14A to the suo-motu disallowance made by the assessee for both AY 2018-19 and AY 2016-17. Regarding the addition to book profit under Section 115JB, the Tribunal held that such additions are not permissible, following the Special Bench decision in ACIT vs. Vireet Investments Pvt. Ltd., which held that computation under Section 115JB(2) is to be made without resorting to the computation under Section 14A read with Rule 8D. Therefore, the AO was not correct in adding the Section 14A disallowance to the book profit. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed books of account, balance sheet, and profit & loss account, which appeared not to have been considered by the Ld. Commissioner. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to record specific dissatisfaction with the assessee's suo-motu disallowance before invoking Rule 8D, making its invocation unsustainable. Furthermore, disallowances under Section 14A cannot be added to book profits under Section 115JB.
The Tribunal found that the appeal was taken up after a significant delay, and the non-compliance with notices could not be entirely ruled out. To ensure substantial justice, the case was remanded to the Ld. Commissioner for a fresh decision after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the AO's failure to dispose of the assessee's objections against the reopening, as per the dictum laid down in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. case, rendered the reopening proceedings void-ab-initio.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to refer the property valuation to the District Valuation Authority as requested by the assessee, thus remanding the first issue. For the second issue concerning shares, the Tribunal deleted the addition, finding the assessee had discharged the onus under Section 68 and relied on High Court judgments regarding the specific scrip.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had consistently denied operating the bank accounts in question, attributing the transactions to her husband. The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for verification of the entries and to consider debit entries as well, rather than solely focusing on credit entries.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order under section 271(1)(c) is liable to be quashed. The primary reason for this decision was that the penalty notice issued by the AO did not clarify whether the penalty was proposed to be imposed on the grounds of concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The AO had not struck off the irrelevant charge in the standard proforma notice, which indicated a non-application of mind. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional Bombay High Court's decisions in CIT vs. Samson Perinchery and PCIT vs. Times Global Broadcasting Ltd., which followed the Karnataka High Court's decision in CIT v. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory. These judgments established that concealment of income and furnishing inaccurate particulars of income carry different connotations, and the AO must be clear about the specific limb under which penalty is imposable. The assessee must be given notice of the specific charge. Since the notice was ambiguous, the penalty order was quashed. Consequently, other legal contentions and contentions on merits raised by the assessee became academic and did not require separate adjudication. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had consistently denied operating the bank accounts in question, attributing the transactions to her husband. The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for verification of the entries and to consider debit entries as well, rather than solely focusing on credit entries.
The Tribunal acknowledged the medical reasons for the non-appearance but also noted the assessee's prior non-compliance on 8 previous occasions. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to remand the case back to the Ld. Addl./Joint Commissioner for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had placed documents on record to substantiate her claim, which were allegedly not considered by the lower authorities. In the interest of justice, the case was remanded to the AO to give the assessee another opportunity to prove her claim.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the present appeals. Despite several opportunities and adjournments, the assessee did not furnish a proper application with supporting affidavit for condoning the delay.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the present appeals. Despite several opportunities and adjournments, the assessee did not furnish a proper application with supporting affidavit for condoning the delay.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid. The AO had issued this notice on 09/09/2016, prior to the expiry of the limitation period for issuing a notice under Section 143(2), which was 30/09/2016. The Tribunal, respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in CIT vs. K.M. Pachayappan and the Delhi High Court in KIM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Asst. Director of Income-tax, held that no action could be initiated under Section 147 of the Act when the assessment proceedings based on the return filed were still pending and had not been terminated. The AO had the opportunity to scrutinize the return under Section 143(3) before the expiry of the limitation period. Since the assessment order was quashed on this preliminary ground, the Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to delve into the merits of the addition made under Section 68. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's cash sales consistently formed 75-80% of total sales in preceding years and that the current year's deposit was less than the deposit in the prior year. Thus, the Tribunal found the deposit not to be exorbitant or unjustified.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the first appeal. It was held that the notice u/s 148 of the Act was issued beyond the prescribed time limit as the escaped income did not exceed Rs. 50,00,000/-, rendering the reopening void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the present appeals. Despite several opportunities and adjournments, the assessee did not furnish a proper application with supporting affidavit for condoning the delay.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order without a speaking order on the merits of the case and without affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the present appeals. Despite several opportunities and adjournments, the assessee did not furnish a proper application with supporting affidavit for condoning the delay.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel provided an undertaking to ensure compliance with future notices. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing the assessee with adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel provided an undertaking to ensure compliance with future notices. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing the assessee with adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities, including the CIT(A), failed to objectively consider the assessee's submissions and explanations. The CIT(A)'s order was deemed cryptic and lacking application of mind.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee had a valid approval under Section 10(23C)(iv) which was not withdrawn, the Assessing Officer could not deny the exemption. The issue of development fund was also decided in favor of the assessee, aligning with previous ITAT orders.
The Tribunal held that all grounds raised by the Revenue were covered by the earlier decision of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case for AY 2013-14 and 2014-15, which was followed by the CIT(A). Regarding grounds 1 and 2, it was an admitted fact that MEDA had been granted approval under Section 10(23C)(iv) by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai, and this approval was still valid. Therefore, the AO could not deny the exemption claimed by the assessee. For ground 3, concerning the addition on account of the difference in the development fund balance, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s directions, which were in line with the Tribunal's previous observations. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding on ground 4 that once exemption is granted under Section 10(23C)(iv), there is no limit to the amount of accumulation, no requirement for trustee resolutions, and no need to file Form 10 specifying the purpose. The only condition is that accumulated funds must be utilized for the trust's objects within five years. The Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A)'s direction to the AO to verify the utilization of accumulated funds. Consequently, all grounds raised by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that for claiming deduction of bad debts under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2) of the Income Tax Act, it is sufficient for the Assessee to show that the debt was written off as irrecoverable in its books of accounts for the previous year, fulfilling the conditions of Section 36(2), without necessarily proving the reason for irrecoverability. As the Assessee fulfilled these conditions, the disallowance made by the AO and affirmed by the CIT(A) was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee could not provide the details due to the short time granted by the CIT(E), and the order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The issue was remitted back to the CIT(E) for reconsideration.
The Tribunal held that all grounds raised by the Revenue were covered by the earlier decision of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case for AY 2013-14 and 2014-15, which was followed by the CIT(A). Regarding grounds 1 and 2, it was an admitted fact that MEDA had been granted approval under Section 10(23C)(iv) by the Chief CCIT, Mumbai, which was still valid. Therefore, the AO could not deny the exemption claimed by the assessee. For ground 3, concerning the addition on account of the difference in the Development Fund balance, the Tribunal upheld the directions of the CIT(A), which were in accordance with the Tribunal's previous observations. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s finding on ground 4 that once exemption is granted under Section 10(23C)(iv), there is no limit to the amount of accumulation, and there is no requirement to file trustee resolutions or Form 10 for such accumulation. The only condition is that the accumulated funds must be utilized for the trust's objects within five years. The CIT(A)'s direction to the AO to verify the utilization of accumulated funds was confirmed. Consequently, all grounds raised by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that although the assessee did not respond to two notices, they fully complied with the show-cause notice. Since the AO considered this compliance while passing the order under Section 147 and did not pass an order under Section 144, the non-compliance did not warrant the penalty.