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Facts
The assessee's appeal is against an order that dismissed their appeal due to delay. The original assessment order was passed under Section 147 r.w.s 144 of the Income-tax Act. The assessee had purchased immovable property, and a difference in sale consideration and market value, amounting to Rs. 26,05,000/-, was considered to have escaped assessment.
Held
The Tribunal held that the delay of 236 days in filing the first appeal was due to the assessee's lack of education, his tax practitioner's medical issues, and his own medical problems. Therefore, the delay was condoned. The Tribunal also quashed the reassessment notice and the subsequent order as invalid due to non-compliance with Section 149 and 151 of the Act.
Key Issues
Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was justifiable, and whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under the new regime were valid given the procedural non-compliance with Section 149 and 151 of the Act.
Sections Cited
147, 144, 56(2)(vii)(b), 148, 148A, 151, 149(1)(b), 50C, 43CA, 249(3)
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “D” BENCH MUMBAI
Before: SHRI AMIT SHUKLA & SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL
O R D E R PER GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:
This appeal filed by the Assessee is against the order of Ld. CIT(A), National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi, vide order no. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2024-25/1068050024(1). dated 28.08.2024, passed against the assessment order by National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi, u/s. 147 r.w.s 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), dated 18.05.2023, for Assessment Year 2017-18.
2. Grounds taken by the Assessee are reproduced as under: “1) The Hon. Commissioner of Appeal erred in not condoning the delay in filing the appeal even though the delay was only 236 days.
2) The Ld assessing officer erred in 26,05,000/- to the returned income of the appellant to the returned income of Rs. 27,36,580/-
3) Assessing officer erred in making addition u/s. 56(2) (vii) (b) of Income Tax Act.
4) Assessing officer has erred in issuing the notice for assessment as the notice itself was barred by the time. The assessment made itself is therefore bad in law and needs to be quashed.
5) Assessing officer erred in not giving proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee.”
2.1. Assessee has also filed an application for revising his grounds of appeal. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal are reproduced as under:
“I. Condonation of delay:
The Id CIT (A) erred in rejecting the Application of Condonation of delay of 236 days without appreciating the complete facts
II. Reopening is bad in law:
2. The Id CIT (A) failed to appreciate that the reopening of assessment vide notice u/s. 148 of the Act dated 29/07/2022 is after expiry of three years from the end of the assessment year 2017-18 and the income escapement is below 50 lacs, i.e. Rs.26,05,000/-, therefore reopening is bad in law.
3. The Ld. CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the reopening notice u/s 148 dated 29.07.2022 and the order u/s 148A(d) of the Act has been passed after the approval of Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-9, Mumbai which is bad in law as the approval should have been obtained in terms of section 151(u) and not section 151(1) of the Act and the PCIT-9 cannot be the specified authority as per section 151 of the Act.
III. Addition of Rs. 26,05,000/- u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act.
4. The Ld. CIT(A) erred making the addition u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act of Rs. 26,05,000/-without referring matter to DVO.”
Brief facts of the case are that assessee filed his return of income on 31.01.2017 reporting the total income at Rs.27,35,580/-. Case of the assessee was reopened for assessment by issuing notice u/s.148, dated 30.06.2021 under the old regime of re-assessment proceedings by recording reasons to believe whereby assessee had purchased immovable property and there was a difference in the sale consideration and market value as per stamp duty valuation amounting to Rs.26,05,000/- which had escaped assessment within the meaning of provisions contained in section 50C/43CA/56(2)(vii).
At the outset, ld. Counsel for the assessee pointed out that these re-opening proceedings were subsequently withdrawn/closed vide letter dated 17.01.2023 issued by the Directorate of Income Tax (Systems) of the Department. Extracts of this letter on the closure of duplicate assessment/re-assessment e-proceedings are reproduced below for ready reference. “Subject: Closure of duplicate assessment/re-assessment e-Proceedings - Reg. This is to intimate that in the present assessment/re-assessment e-Proceedings, the Notice u/s 148 was generated during the period from 01/04/2021 to 30/06/2021 under the old provisions of sections 147 to 151. Therefore, prima- facie, this proceedings is covered by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Uol vs. Ashish Agarwal dated 04/05/2022. It is seen that the jurisdictional Assessing Officer has subsequently issued a new Notice u/s 148 under the new provisions in pursuance of the said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, in view of existence of two e-Proceedings for the same AY and Section, one of which has been later initiated in pursuance of the said judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the present older proceeding which is now rendered redundant being covered by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court is being hereby closed. It is pertinent to mention that identification of the proceeding for closure has been done based on data extracted from the system, therefore, it is possible that in a rare case, a wrong proceeding gets closed. Therefore, the same will be restored if it would be noticed or informed by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer or any Income Tax Authority that the proceeding which has been closed is not the proceedings covered by the aforesaid Supreme Court decision.”
4.1. From the perusal of the above letter, it is noted that the first notice issued u/s.148, dated 30.06.2021 was generated during the period from 01.04.2021 to 30.06.2021 under the old provisions of section 147 to 151. Since these proceedings were covered by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashish Agrawal [2022] 138 taxmann.com 64 (SC) dated 04.05.2022, the same were closed.
4.2. In the meanwhile, ld. Assessing Officer proceeded with show cause notice u/s.148A(b), dated 27.05.2022 which was in consequence with the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashish Agrawal (supra). According to this show cause notice, the initial notice u/s.148, dated 30.06.2021 was deemed to have been issued u/s. 148A(b). Thereafter, ld. Assessing Officer passed an order u/s. 148A(d), dated 29.07.2022. In this order, ld. Assessing Officer took note of the transaction in the immovable property carried by the assessee according to which amount of Rs.26.05,000/- had escaped assessment under the provisions of section 50C/43CA/56(2)(vii). In this order, in para-4, ld. Assessing Officer took note of the first notice dated 30.06.2021 issued under the old regime which was deemed to be a notice u/s.148A(b) by way of directions issued by Hon'ble Supreme Court. In para-7 of this order, ld. Assessing Officer noted taking of necessary approval u/s.151 which is noted to be taken from PCIT-19, Mumbai. Subsequently, ld. Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148, dated 29.07.2022 in which also reference was made to order passed by him u/s.148A(d), dated 29.07.2022, whereby information which requires action in consequence of judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashish Agrawal (supra) suggesting that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and proposing to assess such income in the hands of the assessee. In this notice also, in para-3, ld. Assessing Officer noted that this notice was issued after obtaining prior approval of PCIT-19, Mumbai whish was accorded on 25.07.2022. In the present case of the assessee, assessment order is passed u/s.147 r.w.s. 144 which is an ex-parte order whereby addition of Rs.26,05,000/- has been made u/s.56(2)(vii)(b) for difference in sale consideration and market value for the purpose of stamp duty.
4.3. Ld. CIT(A) on the appeal filed by the assessee noted that there is delay of 236 days. He thus, by taking reference to provisions of section 249(3) did not adjudicate on the merits of the case but dismissed it since it was filed late. In this respect, assessee placed on record an affidavit before us explaining the reasons for the delay which occurred in filing the first appeal before the ld. CIT(A). According to him, he is not adequately educated to understand the nuances of tax compliances and is engaged in furniture contract work. He had been filing his returns of income through tax practitioner, who could not make the necessary submissions in the course of assessment proceedings, since at the relevant time he was facing certain medical problems of his child. To corroborate this, medical records are furnished along with the affidavit. A confirmatory letter is also placed on record from the tax practitioner to this effect. Further, assessee himself was also not keeping well during the relevant time for which medical documents are placed on record along with the affidavit.
4.4 To address the issue in hand before us, we need to delve into the understanding of the expression “sufficient cause”. Sub-section 3 of Section 249 contemplates that the CIT(A) may admit an appeal after expiry of relevant period, if he is satisfied that there was a “sufficient cause” for not presenting it within that period. Similarly, it has been used in section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Whenever interpretation and construction of this expression has fallen for consideration before Hon'ble High Court as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, then, Hon'ble Court were unanimous in their conclusion that this expression is to be used liberally.
4.5. We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, 1987 AIR 1353: "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay.
There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
4.6. Similarly, we would like to make reference to authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (supra). It reads as under:
"Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi lain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."
4.7. We do not deem it necessary to re-cite or recapitulate the proposition laid down in other decisions. It is suffice to say that the Hon'ble Courts are unanimous in their approach to propound that whenever the reasons assigned by an applicant for explaining the delay, then such reasons are to be construed with a justice oriented approach.
4.8. In light of the above, if we examine the facts then it would reveal that there is a delay of 236 days in filing of the first appeal by the assessee before the ld. CIT(A). In its submissions as reproduced in the order of ld. CIT(A), assessee has explained the reasons which prevented him in filing the appeal withing the prescribed limitation. Therefore, for the just decision of the controversy, it is incumbent upon us to condone the delay. Considering the said explanation of the assessee, we condone the same and direct the ld. CIT(A) to admit the appeal for its meritorious adjudication.
5. The issue before us raised is on a jurisdiction of the proceedings initiated by the ld. Assessing Officer. The jurisdictional issues relate to limitation within which the impugned notice u/s.148 ought to have been issued, on the approval which ought to have been taken u/s.151 for the purpose of initiating the reopening of proceedings and due compliance of the procedure enunciated under the new regime of re- assessment u/s.147 to 151 effective from 01.04.2021. The most clinching fact in the present case is that the first notice issued u/s.148 under the old regime by which the reopening was initiated was subsequently withdrawn/closed in compliance to the directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashish Agrawal (supra) for which letter was issued by the Department on 17.01.2023 and its relevant contents are already extracted above. In the intervening period, Department proceeded with the issue of show cause notice u/s. 148A(b), dated 27.05.2022 and thereafter passing an order u/s.148A(d), dated 29.07.2022. Notice u/s.148 in the new regime was thereafter issued on 29.07.2022. In the letter for closure of the first re-opening proceedings, it is noted that in view of existence of two e-proceeding for the same Assessment Year and section, the older proceeding is rendered redundant and is thus closed. Accordingly, the last notice u/s. 148 issued by the ld. Assessing Officer, dated 29.07.2022, which is under the new law. When this notice is taken into consideration for the purpose of impugned assessment order, necessary compliance required u/s.148A are not on record to demonstrate their compliance. The compliances u/s.148A referred above relate to the first and original notice which was issued under the old regime and subsequently withdrawn / closed.
5.1. Secondly, on the approval aspect, it is obtained from PCIT-19, Mumbai. When the latest notice u/s.148, dated 29.07.2022 is considered, it is beyond period of three years from the end of the year under consideration, i.e., 2017-18. The income alleged to have escaped assessment is Rs.26,05,000/- which has been added by ld. Assessing Officer while completing the assessment. Thus, there is violation of section 149(1)(b) as well as section 151(1)(ii) of the Act.
5.2. Hon Supreme Court in case of Rajeev Agarwal [2024] 469 ITR 46 (SC), held that new reassessment proceeding pursuant to Ashish Agarwal (supra) decision have to meet the test of new regime. The applicability of the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime has to be tested on the date of issuance of notice under Section 148 of the new regime. Even if TOLA is read into the Income Tax Act, the time limits for completion or compliance of actions can be extended till 30 June 2021. However, the notices under Section 148 of the new regime were issued by the Revenue on 29/07/2022. The period is beyond the extended time limits stipulated under the Income Tax Act read with TOLA. Therefore, the case is beyond the period of 3 years. TOLA is only applicable to the provisions that specify time limits. Section 151 does not prescribe any time limit for the issuance of sanctions by the specified authorities. Therefore, precondition for issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act are required to be satisfied before issuance of notice.
Ashish Agarwal (supra) treated Section 148 notices issued by the Revenue between 1 April 2021 and 30 June 2021 as show-cause notices in terms of Section 148A(b). Further that old proceedings are closed.
5.3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and other Vs. Rajeev Bansal [2024] 469 ITR 46 (SC), dated 03.10.2024, had elaborately dealt with this issue:
"52. In Ashish Agarwal (supra), this Court held that the benefit of the new regime must be provided for the reassessment conducted for the past periods. The increase of the monetary threshold from Rupees one lakh to Rupees fifty lakh is beneficial for the assesses. Mr Venkataraman has also conceded on behalf of the Revenue that all notices issued under the new regime by invoking the six year time limit prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime will have to be dropped if the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment is less than Rupees fifty lakhs."
"53. The position of law which can be derived based on the above discussion may be summarized thus: (i) Section 149(1) of the new regime is not prospective. It also applies to past assessment years; (ii) The time limit of four years is now reduced to three years for all situations. The Revenue can issue notices under Section 148 of the new regime only if three years or less have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year; (iii) the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime stipulates that the Revenue can issue reassessment notices for past assessment years only if the time limit survives according to Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime, that is, six years from the end of the relevant assessment year; and (iv) all notices issued invoking the time limit under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime will have to be dropped if the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment is less than Rupees fifty lakhs."
"68. After 1 April 2021, the Income Tax Act has to be read along with the substituted provisions. The substituted provisions apply retrospectively for past assessment years as well. On 1 April 2021, TOLA was still in existence, and the Revenue could not have ignored the application of TOLA and its notifications. Therefore, for issuing a reassessment notice under Section 148 after 1 April 2021, the Revenue would still have to look at: (i) the time limit specified under Section 149 of the new regime; and (ii) the time limit for issuance of notice as extended by TOLA and its notifications. The Revenue cannot extend the operation of the old law under TOLA, but it can certainl benefit from the extended time limit for completion of actions falling for completion between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021." "69. For instance, Section 149(1)(a) of the new regime specified the time limit of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year for reopening of the assessment. For assessment year 2017-2018, the three year period expired on 31 March 2021. The expiry of time fell within the time period contemplated by Section 3 of TOLA read with its notifications. Resultantly, the Revenue had time until 30 June 2021 to issue a reassessment notice for assessment year 2017- 2018 under Section 149(1)(a). This harmonious reading gives effect to the legislative intention of both the Income Tax Act and TOLA. Moreover, Sections 147 to 151 are machinery provisions. Therefore, they must be given an interpretation that is consistent with the object and purpose of the Income Tax Act."
"75. After 1 April 2021, the new regime has specified different authorities for granting sanctions under Section 151. The new regime is beneficial to the assesse because it specifies a higher level of authority for the grant of sanctions in comparison to the old regime. Therefore, in terms of Ashish Agarwal (supra), after 1 April 2021, the prior approval must be obtained from the appropriate authorities specified under Section 151 of the new regime. The effect of Section 151 of the new regime is thus:
(i) If income escaping assessment is less than Rupees fifty lakhs: (a) a reassessment notice could be issued within three years after obtaining the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner, or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director; and (b) no notice could be issued after the expiry of three years; and (ii) If income escaping assessment is more than Rupees fifty lakhs: (a) a reassessment notice could be issued within three years after obtaining the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner, or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director; and (b) after three years after obtaining the me prior approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General,"
"76. Grant of sanction by the appropriate authority is a precondition for the assessing officer to assume jurisdiction under Section 148 to issue a reassessment notice. Section 151 of the new regime does not prescribe a time limit within which a specified authority has to grant sanction. Rather, it links up the time limits with the jurisdiction of the authority to grant sanction, Section 151(ii) of the new regime prescribes a higher level of authority if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. Thus, non- compliance by the assessing officer with the strict time limits prescribed under Section 151 affects their jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148."
"81. This Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra) directed the assessing officers to "pass orders in terms of Section 148-A(d) in respect of each of the assesses concerned." Further, it directed the assessing officers to issue a notice under Section 148 of the new regime "after following the procedure as required under Section 148-A." Although this Court waived off the requirement of obtaining prior approval under Section 148A(a) and Section 148A(b), it did not waive the requirement for Section 148A(d) and Section 148. Therefore, the assessing officer was required to obtain prior approval of the specified authority according to Section 151 of the new regime before passing an order under Section 148A(d) or issuing a notice under Section 148. These notices ought to have been issued following the time limits specified under Section 151 of the new regime read with TOLA, where applicable."
"89. In Ashish Agarwal (supra), this Court: (1) upheld the judgments of the High Courts; and (ii) deemed the notices issued under Section 148 of the old regime as show cause notices issued under Section 1484(b) of the new regime. By agreeing with the judgments of the High Courts, this Court laid down the law that the provisions of the new regime will be applicable for all the reassessment notices issued under Section 148 after 1 April 2021. As a result of this holding, all the reassessment notices issued in terms of Section 148 of the old regime would have been declared invalid. Therefore, this Court deemed the reassessment notices issued under the old regime after 1 April 2021 as show cause notices issued under Section 148A(b) of the new regime."
5.4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and other Vs. Rajeev Bansal [2024] 469 ITR 46 (SC), dated 03.10.2024, in para 75, it is very categorically mentioned by the Hon'ble Court that after 01.04.2021, in terms of Ashish Agrawal (supra) the prior approval must be obtained from the appropriate authorities specified u/s.151 of the new regime. This abundantly brings clarity on the aspect of obtaining approval for issue of notice u/s.148 which are fall out of the decision in Ashish Agrawal (supra). Similarly in para 77, objective of section 3(1) of TOLA is mentioned which is to relax the time limit for compliance with actions that fall for completion from 20.03.2020 to 31.03.2021. Thus, the objective is specific for providing temporal flexibility. In para 78, the same has been explained by an example taking Assessment Year 2017- 18 which also in specific terms mentions that the authority specified u/s.151(i) of the new regime can grant sanction till 30.06.2021. Thus, while concluding in para 81 on the issue obtaining approval, Hon'ble Court has specifically stated that the Assessing Officer is required to obtain prior approval of the specified authority according to section 151 of the new regime before passing an order u/s.148A(d) or issuing a notice u/s.148. According to the Hon'ble Court, though it had waived off the requirement obtaining prior approval u/s.148A(a) and Section 148A(b), it did not waive the requirement for section 148A(d) and Section 148.
5.5. The time limit of three years lapsed on 31.03.2021 which falls between 20.03.2020 and 31.03.2021 during which provisions of Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) would apply. Accordingly, the amended provisions under the Act read with TOLA extended the time limit for granting of approval till 30.06.2021 by the specified authority.
5.6. Thus, on the above stated facts and law, in the present case, three years had lapsed from the end of the Assessment Year when the order u/s.148A(d) and notice u/s.148 was issued on 29.07.2022. In the present case, since the notice u/s. 148 and order u/s. 148A(b) have been issued beyond the period of three years from the end of the relevant Assessment Year, case of the assessee falls within the provisions of section 151(ii) of the amended law whereby the specified authority for grant of approval is specified as Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General. Contrary to this requirement, the approval obtained is by Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-17, Mumbai. Accordingly, since a proper sanction by the specified authority had not been obtained for issue of notice u/s.148 under the applicable provisions of law, said notice is invalid and bad in law.
5.7. Thus, the sanction by specified authority has not been obtained by the Id. Assessing Officer in accordance with the provisions contained in section 151 of the Act under the new regime, since notice u/s.148 has been issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant Assessment Year in violation of sec 149(1) and 151 of the Act. Accordingly, the said notice issued is invalid liable to be quashed.
Keeping in the juxtaposition, the undisputed and uncontroverted facts as stated above and the judicial precedents of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashish Agrawal and Rajeev Bansal (supra) the notice issued dated 29.07.2022 for Assessment Year 2017-18 under the new regime is invalid and thus quashed. Resultantly, the impugned reopening proceeding so initiated and the impugned re-assessment order passed thereafter are also quashed. Since, we have already quashed the impugned assessment order, in terms of our observations and findings as stated above, merits of the case are not dealt with. Accordingly, grounds raised by the assessee on the legal aspect are allowed.
In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Order is pronounced in the open court on 28 April, 2025