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734 orders · Page 6 of 15
The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the CIT(A) was bad in law because an effective opportunity of hearing, which is a sine qua non for upholding the principle of natural justice, was not provided to the assessee. While the CIT(A) noted that notices were sent and the assessee repeatedly sought adjournments, ultimately deciding the appeal ex parte based on available material, the Tribunal found that this did not constitute an effective hearing. The Tribunal referred to Section 250(2)(a) of the Act, which grants the appellant the right to be heard. The Tribunal concluded that a miscarriage of justice had occurred and that the assessee should be given one more opportunity to represent its case. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to provide an effective opportunity of hearing within 60 days. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in these terms.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was invalid because the Assessing Officer (AO) relied on borrowed satisfaction without independent application of mind and failed to dispose of the assessee's objections. The notice for reopening and the subsequent reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's submission to withdraw the appeal. The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn, granting liberty to revive it if the settlement under the scheme is not finalized.
The Tribunal held that the transfer of property occurred in 2002 as per Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, considering the payment made and possession handed over. Therefore, Section 50C of the Act, which refers to the market value at the time of registration, was not directly applicable. However, the first proviso to Section 50C was applied.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had no obligation to pay advance tax as per Section 208 of the Act for the assessment year in question, based on the declared turnover. Therefore, the dismissal of the appeal in limine by the Ld. Commissioner was set aside.
The Tribunal held as follows: 1. Regarding Section 14A disallowance for AY 2017-18 and AY 2020-21: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals. It relied on the decisions of the Delhi High Court in PCIT vs. Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in PCIT (Central) vs. Keti Construction Ltd., which held that the amendment to Section 14A by the Finance Act, 2022, is not retrospective. Therefore, the disallowance under Section 14A is to be restricted to the exempt income earned during the year. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was upheld. 2. Regarding ESOP expenses for AY 2020-21: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. It followed the consistent view of various High Courts and ITATs, including the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Biocon Ltd. and the Mumbai ITAT in JM Financial Institutional Securities Ltd. vs. DCIT, which held that ESOP expenses, including reimbursement to a holding company, are allowable as revenue expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Act. The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition was upheld. 3. Regarding TDS credit for AY 2020-21: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. It found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s direction to grant the entire TDS credit available as per the latest Form 26AS, as this issue primarily involves verification of TDS credit. 4. Regarding debenture issue expenses for AY 2017-18 (Cross Objection): The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the cross-objection. It noted that the CIT(A) had inadvertently failed to address the ground of appeal concerning the disallowance of debenture issue expenses. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision by way of a speaking order. The cross-appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after considering the petition and affidavit. It was decided to restore the matter to the Commissioner for denovo adjudication, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard and make further submissions.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Act, dated 29.07.2022, was issued without the requisite approval from the appropriate authority. For Assessment Year 2017-18, the three-year period for issuing the notice expired on 31.03.2021. As this date fell within the period covered by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA), the specified authority under Section 151(i) of the new regime could grant sanction until 30.06.2021. However, the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148 were issued after this period, requiring approval from the authority specified under Section 151(ii) (Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner). The approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT), which is the authority under Section 151(i). This non-compliance with Section 151(ii) affects the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the order under Section 148A(d), the reassessment proceedings, and the order under Section 147 read with Section 144B are quashed as bad in law. The appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
The Tribunal held that the AO based allegations solely on an investigation report without independent inquiry and failed to consider the assessee's request for relied-upon documents. The Tribunal found no justification to uphold the allegations, quashed the additions, and set aside the appeal order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after considering the petition and affidavit. It was decided to restore the matter to the Commissioner for denovo adjudication, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard and make further submissions.
The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment, which was beyond three years, was obtained from an incorrect authority as per Section 151(ii) of the Act. Consequently, the notice u/s 148A and the subsequent assessment order were quashed as void-ab-initio. The Tribunal also observed that even on merits, the purchases were supported by evidence and made through banking channels, with the supplier confirming the transactions.
Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A for AY 2017-18, the Tribunal noted that while the CBDT had issued a clarification regarding the intention of Section 14A even when no exempt income is earned, the Delhi High Court in PCIT vs. Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in PCIT (Central) vs. Keti Construction Ltd. have held that the amendment brought in by the Finance Act 2022 is not retrospective. Therefore, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order deleting the addition, and the Revenue's appeal for AY 2017-18 was dismissed. For AY 2020-21, the Tribunal did not record any specific finding or reasoning on the ESOP expenses issue, but the operative part of the order stated that the Revenue's appeal for AY 2020-21 was dismissed. Regarding the cross-objection concerning debenture issue expenses, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had inadvertently failed to address this ground. Consequently, the issue was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a decision by way of a speaking order. The cross-objection was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's mistake in computing tax on the wrong return was inadvertent and had resulted in an erroneous demand. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to revise the computation sheet based on the return filed under section 119(2)(b).
The Tribunal held that the date of the allotment letter should be considered for the holding period and that the sale transaction was already declared and accepted in AY 2010-11. Therefore, taxing it again in AY 2016-17 would amount to double taxation.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence, finding it relevant and crucial. However, as these documents were not presented to the lower authorities, the Tribunal remanded the entire issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence, finding it relevant and crucial. However, as these documents were not presented to the lower authorities, the Tribunal remanded the entire issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO was not sustainable as it was based on surmises and conjectures. The SEBI confirmation regarding the broker's surrender negated the possibility of the assessee undertaking transactions through them during the impugned year.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence, finding it relevant and crucial. However, as these documents were not presented to the lower authorities, the Tribunal remanded the entire issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) had not made any inquiry regarding the allowability of the claim of 'Any other amount as deduction' amounting to Rs. 238.92 crore, nor had the AO examined the issue of Dividend Stripping under Section 94(7) of the Act. The Tribunal found that the assessment order was very brief and did not reflect any inquiry or verification on these relevant aspects, which were part of the complete scrutiny. The Tribunal distinguished the assessee's cited cases, noting that in those cases, the AO had made detailed inquiries or the issues pertained to a pre-amended period where Explanation 2 to Section 263 was not applicable or the AO had made a plausible view. The Tribunal concluded that in the present case, there was a clear lack of inquiry, not just inadequate inquiry. Therefore, the PCIT validly assumed jurisdiction under Section 263 read with Explanation 2 of the Act, as the assessment order was both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The PCIT correctly set aside the assessment order for de novo assessment, during which the AO would examine the issues and provide the assessee an opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order.
The Tribunal held that while documentary evidence for the assessee's type of work is difficult to obtain, she provided a plausible explanation for the deposits. The Tribunal noted that the nature of her work (housekeeping, cleaning, babysitting) makes it infeasible to provide detailed documentation, and therefore, the addition based solely on the lack of documents was unjustified.
The Tribunal found that during the original assessment proceedings, the AO had specifically raised a query regarding the Section 14A disallowance, and the assessee's explanation was submitted and accepted. Since the issue was already examined and no new material came to the AO's notice, the reopening amounted to a change of opinion and was invalid. Therefore, the Section 148 notice was declared bad in law and void ab initio, consequently quashing the reassessment order.
The Tribunal held that to meet the ends of justice, the issues should be decided on merits after providing a fair opportunity of hearing. Consequently, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee one more opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), considering the assessee's explanation of personal hardships and the principle of substantial justice over technicalities. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) rightly deleted the additions made by the AO. The AO had not applied his own mind and had merely acted on information received from the DDIT Investigation wing, initiating reopening proceedings under Section 148 and making additions without establishing any evidence that the assessee had traded in the script of VMS Industries Ltd. The quantum specified by the AO was also different from what was shown by the assessee's stockbroker and supported by contract notes. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided all required documents, including purchase details, broker information, bank statements, demat account details, and contract notes. The AO's failure to conduct independent verification, examine the assessee's documents, collect evidence from the bank or broker, and his reliance solely on the investigation report, violated the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal also referred to the High Court's decision in PCIT v. Parasben Kasturchand Kochar, which emphasized that the AO should provide an opportunity for cross-examination and furnish material to the assessee. The Tribunal found no cogent evidence brought on record by the Revenue to prove that the transactions were not genuine or that the appellant was a beneficiary of accommodation entries. The AO's conclusion was based on assumptions and presumptions, which are not permissible. The CIT(A)'s deletion of additions was therefore upheld.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), emphasizing the principle of advancing substantial justice over technicalities. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, with a direction for the assessee to cooperate and avoid frivolous adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the gift received by the assessee from Ms. Vidhie Mukerjea is exempt from tax under Section 56(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal reasoned that the term 'relative' should be interpreted to include persons related by affinity, which arises from marriage. Citing definitions from Black's Law Dictionary and P. Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon', the Tribunal concluded that affinity encompasses the relationship created by marriage between a spouse and the blood relatives of the other spouse. Consequently, step-siblings, whose parents are married to each other, are related by affinity and can be considered as 'brother and sister' within the meaning of Section 56(2)(vii). Therefore, the property received by the assessee from his step-sister does not fall under the purview of Section 56(2)(vii)(b) and is not taxable. The addition made by the AO was deleted. As the addition was deleted on merits, the objections raised regarding the validity of reopening under Section 148 were treated as academic.
The Tribunal held that the AO had misunderstood the facts and that the funds raised through OFCD were used for business purposes. The premium paid on redemption of OFCD was considered revenue expenditure, following High Court precedents.
The Tribunal held that the AO had misunderstood the facts and that the funds raised through OFCD were used for business purposes. The premium paid on redemption of OFCD was considered revenue expenditure, following High Court precedents.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), considering the assessee's explanation and the principles of substantial justice over technicalities. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that for properties vacant for the whole year, the annual value should be determined under Section 23(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, resulting in an annual value of 'Nil'. Therefore, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should have been issued a show cause notice before the appeal was dismissed for delay. The matter was set aside to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) to decide afresh after considering the assessee's explanation regarding non-service of the assessment order and the delay in filing the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove the creditworthiness of the lenders and the genuineness of the transactions. Consequently, the additions made by the Assessing Officer under Sections 68 and 69 were sustained.
The Tribunal held that the commission paid to Naaptol was a business expenditure with a clear nexus to the assessee's business. It noted that Naaptol is an established company, disclosed the income, and TDS was deducted, upholding the assessee's business acumen.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should have been issued a show cause notice before the appeal was dismissed for delay. The matter was set aside to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) to decide afresh after considering the assessee's explanation regarding non-service of the assessment order and the delay in filing the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the appeal on merit and did not properly consider the Supreme Court's decision on condonation of delay. Therefore, the case is restored to the CIT(A) for deciding on merit.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was not barred by limitation, as ground no. 1 of the assessee's appeal became infructuous after the decision on merits. Regarding the inclusion of GST, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee. It reasoned that Section 44BB is a special code for presumptive taxation and must be read in conjunction with Section 145A, but Section 44BB overrides provisions like Section 28 to 41 and Section 43B. The Tribunal followed the decisions of its Coordinate Benches in Seadrill International Ltd. and Orient Overseas Container Line Ltd., which held that GST, being a statutory levy collected separately as a line item in invoices, cannot be included in gross receipts for computing presumptive income under Section 44BB. Including GST would amount to taxing tax, and it is not in the nature of charges or consideration for services rendered. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 13,10,09,191 towards GST was directed to be deleted. Consequently, grounds 3 and 4 concerning interest and penalty were also rendered infructuous.
The Tribunal allowed depreciation on assets transferred pursuant to a demerger, deleted additions made on account of secondary freight cost in closing stock valuation, and restored the issue of VRS compensation to the AO for further adjudication. The revenue's appeals were largely dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is a charitable institution promoting sports, which falls under the object of general public utility. It ruled that the club's activities were not commercial and that the proviso to Section 2(15) did not disentitle it from exemption, especially given the continuous deficit incurred in its operations.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is a charitable institution promoting sports, which falls under the object of general public utility. It ruled that the club's activities were not commercial and that the proviso to Section 2(15) did not disentitle it from exemption, especially given the continuous deficit incurred in its operations.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that the non-furnishing of reasons for reopening the assessment, despite a specific request from the assessee, is a violation of law. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings and the order passed are quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus to prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. The AO failed to point out any discrepancies in the evidence provided by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal deleted the Section 68 addition for the property investment, accepting the fresh affidavit and documentary evidence furnished by the assessee regarding the source of funds from her husband. The addition related to the sale of shares was remanded back to the AO for fresh examination and computation of capital gains based on newly provided contract notes, as the issue was not properly examined by lower authorities.
The Tribunal held that the revenue's appeals did not fall within the exceptions provided in the circular for appeals below the monetary limit. The appeals arose from assessment orders under Section 143(3) and not from proceedings related to TDS/TCS as per the circular's exceptions. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of tax effect and lack of new material on merits.
The Tribunal held that the revenue's appeals did not fall within the exceptions provided in the circular for appeals below the monetary limit. The appeals arose from assessment orders under Section 143(3) and not from proceedings related to TDS/TCS as per the circular's exceptions. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of tax effect and lack of new material on merits.
The Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 69A was not applicable. It further held that the stamp duty valuation should be considered as of the allotment date (F.Y. 2010-11) as payments were made by banking channels and an allotment letter was issued. The discrepancy in valuation was deemed unsustainable.