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734 orders · Page 7 of 15
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that the addition made under Section 69A was not applicable. It further held that the stamp duty valuation should be considered as of the allotment date (F.Y. 2010-11) as payments were made by banking channels and an allotment letter was issued. The discrepancy in valuation was deemed unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that additions made under section 153A must be based on incriminating material found during the search. Statements recorded during a search, on their own, without corroborating evidence found during the search, are insufficient to make additions.
The Tribunal allowed depreciation on assets transferred pursuant to a demerger, deleted additions made on account of secondary freight cost in closing stock valuation, and restored the issue of VRS compensation to the AO for further adjudication. The revenue's appeals were largely dismissed.
The tribunal held that the amendment introducing a tolerance band, initially 5% and later 10%, is curative and retrospective. Therefore, the 10% tolerance limit should be applied. The addition made by the AO was unjustified as the difference was within the permissible tolerance limit.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient documentation, including bank statements and contract notes, to prove the genuineness of the share transactions. The AO had not conducted independent investigations to disprove the transactions.
The Tribunal held that the payments made to Deloitte Global Holdings Services Limited (DGSHL) do not fall within the scope and ambit of royalty under Article 13(3) of the India-UK DTAA. This decision was based on the Tribunal's previous rulings in the assessee's own cases for AY 2018-19 and 2019-20, which followed the Delhi High Court's judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P) Ltd. and the ITAT Delhi Bench decision in EY Global Services Ltd. vs ACIT. These judgments clarified that for payments to be considered royalty, there must be a transfer of copyright, which was not evident in the agreement between the assessee and DGSHL. The Tribunal noted that the AO had relied on an AAR judgment that was subsequently reversed. Consequently, the assessee was not required to deduct Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) while making the payments. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals. As the Revenue's appeals were dismissed, the grounds raised in the assessee's cross-objections became infructuous, and thus, the cross-objections were also dismissed. The issue of refund was rendered academic by the decision on the primary issue.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the assessee's age, circumstances, and the principle of substantial justice. It held that the additions sustained by the CIT(A) were not sustainable, partly due to a Rs. 2.5 lakh exemption for housewives and partly because a portion of the deposit was from relatives.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The tribunal held that the amendment introducing a tolerance band, initially 5% and later 10%, is curative and retrospective. Therefore, the 10% tolerance limit should be applied. The addition made by the AO was unjustified as the difference was within the permissible tolerance limit.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's application for withdrawal. The application was allowed, and consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the AO made additions merely based on the Investigation Wing's findings without linking the assessee to any alleged bogus transactions or price rigging. The Tribunal noted that the assessee provided substantial documentation and relied on jurisdictional High Court decisions.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), emphasizing the principle of advancing substantial justice over technicalities. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, with a direction for the assessee to cooperate and avoid frivolous adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued u/s 148 of the Act was jurisdictional and any defect therein is not curable. Since the Income Tax Officer lacked jurisdiction over the assessee due to the high income exceeding Rs. 20 lakh, the notice and subsequent assessment order were quashed and set aside.
The Tribunal held that additions made under section 153A must be based on incriminating material found during the search. Statements recorded during a search, on their own, without corroborating evidence found during the search, are insufficient to make additions.
The Tribunal held that the AO made additions merely based on the Investigation Wing's findings without linking the assessee to any alleged bogus transactions or price rigging. The Tribunal noted that the assessee provided substantial documentation and relied on jurisdictional High Court decisions.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) was not justified in disallowing the claim for premium paid on OFCDs in both assessment years. The AO's reasons for disallowance, including the alleged diversion of funds by SGH and the nature of the development agreement, were found to be based on a misunderstanding of the facts. The Tribunal noted that the assessee obtained possession of land from SGH for development and paid a significant security deposit, thus using the funds for its business. The Tribunal further relied on the established legal principle that premium paid on redemption of debentures is akin to a discount on issue and constitutes revenue expenditure, citing the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in CIT vs. Raymond Ltd and the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court's decision in DCIT vs. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilisers Co Ltd. Consequently, the Tribunal found the CIT(A) to be justified in deleting the disallowances made by the AO. The cross-objections filed by the assessee were dismissed as not pressed.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer (AO) had made additions on account of alleged unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee had provided explanations and documentary evidence for these credits. The Tribunal, after considering the submissions and the material on record, concluded that the assessee had discharged its onus of proving the genuineness of the cash credits. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were deleted. Consequently, since the primary additions were deleted, the basis for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was also vitiated. The Tribunal held that penalty cannot be levied when the additions themselves are not sustainable. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed, and the appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed. The operative direction was the deletion of the additions and consequently the quashing of the penalty.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed by the CIT(E) was not legally sustainable. Upon perusal of the trust deed clauses (c)(v) and (c)(x), it was evident that charitable activities would be carried out in India, as money would be disbursed for education and medical aid in India, not abroad. The Tribunal noted that for students studying abroad, scholarships and fellowships should be awarded in India, and for medical treatment abroad, financial help should be rendered in India. The facts were found to be identical to the case decided by a Coordinate Bench of the ITAT Mumbai in *ITO vs. JN Tata Endowment for the Higher Education of Indians* (supra). Therefore, the Tribunal respectfully followed the earlier judgment, concluding that there was no violation of Section 11 of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee to present its case within 90 days. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that additions made under section 153A must be based on incriminating material found during the search. Statements recorded during a search, on their own, without corroborating evidence found during the search, are insufficient to make additions.
The Tribunal deleted the Section 68 addition for the property investment, accepting the fresh affidavit and documentary evidence furnished by the assessee regarding the source of funds from her husband. The addition related to the sale of shares was remanded back to the AO for fresh examination and computation of capital gains based on newly provided contract notes, as the issue was not properly examined by lower authorities.
The Tribunal held that the revenue's appeals did not fall within the exceptions provided in the circular for appeals below the monetary limit. The appeals arose from assessment orders under Section 143(3) and not from proceedings related to TDS/TCS as per the circular's exceptions. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of tax effect and lack of new material on merits.
The Tribunal held that the AO made additions merely based on the Investigation Wing's findings without linking the assessee to any alleged bogus transactions or price rigging. The Tribunal noted that the assessee provided substantial documentation and relied on jurisdictional High Court decisions.
The Tribunal held that the assessment under Section 153A was not justified as the incriminating material was found during a search at a third party's premises, not the assessee's. The assessment should have been conducted under Section 153C, making the Section 153A assessment legally invalid.
The Tribunal held that the provision for claim payout was an ascertained liability based on an actuarial report and consistent past practice. Therefore, the deduction should be allowed.
The Tribunal held that the payments made by the assessee to DGSHL for Global Brand, Global Communication, and Global Technology/Knowledge Management do not fall within the scope and ambit of royalty under Article 13(3) of the India-UK DTAA. The reasoning was based on the ITAT's prior decisions in the assessee's own case for AY 2018-19 and 2019-20, and the Delhi High Court's judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P) Ltd. and EY Global Services Ltd. vs ACIT. These judgments clarified that for payments to be considered royalty, there must be a transfer of copyright, which was not the case here as the assessee merely received the right to use software and services without exclusive rights. Consequently, the assessee was not required to deduct TDS. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals. As the Revenue's appeals were dismissed, the grounds raised in the assessee's cross-objections became infructuous, and thus, the cross-objections were also dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the Revenue's appeals, implying the CIT(A)'s order allowing the refund stands.
The Tribunal held that for properties vacant for the whole year, the annual value should be determined under Section 23(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, resulting in an annual value of 'Nil'. Therefore, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted.
The Tribunal held that additions made under section 153A must be based on incriminating material found during the search. Statements recorded during a search, without corroborating evidence found during the search, do not empower the AO to make an assessment.
The Tribunal held that the TPO's order for AY 2010-11 was indeed passed beyond the prescribed time limit. By comparing the relevant dates with the precedent set in *Pfizer Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT* (Madras High Court), the Tribunal found that the TPO's order dated 30.01.2014 was beyond the permissible date of 29.01.2014. Therefore, this additional ground raised by the assessee was allowed, and the TPO's order was quashed on this basis. Regarding the interest on income-tax refund under Section 244A, the Tribunal, respectfully following the Hon'ble High Court's decision in *Income Tax Appeal No. 431 of 2012 (M/s DHL Operations B.V. vs. Dy. Director of Income Tax)*, directed the AO to recompute the tax liability by applying the rate as per the DTAA between India and France. The issue of TDS credit towards tax deducted on the income-tax refund was directed to be examined and allowed in accordance with law. Ground No. 13 was allowed. Ground No. 14 pertaining to interest under Section 234B was considered consequential.
The Tribunal found that the matter required reconsideration. The CIT(E) was directed to reconsider the application for provisional registration, taking into account the assessee's submissions and evidence. The assessee was directed to cooperate fully.
The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee had sufficient income in subsequent years to pay the outstanding tax but failed to do so. It concluded that the assessee did not provide good and sufficient reasons for the default and that the AO's exercise of discretion in levying the penalty was justified. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the original appeal with a similar number had already been disposed of. Therefore, the present appeal, being a duplicate, was considered infructuous.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee wished to withdraw the appeals as they had opted for the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme and paid the demanded tax. The Revenue did not object, and the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 56(2)(viia) of the Act are not applicable in respect of capital contribution by a partner in a firm. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the transfer of shares was part of a family settlement entered into between siblings to give effect to their father's will and to ensure amity and goodwill. Relying on judgments from the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Charan Das vs Girjanandini Devi and the Hon'ble Madras High Court in CIT vs R. Ponnammal and CGT vs D. Nagrirathinam, the Tribunal concluded that transactions pursuant to a family arrangement do not attract the provisions of Section 56(2)(viia) as they are not considered transfers for tax purposes. The Tribunal also noted that the initial valuation of the shares was done as per Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and the AO erred in substituting it with the intrinsic value determined by the merchant banker, especially when the merchant banker itself clarified that the intrinsic value was indicative and not necessarily the fair market value. Therefore, the Tribunal found no error in the deletion of the addition by the learned CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the assessee wished to withdraw the appeals as they had opted for the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme and paid the demanded tax. The Revenue did not object, and the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the TPO's order under Section 92CA(3) was indeed passed beyond the prescribed time limit, as evidenced by the comparison of dates with the Pfizer Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd. case. Therefore, the TPO's order was quashed on this ground. Regarding the taxability of interest on income-tax refund under Section 244A, the Tribunal, respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the assessee's own case, directed the AO to recompute the tax liability by applying the rate as per the Indo-France DTAA. The issue of TDS credit on interest on income-tax refund was directed to be examined and allowed by the AO in accordance with law. Interest under Section 234B was considered consequential. The appeals by the assessee for AYs 2010-11 to 2019-20 were partly allowed, and appeals by the revenue for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12 were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment under Section 148 was invalid. The notice for reopening was issued on March 28, 2019, beyond four years from the end of AY 2012-13. The reasons provided for reopening did not contain any whisper about the failure of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The original assessment under Section 143(3) was completed after considering the financial statements. The Tribunal relied on the Bombay High Court decisions in TAO Publishing (P.) Ltd., Sound Casting (P) Ltd., and First Source Solutions Ltd., which held that for reopening beyond four years, a failure to disclose material facts is a jurisdictional requirement, and if not alleged or proven, the notice is issued without jurisdiction. Therefore, the impugned notice under Section 148 and the resultant assessment order were set aside. On merits, the Tribunal observed that the AO himself noted a purchase contract of Rs. 1,07,43,750/- and a sale contract of Rs. 1,09,73,250/-. The Tribunal held that only the profit element should have been considered, which was already declared by the assessee. The addition of the entire sales amount without deducting the purchase amount was wrong. Thus, the addition could not be sustained on merits. The appeal was allowed on both counts.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds concerning the rate of tax on interest received under Section 244A, directing it to be computed as per the India-France DTAA. Revenue's appeals for certain assessment years were dismissed.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds concerning the rate of tax on interest received under Section 244A, directing it to be computed as per the India-France DTAA. Revenue's appeals for certain assessment years were dismissed.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground regarding the TPO's order being barred by limitation, noting it was a pure legal issue. For AY 2010-11, the Tribunal found that the TPO's order was passed on 30.01.2014, which was one day after the prescribed deadline of 29.01.2014, thus holding the TPO's order to be barred by limitation. Regarding interest under section 244A, the Tribunal, respectfully following the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in the assessee's own case (which upheld the Tribunal's direction to tax interest at DTAA rates), directed the AO to recompute the tax liability on interest received under section 244A by applying the rates as per the India-France DTAA. For TDS credit on income tax refund, the AO was directed to examine and allow credit in accordance with law. For AY 2019-20, several grounds, including the validity of DRP orders and set-off of business losses, were not pressed by the assessee and were dismissed as not pressed. Other grounds for AY 2019-20 were held to be mutatis mutandis applicable to AY 2018-19. The revenue's appeals for AY 2010-11 and 2011-12 were dismissed.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the CIT(E) to provide the assessee with one more opportunity to present explanations and documents, subject to a cost of Rs. 2000 for non-cooperation.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee wished to withdraw the appeals as they had opted for the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme and paid the demanded tax. The Revenue did not object, and the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee had only made provisions and not actual payments towards the invoked guarantees, it did not acquire the right to recover from the AE. Therefore, imputing interest on a deemed loan was incorrect. The levy of interest under section 234A was directed to be examined.
The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal without discussing the merits, similar to a previous case (ITA No. 603/Mum/2025 for AY 2016-17). Following the principle of consistency, the appeals were restored back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal without discussing the merits, similar to a previous case (ITA No. 603/Mum/2025 for AY 2016-17). Following the principle of consistency, the appeals were restored back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A).
The Tribunal decided on several grounds. Regarding Ground No. 7 (Section 80G deduction), the Tribunal held that the authorities below erred in denying the claim. It reasoned that while CSR payments might be part of the profit and loss account for business income computation, denying the benefit under Chapter VI-A for computing total taxable income would lead to double disallowance, which is not the legislative intent. The issue was restored to the AO for verification of other prescribed conditions for allowing the deduction. Regarding Ground No. 8 (Section 35DD claim) and Ground No. 9 (inventory write-down claim), since these claims were made for the first time before the Tribunal, the Tribunal restored these issues to the file of the AO for verification and allowance if admissible. For Ground No. 10 (TDS credit), the AO was directed to verify and allow the claim. Ground No. 11 (initiation of penalty proceedings) was dismissed as premature. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide on Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, which were listed in the grounds of appeal but not detailed in the provided excerpt of the judgment. The operative direction was to allow the appeal partly.
The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal without discussing the merits, similar to a previous case (ITA No. 603/Mum/2025 for AY 2016-17). Following the principle of consistency, the appeals were restored back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A).
The Tribunal decided that the TPO's order for AY 2010-11 was indeed passed beyond the prescribed time limit, following the Madras High Court's ruling in *Pfizer Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT*, and therefore quashed the TPO's order. The Tribunal directed the AO to recompute the tax liability on interest received under Section 244A for AY 2019-20 by applying the rates as per the India-France DTAA, respectfully following the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in the assessee's own case. Regarding TDS credit on income tax refund for AY 2019-20, the AO was directed to examine and allow credit in accordance with law. For AY 2019-20, the Tribunal noted that most issues were common to AY 2018-19 and would be decided mutatis mutandis. Several grounds for AY 2019-20 were dismissed as not pressed (Grounds 1, 10, 15), and others were deemed consequential (Grounds 13, 18-20). The appeals for AY 2010-11 to 2019-20 filed by the assessee were partly allowed, and the Revenue's appeals for AY 2010-11 and 2011-12 were dismissed.