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541 orders · Page 11 of 11
The Tribunal held that the AO had not specified any of the circumstances of mis-reporting of income as per section 270A(2). The penalty was levied on an estimated basis under the deeming provision of section 50C without pointing out specific circumstances. The CIT(A)'s action in sustaining the penalty was not justified.
The Tribunal, following its own prior decisions and that of a co-ordinate bench, held that the assessee is a public charitable fund and its income is eligible for exemption. The proviso to Section 2(15) was not attracted.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of Section 14A disallowance as no exempt income was earned. It also upheld the deletion of expenses related to sold assets, finding they pertained to inventory. However, for the write-off of cement bags, the Tribunal found insufficient substantiation and restored the issue to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that this is a recurring issue consistently decided in favor of the assessee, following the binding judgment of the Bombay High Court. The High Court had previously held that negative reserves do not require adjustment to the taxable surplus as per actuarial valuation.
The Tribunal determined that the core activity of sending bulk SMS services does not inherently involve human intervention. It clarified that supplementary activities like placing orders via email or providing 24x7 assistance do not transform the service into one requiring technical expertise with human involvement. Consequently, the payments were rightly classified as contractual, not technical services.
The Tribunal observed that the rejection was based on a technical error. For substantial justice, the decision of the CIT(E) needs to be revisited. Therefore, the issue is restored to the file of the CIT(E) to consider the renewal of approval afresh after providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
Additions cannot be made under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act in the absence of any incriminating material found from a search and seizure operation. A retracted statement, especially one obtained under duress, cannot be considered valid evidence for making such additions.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that additions under Section 153A cannot be made for unabated assessments without incriminating material found during search/seizure. The retracted statement recorded under duress was not considered incriminating. The seized cash pertained to a later assessment year (2017-18), not the impugned years, and disallowance under Section 40A(3) was not applicable as no expenditure was claimed by the assessee.
The Tribunal ruled that no additions could be made under Section 153A for unabated assessments in the absence of incriminating material found during search/seizure operations. The retracted statement under Section 131, which was obtained under duress and related to a different assessment year, did not qualify as incriminating material for the impugned years.
The Tribunal ruled that no additions could be made under Section 153A for unabated assessments in the absence of incriminating material found during search/seizure operations. The retracted statement under Section 131, which was obtained under duress and related to a different assessment year, did not qualify as incriminating material for the impugned years.
The Tribunal held that the AO had relied solely on the Investigation Wing's report without conducting independent inquiry or establishing the assessee's involvement in any alleged scam. The evidence submitted by the assessee, including purchase and sale transactions through banking channels and stock exchanges, outweighed the AO's suspicion. Several judicial precedents, including those involving the same company's shares, supported the genuineness of such LTCG.
The Tribunal noted that the statutory notices were sent to an email ID not belonging to the assessee, and no physical or SMS notice was received. Given the assessee's uneducated status and engagement of an Authorized Representative, the Tribunal found the claim of non-receipt of notices believable. Consequently, it was held that the case falls under the exceptions provided in Section 273B of the Act.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee submitted additional evidence before the CIT(A) which was not considered. The CIT(A)'s order was found to be in violation of Rule 46A and the principle of natural justice.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's counsel statement that the Trust would delete the objectionable clause. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(E) to examine and verify the deletion of the clause.
The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in CIT vs Smifs Securities Ltd. allowed depreciation on goodwill. It also referred to its own previous decisions where similar claims for depreciation on goodwill, distribution network, and customer relations resulting from amalgamation were allowed. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s reasoning contrary to these precedents.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A), concluding that the CIT(A) was correct in finding that the assessee had sufficient sources to explain the investment. The Tribunal noted that the AO, having accepted the profits and gains declared by the assessee, was not justified in rejecting the source of investment, which was reflected in the balance sheet and supported by bank entries. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's counsel statement that the Trust would delete the objectionable clause. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(E) to examine and verify the deletion of the clause.
The Tribunal noted that the entire rental income for A.Y. 2018-19 was appropriately credited and TDS was deducted. The AO had previously accepted income apportionment. The Tribunal found that further verification was required regarding the assessee's claim of rental income and the corresponding TDS credit.
The Tribunal held that the appeal should be dismissed for want of tax effect, as the penalty imposed was only Rs. 6.85 Lakhs and hit by CBDT Circular No. 09/2024. Furthermore, on merits, no penalty is leviable under section 271(1)(c) when profit is estimated.
The Tribunal held that the core activity of sending bulk SMS services, even with some human involvement in order processing, does not qualify as 'technical services' under Section 194J. The services availed were primarily contractual, for which TDS was correctly deducted under Section 194C.
The Tribunal affirmed that additions in assessments completed under Section 153A require incriminating material found during the search and seizure operation, which was absent in this case. A subsequently retracted statement under Section 131, recorded under duress, cannot be considered incriminating material. Furthermore, the cash found pertained to a different assessment year (2017-18) and the assessee had not claimed any expenditure, rendering Section 40A(3) inapplicable. Since no incriminating material linked to the impugned assessment years was found, the additions made by the AO were deleted.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing bonafide and genuine reasons presented by the assessee, consistent with Supreme Court guidelines on condonation. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication on merits, granting the assessee an opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal held that for AY 2016-17, the notice under Section 148 was invalid due to lack of proper approval from the appropriate authority as per the amended Section 151. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings for AY 2016-17 were quashed.
The Tribunal found that the reason for dismissal was the non-furnishing of basic details. Considering the Chartered Accountant's preoccupation, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the appellant in the interest of justice.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus of proof by providing bank details and identity of the donor, and demonstrated the donor's creditworthiness. The fact that the donor's hedge fund was banned did not affect his ability to provide the gift. The AO's addition was based on conjecture and unverified newspaper reports.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for income from investments in cooperative banks. This was based on the principle of consistency and the decisions of coordinate benches in the assessee's own case and similar cases.
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee may not have fully explained its case before the CIT(A), the fact remained that the assessee was not heard before the impugned order was passed. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A was not tenable as the Assessing Officer had not recorded non-satisfaction with the assessee's method. It also held that the ISF expenses were allowable under Section 37(1) as they were mandatory contributions for investor education, and club fees were also allowable as the revenue failed to prove they were for personal purposes.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not leviable as the assessee had made an inadvertent error, not a deliberate attempt to furnish inaccurate particulars. The voluntary concession and withdrawal of the ground by the assessee, along with the absence of such claims in subsequent years, indicated a bona fide mistake.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A was not tenable as the Assessing Officer had not recorded non-satisfaction with the assessee's method. It also held that the ISF expenses were allowable under Section 37(1) as they were mandatory contributions for investor education, and club fees were also allowable as the revenue failed to prove they were for personal purposes.
The Tribunal found that there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The Tribunal condoned the delay and was of the view that the CIT(A) was not justified in not condoning it. Since the CIT(A) had not disposed of the appeal on merits, the Tribunal decided to restore all issues to the CIT(A)'s file for adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the appellant, being a housewife based in Oman and claiming non-receipt of intimation, had made out a sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal. The delay of 64 days was not considered inordinate.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for income from investments in cooperative banks. This was based on the principle of consistency and the decisions of coordinate benches in the assessee's own case and similar cases.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of natural justice, the assessee should be given another opportunity to present the amended deed and other details to the Ld. CIT(E). The assessment order was set aside, and the issues were restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh examination.
The Tribunal found that Euro Diam was one of the 70 entities admitted to be controlled by Bhanwarlal Jain. Notices issued to Euro Diam were returned unserved, and an inspector reported the entity was not available at the given address, thus the genuineness of the transaction was not established.
The Tribunal held that the AO's addition was made solely based on an inspector's report without proper verification of services received or the genuineness of the suppliers' business. The AO also failed to provide the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine the inspector. Regarding management fees, the Tribunal noted that similar disallowances in prior years were deleted by the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal and the CIT(A) had found evidence supporting the payment.
The ITAT found that the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the CIT(A) before an ex-parte order was passed. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the CIT(A) to consider the submissions after affording a proper hearing.
The Tribunal held that for AY 2016-17, the notice under Section 148 was invalid due to lack of proper approval from the appropriate authority as per the amended Section 151. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings for AY 2016-17 were quashed.
The Tribunal found that although the appellant did not explain its case before the Ld. CIT(A) due to various reasons, the fact remained that the assessee was not heard before the impugned order was passed. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the Ld. CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for income from investments in cooperative banks. This was based on the principle of consistency and the decisions of coordinate benches in the assessee's own case and similar cases.