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744 orders · Page 6 of 15
The Tribunal decided that the provision for doubtful debts is deductible under normal provisions and also for book profit computation under Section 115JB. It also found that the relationship between the assessee and its dealers is principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the genuineness of the purchases. Evidence such as delivery challans and transportation details were not furnished, and the suppliers could not be produced or located. Payments made through banking channels were not considered sufficient proof of genuine transactions.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) issued a notice with a response due date of 13.02.2024 but passed the order on 09.02.2024, violating the principles of natural justice. The assessee had also submitted relevant documents to the AO previously, which were not considered.
The Tribunal noted that the AO had accepted the purchases against sales and only added an additional margin of 5% on transactions supported by bogus purchase bills. The Tribunal also considered CBDT instructions and High Court decisions regarding profit margins in the gems and jewellery business, particularly in cases involving hawala purchases. They observed that similar additions of 3% to 5% were made in other cases related to Shri Bhanwarlal Jain.
The Tribunal noted that similar issues in previous cases and for other assessees have been consistently decided in favor of allowing the deduction. Relying on a coordinate bench decision and decisions of various High Courts, the Tribunal held that interest earned by a co-operative society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC's order upholding the addition under section 43CA did not discuss the merits of the case, violating statutory conditions. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was ex-parte and lacked a detailed adjudication as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing and adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the registration of the assessee under the cooperative law is the decisive factor for the allowability of Section 80P deduction, as established in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. CIT. The AO's assessment disallowing the claim was not considered erroneous as the issue of interest income from cooperative banks being eligible for Section 80P deduction is debatable.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, effective from 01.04.2015, disallows the option of reinvesting capital gains in a residential house abroad. Since the assessment year in question is 2015-2016, the assessee's claim is not admissible.
The Tribunal upheld the AO's addition, confirming that the share transactions were not genuine and were structured to claim bogus exemption. The claim for LTCG exemption under Section 10(38) was denied, and the addition for commission paid to entry providers was also confirmed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove the rendition of services by the specified persons and that the payments were at market rates. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the AO for verification of services rendered and market rates.
The Tribunal held that the AO cannot arbitrarily reduce the expenditure eligible for deduction under Section 35(2AB) if it has been quantified by the prescribed authority (DSIR). The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions in similar cases.
The Tribunal noted that coordinate benches of ITAT Mumbai have consistently held that interest income earned from investments in other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d). Following these precedents, the Tribunal allowed the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the compensation received by the assessee for hardship due to redevelopment is a capital receipt and not taxable. This decision was based on a previous order of a coordinate bench concerning the same assessee for a different assessment year.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee's 12A registration was restored by the High Court, it is eligible for benefits under Section 11 of the Act. It clarified that the contributions received from GOI and SIDBI were explicitly directed towards the corpus of the trust as capital receipts, thus not falling under taxable voluntary contributions under section 2(24)(iia). Consequently, the impugned addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted, and the assessee was allowed the benefit of deduction under section 11(1)(a).
The Tribunal held that the issue of deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) for interest income from cooperative banks had been examined by the AO during the original assessment. Relying on judicial pronouncements and previous orders of the coordinate bench, including the assessee's own case for A.Y. 2015-16, the Tribunal found that the deduction was rightly allowed.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) denied the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard. It set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay in filing the appeal, accept it, and hear the case afresh on its merits, ensuring proper opportunity is given to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits of surplus funds in a bank is attributable to its business of providing credit facilities and is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The issue of unexplained cash credits under Section 68 was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal by confirming the addition made by the AO and allowed a deduction under section 80L. The tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had examined the bank accounts and found no infirmity in the order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had acquired development rights for the properties, not outright ownership. Relying on Supreme Court judgments, it was clarified that Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which requires possession, was not attracted, nor was Section 56(2)(x) applicable to a developer acquiring development rights.
The Tribunal held that the term 'investment' under section 80P(2)(d) is not qualified to be restricted to fixed deposits and includes interest derived from all investments with any other Co-operative Society, including Co-operative Banks. Relying on a coordinate bench decision, the Tribunal found that interest income from saving accounts is also covered under section 80P(2)(d). The reliance of the CIT(A) on section 194A to differentiate between investment and savings accounts was also found to be without merit.
The Tribunal held that the difference in turnover arose due to the assessee's accounting method, where credit notes for rejected sales were netted off against sales, resulting in a lower reported turnover. The Assessing Officer (AO) had previously raised this query and was satisfied with the assessee's explanation and reconciliation. Therefore, the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that once an issue is examined and adjudicated in a regular assessment under section 143(3), the doctrine of merger applies, and the intimation under section 143(1) for that issue merges with the 143(3) order. Therefore, the appeal against the 143(1) intimation becomes infructuous and is rightly dismissed by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's explanation that the cash used for credit card payments was withdrawn by his wife (then fiancée) for their upcoming marriage expenses, including jewellery purchases. Although there was no direct correlation between the wife's withdrawals and the payments, the Tribunal considered the small amount of payment and the husband-wife relationship.
The Tribunal noted that the delay in deposit pertains to April and May 2020, which were during the peak of the COVID-19 lockdown. The EPF Organisation issued a circular providing relief from penal damages for delayed deposits during the lockdown period. The Tribunal held that given the EPF Organisation's waiver of penal damages, the delay should not be considered detrimental to the assessee under section 36(1)(va) of the Act. The assessee acted vigilantly by depositing the amounts as soon as relaxation was permitted.
The Tribunal held that the TPO should have determined the Arm's Length Price (ALP) as a markup on the cost incurred by the assessee in coordinating with the third-party vendor for fashion shows, not on the entire performance of services by the vendor. The issue was restored to the TPO for re-characterization of the assessee's functions and selection of functionally similar comparables.
The Tribunal noted that the agreement for sale was dated 26/12/2013, prior to the effective date of the relevant provision of section 56(2)(vii)(b). Considering the difference in market value and the actual consideration paid, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order did not contain any direction or satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings. The assessee was under a bonafide belief that tax was correctly deducted at source, and her submissions were not disputed by the revenue.
The Tribunal held that penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied solely on the basis of an estimated addition. The decisions of various High Courts were followed.
The Tribunal admitted the additional evidence (audited accounts) which showed a lower payout than estimated by the AO and CIT(A). The matter was restored to the AO for fresh examination of the quantification of payouts and incentives.
The Tribunal considered the definition of 'date of acquisition' for the purpose of Section 54. It referred to various judicial precedents which suggest that the date of allotment or possession, rather than the date of registration of the agreement, is crucial for determining eligibility. The Tribunal noted that the new flat was allotted on 28.03.2012 and the agreement for sale was registered on 29.03.2012, while the old flat was transferred on 29.05.2013.
The Tribunal held that disallowances cannot be made on presumption. Since the rent payments to each party were below the TDS limit, the addition of Rs. 6,48,000/- for rent was directed to be deleted. For interest payments, the AO was directed to verify the inclusion of income by the recipients and delete additions if found correct.
The Tribunal held that the AO had made sufficient inquiries and the assessment order was not erroneous. The CIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was found to be unjustified.
The ITAT remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO) with a direction to reconsider the details and submissions filed by the appellant. The AO is instructed to pass a fresh order after providing the appellant an adequate opportunity of being heard and allowing them to provide necessary documents and evidence.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 10CCB can be condoned if the assessee meets other eligibility criteria for the deduction. Following judicial pronouncements, the Tribunal condoned the meager delay of 14 days.
The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) passed the appeal order without considering the submission made by the assessee within the due date, which is a violation of natural justice and denial of reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the Ld.CIT(A) to pass an order on merit.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposits were explained by the assessee's cash sales and were duly recorded in the books of account. Furthermore, the notice for reassessment was found to be barred by limitation, as it was issued beyond the prescribed time limit.
The Tribunal noted that the variable pay policy had not been thoroughly examined by the lower authorities. The assessee also sought to introduce additional evidence in the form of the variable pay policy. Considering that this policy goes to the root of the matter, the Tribunal restored the appeals to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal noted that while some notices might have been sent to an incorrect email, the primary email address provided by the assessee in Form No. 35 was also used, indicating sufficient opportunity was given. However, to ensure substantial justice and a decision on merits, the Tribunal decided to remand the case to the Ld. Commissioner for re-adjudication, directing the assessee to cooperate and provide all necessary documents.
The Tribunal found sufficient cause for the assessee's non-compliance due to the email going to the junk folder. The assessee provided an undertaking to comply with future notices.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee did receive notices on both email addresses, but due to the CIT(A)'s inability to decide the matter on merits without proper documents, the case was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with a directive for the assessee to cooperate.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was filed within time. It further ruled that the assessee is entitled to credit for TDS once it is deducted by the payer, even if the payer fails to deposit it with the government, as the Act provides remedies against the deductor.
The Tribunal noted that the variable pay policy had not been thoroughly examined by the lower authorities. The assessee also sought to introduce additional evidence in the form of the variable pay policy. Considering that this policy goes to the root of the matter, the Tribunal restored the appeals to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal based on section 249(4)(b) of the Income Tax Act, as no return was filed and advance tax was not paid. However, the assessee argued that their income was below the taxable limit, making these provisions inapplicable. The Tribunal found that the AO's order was passed ex-parte without proper notice to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the order of the CPC u/s 143(1) was erroneous as the disallowance of deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) was beyond the scope of adjustments allowed under that section. Furthermore, even on merits, a cooperative housing society is entitled to claim such deductions. The Tribunal also noted that the delay in filing the appeal should have been condoned, interpreting "sufficient cause" liberally.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC had dismissed the appeal in limine and that the facts discussed in the order did not pertain to the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the NFAC/CIT(A) with a direction to decide it afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had rightly allowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) after considering the assessee's submissions. The PCIT's order under Section 263 was found to be without merit, as the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's AR filed an undertaking for an opportunity to explain their case before the CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) to provide the appellant an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that since the additions themselves were deleted by the Tribunal in the quantum proceedings, the penalty levied on those additions cannot be sustained.
The Tribunal observed that the underlying quantum additions, which formed the basis for the penalty, had already been deleted by the Tribunal in separate quantum proceedings. Since the very additions relating to bogus long-term capital gains and accommodation entries were set aside, the penalty imposed on these additions could not be legally sustained. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the penalty was upheld.