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744 orders · Page 5 of 15
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)-NFAC's findings were made ex-parte and lacked proper adjudication as per Section 250(6) of the Act. Consequently, the Revenue's contentions were rejected.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus of proving the genuineness of the purchases. Evidence such as delivery challans and transportation details were not furnished, and the suppliers could not be produced or located. Payments made through banking channels were not considered sufficient proof of genuine transactions.
The Tribunal held that Section 80P(4) is relevant only when a co-operative bank claims deduction under Section 80P, which is not the case here. Following Supreme Court and High Court precedents, the Tribunal ruled that interest and dividend income earned by a co-operative credit society from co-operative banks are eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not heard by the CIT(A) and therefore, the appeal should be restored on the issue of addition. The Tribunal directed the assessee to deposit a cost and submit details, allowing the CIT(A) to decide the addition on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal decided that the provision for doubtful debts is deductible under normal provisions and also for book profit computation under Section 115JB. It also found that the relationship between the assessee and its dealers is principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent.
The Tribunal held that the transactions were dubious and lacked genuineness, citing various High Court and Supreme Court judgments on penny stock manipulation. The AO's addition was confirmed as the assessee failed to provide cogent evidence to support the exemption claim.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was approved under section 35(1)(ii) and its investment in its subsidiary was for carrying out similar objectives. However, it also observed that the assessee's approval was as an 'other institution' partly engaged in research activities, not specifically as a 'research association' as required by section 10(21). The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for fresh computation.
The Tribunal held that income earned by way of interest from investments made with other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decisions of coordinate benches of the ITAT (Mumbai).
The Tribunal noted that the impugned ex-parte order by the CIT(A) lacked detailed adjudication. The Revenue's arguments were found to have no merit due to the absence of detailed adjudication. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for proper adjudication.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal on the ground that the consequential assessment order would not survive as the section 263 order was quashed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, stating that with the section 263 order being set aside, there was no basis for the CIT(A) to decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee provided a cash flow statement and bank statements indicating prior withdrawals totaling significantly more than the deposit. The AO failed to provide evidence that these withdrawals were for other purposes. Therefore, the source of the cash deposit was considered explained.
The Tribunal noted that in identical earlier years, addition to the extent of 12.5% was held to be chargeable. Following a coordinate bench decision confirmed by the High Court, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to restrict the addition to 12.5% of the bogus purchases.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee did not initially provide all details, they later submitted a loan statement and explained the credit card payments. The CIT(A) erred in not considering this evidence. The Tribunal decided to restore the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not provide the appellant an opportunity to be heard regarding the delay in filing the appeal. This was considered a violation of the principle of natural justice.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's ground regarding the deduction for provision for doubtful debts, both under normal provisions and for book profits. Other grounds were decided based on previous tribunal decisions or were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had admitted the assessee's evidence for the first time, which led to the reversal of assessment findings. Considering the situation, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the appeals back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication and factual verification of the evidence submitted by the assessee regarding the source of investments and deposits.
The Tribunal noted that the difference amount of Rs. 30,80,661/- was 4.84% of the consideration, which is less than the 10% tolerance limit introduced by the Finance Act, 2018. Citing co-ordinate bench decisions, the Tribunal held that the tolerance band provisions should be applied retrospectively. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was not sustainable.
The Tribunal noted that the arbitration dispute and award, which explained the withdrawal of cash, were not submitted to the AO during assessment. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the AO for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee an opportunity to provide requisite evidence.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove the rendition of services by the specified persons and that the payments were at market rates. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the AO for verification of services rendered and market rates.
The Tribunal, relying on various High Court decisions and coordinate bench judgments, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from investments made with other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's alternate plea for deduction under section 80P(2)(d), finding the issue covered in favour of the assessee by established judicial precedents.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's submission and the Ld. DR's arguments. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with the assessee granted liberty to refile the appeal before the appropriate bench.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had admitted the assessee's evidence for the first time, which led to the reversal of assessment findings. Considering the situation, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the appeals back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication and factual verification of the evidence submitted by the assessee regarding the source of investments and deposits.
The Tribunal considered that although cooperative banks are excluded from the benefit of Section 80P(4), a cooperative society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, which derives interest income from investments in a cooperative bank, is still entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). Previous decisions of coordinate benches were also referred to.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be cooperative and diligent in future proceedings.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be cooperative and diligent in future proceedings.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be cooperative and diligent in future proceedings.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be cooperative and diligent in future proceedings.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to be cooperative and diligent in future proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, effective from 01.04.2015, disallows the option of reinvesting capital gains in a residential house abroad. Since the assessment year in question is 2015-2016, the assessee's claim is not admissible.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of Rs. 12.41 crores of revenue expenditure on R&D, which was disapproved by DSIR, was not justified. The Tribunal relied on its own precedents in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years, which held that the Assessing Officer cannot arbitrarily disallow amounts approved by DSIR. The ratio is that the DSIR's determination of eligible scientific expenditure for weighted deduction under Section 35(2AB) is binding, and the AO cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the prescribed authority. Regarding the 'Colour Idea Stores' expenditure, the Revenue's appeal argued it was capital in nature. The judgment does not explicitly record the Tribunal's finding on this specific issue, but it is listed as a ground of appeal for the Revenue. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's ground regarding the disallowance of foreign tax credit claims under Sections 90 and 91. The reasoning was that the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 80G was independent of CSR expenses and should be allowed as per Chapter VIA, which is separate from the prohibition in Section 37(1) pertaining only to CSR expenses. The Tribunal found no bar for the assessee to claim benefits under Section 80G, and the Revenue's grounds were dismissed. The judgment also noted that the genuineness of transactions and identity of donees were not challenged, and payments were made through proper channels with valid receipts.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was ex-parte and lacked a detailed adjudication as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing and adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was bad in law as the AO had already conducted detailed investigations and verified the share transactions during the original assessment. Furthermore, the AO failed to dispose of the assessee's objections to the reopening as mandated by the Supreme Court.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was ex-parte and lacked a detailed adjudication as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing and adjudication.
The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to verify if the tax deducted by the employer was deposited in the government treasury and to investigate the reason for the TDS mismatch. The AO was instructed to make a decision accordingly, and the appellant was directed to present their case with all evidence.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's contention that the expenditure was for reimbursement and that profit was already taxed. However, considering it was a second round of litigation and the profit margin was low, the Tribunal decided to restrict the addition to a profit percentage. The Tribunal applied a profit percentage of 12% to the addition sustained by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) should have given the assessee an opportunity to rebut the findings before making the addition under Section 68. In the absence of such an opportunity, the addition cannot be sustained.
The ITAT held that the reopening of the assessment was valid, as the AO had sufficient material to form a 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment. However, regarding the disallowance of F&O loss, the Tribunal found that the trading account filed by the assessee for the first time before the ITAT showed a claimed loss in F&O of Rs. 49,15,175, which was approximately in line with the AO's figure but not clearly explained in the lower authorities' orders. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the AO for proper verification.
The Tribunal held that once the DVO determines the Fair Market Value (FMV) of the property, it must be relied upon for calculating short-term capital gains, especially when the DVO's valuation is made on a reference by the Department.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC's order upholding the addition under section 43CA did not discuss the merits of the case, violating statutory conditions. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the audit report in Form No. 10B was filed on 07.11.2022, along with the return of income, which was within the extended due date as per CBDT circular No. 20/2022. The Tribunal found force in the assessee's grievance that the exemption could not be declined for this reason, especially since the report was uploaded before the processing of the return and within the extended due date.
The Tribunal noted that notices sent to the assessee's email ID bounced, and the assessee did not get a proper opportunity to represent its case before the CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The tribunal noted that the CIT(A)-NFAC's order was passed ex-parte without framing points for determination. Therefore, to ensure justice, the appeals were restored to the CIT(A)-NFAC for a fresh adjudication with at least three effective opportunities of hearing.
The tribunal noted that the CIT(A)-NFAC's order was passed ex-parte without framing points for determination. Therefore, to ensure justice, the appeals were restored to the CIT(A)-NFAC for a fresh adjudication with at least three effective opportunities of hearing.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's income was less than the threshold limit of Rs. 50 lakhs, which is the prerequisite for levying surcharge as per the First Schedule introduced by the Finance Act, 2021. Therefore, the surcharge levied by the CPC and affirmed by the CIT(A) was not warranted.
The Tribunal held that the payments made as turnover rebate and special incentive were in the nature of a discount and not commission. The relationship between the assessee and its distributors/stockists was on a principal-to-principal basis, and they were not acting as agents of the assessee. Therefore, Section 194H of the Income Tax Act was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that the claim for deduction under Section 80G is independent of CSR expenses and should be allowed. It also ruled that the disallowance of R&D expenditure by the AO was not justified as per previous tribunal decisions. The grounds not pressed were dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed to have made submissions before the CIT(A) on 30th August, 2017, but this was not considered, leading to an ex-parte order against the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal found it apparent that the assessee's submissions were not considered.
The Tribunal held that the registration of the assessee under the cooperative law is the decisive factor for the allowability of Section 80P deduction, as established in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. CIT. The AO's assessment disallowing the claim was not considered erroneous as the issue of interest income from cooperative banks being eligible for Section 80P deduction is debatable.
The Tribunal held that the registration of the assessee under the cooperative law is the decisive factor for the allowability of Section 80P deduction, as established in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. CIT. The AO's assessment disallowing the claim was not considered erroneous as the issue of interest income from cooperative banks being eligible for Section 80P deduction is debatable.
The Tribunal held that the AO cannot arbitrarily reduce the expenditure eligible for deduction under Section 35(2AB) if it has been quantified by the prescribed authority (DSIR). The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions in similar cases.