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744 orders · Page 4 of 15
The Tribunal held that the application of MMR was unjustified for the assessee's case. The tax should be calculated at normal rates as per the slab mentioned in the First Schedule of the Finance Act, 2021. The calculation of tax at MMR was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 80P(4) was unsustainable, citing the Supreme Court's *Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.* judgment, which clarifies that Section 80P(4) applies only to co-operative societies holding a banking license from RBI. Since the appellant did not hold such a license, it was eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for income from credit facilities and under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest from co-operative banks. Furthermore, any disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) would not result in additional tax liability as the enhanced income would also be eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal observed that the lower authorities had accepted a turnover of ₹14,19,911/- as business income, implying acceptance of the assessee's business activity. It was found that the cash deposit was not necessarily an unexplained cash credit but could be considered business income, especially since the assessee claimed it was from sales. The Tribunal directed the AO to tax the income from the cash deposited at the rate of 8.65%, as offered by the assessee himself, and to delete the remaining addition.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear before the lower authorities and provide necessary evidence to substantiate the claimed agricultural income. However, considering the disproportionate increase in agricultural income compared to the previous year and the lack of documentation, the Tribunal decided to grant one last opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that Form 10B was filed and the utilization of funds was explained. However, the appeal before the CIT(A) was ex-parte, denying the assessee a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the appeal order was set aside.
The Tribunal noted that many notices were issued during the Covid period and granted the assessee one final opportunity to present their case on merits before the CIT(A). The appeals were remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was valid due to tangible material received. The assessee failed to prove the genuineness of purchases and did not respond to notices. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to determine the addition based on the profit element of bogus purchases.
The Tribunal held that the AO was not justified in disbelieving the assessee's transactions solely because the broker was subjected to an investigation for manipulative practices. The assessee's transactions were supported by proper documents and conducted through the stock exchange platform, with payments made through banking channels. There was no material to suggest the assessee's transactions were bogus.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had sufficient cash withdrawals from bank accounts prior to the demonetization period. The explanation that these withdrawn cash amounts were kept at the residence and deposited due to demonetization was considered logical and acceptable. The Tribunal found no reason to disallow the withdrawals in totality.
The Tribunal noted that many notices were issued during the Covid period and granted the assessee one final opportunity to present their case on merits before the CIT(A). The appeals were remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition of Rs. 69,000, holding that the beneficiary of the commission was another company and not the assessee. However, the CIT(A) confirmed the addition of Rs. 46 lakhs, finding that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of the investment. The AO is in appeal against the deletion of Rs. 69,000.
The Tribunal found that the PCIT passed the revision order without providing an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee, violating principles of natural justice. Therefore, the revision orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 199 days in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) should be condoned. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed an affidavit explaining that he had entrusted his tax matters to his friend's wife, Ms. Devarakonda Gowthami, who also filed an affidavit stating she could not communicate the receipt of notices. The revenue did not file any counter-affidavit. The Tribunal emphasized the well-established principle that substantial justice cannot be denied on technicalities and that the object of procedural provisions is to advance justice. It stated that provisions relating to condonation of delay need to be interpreted liberally. Consequently, the Tribunal condoned the delay based on the uncontroverted affidavits and refrained from making any observations on the merits of the case. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for passing an order afresh on merits, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee maintained regular books of accounts, and the AO did not reject them, the explanation regarding the availability of cash balance from sales should not have been rejected. The deposit was considered to be out of the cash balance available in the books.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the Ld. CIT(A), which is a violation of natural justice. The original orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had been enjoying registration since 2001 and had applied for regularization under Section 12AB. The CIT had rejected the application stating a defect in the trust deed. However, a recent CBDT circular extended the due date for filing such applications and allowed for fresh applications in cases where orders were rejected on technical grounds.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had been enjoying registration since 2001 and had applied for regularization under Section 12AB. The CIT had rejected the application stating a defect in the trust deed. However, a recent CBDT circular extended the due date for filing such applications and allowed for fresh applications in cases where orders were rejected on technical grounds.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee sought adjournments to collate data, and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte without affording a reasonable opportunity, violating natural justice. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to give one more opportunity.
The Tribunal observed that the appellant failed to furnish concrete evidence and did not respond to opportunities provided by the lower authorities. However, considering the averments made by the appellant's AR, the Tribunal decided to remit the case back to the Ld. CIT(A) to re-examine the penalty with all material on record.
The Tribunal held that the issue of whether a co-operative society is entitled to claim deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income received from a co-operative bank is no longer res-integra. Relying on previous judgments, including that of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Totgars Cooperative Sale Society Ltd. vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that such interest income is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal held that the supply planning services do not constitute fees for technical services or royalty as per the India-UK Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. Therefore, the receipts are not taxable in India.
The Tribunal held that the addition of cash deposits made by the AO was erroneous as the transactions/sources were not adequately supported by documentary evidence. The CIT(A) had erred in confirming the addition by rejecting additional evidence without proper investigation.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided evidence of cash sales and other receipts, which were reflected in its books of accounts and offered to tax. The books of accounts were not rejected by the AO. The Tribunal found that the AO erred in relying on statements from employees who were not fully aware of the business activities.
The Tribunal held that the AO had taken a plausible view by accepting the assessee's return, especially since the difference between stamp duty value and actual consideration (8.14%) was within the 10% tolerance limit. The Tribunal also noted that the PCIT did not provide sufficient material to justify the revision and that the tolerance limit introduced by the Finance Act, 2020, was applied retrospectively by coordinate benches.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the CIT(A) was not sustainable in law. The Tribunal found that the affidavit of Mrs. Pooja Ashanand Mishra, who managed the assessee's emails, provided detailed reasons for inadvertently missing the email containing the penalty order. The Tribunal accepted these reasons as sufficient cause for the delay of 380 days. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. MST. Katiji & Ors., which emphasizes a liberal approach in condoning delays to enable substantial justice. The Tribunal noted that nothing contrary was brought on record by the Revenue to contradict the employee's affidavit. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the case was restored to the CIT(A)'s file with directions to dispose of the appeal on merits after considering the material on record. The assessee was directed to present its case before the CIT(A) within 90 days of the order.
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee do not qualify as fees for technical services (FTS) under Article 12(4) of the India-Singapore DTAA. The Tribunal found that the services were operational management and support, and did not involve making available technical know-how or developing/transferring technical plans. Therefore, the management fees are not taxable as FTS.
The Tribunal observed that the appellant failed to provide reasons for the repayment of loans in cash and did not cooperate with the lower authorities. Despite multiple opportunities, no documentary evidence was submitted to substantiate the claims. The Tribunal, however, decided to remit the case back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after considering all material on record and providing an opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal was filed beyond the time limit, and the assessee's claim for condonation of delay due to the Covid-19 pandemic was not accepted by the CIT(A). However, considering the facts and the inability of the assessee to demonstrate non-service of the assessment order, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication.
The tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. and the Madras High Court's decision in CIT vs. Madras Radiators & Pressing Ltd., holding that the employee's contribution to PF/ESIC must be deposited by the employer on or before the prescribed due date for deduction under section 36(1)(va).
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had made due enquiries regarding the EPCG payment and additional depreciation claim. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had correctly accounted for the capital loss in the subsequent assessment year.
The CIT(A) confirmed the addition, doubting the genuineness of the debit notes submitted without signatures. The Tribunal noted that these debit notes were filed for the first time before the CIT(A) and were not verified by either the CIT(A) or the AO.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee presented invoices and made payments via checks, the purchase invoices were from parties involved in a bogus hawala racket. The genuineness of these purchases could not be accepted. However, the addition should be limited to the profit involved in such bogus purchases, not the entire purchase amount, in accordance with the Bombay High Court decision.
The tribunal observed that the assessee was engaged in providing accommodation entries. The AO estimated the commission income at 1% of the turnover. The CIT(A) restricted this to 0.10%. The tribunal, considering previous ITAT rulings on similar cases where commission rates ranged from 0.02% to 0.05%, found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s decision to estimate commission income at 0.10% of the total turnover.
The Tribunal held that passing an appellate order before the scheduled hearing date violates the principles of natural justice. Such an order is considered void-ab-initio. Therefore, the issue was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh decision.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) set aside the PCIT's order, ruling that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction u/s 263 was invalid. The ITAT found that the Assessing Officer had conducted inquiries and the assessee had already suo moto disallowed the disputed expenditure (including penalties and fines) in its income computation. Citing the Supreme Court's Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. precedent, the Tribunal concluded that the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue, as required for a valid revision under Section 263.
The tribunal observed that the assessee was engaged in providing accommodation entries. The AO estimated the commission income at 1% of the turnover. The CIT(A) restricted this to 0.10%. The tribunal, considering previous ITAT rulings on similar cases where commission rates ranged from 0.02% to 0.05%, found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s decision to estimate commission income at 0.10% of the total turnover.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided several documents to substantiate the loan, including loan confirmation, lender's ITR, PAN, financial accounts, bank statements, and Form 16A. While the AO was not convinced due to the same-day fund transfer and sufficient own funds of the assessee, the Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged the primary onus and the AO failed to bring on record material to justify the addition under Section 68.
The Tribunal noted that the difference between the transaction value and the stamp duty value was Rs 595,000, which is 3.25% of the transaction value. The Tribunal held that the benefit of the 10% tolerance limit under Section 56(2)(x) and Section 50C of the Act should be allowed to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to substantiate the claim of receiving cash from his father and also failed to explain how the father accumulated such a large sum. However, considering the assessee's small income, the Tribunal decided to give one more opportunity to present evidence.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are also cooperative societies carrying on banking business. The interest earned by the assessee on fixed deposits and savings accounts with these cooperative banks qualifies as investment income and is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court's decision cited by the CIT(A) pertained to Section 80P(2)(a) and was not applicable to the current case.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not file a reply to the AO's show-cause notice. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO to re-calculate the profit using the percentage completion method, giving due opportunity to the assessee to present their submissions and details.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) adopted a pedantic approach by not condoning the delay in filing the appeal, which was caused by the prolonged illness and subsequent death of a partner who handled tax matters. The Tribunal held that a 'sufficient cause' should be interpreted with pragmatism and a justice-oriented approach. Therefore, the Tribunal condoned the delay.
The Tribunal held that the difference between the stamp duty value and the transaction value was less than 10% of the transaction value. Following judicial precedents, the Tribunal ruled that the tolerance limit applies retrospectively, and therefore, the addition under Section 56(2)(x) could not be made.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in assuming jurisdiction under Section 263 as the AO had thoroughly examined all issues with supporting evidence. The assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue's interest.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks are also cooperative societies carrying on banking business. The interest earned by the assessee on fixed deposits and savings accounts with these cooperative banks qualifies as investment income and is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court's decision cited by the CIT(A) pertained to Section 80P(2)(a) and was not applicable to the current case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Observing that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal without deciding on merits due to the assessee's absence, the Tribunal restored the appeal back to the CIT(A). The assessee is directed to provide details regarding the cash credit and investments made.
The assessee appealed to the CIT(A), who dismissed the appeal ex-parte due to non-compliance with notices. The Tribunal, considering principles of natural justice, set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee with an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal noted that the notice issued under Section 133(6) to the contractor was not served. The AO rejected the claim without proper inquiry. The Tribunal found that the claim for renovation expenses should be re-examined.
The Tribunal, relying on various High Court decisions and coordinate bench judgments, held that interest income earned by a co-operative society from investments made with other co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's alternate plea for deduction under section 80P(2)(d), finding the issue covered in favour of the assessee by established judicial precedents.