Loading ITAT cases…
744 orders · Page 11 of 15
The Tribunal held that income earned by a co-operative society from its investment with any other cooperative society is deductible under section 80P(2)(d). The assessee is a co-operative society and not a cooperative bank, thus section 80P(4) is not applicable. The issue is covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Kerala State Co-Operative Agricultural & Rural Development Bank Ltd.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) referred to the Bombay High Court's decision in *PCIT vs. Mohammed Haji Adam & Co.* which restricts additions to the gross profit rate on genuine purchases, and its own prior order for the assessee for AY 2009-10 where a 4% profit rate was applied on bogus purchases. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to apply a 4% profit rate on the total alleged bogus purchases of Rs.2,00,23,871/-.
The Tribunal found the additional evidence highly relevant for explaining the source of investments and going to the root of the issue. Consequently, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A)-NFAC for a fresh adjudication, with the responsibility on the taxpayer to file and prove all relevant facts. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the disallowance of the club expenditure made by way of CPC's section 143(1)(a) processing was incorrect. Section 143(1)(a)(i) to (iv) prescribes disallowance only for arithmetic errors or incorrect claims based on available information or audit reports.
The Tribunal noted that the tax effect in the appeal was Rs.45,13,516/-. Following CBDT Circular No. 17/2019 dated 08/08/2019, the Tribunal held that the appeal by the revenue had to be dismissed.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's application for withdrawal and the reasons provided. The assessee explicitly stated that the withdrawal should not be construed as acceptance of the order or as a precedent.
The Tribunal condoned the 1106-day delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the challenges of the new faceless e-proceedings regime. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh, de novo meritorious adjudication of all the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee, allowing the assessee to furnish further details and documents.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) for its income from providing credit facilities to members. It was also held that interest income derived from investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A)-NFAC for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was given three effective opportunities to plead and prove her case regarding advance tax payment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the assessee's profession. It remitted all four appeals back to the Ld. CIT(A) for de novo meritorious adjudication, directing the assessee to prove tax payment and be diligent in subsequent hearings.
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeals. Regarding the deletion of additions under Section 68 (share capital/premium) for both assessment years, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision. For AY 2012-13, the Tribunal noted that the assessee's own funds were significantly higher than the investments yielding exempt income. Relying on the principle from HDFC Bank Limited (2014) 366 ITR 505 (Bom), the Tribunal agreed that if sufficient interest-free funds are available, investments are presumed to be out of such funds. For AY 2009-10, the Tribunal found that the investment in share capital and premium was duly complied with FEMA and RBI regulations. The deletion of additions under Section 14A was also upheld. For AY 2009-10, the Tribunal noted that the ground challenging the validity of reassessment under Section 147 was academic as the revenue did not dispute the finding of non-addition on the grounds for reopening. The Tribunal also made observations regarding the importance of proactive claim filing by tax authorities when a corporate debtor is under liquidation.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) restored the assessee's appeal to the lower appellate authority for fresh adjudication. The ITAT directed the lower authority to consider all supportive material from the assessee regarding their eligibility for the Section 115BAA benefit. The ITAT emphasized that the assessee is responsible for pleading and proving all relevant facts during the consequential proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that the penalty was confirmed by the CIT(A) before the disposal of the quantum appeal. Therefore, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the issue of the correctness of the penalty to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the exclusion of 'ECMAS Resins Private Limited' as a comparable but directed the exclusion of 'Arrow Technical Textiles Private Limited' due to product dissimilarity. The Tribunal also directed the TPO to re-examine working capital adjustments.
The tribunal condoned a delay of 104 days in filing the appeal, citing the need for substantial justice. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A)-NFAC for a fresh adjudication, with the taxpayer bearing the onus to prove facts.
The Tribunal acknowledged the CIT(A)'s power to admit fresh claims but found that the CIT(A) failed to either seek a remand report from the AO or verify the claim's genuineness independently. Given the AO had no prior opportunity to examine the claim, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for fresh examination and verification of the claim's genuineness and authenticity, after providing the assessee an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the assessee's profession. It remitted all four appeals back to the Ld. CIT(A) for de novo meritorious adjudication, directing the assessee to prove tax payment and be diligent in subsequent hearings.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not comply with statutory provisions. While the assessee provided details of expenses, supporting proof to establish their incurrence for earning commission income was lacking. The Tribunal, considering the facts and in the interest of justice, restricted the disallowance.
The Tribunal found that the penalty notice issued by the AO was defective as it failed to strike off the irrelevant charge, thereby not clearly indicating whether the penalty was for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. Relying on a Bombay High Court decision, the Tribunal held that such a defect vitiates the penalty proceedings because an omnibus notice lacks clarity. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and quashed the penalty notice.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's request to admit additional evidence (Vijaya Bank statements) under Rule 29 of ITAT Rules, which was not available to lower authorities. Considering the importance of this evidence for a fair decision, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the disputed issues, along with the additional evidence, to the AO for fresh adjudication on merits, granting the assessee an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that Section 80P(4) is attracted only to co-operative societies holding a banking license issued by the RBI, which was not the case for the assessee. Relying on Supreme Court and various Tribunal decisions, the Tribunal ruled that interest income received from a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It held that TDS credit cannot be denied if it is reflected in Form 26AS and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the tax credit for the respective assessment years. However, the assessee must also demonstrate that the income is not taxable in India, and the AO will verify this before allowing the credit.
The Tribunal, following binding precedents and a Bombay High Court decision, held that an addition restricted to 12.5% of bogus purchases is fair and reasonable, especially since sales were executed based on these purchases and not rejected by the AO. The Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the addition to 12.5% of Rs. 22,20,594/-, amounting to Rs. 277,574/-.
The Tribunal held that export commission paid to foreign agents was not liable for TDS as they provided sales and marketing services, not consultancy. It also directed inclusion of certain comparables for TP adjustments and allowed credit for foreign taxes.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal was filed with a delay, and the assessee had filed a condonation petition explaining the delay due to a director's liver transplant surgery. The Tribunal found that the assessee had reasonable grounds for the delay. It also observed that the NFAC had called for a remand report, but the assessee was unable to appear for a reasonable cause, leading to a denial of a reasonable opportunity. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the appellate order and restored the case to the file of the NFAC. The Tribunal directed the NFAC to condone the delay, accept the petition, and pass an appellate order on merits after providing a proper and adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The evidence and explanations submitted by the assessee were to be admitted and adjudicated on merits. The issue regarding the assessment order being non-est and the addition of Rs. 15,03,557/- were not decided on merits by the Tribunal, as the matter was remanded.
The Tribunal held that export commission paid to foreign agents was not liable for TDS as they provided sales and marketing services, not consultancy. It also directed inclusion of certain comparables for TP adjustments and allowed credit for foreign taxes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It held that TDS credit cannot be denied if it is reflected in Form 26AS and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the tax credit for the respective assessment years. However, the assessee must also demonstrate that the income is not taxable in India, and the AO will verify this before allowing the credit.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) rejected the application without providing adequate opportunity for the assessee to be heard and clarify issues. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and directed a fresh consideration of the application.
The Tribunal held that the referral fees received by the assessee were in the nature of business income and not fees for technical services. Since the assessee had no business connection or permanent establishment in India, the income was not taxable in India.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer bypassed mandatory provisions of Section 144C by directly issuing a final assessment order without a draft order. Consequently, the assessment order, demand notice, and penalty proceedings were rendered invalid.
The Tribunal followed its previous order in the assessee's own case for A.Y. 2016-17 and 2017-18, which had restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for re-examination based on the Supreme Court's decision in ACIT vs. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s orders and restored the disputed issues for both assessment years (2014-15 and 2015-16) to the Assessing Officer to decide afresh in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.
The Tribunal held that for Assessment Year 2018-19, the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) could not have been disallowed on the ground that the return was filed after the due date. The Tribunal also found that interest received from a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The tribunal held that interest income derived by a co-operative society from a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d), as Section 80P(4) applies only to societies with RBI banking licenses, which the assessee did not have. The tribunal also ruled that the assessee's return of income was not belated, based on the dispatch date of ITR-V as per relevant notifications.
The Tribunal noted that the penalty notice and the penalty order did not specifically mention whether the penalty was for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that such a defect makes the penalty unsustainable on legal grounds.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus under Section 68 by providing confirmations, PAN details, balance sheets, P&L accounts, and bank statements of the lenders. The Tribunal also noted that the proviso to Section 68, introduced in 2012, was prospective and not applicable to the assessment year in question.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in directing a de-novo assessment based on a bonafide mistake in accumulation of income. The assessee had accepted the mistake and it was rectifiable. Therefore, the directions of the CIT(E) were modified to the extent of rectification of the mistake.
The Tribunal noted that a Coordinate Bench had already decided a similar issue in favor of the assessee in earlier assessment years, consistently holding that income from borrowed services is not taxable under the India-Singapore Treaty. The revenue could not provide any distinguishing facts or decisions.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act was barred by limitation. Consequently, the assessment order passed based on this invalid notice was liable to be quashed.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear before the CIT(A) despite adequate opportunities, leading to an ex-parte dismissal. However, citing principles of natural justice and considering the assessee's grounds challenging the additions, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity. It set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted all disputed issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, requiring the assessee to cooperate and be provided an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The tribunal found that the Assessee was aggrieved by the reassessment proceedings. The CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate the grounds of appeal challenging the validity of the reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal decided to follow the precedent set by a Co-ordinate Bench in a similar case (ITA No. 3130/Mum/2019). The CIT(A) had also followed this precedent. The revenue's contention that the pending appeal before the High Court should prevent following the precedent was rejected.
The Tribunal held that the services provided by the consultant were in the nature of regular business consultancy services for operational efficiencies, not for creating an asset or brand with enduring benefit. The disallowance of expenses was therefore incorrect.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s findings to be contrary to material on record, noting that evidence supported the expenses were for the assessee's proprietorship concern. The Tribunal set aside the disallowance and remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer for a de-novo adjudication, directing the AO to consider all documentary evidence submitted by the appellant and provide a sufficient opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence, including purchase and sale details, bank statements, and demat account records, to substantiate the share transactions. The AO's additions were based on assumptions and an investigation report without independent inquiry.
The Tribunal observed that the Ld.CIT(E) had not considered the relevant paragraphs of the circular. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the file of the Ld.CIT(E) to process the application afresh, duly considering the specified paragraphs of the circular.
The Tribunal, following the decision of a co-ordinate bench and the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Smifs Securities Ltd., held that goodwill arising on amalgamation is a capital asset eligible for depreciation. The disallowance made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal found that the issue had been decided by co-ordinate benches in favor of the assessee for prior assessment years. The payments were considered professional fees for consultancy and not royalties, thus not subject to TDS under the relevant DTAA provisions.
The Tribunal found that there was a reasonable cause for the assessee filing the appeal belatedly. Therefore, the delay was condoned, and the matter was restored to the Ld.CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.