226 orders · Page 5 of 5
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not have proper representation before the CIT(A) and the appeal was decided ex parte due to non-prosecution. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the appeal back for fresh adjudication, allowing an opportunity for the assessee to be heard.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had responded to notices but was dismissed ex-parte by the CIT(A) for non-representation after an adjournment request was denied. In the interest of justice, the issues were restored to the AO for readjudication.
The Tribunal held that the order passed by the Id. Addl/JCIT(A)-1, Mumbai was a non-speaking order and did not adequately address the assessee's submissions. This was considered a violation of judicial principles.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding that the assessee had a reasonable and sufficient cause for being prevented from filing within the statutory time limit due to communication issues regarding address changes and notice delivery. Regarding the grounds of appeal, the Tribunal noted that proper representation was not made by the assessee at both the AO and CIT(A) stages due to a lack of communication. The assessee's AR requested a remand to the AO, while the DR supported the CIT(A)'s order. Considering the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to provide another opportunity to the assessee to represent its case properly. Consequently, the order of the CIT(A) and the AO were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AO to frame the assessment afresh after affording an opportunity of being heard. The assessee was directed to produce persons with whom trades were carried out for cross-examination and furnish all evidence supporting the genuineness of transactions. The assessee was cautioned against seeking unnecessary adjournments. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that merely filing basic documents like income tax details and bank statements is insufficient to discharge the onus under Section 68. However, considering the assessee's willingness to provide further evidence, the case was remanded.
The Tribunal held that the assessee possessed a valid registration till AY 2026-27, which was a final registration and not merely provisional. The Tribunal relied on CBDT Circular No. 11/2022, which clarifies that technical glitches might have led to 'provisional' being mentioned when 'final' was intended.
The Tribunal noted that both the assessment order and the appellate order were passed ex parte due to the assessee's non-compliance. Considering the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one final opportunity to substantiate its claim.
The Tribunal restricted the corporate guarantee commission to 0.5% based on the interest savings method, apportioning the benefit between the assessee and the AE. For Section 14A, the matter was remanded to the AO to recompute the disallowance based on the cost of investments as per ICDS.
The ITAT observed that the CIT(A)'s order was ex-parte and lacked a decision on the merits of the case. Consequently, the tribunal remitted the appeal back to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration, directing that the assessee be given a proper opportunity of hearing to present their explanations and evidence.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing loan confirmations, PANs, IT acknowledgments, and bank statements for the transactions. The Tribunal noted that the lending entities were regular taxpayers with adequate net worth.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing loan confirmations, PANs, IT acknowledgments, and bank statements for the transactions. The Tribunal noted that the lending entities were regular taxpayers with adequate net worth.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It was held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was barred by limitation as it was served beyond the period prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the Act, making it invalid and void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that the AO had no jurisdiction to make the addition in an unabated assessment year without any seized incriminating material. Relying on the Apex Court's decision in PCIT v. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., the Tribunal found that a third party's statement does not constitute incriminating material for such additions.
The Tribunal held that the appeal for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation as per the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal. For AY 2014-15, the approval granted by the PCCIT for issuing the notice under Section 148 was found to be mechanical and without application of mind, rendering the reopening invalid.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal, holding that it was a purely legal issue with all necessary facts available on record, and the assessee is at liberty to raise such issues before any appellate authority for the first time. The Tribunal found that the notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Act dated September 22, 2018, did not specify whether it was for limited scrutiny, complete scrutiny, or compulsory manual scrutiny. This was in violation of CBDT Instruction F. No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated June 23, 2017. The Tribunal held that revenue authorities must follow CBDT instructions, and violation thereof renders the notice invalid, making all consequential proceedings invalid. The Tribunal relied on the decision of a co-ordinate bench in Tapas Kumar Das Vs. ITO and Shib Nath Ghosh Vs. ITO, holding that the notice issued under Section 143(2) was invalid, and consequently, the assessment framed was also invalid and quashed. The appeal was allowed on this legal issue, and other grounds on merit were left undecided. The ratio decidendi is that a notice under Section 143(2) issued in violation of mandatory CBDT instructions regarding the type of scrutiny is invalid, leading to the quashing of the assessment.
During the appeal, the assessee informed the tribunal that the CIT(Exemption) had subsequently granted approval under Section 12AB(1)(b) on 19.09.2025. Consequently, the assessee requested to withdraw the appeal, which was allowed as the Revenue had no objection.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 11,49,794/- is liable to be sustained in part. Regarding purchases from Durga Trading Corporation (Rs. 99,689/-) and Vasukinath Enterprises (Rs. 1,45,758/-), the assessee claimed to have made purchases but was unable to produce verifiable evidence like lorry receipts and challans. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's accounting software was no longer functional, making retrieval of historical data infeasible. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 99,689/- and Rs. 1,45,758/- is sustained. However, to provide an opportunity to the assessee, the matter is remanded to the Ld. AO for fresh adjudication after allowing the assessee to produce all evidence and confronting the AO's evidence. Regarding purchases from Jayshree Sales Corporation (Rs. 4,30,100/-) and Metal and Alloy Syndicate (Rs. 4,74,247/-), where the assessee denied any transactions, the issue is remanded to the Ld. AO to provide necessary evidence to counter the assessee's affidavit. Ground No. 3 is rejected as the addition under a deeming provision like Section 69C loses the concept of gross profit ratio. Ground No. 4 is confirmed as the Ld. CIT(A) addressed it. Grounds 5 and 6 regarding borrowed satisfaction are dismissed, particularly as the assessee did not file a return in response to the notice u/s 148, leaving the AO with no option but to proceed under Section 144. The principle laid down in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer is cited. The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes.
For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal held that the assessment is barred by limitation, following the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. The notice under Section 148 and the consequent assessment were quashed as time-barred. For AY 2014-15, the Tribunal found that the approval granted by the PCCIT for issuing the notice under Section 148 was not valid. The PCCIT merely affixed a stamp (approved) without recording any satisfaction or independently applying his mind to the proposal from the AO. This was considered a mechanical approval, not in accordance with the requirements of Section 151 of the Act. The Tribunal relied on the decision in Capital Broadways Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO, which held that such mechanical approval is bad in law. Consequently, the notice under Section 148 and the reassessment proceedings were quashed. The Tribunal explicitly noted that the decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-6 vs. Meenakshi Overseas Pvt. Ltd. was not applicable as it involved a letter clearly showing application of mind, unlike the present case.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition, finding that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence to establish the identity, creditworthiness of the lenders, and genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal noted that the AO had not conducted further independent verification.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued u/s 143(2) of the Act was not in the format prescribed by the CBDT, making it invalid. Consequently, the assessment framed based on this invalid notice was also quashed.
The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 10AB is procedural and not mandatory. They condoned the 3-day delay in filing the application, considering the reasonable cause explained by the assessee and the hardship that would be caused.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) did not refer the matter to the DVO to determine the difference between stamp duty value and market value. The Tribunal decided to remit the appeal to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that filing Form 67 is directory, not mandatory, and the assessee is entitled to claim FTC even if the form was filed late. The AO is directed to allow the FTC.
The Tribunal first addressed the delay in filing the appeal. It condoned the 44-day delay, finding that the assessee had a reasonable and sufficient cause for being prevented from filing the appeal within the statutory time limit, citing the lack of intimation from the CIT(A) and the subsequent discovery of the dismissal through the AO's office. On the merits of the penalty, the Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 269SS were not attracted to the facts of the case. The Tribunal noted that while the assessee was not the owner of the land at the time of receiving the advance, agreements were filed showing the purchase of plots. It was also noted that the agreements were cancelled, and the money was refunded to the prospective buyers in the form of shares in M/s. Pushpanjali Pvt. Ltd. because the owner of the land could not fulfill the agreement. The Tribunal respectfully followed the findings in the case of Arati Sarraf and other decisions relied upon by the assessee. Therefore, the penalty levied by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was cancelled. The ratio decidendi is that cash received as advance for sale of rights in a property, where the transaction ultimately does not materialize and the advance is refunded, does not constitute a violation of Section 269SS, especially when the relevant provisions were amended later to specifically include such advances. The appeal of the assessee was allowed, with the penalty being cancelled.
The Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A) in ITA No. 956/KOL/2025 and remand the issue to the CIT(A) for de novo decision. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had merely reproduced the findings of the Assessing Officer and that the issue relating to the sale proceeds of shares and the validity of the Section 148 notice, including the approval by the competent authority, had not been adequately addressed. The assessee was granted liberty to raise all objections, including legal grounds, before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) was directed to either call for a remand report from the AO or grant an opportunity under Rule 46A. For statistical purposes, this appeal was partly allowed. Regarding ITA No. 955/KOL/2025, the Tribunal also set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter for granting the assessee one more opportunity to submit justifications for the non-imposition of penalty, specifically concerning a reasonable cause for the delay. The CIT(A) was to pass an order as per law after providing this opportunity. For statistical purposes, this appeal was also partly allowed. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided, but the remands indicate that the merits of several grounds were not finally adjudicated by the Tribunal itself.
The Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A) in ITA No. 956/KOL/2025 (assessment order) and the order in ITA No. 955/KOL/2025 (penalty order) for de novo decision. For ITA No. 956/KOL/2025, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had merely reproduced the AO's findings on merits and that the issue regarding sale proceeds of shares had not been examined properly. The Tribunal also observed that the chronological sequence of events for the validity of the notice under Section 148 and the approval by the competent authority were not adequately addressed. Therefore, the appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes, with the CIT(A) directed to decide the matter afresh, considering all objections, including legal grounds, and potentially calling for a remand report or granting an opportunity under Rule 46A. For ITA No. 955/KOL/2025, the Tribunal found that the assessee needed another opportunity to justify a reasonable cause for the non-imposition of penalty. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside to grant this opportunity, and the appeal was also partly allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided, but the de novo consideration implies all issues will be re-examined.