226 orders · Page 3 of 5
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal as it was for bonafide and genuine reasons. The Tribunal found that the appeal was dismissed ex-parte without deciding the issues on merits, which violates Section 250(6) of the Act.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had rejected the 80G application under an erroneous presumption, despite the 12A application being pending. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication after granting an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemption) erred in rejecting the application solely for a technical mistake without considering the actual charitable nature and activities of the Trust. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(Exemption)'s order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, directing the CIT(Exemption) to grant the assessee an opportunity to correct the section code and be heard.
The Tribunal directed that the corporate guarantee fee should be restricted to 0.5% based on a previous ruling for the same assessee. For the deduction u/s 80M, the AO was directed to examine and grant the claim as per law. The AO was also directed to grant credit for TDS/TCS after examination.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148A(d) was issued beyond the time limit prescribed, making it time-barred and invalid. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings initiated are void ab initio, and the additions made have no legal basis.
Noting the assessee's consistent non-compliance before the lower authorities, the ITAT remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment with specific directions for the assessee to produce documents and persons for examination. The Tribunal also imposed a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- on the assessee for wasting departmental resources.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not condoning the 469-day delay, given the peculiar facts of the case. It set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the appeal back to the CIT(A) for disposal on merits, directing that the assessee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and that Rule 46A of the I.T. Rules, 1962 be followed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after considering the facts and circumstances. The appeal was restored to the file of the AO, subject to the assessee paying ₹10,000 to Legal Aid Services within 60 days.
The Tribunal held that the assessment for AY 2016-17 was unabated and completed before the search on February 10, 2021. The time period for issuing a notice under Section 143(2) had expired on September 30, 2017. In such a scenario, the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to make additions under Section 153A is limited to making additions based on seized incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal noted that it is a settled position of law that in respect of completed/unabated assessments, no addition can be made in the absence of any incriminating material found during the search. Following the decision in Exhibit India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT, which relied on the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision in PCIT vs. M/s Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal found that the assessment order under Section 153A was bad in law. The addition of Rs. 16,62,829/- (and Rs. 2,73,603/- in the other appeal, as per the cited case) was deleted. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal, relying on a precedent (Nabiul Industrial Metal Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO), held that the notification enabling faceless assessments under Section 151A came into effect on 29.03.2022. As the notices for reassessment (Section 142(1) and show-cause notice) were issued prior to this date, they were deemed invalid and without jurisdiction, rendering the subsequent assessment order null and void.
The Tribunal held that the assessment for AY 2016-17 was unabated and completed before the search on February 10, 2021. The time period for issuing a notice under Section 143(2) had expired on September 30, 2017. In such a scenario, the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to make additions under Section 153A is limited to making additions based on seized incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal noted that it is a settled position of law that in respect of completed/unabated assessments, no addition can be made in the absence of any incriminating material found during the search. Following the decision in Exhibit India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT, which relied on the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision in PCIT vs. M/s Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal found that the assessment order under Section 153A was bad in law. The addition of Rs. 16,62,829/- (and Rs. 2,73,603/- in the other appeal, as per the cited case) was deleted. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions, ruling that since no incriminating material was unearthed during the search for the unabated assessment year, the additions made under Section 68 and Section 69C were not sustainable, in line with the Supreme Court's judgment in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. The seized documents were considered part of regular accounting records and not incriminating material.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was not sustainable as the income surrendered during the survey was voluntarily disclosed in the original return under Section 139(1) and accepted by the Department. It clarified that Explanation 5 to Section 271(1)(c) applies only to search cases, not surveys, and relied on the Calcutta High Court precedent that no penalty is leviable in such circumstances.
The ITAT noted that Form 3 under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme was not allowed to the assessee. Therefore, the ITAT restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh consideration, providing an opportunity for hearing and for the CIT(A) to pass a speaking order on merits.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A)'s order was ex-parte and not decided on merits due to the assessee's non-compliance. With no objection from the DR, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh consideration, directing the assessee to cooperate in the remand proceedings.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding no evidence of excess sponge iron production. It agreed that the cash purchase of coal was likely for trading purposes and estimated profits at 3% of the purchase value.
The Tribunal found that the Section 148 notice was issued on 01.04.2021, not 31.03.2021, and without complying with the statutory formalities of Section 148A as mandated by the Finance Act, 2021, effective from 01.04.2021. Relying on Calcutta High Court precedents, the Tribunal held that the notice was issued beyond the limitation period, rendering all subsequent assessment proceedings invalid.
The Tribunal condoned the 66-day delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's medical reasons. Citing the Bombay High Court, the Tribunal emphasized the Ld. CIT(A)'s obligation to decide appeals on merits. The matter was consequently remanded back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with directions for the assessee to provide all necessary evidence and cooperate.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding no evidence of excess sponge iron production. It agreed that the cash purchase of coal was likely for trading purposes and estimated profits at 3% of the purchase value.
The Tribunal found that the ₹3,00,000 difference in bank balance was indeed due to a timing difference in cheque clearance, supported by a bank reconciliation statement and other evidence. It concluded that there was no unexplained cash credit or concealed income. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the addition of ₹3,00,000.
Citing Supreme Court precedents on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the ITAT observed that the delay was due to the tax consultant's negligence, which was beyond the assessee's control. The tribunal held that rules of limitation should not destroy rights and remitted the case back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, after condoning the delay.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes, remitting the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh de novo assessment. The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal, observing that the Assessing Officer should pass an order in light of the CIT(A)'s directions.
The Tribunal observed that the assessment was completed on an estimated basis, and the CIT(A) sustained it without detailed verification of bank transactions. In the interest of justice and fair play, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to re-examine the bank transactions, verify the nature of deposits and withdrawals, and provide the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard before passing a fresh speaking order.
The Tribunal observed that the genuineness of the assessee's charitable activities was not doubted, and an inadequate time of only three days was provided for furnishing the amended Trust Deed. Since the required amendment, including the 'irrevocability clause', was subsequently made, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT (Exemption) for fresh consideration of the registration application.
The Tribunal, in this case and in its own case for a prior assessment year, held that if employees' contribution to EPF/ESI is not deposited within the stipulated due dates as per the relevant Acts, the deduction under section 36(1)(va) would not be available. However, regarding specific payments for October 2020, the Tribunal observed that based on the EPF Scheme, the liability arises on salary payment, and if salary for October was paid in November, the deposit within 15 days of November would be within the due date.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the application as time-barred and on an incorrect appreciation of facts. Citing a similar case, it clarified that as an existing trust, the assessee should have applied under Section 80G(5)(i), making the incorrect clause selection a curable defect. The CIT(E)'s order was set aside, and the matter remanded for fresh consideration under Section 80G(5)(i).
The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not make proper submissions before the CIT(A). Upon the request of the assessee's representative, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) for both assessment years and remanded the appeals back to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) is directed to dispose of the grounds of appeal on merit after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal noted that the claim of exemption under Section 10(26AAA) based on customary practices in Sikkim was not properly examined by the lower authorities. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for a fresh examination.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not make proper submissions before the CIT(A). Upon the request of the assessee's representative, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) for both assessment years and remanded the appeals back to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) is directed to dispose of the grounds of appeal on merit after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal, considering the interest of justice and fair play, decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remit the matter back to the AO for reassessment de novo, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) to re-examine whether the assessee's own funds were higher than borrowed funds for investments, whether short-term borrowings were utilized for investment in shares, and if the disallowance under Section 14A should be limited to the maximum expenses debited in the profit and loss account, citing the Supreme Court's decision in *South Indian Bank Ltd. vs. CIT*.
The Tribunal, referencing a previous decision, ruled that surcharge is leviable on the total income quantum, not the tax rate, and thus no surcharge was applicable as the income was below ₹50 lakh and there was a sole beneficiary. It was further held that Section 164 provisions for unknown shares were not applicable since the share of the sole beneficiary (Deity) was not unknown.
The Tribunal noted that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) considered the assessee's submissions, including the IDS disclosure, on their merits. Consequently, to ensure natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter to the AO for a fresh assessment, instructing to provide the assessee a full opportunity to present evidence and a cash flow statement.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was not speaking and lacked necessary verification regarding the actual receipt of GST and its debit in the P&L account. Relying on various High Court decisions, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of deduction under Section 80P by the CPC under Section 143(1)(a)(v) was not legally permissible for the Assessment Year 2018-19. The reasoning was that the power to make such a prima facie disallowance for deductions under Chapter VIA (including Section 80P) was conferred upon the CPC only by the Finance Act, 2021, with effect from April 1, 2021. Prior to this amendment, the CPC lacked the authority to disallow such claims during the processing of returns under Section 143(1). The Tribunal noted that Section 80AC, which bars deductions if returns are not filed by the due date, could only be invoked in a scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3). Therefore, the disallowance made by the CPC was beyond its jurisdiction for the impugned assessment year. The Tribunal followed the decision in Bisharpara Kodalia Coop. Credit Society Ltd. Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 49(2), Kolkata, and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the disallowance and allow the deduction of ₹16,27,104/- under Section 80P.
The Tribunal upheld the addition made by the Assessing Officer, confirming that the long-term capital loss claimed by the assessee was bogus. The decision was based on the company's lack of substantial turnover and operating profits, and reliance on a jurisdictional High Court ruling.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's willingness to produce directors for cross-examination. To provide a further opportunity for the assessee to furnish evidence, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the AO for a fresh assessment. The AO is directed to allow the assessee to produce directors for cross-examination and prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was invalid as it was based on potential and probable transactions without concrete evidence linking the assessee. The CIT(A) had rightly deleted the additions made by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) cannot be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the addition was primarily based on the statement recorded during the search, which was subsequently retracted by the assessee. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had incorrectly recorded that the retraction was made late during assessment proceedings, when in fact, it was made within seven days of the disclosure. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the disclosures were linked to share capital introduced, with a presumed amount of ₹4,96,12,000/-, whereas the actual amount was ₹2,46,12,000/-, indicating a factual error in the AO's assessment. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decisions in PR Metrani Vs CIT and Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, and the Delhi High Court decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi-2 vs. Best Infrastructure (India) (P.) Ltd., which held that a statement under Section 132(4) does not constitute incriminating material by itself, especially when retracted with supporting evidence. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. For AYs 2014-15 to 2019-20, the issues were similar, and the same decision was applied.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the file of the Assessing Officer for re-examination, directing the assessee to cooperate with the remand proceedings and submit necessary evidence.
The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration, noting the assessee's claim of unavoidable circumstances for not producing evidence. The Assessing Officer is directed to re-examine the issues afresh after affording the assessee sufficient opportunity to present all necessary evidence and pass a speaking order.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) cannot be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the addition was primarily based on the statement recorded during the search, which was subsequently retracted by the assessee. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had incorrectly recorded that the retraction was made late during assessment proceedings, when in fact, it was made within seven days of the disclosure. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the disclosures were linked to share capital introduced, with a presumed amount of ₹4,96,12,000/-, whereas the actual amount was ₹2,46,12,000/-, indicating a factual error in the AO's assessment. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decisions in PR Metrani Vs CIT and Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, and the Delhi High Court decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi-2 vs. Best Infrastructure (India) (P.) Ltd., which held that a statement under Section 132(4) does not constitute incriminating material by itself, especially when retracted with supporting evidence. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. For AYs 2014-15 to 2019-20, the issues were similar, and the same decision was applied.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was barred by limitation as it was issued beyond the period prescribed by law, considering the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) cannot be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the addition was primarily based on the statement recorded during the search, which was subsequently retracted by the assessee. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had incorrectly recorded that the retraction was made late during assessment proceedings, when in fact, it was made within seven days of the disclosure. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the disclosures were linked to share capital introduced, with a presumed amount of ₹4,96,12,000/-, whereas the actual amount was ₹2,46,12,000/-, indicating a factual error in the AO's assessment. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decisions in PR Metrani Vs CIT and Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, and the Delhi High Court decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi-2 vs. Best Infrastructure (India) (P.) Ltd., which held that a statement under Section 132(4) does not constitute incriminating material by itself, especially when retracted with supporting evidence. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. For AYs 2014-15 to 2019-20, the issues were similar, and the same decision was applied.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) cannot be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the addition was primarily based on the statement recorded during the search, which was subsequently retracted by the assessee. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had incorrectly recorded that the retraction was made late during assessment proceedings, when in fact, it was made within seven days of the disclosure. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the disclosures were linked to share capital introduced, with a presumed amount of ₹4,96,12,000/-, whereas the actual amount was ₹2,46,12,000/-, indicating a factual error in the AO's assessment. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decisions in PR Metrani Vs CIT and Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, and the Delhi High Court decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi-2 vs. Best Infrastructure (India) (P.) Ltd., which held that a statement under Section 132(4) does not constitute incriminating material by itself, especially when retracted with supporting evidence. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. For AYs 2014-15 to 2019-20, the issues were similar, and the same decision was applied.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was invalid as it was based on potential and probable transactions without concrete evidence linking the assessee. The CIT(A) had rightly deleted the additions made by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) cannot be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the addition was primarily based on the statement recorded during the search, which was subsequently retracted by the assessee. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had incorrectly recorded that the retraction was made late during assessment proceedings, when in fact, it was made within seven days of the disclosure. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the disclosures were linked to share capital introduced, with a presumed amount of ₹4,96,12,000/-, whereas the actual amount was ₹2,46,12,000/-, indicating a factual error in the AO's assessment. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decisions in PR Metrani Vs CIT and Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala, and the Delhi High Court decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi-2 vs. Best Infrastructure (India) (P.) Ltd., which held that a statement under Section 132(4) does not constitute incriminating material by itself, especially when retracted with supporting evidence. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition. For AYs 2014-15 to 2019-20, the issues were similar, and the same decision was applied.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was unsustainable. The Tribunal noted that the AO relied primarily on the statement recorded during the search without reference to any incriminating material. The CIT(A) made a factual error regarding the timing of the retraction, which occurred within seven days of the statement, not late during assessment proceedings. Furthermore, the addition was linked to presumed share capital figures that were factually incorrect. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in PR Metrani and Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd., and the Delhi High Court's decision in Best Infrastructure (India) (P.) Ltd., to hold that a retracted statement, especially when not supported by independent incriminating material, cannot be the sole basis for assessment. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO to delete the addition. The issues for AYs 2014-15 to 2019-20 were held to be similar and were decided mutatis mutandis.
The ITAT, considering the assessee's explanation for the delay (director's ill-health and consultant's negligence) and the principle of substantial justice, remanded the case back to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) was directed to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits after providing the assessee a fair hearing.
The Tribunal held that while the Ld. CIT(A) correctly noted the lack of direct evidence linking the appellant company to the transactions and the reliance on the 'flagship company' status, the matter required further examination. The Tribunal observed that the seized documents mentioned recipients like 'DNK HL Loharuka and others' and payments to 'HL Loharuka etc.', indicating potential transactions within the Loharuka Group. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the company's name was not explicitly mentioned, and the concerned persons denied transactions with the company, attributing them to individuals Anil Loharuka and Sunil Loharuka. However, it also acknowledged that these individuals are key persons of the company, and non-mention of a legal entity's name does not fully absolve it. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) accepted that the amount was disclosed by persons from whom documents were seized, but the exact amount admitted in their returns was not worked out. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and directed a remand. The AO is to work out and quantify the amounts in the seized documents, ascertain which persons from the Disha Group or Shri Kotgire and his employees disclosed these transactions in their income returns, and consider the explanation of the diary owners. The assessee must produce evidence to support claims that transactions were owned up by others or pertain to other group concerns. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.