256 orders · Page 4 of 6
The Tribunal condoned the one-day delay in filing the appeal, holding that the delay was not due to negligence and the assessee had established sufficient cause. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) to meet the principle of natural justice and remitted the matter back with a direction to provide another opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the notice u/s 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was indeed issued beyond the time limit prescribed in the first proviso to Section 143(2). The Tribunal found that the AO candidly admitted the delay. The Tribunal disagreed with the CIT(A)'s view that Section 292BB could cure the defect of delayed issuance of notice. Citing the Supreme Court decision in *CIT vs Laxman Das Khandelwal*, the Tribunal reiterated that Section 292BB cures infirmities in the manner of service of notice, not the complete absence or delayed issuance of notice. The Tribunal also referred to *Hotel Blue Moon* and other High Court decisions, emphasizing that the issuance of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the notice issued u/s 143(2) was barred by limitation, rendering the consequent assessment invalid and quashed. The other grounds raised on legal issues and merits were left undecided.
The Tribunal held that corporate guarantee transactions are international transactions, dismissing the assessee's ground of appeal on this issue. The Tribunal also dismissed the assessee's ground regarding the restriction of the ALP for corporate guarantee fees, noting that the Ld. CIT(A) had already followed the co-ordinate bench's decision restricting it to 0.5%. For the issue concerning disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D, the Tribunal upheld the deletion of additions made by the AO. It relied on its previous decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2012-13, which had accepted the suo moto disallowance offered by the assessee and deleted the disallowance made by the AO applying Rule 8D. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the Ld. CIT(A)'s order and dismissed the Revenue's appeals on this point. Consequently, all appeals filed by both the assessee and the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal, after considering the facts and the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, particularly in Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, which emphasize the liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' to advance substantial justice, found merit in the assessee's plea. The Tribunal noted that the AO's order was ex-parte and there was no compliance before the AO or the CIT(A). The CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of delay, finding no sufficient cause. However, the Tribunal, considering the affidavit filed by the assessee explaining the delay and the fact that the firm allegedly did not exist during the period, was inclined to condone the delay. The Tribunal decided to remit the appeal back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh order after condoning the delay. The issue of the existence of the firm and the merits of the assessment were not decided by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that the shares of M/s Indian Infotech & Software Ltd. involved in the transaction were not 'penny stock' as they were not included in the list of 84 penny stocks relied upon by the AO. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided copies of contract notes for purchase and sale, as well as audited balance sheets, which showed the sale of shares on the income side of the Profit and Loss account. The profit earned from these sales was offered to tax at the maximum marginal rate. The Tribunal found no mistake or infirmity in the order of the CIT(A), who had correctly observed that the LTCG was not claimed under Section 10(38). Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Revenue, upholding the order of the CIT(A). The cross-objection filed by the assessee was dismissed as not pressed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal, finding that the reasons provided by the assessee were genuine and bonafide, and beyond the appellant's control. Regarding the addition on account of bogus purchases, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had complied with notices, produced documentary evidence, and its accounts were audited without adverse inference. The AO had not disbelieved the sales made out of these purchases. The Tribunal observed that confirming the entire addition would lead to unrealistic results, as the assessee had declared profit on sales made from these purchases. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A). However, it directed the AO to levy an additional gross profit of 2.00% on the said purchases over and above the profits declared by the assessee. This effectively meant deleting the addition to the tune of ₹41,41,707/-, while allowing a notional profit on the disputed purchases.
The Tribunal, noting that the impugned appeal had already been decided by a co-ordinate Bench and with the consent of the Departmental Representative, allowed the assessee's request and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of director's remuneration under Section 154 was not an apparent mistake but a debatable issue involving interpretation of the Act. Rectification under Section 154 is permissible only for glaring mistakes apparent from the record, not for debatable questions. Thus, the rectification proceedings and the resulting addition were set aside.
The Tribunal condoned a 2-day delay in filing the appeal and, to ensure natural justice, set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee another opportunity of being heard, with a caution for cooperation.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission regarding the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and the DR's argument for dismissal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal with liberty to the assessee to seek revival if the scheme outcome is not successful.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to submit documents to the CIT(Appeals) but acknowledged that a paper book was filed before the Tribunal. To ensure justice and provide a fresh opportunity, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for re-examination of the issues and evidence. The assessee was also cautioned to cooperate with the proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) properly examined the assessee's claim regarding deferred revenue recognition as per AS-9 or the substantiation for the Section 68 addition. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the case was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication, giving the assessee an opportunity to present all facts and documents. The orders of the AO and CIT(A) were set aside.
The Tribunal found that the entire unsecured loan was utilized for business purposes and no personal or capital usage was established by the AO. The Tribunal concluded that the disallowance of interest under Section 36(1)(iii) was based on guesswork and directed its deletion.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal. However, it granted the assessee liberty to revive the appeal by filing a miscellaneous application if the assessee is unsuccessful in the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme for any reason.
The Tribunal held that since the loan was repaid and interest was paid after TDS, it cannot be treated as an unexplained cash credit. The court relied on the Gujarat High Court's decision in CIT vs. Ayachi Chandrashekhar Narsangji.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. It provided the assessee with the liberty to revive the appeal by filing a miscellaneous application, should their enrollment in the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme 2024 prove unsuccessful.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the Ld. CIT(A) was bad in law. Since no show cause notice was issued as per the proviso to Section 143, the intimation under Section 143(1) was unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the impugned property was not free from encumbrances, and possession was not handed over. The ownership was in litigation with tenants. Therefore, it was deemed fair and reasonable to ascertain the property's status by the AO. This would involve examining the ownership status, ongoing legal disputes, and the presence of tenants. If, after these investigations, there was a deviation between the stamp valuation and the price paid by the assessee, the matter should be referred to the DVO for valuation. The AO was directed to decide the issue afresh after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The ratio decidendi is that when a property's valuation is disputed due to encumbrances, litigation, or other factors affecting ownership, the AO must refer the matter to the DVO before making an addition under Section 56(2)(x), following established High Court precedents.
The tribunal found that the assessee was not represented in the appellate proceedings due to non-service of notices. Consequently, it restored the appeals to the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to decide them on merit after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was against an order under Section 143(1) and that verification could only be done under Section 143(3). It noted that no show cause notice was issued as per the proviso to Section 143. Therefore, the intimation under Section 143(1) was unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that while the issue of Rs. 20,76,149/- towards Sarada Trading's sundry creditors could be deleted upon furnishing evidence to the AO, the remaining amount of Rs. 14,51,991/- requires verification of payment mode or other evidence, as the provided certificate from the Chartered Accountant did not specify the repayment date.
The tribunal found that the assessee was not represented in the appellate proceedings due to non-service of notices. Consequently, it restored the appeals to the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to decide them on merit after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal found that the share capital/premium was raised from four subscribers, two of whom had their investments added to their income by the revenue, while the other two cases were accepted by the revenue. The Tribunal held that the issue of shares at a premium is a management decision and the revenue has no role in deciding the premium rate.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee consistently followed the same accounting system for years, and revenue had accepted income in summary proceedings under Section 143(1). Finding the CIT(A)'s 2% addition to be based on surmises and without reasoning, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order, directing the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned addition entirely. Consequently, the revenue's appeal became infructuous and was dismissed.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to present its case before the Ld. CIT(A). Therefore, the appeal was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of notice under Section 143(2) was mandatory for the Assessing Officer to assume jurisdiction once a return was filed in response to a Section 148 notice. Since no such notice was issued, the assessment framed without it was deemed invalid, void ab initio, and without jurisdiction, and could not be cured by Section 292BB.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after noting it was not intentional. It was held that the CIT(A) order was an ex-parte order, lacking merit discussion. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay and restored the appeal to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, subject to the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the DTPA within sixty days. Failure to pay this cost would result in the confirmation of the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the Assessing Officer was tax-neutral. Allowing the expenses in the current year would affect carry-forward losses, while disallowing them would increase the cost of work-in-progress. Given the practical difficulties in adjustments across multiple years, the appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal found that two comparables used by the TPO (Tata Elxsi and Sasken Technologies) were not functionally comparable to the assessee's software development services. The Tribunal also allowed the deduction for lease rentals and CSR expenses claimed under Section 80G, setting aside the DRP's directions.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after noting it was not intentional. It was held that the CIT(A) order was an ex-parte order, lacking merit discussion. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was invalid as the conditions precedent, specifically the failure of the assessee to disclose material information during the original assessment, were not satisfied for reopening after four years. The Tribunal relied on the Apex Court decision in ACIT Vs. CEAT Ltd.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued u/s 143(2) of the Act was not in the prescribed format as per CBDT Instruction F.No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017. Therefore, the notice was invalid, and all subsequent proceedings were void ab initio.
The Tribunal condoned the delay and admitted the appeal. In the interest of natural justice, the appeal was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer, subject to the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the Income Tax Bar Association within 60 days.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee consistently followed the same accounting system for years, and revenue had accepted income in summary proceedings under Section 143(1). Finding the CIT(A)'s 2% addition to be based on surmises and without reasoning, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order, directing the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned addition entirely. Consequently, the revenue's appeal became infructuous and was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO under section 69 was incorrect. The payment for the property was made through cheques from the assessee's bank accounts, details of which were provided to the AO and clearly indicated the source of funds.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after noting it was not intentional. It was held that the CIT(A) order was an ex-parte order, lacking merit discussion. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after noting it was not intentional. It was held that the CIT(A) order was an ex-parte order, lacking merit discussion. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte assessment and the CIT(A)'s order. It directed the Assessing Officer to restore the case to its file and decide the matter on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, ensuring natural justice.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after noting it was not intentional. It was held that the CIT(A) order was an ex-parte order, lacking merit discussion. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A)'s order was passed without considering the assessee's submissions and without providing a proper opportunity to be heard. For the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the Ld. CIT(A)'s order and remitted the case back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the provisional approval granted was sufficient for claiming exemption under Section 11, and Section 12A(ba) was not applicable for the assessment year in question. The case was remitted for recomputation of income.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued u/s 148 on 23.07.2022 was beyond the outer limit of 31.03.2022 as per the Supreme Court decision in Rajeev Bansal. Therefore, the notice and the consequential assessment order were quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. In the interest of natural justice, the issues were restored to the Assessing Officer for re-adjudication after providing the assessee an opportunity to be heard, subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal noted that both the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) orders were passed ex-parte due to the assessee's non-compliance. Considering the interest of justice and the assessee's prayer for an opportunity to substantiate its claim, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and remitted the case back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, stating that the assessee has sufficient cause. For the interest of natural justice, the appeal is restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, subject to the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 50,000/- to DTPA.
The Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity. This was conditional on the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 25,000/- to the Department within sixty days, failing which the CIT(A)'s order would be confirmed.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's assessment was based on the Supreme Court's *Union of India v. Asish Agarwal* decision, but a subsequent judgment in *Union of India v. Rajib Bansal* clarified reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the AO and CIT(A) and remanded the case to the AO for a fresh decision in light of the *Rajib Bansal* ruling.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the AO for fresh adjudication, directing the AO to admit the additional evidence filed by the assessee. Consequently, the additions for interest on loans and bogus short-term loans, totaling Rs. 32,72,986/- and Rs. 5,93,383/-, respectively, were set aside. However, the disallowance of Rs. 50,040/- under Section 14A read with Rule 8D was confirmed as the assessee did not press this ground during arguments.