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157 orders · Page 1 of 4
The Tribunal found that while Section 14A and Rule 8D provide a method for disallowance, the exercise should not be mechanical. It held that the disallowance should be restricted to Rs. 1,73,451/-, as argued by the assessee in an alternative submission.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer on account of alleged unaccounted interest and brokerage expenses paid on cash loans were not sustainable. The reasoning was based on the fact that penalty proceedings under Section 269SS, initiated for the alleged receipt of cash loans in violation of the Act, were dropped against the assessee. The assessee had successfully demonstrated in those proceedings that no such cash loans were received. Since the very foundation of the cash loans was eliminated and accepted by the department, the subsequent claim of interest and brokerage payments on these non-existent loans could not stand. The Tribunal applied the legal maxim 'sublato fundamento cadit opus'. Accordingly, the impugned additions were ordered to be deleted. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer on account of alleged unaccounted interest and brokerage expenses paid on cash loans were not sustainable. The reasoning was based on the fact that penalty proceedings under Section 269SS, initiated for the alleged receipt of cash loans in violation of the Act, were dropped against the assessee. The assessee had successfully demonstrated in those proceedings that no such cash loans were received. Since the very foundation of the cash loans was eliminated and accepted by the department, the subsequent claim of interest and brokerage payments on these non-existent loans could not stand. The Tribunal applied the legal maxim 'sublato fundamento cadit opus'. Accordingly, the impugned additions were ordered to be deleted. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities were not justified in restricting the deduction. They followed various High Court decisions stating that deduction under Section 54F cannot be denied merely because the property is purchased in joint names, especially with a legal heir.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Considering the interests of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient documentation to prove the genuineness of the expenditure, considering the nature of business and the limits of evidence a normal business entity can maintain. The disallowance was deemed unwarranted.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal, finding that the assessee's case was squarely covered by a previous judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. The Tribunal noted that the trust deed clearly showed the assessee was formed solely for educational purposes and that expenses were incurred for running the school.
The Tribunal restored the gratuity provision issue to the Assessing Officer for verification of the double disallowance. The issue of delayed PF/ESI contributions was dismissed as not pressed in one appeal, but deleted in another due to lack of incriminating material in a 153C assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding that the assessee had a fair case on merits. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment to provide the assessee an opportunity to present its case.
On the issue of provision for gratuity (Rs.73,65,644/-), the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer (AO) to verify the assessee's contention of inadvertent double disallowance. If confirmed, the AO is directed to assess income by disallowing only the amount liable under the relevant provisions, giving the assessee benefit of any excess disallowance. Regarding delayed PF/ESI contributions (Rs.20,76,540/- for AY 2017-18), the assessee did not press the ground, accepting the Hon'ble Supreme Court's verdict in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT. Thus, this ground was dismissed as not pressed. For the Rs.76,371/- addition under section 153C (AY 2017-18), the Tribunal deleted the addition, finding no evidence in the assessment order to establish that the cash amount was received by M/s. Sunny Chemical Pvt. Ltd. from the assessee, and noting the assessee's categorical denial. The Rs.20,76,540/- addition for delayed PF/ESI contributions in the section 153C assessment (AY 2017-18) was dismissed as not relating to incriminating material found during search, as it was an amount already assessed in the section 143(3) assessment. For the Rs.7,32,646/- addition for delayed PF/ESI contributions under section 153C (AY 2018-19), the Tribunal deleted the addition, holding that no incriminating material was found in the search action, and the issue was already decided in favour of the assessee by a prior ITAT order. The Tribunal noted that the prior ITAT order in ITA No.180/Kol/2022 for AY 2018-19 would prevail.
On the issue of provision for gratuity (Ground No. 1 in ITA No. 944/Kol/2024 and Ground No. 3 in ITA No. 43/Kol/2024), the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer (AO). The AO was directed to verify the assessee's contention of inadvertent double disallowance. If confirmed, the AO was to assess the income by disallowing only the amount liable under the relevant provisions, giving the assessee the benefit of any excess amount inadvertently disallowed. Regarding the delayed deposit of employees' contributions to PF and ESI (Ground No. 2 in ITA No. 944/Kol/2024 and Ground No. 4 in ITA No. 43/Kol/2024), the assessee did not press the ground, acknowledging the Supreme Court's decision in *Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd.*, and the ground was dismissed as not pressed. For the addition of Rs. 76,371/- under Section 153C (Grounds 1 & 2 in ITA No. 43/Kol/2024), the Tribunal found no evidence in the assessment order to establish that the cash payment was from the assessee to M/s. Sunny Chemical Pvt. Ltd., especially since the assessee denied any such transaction. The addition was held unsustainable and ordered to be deleted. Concerning the delayed deposit of employees' contributions to PF and ESI for AY 2018-19 under Section 153C (Ground 2 in ITA No. 44/Kol/2024), the Tribunal noted that no incriminating material was found during the search related to this issue, and the issue was already decided in favour of the assessee by a previous ITAT order. Therefore, the addition was not sustainable and ordered to be deleted. The issue of AO's authority under Section 153C without incriminating material was implicitly decided in favour of the assessee by deleting additions made under this section where no such material was found.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer. The assessee is directed to furnish a bank certificate confirming the interest payment before the due date of filing the return. The AO will consider this certificate and allow the claim if found correct.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's income from deposits with banks for non-agricultural purposes was not eligible for deduction under Section 80P, as it did not qualify as a primary agricultural credit society. The issue of demonetization deposits was not elaborated in the provided text.
The Tribunal held that a valid search conducted on the assessee under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 153A. The Tribunal referred to the Special Bench decision in C. Ramaiah Reddy v. Asstt. CIT (Inv.) which held that the Tribunal needs to satisfy itself that a search was indeed conducted with reference to the assessee in question, and it should not merely have been initiated but conducted. In the present case, although a warrant of authorization was issued in the name of the assessee, the premises searched belonged to a partner, and the assessee was not found at those premises. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's business premises at Asansol were not entered upon and searched by the authorized officer, and a mere mention of the name in the Panchnama does not prove a valid search was conducted against the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the assessments made under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A as null and void, directing the Assessing Officer to cancel them. The issue related to the validity of the search was allowed. The Tribunal also noted that this decision was confirmed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. J. M. Trading Corpn.
The Tribunal held that the assessment framed by the AO was invalid and bad in law due to lack of jurisdiction and non-application of mind to the assessee's explanations. The notices were also found to be issued in violation of procedural requirements and limitations.
The Tribunal held that a valid search conducted on the assessee under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 153A. The Tribunal referred to the Special Bench decision in C. Ramaiah Reddy v. Asstt. CIT (Inv.) which held that the Tribunal needs to satisfy itself that a search was indeed conducted with reference to the assessee in question, and it should not merely have been initiated but conducted. In the present case, although a warrant of authorization was issued in the name of the assessee, the premises searched belonged to a partner, and the assessee was not found at those premises. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's business premises at Asansol were not entered upon and searched by the authorized officer, and a mere mention of the name in the Panchnama does not prove a valid search was conducted against the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the assessments made under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A as null and void, directing the Assessing Officer to cancel them. The issue related to the validity of the search was allowed. The Tribunal also noted that this decision was confirmed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. J. M. Trading Corpn.
The Tribunal held that a valid search conducted on the assessee under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 153A. The Tribunal referred to the Special Bench decision in C. Ramaiah Reddy v. Asstt. CIT (Inv.) which held that the Tribunal needs to satisfy itself that a search was indeed conducted with reference to the assessee in question, and it should not merely have been initiated but conducted. In the present case, although a warrant of authorization was issued in the name of the assessee, the premises searched belonged to a partner, and the assessee was not found at those premises. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's business premises at Asansol were not entered upon and searched by the authorized officer, and a mere mention of the name in the Panchnama does not prove a valid search was conducted against the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the assessments made under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A as null and void, directing the Assessing Officer to cancel them. The issue related to the validity of the search was allowed. The Tribunal also noted that this decision was confirmed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. J. M. Trading Corpn.
The Tribunal held that a valid search conducted on the assessee under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 153A. The Tribunal referred to the Special Bench decision in C. Ramaiah Reddy v. Asstt. CIT (Inv.) which held that the Tribunal needs to satisfy itself that a search was indeed conducted with reference to the assessee in question, and it should not merely have been initiated but conducted. In the present case, although a warrant of authorization was issued in the name of the assessee, the premises searched belonged to a partner, and the assessee was not found at those premises. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's business premises at Asansol were not entered upon and searched by the authorized officer, and a mere mention of the name in the Panchnama does not prove a valid search was conducted against the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the assessments made under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A as null and void, directing the Assessing Officer to cancel them. The issue related to the validity of the search was allowed. The Tribunal also noted that this decision was confirmed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. J. M. Trading Corpn.
The Tribunal held that a valid search conducted on the assessee under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 153A. The Tribunal referred to the Special Bench decision in C. Ramaiah Reddy v. Asstt. CIT (Inv.) which held that the Tribunal needs to satisfy itself that a search was indeed conducted with reference to the assessee in question, and it should not merely have been initiated but conducted. In the present case, although a warrant of authorization was issued in the name of the assessee, the premises searched belonged to a partner, and the assessee was not found at those premises. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's business premises at Asansol were not entered upon and searched by the authorized officer, and a mere mention of the name in the Panchnama does not prove a valid search was conducted against the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the assessments made under Section 143(3) read with Section 153A as null and void, directing the Assessing Officer to cancel them. The issue related to the validity of the search was allowed. The Tribunal also noted that this decision was confirmed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. J. M. Trading Corpn.
The Tribunal held that the assessment framed by the AO was invalid and bad in law due to lack of jurisdiction and non-application of mind to the assessee's explanations. The notices were also found to be issued in violation of procedural requirements and limitations.
The Tribunal found that both lower authorities made additions without properly appreciating the facts. The reopening of assessment was deemed bad in law, and the additions were not sustainable on merits.
The Tribunal held that the advance was indeed a deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e). However, it should be restricted to the accumulated profits of the company, which was Rs. 4,49,441/-.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to obtain a DVO's report for property valuation, which is mandatory for determining capital gains and for issues under Section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). The Tribunal also directed the AO to ascertain independent assessment of co-owners.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 67 should not preclude the assessee from claiming foreign tax credit, as the DTAA provisions override the Act and grant a vested right. The AO is directed to allow the foreign tax credit.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and restored the matter for fresh decision. The CIT(E) was directed to provide the trust an opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the onus under Section 68 of the Act to prove the genuineness of the share capital transaction. The inquiries revealed that some share subscribers were untraceable, and others lacked the financial capacity for such investments.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's error in filing under clause (iii) instead of clause (i) was a technical one, especially since the assessee was an existing trust. The Tribunal followed previous decisions that such technical errors should not lead to rejection of the application.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeals. This was because the assessee had filed a fresh application for registration under the extended due date as per the CBDT circular, rendering the current appeals infructuous.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeals. This was because the assessee had filed a fresh application for registration under the extended due date as per the CBDT circular, rendering the current appeals infructuous.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had demonstrated sufficient cash in hand from pre-demonetization withdrawals and existing cash balance to explain the deposits. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemption) erred in rejecting the application based on the commencement of activities prior to provisional approval. The application for final approval is to be considered from the date of provisional approval.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cash in hand, as evidenced by her balance sheet and prior withdrawals, to explain the cash deposit. Therefore, the addition made by the lower authorities was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was valid as the assessee had not filed a return and there was information about a significant investment. However, on merits, the Tribunal found that the assessee had provided sufficient explanation for the investment through his business activities and accumulated funds.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to file necessary evidence and documents, and the CIT(A) was asked to obtain a remand report from the AO if additional evidence was filed.
The Tribunal held that the addition was made without substantive basis and that Section 14A is not applicable if no exempt income is derived. The CIT(A) also failed to consider the assessee's submissions.
The Tribunal held that for the purpose of computing book profit under Section 115JB, accounts must be prepared in accordance with the Companies Act, which does not provide for the benefit of indexation. The capital gains, therefore, should be included in book profit without indexation.
The Tribunal held that the issue was squarely covered by a coordinate bench's decision, which allowed the appeal due to a technical error in procedure and directed the CIT(Exemption) to consider the application.
The Tribunal held that Section 143(1)(a)(v) of the Act, as it stood prior to amendment, did not disallow deduction under Section 80P for belatedly filed returns. Section 80AC was considered outside the purview of Section 143(1)(a).
The Tribunal held that the assessee had fully disclosed particulars of the capital gain and that the AO failed to demonstrate that the claim was false or bogus. The penalty was deleted, relying on the principle that if particulars are disclosed, penalty is not leviable even if the disclosure is not accepted by the revenue.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the need to advance substantial justice and the liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause'. The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a villager unfamiliar with procedures, had shown a plausible reason for the delay.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) order was indeed ex-parte. To ensure justice, the Tribunal decided to remand the issue back to the CIT(A) for a fresh examination after providing a proper hearing opportunity.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the potential lack of proper opportunity for the assessee. The matter was set aside to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to re-examine the claim under Section 80P, consider the disallowance under Section 36(1)(va) within the ambit of Section 80P, and ensure TDS credit is allowed. Interest under Sections 234B and 234C would be consequential.
The Tribunal found that a previous ITAT order in ITA No. 382/KOL/2021 had confirmed the AO's order in favor of the assessee. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s subsequent order on the same issue was considered infructuous.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order despite notices being served, as the assessee's representative did not appear properly. In the interest of justice, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh examination.
The Tribunal, following a coordinate bench's decision, held that the rejection was due to a technical error arising from procedural changes. The application was directed to be considered as filed under the correct provision, subject to verification of prior approval.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's bank account did not reflect the impugned amount. Considering the totality of facts, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that it does not have the power to condone the delay in filing returns, directing the assessee to seek condonation from the Board under Section 119(2). However, it allowed the deduction of expenditure incurred by the assessee, even if the exemption under Section 11 was denied due to late filing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), considering the COVID-19 pandemic period. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct independent investigations and rejected the loss claim based on surmises and statements of unrelated entry operators. The Tribunal found no adverse material against the assessee.