ITAT Hyderabad Judgments — October 2026

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 29.07.2022, for Assessment Year 2014-15, is bad in law and quashed. The reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. The Tribunal noted that the period of limitation for issuing the notice under Section 148, even after considering the extension provided by TOLA, expired on 30.06.2021 for AY 2014-15. The facts indicated that the reply to the show-cause notice under Section 148A(b) was received on 18.06.2022. The surviving period was only 3 days, which, by virtue of the fourth proviso to Section 149(1), was extended to 7 days, expiring on 25.06.2022. Therefore, the Assessing Officer ought to have issued the Section 148 notice by 25.06.2022. Since the notice was issued on 29.07.2022, it was beyond the permissible time limit. The Tribunal relied on its coordinate bench's decision in Sanjay Kumar Bhutra vs. ITO, which followed the principles laid down in Rajeev Bansal. The ratio decidendi is that reassessment notices issued beyond the time limit surviving under the Income Tax Act read with TOLA are time-barred and liable to be set aside. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee was allowed on the legal ground, and the notice issued under Section 148 and subsequent proceedings were declared void.

The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. Regarding the jurisdiction of the AO and the validity of the Section 148 notice, the Tribunal noted that this issue is sub-judice before various High Courts due to amendments to Section 147A of the Act. Since the matter has not reached finality, the Tribunal chose not to adjudicate this legal ground at this stage. The grounds of appeal on this issue were kept open to be decided later, with liberty to restore the appeal if the High Court decision warrants it. Therefore, this issue was not decided on merits. 2. Regarding the addition of Rs. 27,57,200, the Tribunal held that once the assessee established the source of cash deposits as sale proceeds of property by his father, the addition cannot be made merely on the ground of a time gap between the sale and the deposit. The AO had accepted the source of funds from property sale to a certain extent. The Tribunal relied on CIT v. Ashok Kumar ([2010] 320 ITR 561 (P&H)) and CIT v. Shri Kulwant Rai ([2007] 291 ITR 36 (Delhi)) which state that an explanation cannot be rejected solely on suspicion or a time gap if the source is established and there is no material showing the cash was utilized elsewhere. The Tribunal found that the AO erred in making an addition of Rs. 23,95,000 out of the disputed amount, as the source was established as property sale. However, for the remaining Rs. 3,62,200, which the assessee claimed as out of agricultural income and pension, no evidence was filed. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 3,62,200 was confirmed. The operative direction was to delete the addition of Rs. 23,95,000 and confirm the addition of Rs. 3,62,200.

The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) for AY 2019-20, which was 869 days, was due to a bona fide medical emergency of the accountant, supported by medical records. This constituted 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay, aligning with the principles of substantial justice as laid down in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and M/s. Meridian Promoters (P) Ltd. v. DCIT. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits. Regarding the denial of exemption under Section 11 for non-filing of the audit report in Form 10B, the Tribunal, following the decision in Vagdevi Educational Society v. ITO, held that if exemption under Section 11 is denied, the income should be computed under normal commercial principles, allowing for expenditure incurred to earn income. Since the assessee reported a loss (excess of expenditure over income) for AY 2019-20, the AO was directed to recompute the income by considering the financial statements and taxing only the excess of income over expenditure, if any. The same reasoning was applied to AY 2020-21, where the delay in filing the appeal was condoned by the CIT(A) but the addition was upheld. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the issue to the AO for recomputation. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) for AY 2019-20, which was 869 days, was due to a bona fide medical emergency of the accountant, supported by medical records. This constituted 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay, aligning with the principles of substantial justice as laid down in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and M/s. Meridian Promoters (P) Ltd. v. DCIT. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits. Regarding the denial of exemption under Section 11 for non-filing of the audit report in Form 10B, the Tribunal, following the decision in Vagdevi Educational Society v. ITO, held that if exemption under Section 11 is denied, the income should be computed under normal commercial principles, allowing for expenditure incurred to earn income. Since the assessee reported a loss (excess of expenditure over income) for AY 2019-20, the AO was directed to recompute the income by considering the financial statements and taxing only the excess of income over expenditure, if any. The same reasoning was applied to AY 2020-21, where the delay in filing the appeal was condoned by the CIT(A) but the addition was upheld. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the issue to the AO for recomputation. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee had not participated in the proceedings before the CIT(A) despite being afforded multiple opportunities. However, the Tribunal also noted the settled legal position that even in cases of non-prosecution, an appellate authority has a duty to dispose of the appeal based on a speaking and reasoned order, addressing the specific grounds raised. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the CIT(A) had failed to adjudicate specific grounds of appeal, namely, the AO's failure to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard under Section 144, and the incorrect application of Section 69A to business receipts. While concurring with the CIT(A)'s decision to proceed ex-parte due to non-participation, the Tribunal held that the failure to deal with these specific grounds rendered the CIT(A)'s order unsustainable. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the CIT(A) with a direction to re-adjudicate the appeal after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and passing a reasoned order. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not made any observations on the merits of the case, leaving those to be decided by the CIT(A). The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that while there was no dispute that the company paid the assessee's self-assessment tax and that the assessee was a shareholder holding more than 40% equity in M/s. Vital Therapeutics Private Limited, the crucial fact was that the amount was repaid through the director's current account within the same financial year, leaving no debit balance at the year-end. The Tribunal found that these transactions, being in the ordinary course of business for self-assessment tax payment and repaid promptly within the financial year, could not be considered a loan or deposit within the meaning of Section 2(22)(e). The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the ITAT, Chennai Bench in V. Sriram (HUF) v. ACIT, which held that if loan transactions are in the ordinary course of business and squared up within the same financial year, they cannot be treated as loans or deposits under Section 2(22)(e). Consequently, the AO was not justified in treating the transaction as deemed dividend. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the additions made by the AO were deleted.

The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 270A for AY 2019-20 was incorrect. The assessee had a bona fide belief regarding the taxability of capital gains and promptly disclosed them in the revised return. The voluntary withdrawal of the Section 54F deduction and payment of taxes indicated under-reporting, not misreporting. The Tribunal noted that the assessee fulfilled substantial conditions for immunity under Section 270AA by paying taxes and not filing an appeal, and the delay in filing Form 68 was a procedural lapse that could be cured. Therefore, immunity should have been provided, and the penalty deleted. For AY 2020-21, the facts and issues were identical, with capital gains disclosed in the revised return and accepted by the AO. The Tribunal applied the same reasoning, setting aside the CIT(A)'s order and deleting the penalty. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed to have entered into an agreement with M/s. Building Blocks Properties LLP for project sales, which was later cancelled. The assessee had furnished relevant agreements and details of commissions paid to various parties, including party-wise amounts and TDS deducted, which were available in the Paper Book. The Tribunal found that the assessee had also filed details of commission paid directly. However, it was not clear from the orders of the lower authorities whether these evidences were filed before the AO and CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal held that the issue needed to be re-examined by the AO in light of the various evidences filed by the assessee. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the issue back to the file of the AO, directing the AO to re-examine the issue and the assessee's contentions regarding the applicability of Section 69C, and decide the matter as per law.

The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds of appeal as they were purely legal and went to the root of the matter, requiring no fresh factual inquiry, relying on National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT. Regarding the first issue, the Tribunal held that the assessment order dated 27.04.2024 was barred by limitation. The Tribunal analyzed Section 153(1) read with Explanation (1)(xii), noting that the period of exclusion for handing over books of account could not extend the limitation period beyond 31.03.2024. The Tribunal calculated that the AO had time until 31.03.2024 to pass the order, but passed it on 27.04.2024, thus quashing the assessment order. Consequently, the Tribunal held that other grounds raised by the assessee, including the validity of assessment under Section 147 and the additions made under Sections 69A and 69C, became academic and were dismissed as infructuous. The appeal was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Act, dated 31.03.2021, was issued on 16.04.2021. As this date falls after the effective date of the amendments brought about by the Finance Act, 2021 (w.e.f. 01.04.2021), the procedure prescribed under Section 148A of the Act, including conducting an inquiry and providing an opportunity of being heard, was mandatory before issuing the notice under Section 148. The Tribunal noted that the AO had failed to comply with these statutory requirements. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Ashish Agrawal, the Tribunal concluded that the AO had wrongly assumed jurisdiction and framed the assessment without following the mandatory procedure. Therefore, the assessment framed by the AO was quashed for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Tribunal refrained from adjudicating the other grounds of appeal, which were left open. The appeal was allowed in terms of these observations.

The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 271B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, cannot survive when the underlying assessment proceedings under Section 147 have been quashed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order was indeed quashed as being barred by limitation due to an invalid notice under Section 148, rendering the assessment proceedings void ab initio and non-est. The Tribunal reasoned that to initiate any penalty proceedings, there must be valid proceedings before the AO under the Act. Without such proceedings, the AO cannot independently initiate penalty proceedings, even if the penalty is considered independent of the assessment itself. The Tribunal distinguished the case relied upon by the Revenue, Naresh Kumar Vs. ITO, stating that in that case, the AO had validly levied penalty pursuant to valid assessment proceedings. In the present case, the assessment proceedings being invalid and non-est, the penalty under Section 271B for not obtaining an audit report under Section 44AB is not sustainable. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and deleted the penalty.

The Tribunal held that there was a justifiable reason for the assessee-appellant's delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The assessee had initially decided not to contest the assessment order dated March 22, 2024, and had paid the demand. However, the subsequent rectification order under Section 154 dated September 4, 2025, significantly revised the tax liability, prompting the assessee, upon professional advice, to file an appeal. The Tribunal opined that the CIT(A), by adopting a justice-oriented and liberal approach, ought to have condoned the delay. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to his file with a direction to condone the delay and decide the appeal on its specific grounds on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the applications without providing sufficient opportunity to the assessee. While acknowledging the assessee's failure to furnish the requested information and documents, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's plea that reasons beyond their control prevented compliance. The Tribunal reasoned that the applications needed to be considered based on relevant information and documents. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee. The orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, with a clear direction for the assessee to furnish all required information and documents. The CIT(E) was directed to decide the applications afresh after hearing the assessee. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the applications without providing sufficient opportunity to the assessee. While acknowledging the assessee's failure to furnish the requested information and documents, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's plea that reasons beyond their control prevented compliance. The Tribunal reasoned that the applications needed to be considered based on relevant information and documents. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee. The orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the matters were restored to the file of the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, with a clear direction for the assessee to furnish all required information and documents. The CIT(E) was directed to decide the applications afresh after hearing the assessee. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal decided the appeal partly allowing it for statistical purposes. On the procedural grounds, the Tribunal did not provide a specific finding on each of the numerous grounds related to the validity of the assessment and notices, implying that the substantive issues were addressed. Regarding capital gains on the Development Agreement, the Tribunal allowed grounds 15.13 and 15.14, restoring the matter to the AO to determine if GST forms part of the full value of consideration and whether the assessee is entitled to a consequential reduction. The AO was directed to ensure no double taxation of GST. Grounds 15.15 and 15.16 concerning amenity charges were also allowed, restoring the matter to the AO to examine if these charges were an obligation of the society, incurred in connection with the transfer, and if they were already included in the FVC, to avoid double addition. Ground 16, regarding credit for taxes paid by members, was allowed, directing the AO to verify the claim and determine the extent of credit allowable to the society. Ground 18 was dismissed as it did not emanate from the impugned order. Ground 19 concerning dividend income was allowed, restoring the matter to the AO to examine the nature of the investment and determine exemption under section 10(35). Finally, ground 20 regarding interest under sections 234B and 234C was allowed, directing the AO to recompute the interest liability. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide on the issue of whether capital gains are chargeable in the hands of members versus the society (Grounds 14.1 to 14.5) or the specific applicability of section 2(47)(v)/(vi) and the determination of FVC under various sub-grounds of Ground 15, as these were either implicitly covered by the directions to the AO or not specifically addressed in the excerpt.

The Tribunal quashed the assessment order dated 07/03/2024 passed by the AO under Section 147 r.w.s 144 r.w.s 144B of the Act. The Tribunal found that for Assessment Year 2018-19, since the notice under Section 148 was issued on 13.04.2022, which was beyond three years from the end of the assessment year, the AO was statutorily obligated to obtain approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, or Chief Commissioner or Director General, as per Section 151(ii) of the Act. However, the AO obtained approval from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, an authority not vested with the requisite jurisdiction. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's contention that the proviso to Section 151, inserted by the Finance Act, 2023, should be applied retrospectively to exclude the period of reply to the Section 148A(b) notice. The Tribunal relied on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in LinkedIn Singapore Pte. Ltd. and a Hon'ble High Court order. Consequently, the assessment was deemed bad in law for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction. The Tribunal refrained from adjudicating other contentions, leaving them open. The appeal was allowed.

The Tribunal first addressed the delay in filing the appeal. It condoned the 156-day delay, citing the assessee's age (71 years), serious illness (liver transplantation in 2022), and the fact that notices from the CIT(A) were not validly served as per the assessee's opted mode of communication. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Vidya Shankar Jaiswal vs. ITO, advocating for a justice-oriented and liberal approach. On the merits, the Tribunal found that the notice issued under section 148 dated 04.04.2022 for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation as per the first proviso to section 149 of the Act, as amended by the Finance Act, 2021. The Tribunal followed the Bombay High Court's decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. and Godrej Industries Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, holding that the fifth and sixth provisos to section 149(1)(b) extend the general limitation period but cannot override the restriction imposed by the first proviso. Since the notice was issued beyond the 6-year period prescribed by the first proviso, it was held to be invalid. Consequently, the assessment order passed under section 147 r.w.s 144B, based on this invalid notice, was quashed for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction. Other contentions were left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 270A for AY 2019-20 was incorrect. The assessee had a bona fide belief regarding the taxability of capital gains and promptly disclosed them in the revised return. The voluntary withdrawal of the Section 54F deduction and payment of taxes indicated under-reporting, not misreporting. The Tribunal noted that the assessee fulfilled substantial conditions for immunity under Section 270AA by paying taxes and not filing an appeal, and the delay in filing Form 68 was a procedural lapse that could be cured. Therefore, immunity should have been provided, and the penalty deleted. For AY 2020-21, the facts and issues were identical, with capital gains disclosed in the revised return and accepted by the AO. The Tribunal applied the same reasoning, setting aside the CIT(A)'s order and deleting the penalty. The appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 52 days in filing the appeal, holding that the delay was due to bona fide reasons and an inadvertent mistake, adopting a justice-oriented and liberal approach as per the Supreme Court's decision in Vidya Shankar Jaiswal vs. ITO. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal found that the assessee's claim that the VSVS, 2024 was opted for regarding the penalty and not the quantum assessment, and that the CIT(A) had misconstrued the submission dated 01/05/2025, was not discernible from the record. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the matter to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to verify the correct factual position. If the assessee's claim is found correct, the CIT(A) is to restore the appeal and dispose of it on merits, dealing with the specific contentions raised by the assessee against the assessment order. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal quashed the assessment order passed by the AO under Section 147 r.w.s 144 r.w.s. 144B of the Act, dated 10.01.2024, for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction. The primary reason for this decision was that the notice issued by the AO under Section 148 of the Act, dated 09.04.2022, was found to be barred by limitation as per the mandate of the 'first proviso' to Section 149 of the Act, as amended by the Finance Act, 2021. The Tribunal relied on judicial pronouncements, including those from the Bombay High Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. and Godrej Industries Ltd., which clarified that the first proviso to Section 149 restricts the issuance of notices under Section 148 for assessment years up to 2021-22 beyond a certain date, and subsequent provisos (fifth and sixth) cannot extend this restriction. Since the notice was issued beyond the period prescribed by the first proviso, it was deemed invalid. Consequently, the assessment order passed based on this invalid notice had to be quashed. The Tribunal explicitly stated that as the assessment order was quashed for want of jurisdiction, it refrained from adjudicating the other contentions raised by the assessee, leaving them open. The appeal was allowed in terms of these observations.

The Tribunal acknowledged that the AO made an addition of Rs. 2,79,92,816/- under section 68 for unexplained unsecured loans due to the assessee's failure to establish the identity, creditworthiness of lenders, and genuineness of transactions. It was also noted that the assessee remained non-compliant before both the AO and the CIT(A), despite opportunities and notices. However, considering the nature of the addition and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to substantiate their claim. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication on merits. The AO was directed to reconsider the issue after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was directed to pay a nominal cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the ITAT Bar Association, Hyderabad, for repeated non-compliance. The assessee was also directed to file all relevant details and evidence as called for by the AO.

The Tribunal, while considering the contentions and the orders of the authorities below, noted that the assessee, in her affidavit, claimed to have received a cash advance of Rs. 20 lakhs on 15/11/2016 for the sale of property, which was used to source cash deposits of Rs. 16,31,453/- made on 18/11/2016. The purchaser, Shri Lodangi Govardhan, also filed an affidavit confirming the cash payment of Rs. 20 lakhs as advance sale consideration on 15/11/2016. The assessee also claimed the AO wrongly took the cash deposits at Rs. 32,62,906/- instead of Rs. 16,31,453/-. Since these claims and supporting documents (additional evidence) were not before the lower authorities, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the AO. The AO was directed to re-adjudicate the case after considering the assessee's claims regarding the amount of cash deposits and their source, in light of the additional evidence. The Tribunal also observed that while the affidavits inspire confidence regarding the date of receipt of cash advance, the AO should carry out necessary verifications to dispel doubts regarding the veracity of the claim.

The Tribunal considered the submission made by the assessee's AR seeking withdrawal of the appeal. The AR had placed on record a letter dated 24/09/2026 requesting the withdrawal. The Revenue's DR did not object to this request. In light of these facts, the Tribunal granted liberty to the assessee-appellant to withdraw the captioned appeal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original order under challenge, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish a sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 402 days. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's explanation, attributing the delay to the accountant's failure to monitor the income-tax portal and email, was not substantiated by any relevant documentary evidence, such as an affidavit or confirmation from the accountant. Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in P.K. Ramachandran, Basawaraj & Anr., and Pathapati Subba Reddy, the Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay requires a satisfactory explanation supported by evidence, and mere attribution of delay to another party without corroboration is insufficient. The Tribunal reiterated that the law of limitation is based on public policy and cannot be extended on equitable or sympathetic grounds, especially in cases of negligence or lack of due diligence. Since the assessee did not demonstrate sufficient cause, the petition for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. No issue regarding the merits of the case was decided.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish a sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 300 days. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's explanation for the delay was inconsistent, with one part attributing it to the accountant's failure to monitor the portal and the other to the accountant advising against filing an appeal. Furthermore, these assertions were unsupported by any documentary evidence or an affidavit from the accountant. Citing pronouncements from the Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases like P.K. Ramachandran and Basawaraj & Anr., the Tribunal emphasized that the law of limitation must be applied with rigor and that delay cannot be condoned on equitable or sympathetic grounds without a satisfactory explanation. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee's explanation was neither cogent nor convincing, and the delay was not due to circumstances beyond his control. Consequently, the petition for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.

The Tribunal noted that the fundamental principle under the mercantile system of accounting is that an expenditure is allowable in the year the liability accrues or crystallizes. Regarding the addition of Rs. 9,74,90,000 as prior period expenditure under Section 37(1), the Tribunal found that the precise details regarding the nature of the expenditure, the date of liability determination, invoice raising, and crystallization were not sufficiently clear. Therefore, this issue was restored to the file of the AO for verification of the actual date of crystallization of the liability. The assessee is to furnish complete particulars and supporting documentary evidence. If the AO finds that the liability crystallized during the current year, the expenditure will be allowed; otherwise, it will be dealt with according to law. The Tribunal also noted that grounds of appeal 12 & 13 (related to this issue) were allowed for statistical purposes. The judgment does not explicitly record findings on issues 1, 2, and 3, but the overall result indicates that the appeal was partly allowed, implying some relief was granted or issues were remanded.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was not passed in conformity with the binding directions of the Ld. DRP. The DRP had explicitly directed the AO to ensure that the interest expenditure already disallowed by the assessee under section 94B was not disallowed again. The AO's failure to implement this direction, by making the full transfer pricing adjustment without accounting for the section 94B disallowance, rendered the assessment order unsustainable. The Tribunal quashed the assessment order on this ground and restored the matter to the AO to give effect to the DRP's directions. Regarding the benchmarking of interest on CCDs denominated in Indian currency, the Tribunal followed the Special Bench decision in Hyderabad Infratech Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT, holding that PLR should be applied against LIBOR. The AO was directed to recompute the transfer pricing adjustment accordingly. Issues related to set-off of brought forward losses, book profit computation under section 115JB, and TDS credit were also restored to the AO for verification and re-adjudication in accordance with law.

The Tribunal held that the interests of justice would be better served by granting the assessee an opportunity to present their case before the CIT(A). The Tribunal acknowledged the delay in filing the appeal and, to address the negligence on the part of the assessee, directed the assessee to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the 'Prime Minister National Relief Fund'. The delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was condoned subject to this deposit. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to furnish proof of deposit to the CIT(A) before the appeal is decided on merits. The Tribunal considered the appeal to be allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the interests of justice would be better served by giving the assessee an opportunity to present his case before the Assessing Officer. The delay of 138 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was condoned, subject to the assessee depositing a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the Prime Minister National Relief Fund as costs. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication on merits after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing. The assessee was directed to furnish proof of deposit to the AO, who was then directed to verify it and decide the appeal afresh. The appeal was treated as allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 55 days in filing the appeal, finding sufficient cause due to the assessee's Chikungunya infection, supported by medical records. Regarding the penalty under Section 270A, the Tribunal noted that the quantum appeal for the same assessment year had been set aside by the Tribunal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. Citing its own order in ITA.No.318/Hyd./2025, where the quantum appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication after observing that the assessee was deprived of an opportunity to present their case, the Tribunal held that the penalty levied under Section 270A would not survive. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) against the penalty order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after the outcome of the quantum proceedings. The assessee was to be given an appropriate opportunity of being heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 26.04.2022, was barred by limitation. This was based on the fact that the notice was issued beyond the period of six years from the end of the Assessment Year 2015-2016. The Tribunal followed the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Cyberabad Citizens Health Services Private Limited vs. DCIT and this Tribunal's decision in Sudheer Parimala vs. ITO, as well as the Supreme Court's judgment in ITO vs. Sai Kumar Mateti. The ratio is that a notice issued under Section 148 after the expiry of six years from the end of the assessment year is not valid and is liable to be quashed. Consequently, the reassessment order passed by the Assessing Officer was also vitiated and quashed. The other grounds raised by the assessee were rendered infructuous. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had correctly upheld the rejection of the assessee's books of account under Section 145(3) of the Act. The CIT(A) found that the assessee had not maintained proper books of account, the audit report was inordinately delayed and prepared after the notice under Section 148, and crucial supporting documents like bills and vouchers were not furnished. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had concluded that the audited accounts and profits returned by the assessee were unreliable due to the lack of evidence for substantial expenses claimed. However, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not provided any specific finding on the justification for the AO's estimation of income at 30%. The Tribunal observed that the AO had applied the 30% rate arbitrarily without any basis, comparable case, or consideration of prevailing profit rates. While Section 44AD was not directly applicable, its presumptive rate of 8% was considered as a guidance. To bring the litigation to an end and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal directed the AO to estimate the net profit at 10% of the total turnover. The addition, if any, was to be made accordingly for the respective assessment years.

The Tribunal held that the compensation received by the assessee from BSNL under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme – 2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the Addl. JCIT(A) had dismissed the appeal on technical grounds (delay and classification as a workman) without deciding the merits of the exemption claim. The Tribunal relied on numerous judicial precedents from various Benches of the ITAT and the jurisdictional High Court, which consistently held that compensation received by BSNL employees under the VRS-2019 scheme is akin to retrenchment compensation and eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B). The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify the claim and allow the exemption under Section 10(10B), and consequently determine the tax payable/refundable, including interest under Section 244A. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the ex-gratia compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted a consistent view taken by various Coordinate Benches of the Tribunal across the country, holding that such compensation is akin to retrenchment compensation and qualifies for exemption under Section 10(10B), especially in light of the second proviso to the section. The Tribunal followed decisions in cases like Raghavendra Latha Madhavi & 3 Others vs. ITO and Shri Sekar Gnanaprakasam Vs. DCIT. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify the assessee's claim in light of these findings and allow the exemption under Section 10(10B), thereafter determining the tax payable or refundable and granting interest under Section 244A where admissible. The issue of capital receipt was not explicitly decided but subsumed within the Section 10(10B) exemption.

The Tribunal held that the ex-gratia compensation received by the assessee under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted a consistent view taken by various Coordinate Benches of the Tribunal across the country, holding that such compensation is akin to retrenchment compensation and qualifies for exemption under Section 10(10B), especially in light of the second proviso to the section. The Tribunal followed decisions in cases like Raghavendra Latha Madhavi & 3 Others vs. ITO and Shri Sekar Gnanaprakasam Vs. DCIT. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify the assessee's claim in light of these findings and allow the exemption under Section 10(10B), thereafter determining the tax payable or refundable and granting interest under Section 244A where admissible. The issue of capital receipt was not explicitly decided but subsumed within the Section 10(10B) exemption.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 55 days in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) subject to a cost of Rs. 5,000/- for each appeal, totaling Rs. 10,000/-, to be paid to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund. The Tribunal held that the notice issued by the Assessing Officer under Section 148 of the Act on 01.04.2022 was invalid and void because it was issued without obtaining prior approval from the prescribed authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in ACIT (International Taxation) vs. LinkedIn Singapore Pte Ltd. and the Telangana High Court in Deloitte Consulting India Private Limited. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's contention based on Section 292BC, stating that it does not cure defects relating to the competence of the authority granting approval. Consequently, the reassessment order passed under Section 147 r.w.s. 144B was also held to be unsustainable and liable to be quashed. As the reassessment order was set aside, the penalty levied under Section 272A(1)(d) for non-compliance with notices during the assessment proceedings was also deleted. The Tribunal noted that other grounds raised by the assessee became infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeal due to non-participation. The assessee provided evidence from the ITBA Portal showing that notices were sent to an email ID other than the one provided in Form-35. This clearly indicated that the assessee could not respond to the notices due to non-communication through the correct email ID. Therefore, the assessee was not afforded an effective opportunity of being heard. Accordingly, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after giving an appropriate opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition of Rs. 7,72,04,275/-. The Tribunal noted that the seized material, containing details of payments amounting to Rs. 94,26,862/- (a component of the larger sum), was found from a computer in the office room at the assessee's residence, leading to a prima facie presumption that the documents belonged to the business concerns of the assessee's family. The assessee's Authorized Representative (AR) submitted a confirmation letter from M/s. Rithwik Projects Ltd. stating that the loose sheets pertained to the company and that the payments of Rs. 94,26,862/- were made by the company. The CIT(A) observed that M/s. Rithwik Projects Ltd. had incorporated these individual expenditure entries into its books of accounts. Since the payments were recorded by the company in its books, the addition could not be sustained in the hands of the assessee. Therefore, the AO was directed to delete the addition. The Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s order for AY 2017-2018 and upheld it. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal for AY 2018-2019 (ITA No. 699/Hyd/2022) was dismissed. The cross-objections filed by the assessee were dismissed as academic and infructuous due to the dismissal of the Revenue's appeals and inordinate delay without reasonable cause.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition of Rs. 7,72,04,275/-. The Tribunal noted that the seized material, containing details of payments amounting to Rs. 94,26,862/- (a component of the larger sum), was found from a computer in the office room at the assessee's residence, leading to a prima facie presumption that the documents belonged to the business concerns of the assessee's family. The assessee's Authorized Representative (AR) submitted a confirmation letter from M/s. Rithwik Projects Ltd. stating that the loose sheets pertained to the company and that the payments of Rs. 94,26,862/- were made by the company. The CIT(A) observed that M/s. Rithwik Projects Ltd. had incorporated these individual expenditure entries into its books of accounts. Since the payments were recorded by the company in its books, the addition could not be sustained in the hands of the assessee. Therefore, the AO was directed to delete the addition. The Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s order for AY 2017-2018 and upheld it. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal for AY 2018-2019 (ITA No. 699/Hyd/2022) was dismissed. The cross-objections filed by the assessee were dismissed as academic and infructuous due to the dismissal of the Revenue's appeals and inordinate delay without reasonable cause.

The Tribunal restored the matter in the present appeal to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for the limited purpose of reconciliation of figures. This reconciliation pertains to amounts already paid by the assessee towards salary and other expenditures, on which TDS was deducted and deposited within the prescribed time. The Tribunal directed that for amounts where the assessee has not deducted TDS or not deposited it to the Government Treasury, the interest under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act will be levied in accordance with law. The appeal was treated as allowed for statistical purposes. The Ld. CIT(A)'s order dated 30.03.2026, which had upheld the AO's action but directed verification and credit, is implicitly modified by this restoration.

The Tribunal decided the appeal by addressing the two grounds raised. Ground 1, concerning the validity of the Section 148 notice, was dismissed as not pressed by the assessee. For Ground 2, regarding the addition of Rs. 20,59,000/- as unexplained money, the Tribunal analyzed the bank statements of the assessee and her family members. The Tribunal found that the deposits into the assessee's joint bank account, from which the stamp duty was paid, were adequately explained by withdrawals from the bank accounts of her daughter and son on the same dates or closely thereafter. Specifically, Rs. 8 lakhs from the daughter on 03.07.2015, Rs. 4 lakhs and Rs. 1 lakh from the son on 12.08.2015 and 22.08.2015 respectively, and Rs. 5 lakhs transferred from the assessee's own SBI account on 17.12.2015 were all substantiated. Further, Rs. 8 lakhs deposited on 18.12.2015 was explained by withdrawals from the son's account (totaling Rs. 4,29,900/-) and the daughter's account (Rs. 4 lakhs). The remaining Rs. 1 lakh deposited on 09.02.2016 was partly explained by a withdrawal from the assessee's account (Rs. 50,000/-) and the balance from past savings (Rs. 50,000/-). The Tribunal concluded that the source of Rs. 20,59,000/- was proved by the assessee through documentary evidence, and thus, the addition made by the AO was deleted. The ratio decidendi is that when an assessee provides documentary evidence, such as bank statements, demonstrating the flow of funds from family members or personal accounts to explain deposits used for a specific expenditure, the onus to prove the source is discharged.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the 124-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The reasons provided, such as time taken to collect data and non-availability of persons in charge due to personal reasons, were considered vague and unsubstantiated. The Tribunal noted that even before the Tribunal, the assessee's counsel did not explain the cause of delay despite repeated queries. Consequently, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal as time-barred. Since the quantum appeal was dismissed on this preliminary ground, the Tribunal also dismissed the consequential penalty appeal, stating that the penalty was levied as a consequence of the addition made by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal did not adjudicate on the merits of the addition or the penalty.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide sufficient cause for the 124-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The reasons provided, such as time taken to collect data and non-availability of persons in charge due to personal reasons, were considered vague and unsubstantiated. The Tribunal noted that even before the Tribunal, the assessee's counsel did not explain the cause of delay despite repeated queries. Consequently, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal as time-barred. Since the quantum appeal was dismissed on this preliminary ground, the Tribunal also dismissed the consequential penalty appeal, stating that the penalty was levied as a consequence of the addition made by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal did not adjudicate on the merits of the addition or the penalty.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 55 days in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) subject to a cost of Rs. 5,000/- for each appeal, totaling Rs. 10,000/-, to be paid to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund. The Tribunal held that the notice issued by the Assessing Officer under Section 148 of the Act on 01.04.2022 was invalid and void because it was issued without obtaining prior approval from the prescribed authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in ACIT (International Taxation) vs. LinkedIn Singapore Pte Ltd. and the Telangana High Court in Deloitte Consulting India Private Limited. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's contention based on Section 292BC, stating that it does not cure defects relating to the competence of the authority granting approval. Consequently, the reassessment order passed under Section 147 r.w.s. 144B was also held to be unsustainable and liable to be quashed. As the reassessment order was set aside, the penalty levied under Section 272A(1)(d) for non-compliance with notices during the assessment proceedings was also deleted. The Tribunal noted that other grounds raised by the assessee became infructuous.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel, through a letter dated 08.10.2026, submitted that the addition made by the Assessing Officer (AO) had been deleted by the Ld. CIT(A). This rendered the issue in the appeal infructuous. Consequently, the assessee requested permission to withdraw the appeal. The Revenue's representative had no objection to this request. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee as withdrawn. No specific finding on the merits of the original addition or deletion by the Ld. CIT(A) was made, as the appeal was disposed of on the procedural ground of withdrawal. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.

The Tribunal decided to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) for both assessment years, taking a lenient view due to the assessee's illiteracy and the circumstances explained. For AY 2015-2016, the Tribunal found that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on 01.04.2022 was indeed barred by limitation as per the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently, the reassessment order was vitiated, and the appeal was allowed by quashing the Section 148 notice and the reassessment order. The Tribunal did not adjudicate other grounds for AY 2015-2016 as the primary issue of the invalid notice disposed of the appeal. For AY 2016-2017, the quantum appeal (ITA No. 1602/Hyd./2026) was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after giving the assessee an opportunity to explain the source of bank deposits. The penalty appeal (ITA No. 1603/Hyd./2026) for AY 2016-2017 was allowed, as the penalty was consequential to the quantum additions, which were set aside. The ratio is that a notice issued beyond the prescribed time limit under Section 149 renders the reassessment proceedings invalid, and for matters where the quantum is set aside, consequential penalties do not survive.

The Tribunal decided to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) for both assessment years, taking a lenient view due to the assessee's illiteracy and the circumstances explained. For AY 2015-2016, the Tribunal found that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on 01.04.2022 was indeed barred by limitation as per the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently, the reassessment order was vitiated, and the appeal was allowed by quashing the Section 148 notice and the reassessment order. The Tribunal did not adjudicate other grounds for AY 2015-2016 as the primary issue of the invalid notice disposed of the appeal. For AY 2016-2017, the quantum appeal (ITA No. 1602/Hyd./2026) was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after giving the assessee an opportunity to explain the source of bank deposits. The penalty appeal (ITA No. 1603/Hyd./2026) for AY 2016-2017 was allowed, as the penalty was consequential to the quantum additions, which were set aside. The ratio is that a notice issued beyond the prescribed time limit under Section 149 renders the reassessment proceedings invalid, and for matters where the quantum is set aside, consequential penalties do not survive.

The Tribunal decided to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) for both assessment years, taking a lenient view due to the assessee's illiteracy and the circumstances explained. For AY 2015-2016, the Tribunal found that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on 01.04.2022 was indeed barred by limitation as per the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently, the reassessment order was vitiated, and the appeal was allowed by quashing the Section 148 notice and the reassessment order. The Tribunal did not adjudicate other grounds for AY 2015-2016 as the primary issue of the invalid notice disposed of the appeal. For AY 2016-2017, the quantum appeal (ITA No. 1602/Hyd./2026) was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after giving the assessee an opportunity to explain the source of bank deposits. The penalty appeal (ITA No. 1603/Hyd./2026) for AY 2016-2017 was allowed, as the penalty was consequential to the quantum additions, which were set aside. The ratio is that a notice issued beyond the prescribed time limit under Section 149 renders the reassessment proceedings invalid, and for matters where the quantum is set aside, consequential penalties do not survive.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had correctly upheld the rejection of the assessee's books of account under Section 145(3) of the Act. The CIT(A) found that the assessee had not maintained proper books of account, the audit report was inordinately delayed and prepared after the notice under Section 148, and crucial supporting documents like bills and vouchers were not furnished. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had concluded that the audited accounts and profits returned by the assessee were unreliable due to the lack of evidence for substantial expenses claimed. However, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not provided any specific finding on the justification for the AO's estimation of income at 30%. The Tribunal observed that the AO had applied the 30% rate arbitrarily without any basis, comparable case, or consideration of prevailing profit rates. While Section 44AD was not directly applicable, its presumptive rate of 8% was considered as a guidance. To bring the litigation to an end and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal directed the AO to estimate the net profit at 10% of the total turnover. The addition, if any, was to be made accordingly for the respective assessment years.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had correctly upheld the rejection of the assessee's books of account under Section 145(3) of the Act. The CIT(A) found that the assessee had not maintained proper books of account, the audit report was inordinately delayed and prepared after the notice under Section 148, and crucial supporting documents like bills and vouchers were not furnished. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had concluded that the audited accounts and profits returned by the assessee were unreliable due to the lack of evidence for substantial expenses claimed. However, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not provided any specific finding on the justification for the AO's estimation of income at 30%. The Tribunal observed that the AO had applied the 30% rate arbitrarily without any basis, comparable case, or consideration of prevailing profit rates. While Section 44AD was not directly applicable, its presumptive rate of 8% was considered as a guidance. To bring the litigation to an end and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal directed the AO to estimate the net profit at 10% of the total turnover. The addition, if any, was to be made accordingly for the respective assessment years.