125 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's invocation of Section 148 was invalid as it did not follow the prescribed procedure and lacked proper authorization. Consequently, the assessment proceedings were deemed void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that the second notice issued under Section 148 was invalid as it was issued without complying with the mandatory procedures under Section 148A, especially after the initial reassessment proceedings were dropped. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed by the AO was barred by limitation. The exclusion period for handing over seized materials was calculated, and it was found that the assessment order was passed beyond the permissible time limit.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, considering the exclusion period for search proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 of the Income Tax Act. The period of exclusion for handing over seized materials was calculated, and it was found that the AO passed the order beyond the extended time limit.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was passed beyond the prescribed limitation period under Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, considering the exclusion period for handing over seized materials. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was bad in law as the AO failed to fulfill the prescribed conditions for reopening the assessment, particularly when relying on material from another person's search. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated by issuing the second notice under Section 148 of the Act on November 14, 2024, are invalid and liable to be quashed. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had initially issued a notice under Section 148 on March 18, 2023, to which the assessee filed a return. Subsequently, the AO dropped these proceedings. Without issuing a show-cause notice under Section 148A(b) and passing an order under Section 148A(d) disposing of objections, the AO issued a fresh notice under Section 148 on November 14, 2024. The Tribunal found this second notice to be not in conformity with the scheme of re-assessment provided under Section 148A. The Tribunal reasoned that once reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148 are dropped for any reason, the AO cannot initiate fresh proceedings under Section 147/148 without strictly adhering to the procedure laid down in Section 148A. The AO cannot get a second chance to revive an assessment by issuing a second notice under Section 148 without fulfilling the mandatory conditions of Section 148A. Therefore, the second notice dated November 14, 2024, and the consequent assessment order for AY 2019-2020 were quashed. The Tribunal allowed all six appeals.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the audit report was due to reasonable causes like the COVID-19 pandemic and search operations. It also noted that the assessee had applied its entire receipts for charitable purposes, and the time limit for filing Form 10B is directory. The penalty under section 271D was also examined in relation to cash receipts for property transactions.
The Tribunal held that the second notice issued under Section 148 was invalid as it was issued without complying with the mandatory procedures under Section 148A, especially after the initial reassessment proceedings were dropped. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the second notice issued under Section 148 was invalid as it was issued without complying with the mandatory procedures under Section 148A, especially after the initial reassessment proceedings were dropped. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that while the entire amount of Rs. 1,53,93,26,769/- may qualify as business expenditure, its allowability is governed by Section 43B, which requires actual payment before the due date of filing the return. Only Rs. 78,01,08,715/- was found to be actually paid, while Rs. 85,92,18,054/- was an adjustment entry, not an actual payment.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid because the notice under Section 148 was issued without fulfilling the mandatory conditions, and the approval granted was mechanical without application of mind.
The Tribunal held that the non-recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer for initiating penalty proceedings under section 271D makes the penalty order invalid. It also noted that consideration received against the sale of immovable property at the time of registration does not fall under section 269SS.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 10B/10BB was due to reasonable causes like the COVID-19 pandemic and search operations. It also noted that the assessee had applied its entire receipts for charitable purposes, and the time limit for filing the audit report is directory, not mandatory.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 10B was due to reasonable causes like the search operation and COVID-19 pandemic, and that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal on technical grounds. The penalty under Section 271D was also examined in light of the amended provisions of Section 269SS.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) failed to follow the prescribed procedure under Section 148 for issuing notice, particularly regarding recording satisfaction and obtaining approval when seized material pertains to another person. Consequently, the assessment order is invalid.
The tribunal noted that the Competent Authority issued Form-2 determining the tax liability under the dispute as Rs.0 and a refund of Rs.40,44,239/-. Since the dispute was settled under VIVAD SE VISHWAS SCHEME and there was no outstanding liability but a refund, the appeal became infructuous.
The Tribunal held that properties sold during the year, even if owned till sale, should not be treated as deemed let-out if no rent was received and the sale was a commercial decision. Additions based solely on local enquiry without supporting material were also deleted.
The Tribunal held that the explanation for the delay was not satisfactory and did not inspire confidence, indicating negligence and lack of due diligence. Therefore, the petition for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that while there was no valid accumulation for most earlier years, an amount of Rs. 1,24,09,748/- from AY 1994-95 could be considered as available accumulation. However, the utilization of this amount in AY 1995-96 required fresh verification.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the first appeal was not due to a 'sufficient cause' as it stemmed from negligence and lack of due diligence. For the second appeal, the Tribunal ruled that the penalty proceedings were invalid due to the Assessing Officer's failure to record the mandatory satisfaction in the assessment order before initiating penalty proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the AO ought not to have made the addition as the cash withdrawn by the assessee from the bank in the earlier financial year was available to explain the cash deposits. The CIT(A) had allowed partial relief by accepting the explanation in light of human probability, but without proper reasoning for the partial relief granted.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence regarding the fair market value of land and cost of construction for capital gains computation. The issue of long-term capital gains was set aside to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, holding that the seized pen drive's contents were inadmissible evidence due to the absence of a valid certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. The Tribunal upheld this decision, agreeing that the electronic evidence was not properly proved.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities did not conduct a proper factual examination regarding the nature of the land and its classification as agricultural land or urban/rural. Therefore, the case was restored to the AO for a de novo examination.
The assessee submitted that the appeal has become infructuous due to the High Court's order and prayed for withdrawal. The DR had no objection to the dismissal as withdrawn. The Tribunal noted that the High Court had already quashed the notice u/sec.148 of the Act.
The Tribunal addressed the issue of material purchases amounting to Rs. 15,29,99,757/-. The assessee claimed these purchases related to FY 2007-08 but accounted for them as prior period expenses in FY 2008-09. While purchase bills from M/s PSL Ltd. for January, February, and March 2008 were submitted, the AO disallowed the purchases for lack of supporting evidence like delivery challans and proof of supply at the site. The Tribunal noted that the assessee itself accounted for these purchases in FY 2008-09, and payments were made via letter of credit in April 2008 onwards. The Tribunal found that the supply of materials was effected in FY 2008-09, not FY 2007-08, and in the absence of other evidence like delivery challans or stock register entries for FY 2007-08, the claim of expenditure in the revised return could not be accepted. Therefore, the AO rightly disallowed the purchases, and the CIT(A) rightly sustained the additions. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding on this issue. The judgment does not explicitly detail findings on all grounds raised by the Revenue and Assessee, but the operative part indicates a partial allowance for the assessee and dismissal for the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that Rule 21AB of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, read with Section 90 of the Act, does not prescribe any time limit for filing Form 10F. Form 10F is not the source of the right to claim DTAA benefits; it merely facilitates verification. The right flows from the DTAA read with Section 90(2) of the Act. Once tax residency and treaty entitlement are established, Form 10F is a procedural compliance. Therefore, the delay in filing Form 10F is a curable procedural defect, and once furnished, it relates back to the claim made in the return. The Tribunal distinguished the Revenue's reliance on Wipro Ltd. and Muralikrishna Vaddi, noting that those cases involved provisions with express time limits for filing, unlike Section 90 for Form 10F. The objection regarding rectification under Section 154 was also dismissed as the issue became non-debatable upon furnishing of Form 10F and TRC. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal addressed the issue of material purchases amounting to Rs. 15,29,99,757/-. The assessee claimed these purchases related to FY 2007-08 but accounted for them as prior period expenses in FY 2008-09. While purchase bills from M/s PSL Ltd. for January, February, and March 2008 were submitted, the AO disallowed the purchases for lack of supporting evidence like delivery challans and proof of supply at the site. The Tribunal noted that the assessee itself accounted for these purchases in FY 2008-09, and payments were made via letter of credit in April 2008 onwards. The Tribunal found that the supply of materials was effected in FY 2008-09, not FY 2007-08, and in the absence of other evidence like delivery challans or stock register entries for FY 2007-08, the claim of expenditure in the revised return could not be accepted. Therefore, the AO rightly disallowed the purchases, and the CIT(A) rightly sustained the additions. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding on this issue. The judgment does not explicitly detail findings on all grounds raised by the Revenue and Assessee, but the operative part indicates a partial allowance for the assessee and dismissal for the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the SCN was invalid because it failed to specify whether the penalty was for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. This defect vitiated the penalty proceedings, rendering the penalty orders unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the SCN was invalid because it failed to specify whether the penalty was for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. This defect vitiated the penalty proceedings, rendering the penalty orders unsustainable.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on the issue of Section 56(2)(viib) additions for all three assessment years. It was reasoned that the AO erred in rejecting the assessee's valuation report based on the DCF method, which is a permissible method under Rule 11UA(2). The AO's adoption of the NAV method without the assessee opting for it was legally unsustainable. The Tribunal also noted that the legislative intent of Section 56(2)(viib) was to curb unaccounted money, and the facts did not warrant its invocation. The issue of whether Section 56(2)(viib) applies to CCPS was also decided in favour of the assessee. Regarding depreciation for AY 2018-2019, the Tribunal found that the separate addition for depreciation, when the returned loss already included it, amounted to a double addition. The AO was directed to verify this and delete the addition if the depreciation was indeed part of the returned loss. Consequently, the appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on the issue of Section 56(2)(viib) additions for all three assessment years. It was reasoned that the AO erred in rejecting the assessee's valuation report based on the DCF method, which is a permissible method under Rule 11UA(2). The AO's adoption of the NAV method without the assessee opting for it was legally unsustainable. The Tribunal also noted that the legislative intent of Section 56(2)(viib) was to curb unaccounted money, and the facts did not warrant its invocation. The issue of whether Section 56(2)(viib) applies to CCPS was also decided in favour of the assessee. Regarding depreciation for AY 2018-2019, the Tribunal found that the separate addition for depreciation, when the returned loss already included it, amounted to a double addition. The AO was directed to verify this and delete the addition if the depreciation was indeed part of the returned loss. Consequently, the appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on the issue of Section 56(2)(viib) additions for all three assessment years. It was reasoned that the AO erred in rejecting the assessee's valuation report based on the DCF method, which is a permissible method under Rule 11UA(2). The AO's adoption of the NAV method without the assessee opting for it was legally unsustainable. The Tribunal also noted that the legislative intent of Section 56(2)(viib) was to curb unaccounted money, and the facts did not warrant its invocation. The issue of whether Section 56(2)(viib) applies to CCPS was also decided in favour of the assessee. Regarding depreciation for AY 2018-2019, the Tribunal found that the separate addition for depreciation, when the returned loss already included it, amounted to a double addition. The AO was directed to verify this and delete the addition if the depreciation was indeed part of the returned loss. Consequently, the appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding the reasons provided to be bona fide. It was held that an addition made solely on the basis of an uncorroborated statement of a third party, without any supporting evidence, is unsustainable in law. The Tribunal also noted that WhatsApp messages, without a Section 65B certificate, cannot be relied upon as evidence.
The Tribunal held that the SCN was invalid because it failed to specify whether the penalty was for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. This defect vitiated the penalty proceedings, rendering the penalty orders unsustainable.
The Tribunal found that the addition was made solely on the uncorroborated statement of a third party, violating principles of natural justice. The reliance on the son's statement, even with WhatsApp messages, was deemed insufficient without proper confrontation or corroboration.
The Tribunal held that cash received as part of the sale consideration for the transfer of immovable property, as acknowledged in the registered sale deed, does not fall within the ambit of Section 269SS. Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271D was not sustainable.
The Tribunal condoned the significant delay in filing the appeal before it, considering the assessee's background and wife's medical emergencies. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4), whether of a third party or the assessee, cannot be the sole basis for an addition without corroborative evidence. Such additions are unsustainable in law.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer, in the consequential order passed after the revision proceedings, did not make any disallowance or addition concerning section 14A. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the assessee had no further grievance, and the appeal had become infructuous.
The Tribunal held that while recovery proceedings are stayed under IBC, adjudicatory proceedings like appeals for tax liability determination should be decided on merits. The CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine without adjudicating on merits.
The Tribunal held that while the rejection of books of account by the AO was not wholly unjustified due to certain deficiencies in self-made vouchers and lack of third-party evidence for substantial expenses, the estimation of income at 8% of gross receipts was on the higher side. The Tribunal found merit in some of the assessee's explanations and considered it appropriate to restrict the estimation of income to 5% of gross receipts.
The Tribunal held that the cash received as part of the sale consideration at the time of registration of the sale deed, duly acknowledged before the Sub-Registrar, does not violate Section 269SS. The Tribunal further emphasized that the initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271D requires prior assessment proceedings and a recorded satisfaction by the Assessing Officer, which were absent in these cases. The Tribunal also noted that the penalty was time-barred.
The tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient bonafide reasons for the delay of 36 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), which were not disputed by the lower authorities. Consequently, the delay was condoned in the interest of justice.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to record specific satisfaction regarding concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars in the assessment order. This lack of mandatory satisfaction renders the penalty proceedings invalid.
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee provided credit card and bank statements, and confirmations from his friends, the Assessing Officer (AO) and CIT(A) had not fully considered this evidence. The Tribunal found that the payments made from the friends' bank accounts appeared in the assessee's credit card statements. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore the issue to the AO for further verification.
The Tribunal observed that the appellant had provided confirmations from 35 parties regarding sundry debtors and that the AO and CIT(A) had only randomly examined 20 parties. It was held that the remaining amounts from other sundry debtors should also be considered genuine, and the additions made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) were erroneous.