130 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal condoned the 25-day delay in filing the appeal. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, and the issue of disallowance of deduction under Section 80C for LIC premium was remanded to the Assessing Officer for verification of the additional evidence (LIC receipt) submitted by the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal due to a delay of 177 days without considering the 'reasonable and sufficient cause' explained by the assessee, which included her father's hospitalization and death. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not properly notified as the notices were sent to an unrelated email address, depriving them of the opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the dismissal was set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the 10-day delay in filing the appeal, noting that initial steps were taken within the limitation period. It held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely for non-prosecution without adjudicating on merits, which is contrary to Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication on merits, providing the assessee another opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in affirming the addition of INR 564,100,000 under Section 69A. The Tribunal noted that the SBNs were recorded in the assessee's books and an explanation was provided. The AO did not reject the books of account, and the assessee's explanation regarding collections from borrowers was supported by branch-wise and borrower-wise details. The auditor's report also corroborated the source of SBNs. The Tribunal found no justification for invoking Section 69A when the money was recorded and its source explained. Regarding the adjustment under Section 145, the Tribunal held that the change in accounting policy by the assessee was in pursuance of statutory compliance with RBI clarifications. The Tribunal found no justification for the AO to reject this change, as the accounting principles were in agreement with relevant Accounting Standards and prepared on an accrual basis. The Tribunal relied on High Court and ITAT decisions, including CIT v. Citi Financial Consumer Fin. Ltd and Magma Fincorp Ltd, and Supreme Court decisions in Taparia Tools Limited and Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd, to allow the upfront recognition of ancillary borrowing costs and loan processing fees. The addition of INR 114,451,818 was vacated. Grounds 1.1 and 4.1 were dismissed as not pressed. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that since the seized cash belonged to Shri Bajrang Pershad and not the assessee, the addition made in the hands of the assessee under Section 69A of the Act could not be sustained. The ownership of the cash was established, and no addition could be made based solely on possession.
Regarding Ground No. 2 (addition of Rs. 10,25,104 under Section 68), the Tribunal noted the AO's finding that the assessee failed to provide proof for the withdrawal of Rs. 10,25,104 from the bank account for loan repayment. The CIT(A) had accepted bank statements as evidence of cash withdrawals. However, the Tribunal found that the fixed asset schedule showed inconsistencies regarding the sale of a building. Specifically, the schedule indicated a closing balance of Rs. 83,25,933 for 'Building (Block-1) - Business' despite the claim of a total sale. This inconsistency raised questions about the classification of the asset (residential vs. business) and the computation of capital gains. The Tribunal held that these discrepancies required detailed examination and reconciliation at the assessment stage. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the issue was restored to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to verify the asset classification, whether the entire building or part was sold, reconcile closing balances, and ensure consistency of figures. The assessee would be given an opportunity to furnish evidence. Ground No. 6 raised by the Revenue was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal on a technicality without addressing the merits. The existence of two PANs, even if problematic, should not lead to the dismissal of an appeal if the transactions can be accounted for.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in remanding the entire matter for de novo assessment. It directed the AO to apply the principle of commercial expediency for certain investments and restore the issue of other investments to the AO for limited verification.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed by the AO was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Tribunal noted that the AO had thoroughly examined the issues questioned by the Pr. CIT during the assessment proceedings, as evidenced by the notice issued under Section 142(1) and the assessee's reply. The Tribunal further observed that the Pr. CIT did not specify how the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial, and that setting aside the assessment for further verification was not permissible under Section 263, even after the insertion of Explanation (2). Relying on various case laws, including CIT Vs. Max India Ltd., CIT Vs. Tamilnadu Warehousing Corpn., CIT Vs. Nahar Exports Ltd., CIT Vs. Mepco Industries Ltd., CIT Vs. Arvind Jewellery, CIT Vs. Bharat Aluminum Co. Ltd., and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sunbeam Auto Ltd., the Tribunal concluded that the Pr. CIT erred in invoking Section 263. The assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue, and the Pr. CIT's order was quashed. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal on a technicality without addressing the merits. The existence of two PANs, even if problematic, should not lead to the dismissal of an appeal if the transactions can be accounted for.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding that the assessee was not properly notified due to a technical issue with email communication. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not entitled to claim the deduction under Section 80-IA for the first time in the return filed in response to a notice under Section 153A, especially when the original assessment for the year was already completed. This decision was based on the identical facts in the assessee's own earlier cases.
The Tribunal held that a liberal approach is warranted when an assessee expresses willingness to prosecute and pleads for another opportunity, especially when the appeal has not been adjudicated on merits. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had erroneously stated that no supporting documents were filed, contrary to the record. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination of the evidence.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) wrongly dismissed the appeal ex-parte, especially considering the medical reasons provided by the assessee for the delay. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after verifying the evidence filed by the assessee, providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form-10B is a procedural lapse and not fatal to claiming exemption under Section 11, especially when the form was available at the time of processing. The appeal against the Section 119(2)(b) order was dismissed as not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessment framed under section 153C read with section 144C(3) was not invalid due to lack of jurisdiction. The Tribunal noted that the assessee, being a non-resident who had not filed a return, was initially issued notice by ACIT, New Delhi, based on PAN database information. Subsequently, the assessment records were transferred to ADIT, Hyderabad, which had the correct jurisdiction. The Tribunal found that this was not a transfer of a case requiring a section 127 order, but rather a transfer of assessment records to the officer with proper jurisdiction. The assessee had participated in proceedings without objection. Regarding the taxation of capital gains, the Tribunal found that the assessee had offered capital gains for AY 2019-2020 when the developer handed over the constructed building in FY 2017-2018. Therefore, invoking section 2(47)(v) for AY 2016-2017 was considered incorrect. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition made towards capital gains arising from the development agreement for AY 2016-2017. The legal grounds challenging jurisdiction were rejected.
The Tribunal held that the issue of validity of notice under section 148, including its service, was also remanded to the Assessing Officer for proper verification and examination, in light of the Delhi High Court's judgment in Suman Jeet Agarwal. Other issues were also remanded.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148 and the order under section 148A(d) were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of the Faceless Assessing Officer, which is contrary to the CBDT's faceless reassessment scheme. Therefore, these proceedings are void ab initio.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that for proceedings under Section 153C, the seized incriminating material must pertain to the assessment year and establish a co-relation. This is a jurisdictional fact.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not properly adjudicate the ground related to the disallowance of purchases. Due to this oversight and the complexity of the evidence, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification and adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer passed the assessment order without considering the assessee's objections filed before the DRP, and the DRP incorrectly rejected the objections. Therefore, both the CIT(A)'s order and the AO's assessment order were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) passed the draft assessment order on 14.02.2024 and the assessee filed objections before the Disputes Resolution Panel (DRP) on 14.03.2024, within the stipulated period. Despite this, the AO proceeded to pass the final assessment order on 03.04.2024 without waiting for the DRP's decision. The DRP, in turn, rejected the assessee's objections on 25.11.2024, not on merits, but on the technical ground that the AO had already passed the final assessment order. This procedural lapse by the AO and the DRP led to the assessee filing an appeal before the CIT(A), which was dismissed for delay. The Tribunal found that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was explained by the assessee pursuing objections before the DRP. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and the AO's assessment order dated 03.04.2024 as illegal and void ab initio for not following the prescribed procedure under Section 144C(5) and (13). Since the AO's order was set aside, the proceedings related to the draft assessment order remained incomplete. The matter was remanded to the DRP for fresh adjudication of the assessee's objections against the draft assessment order, with liberty to the assessee to raise further objections. The assessee is to be given an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the notices and orders were issued by an authority without jurisdiction, as they were not in accordance with the faceless assessment scheme mandated by CBDT Notification No. 18/2022. Following various High Court judgments, the Tribunal quashed the proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that the joint ownership of the bank account was evident from the record, even though this contention was raised for the first time. The Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination to determine the ownership and extent of the assessee's share in the cash deposits.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form-10B is a procedural lapse and not fatal to claiming exemption under Section 11, especially when the form was available at the time of processing. The appeal against the Section 119(2)(b) order was dismissed as not maintainable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 248 days in filing the appeal, subject to the assessee paying Rs. 5,000/- to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee pursued a rectification remedy, and the subsequent delay was explained by the counsel's preoccupation, constituting a reasonable and bona fide cause. The decision was guided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court's ruling in Vidya Shankar Jaiswal, advocating a justice-oriented and liberal approach. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal found that the controversy hinges on whether the Rs. 21 lakhs cash deposit is already embedded in the turnover of Rs. 3,07,41,823/- used for profit estimation. If it is, a further addition under Section 69A would constitute impermissible double taxation. If it is independent, the AO can examine its taxability. Since the present record does not conclusively establish this factual nexus, the Tribunal set aside the issue to the file of the AO for a limited purpose: to verify if the Rs. 21 lakhs was included in the turnover. If included, the addition under Section 69A shall be deleted to avoid double addition. If not included, the AO may proceed in accordance with law after affording an opportunity to the assessee and passing a speaking order. All other aspects adjudicated by lower authorities remain undisturbed. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is duty-bound to dispose of an appeal on merits, even when dismissing it ex parte for non-prosecution, by framing points of determination. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for a de novo decision on merits after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and the fact that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The assessee's counsel submitted that unavoidable circumstances prevented compliance with the CIT(A)'s notices and there was no mala fide intention. The Tribunal, considering the principle of natural justice, was of the opinion that the assessee deserved one more opportunity to present their case. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication. The assessee was directed to cooperate and not seek unnecessary adjournments. The AO was to pass a fresh assessment order after considering the evidence and submissions. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that once the AO rejects the books of account, they cannot make further additions, especially when the issue pertains to unexplained investment. The Tribunal followed various precedents to arrive at this decision.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not provide an opportunity to the assessee to furnish supporting evidence for the cash deposits. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in allowing the appeals filed by the assessee for Assessment Year 2017-18. The reasoning is based on the established principles of judicial discipline, which mandate that subordinate appellate authorities must follow the unreserved decisions of higher appellate authorities. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd. and Khalid Automobiles Vs. Uol. These judgments clearly state that the mere fact that an order of the appellate authority is not acceptable to the Department or is the subject matter of a further appeal does not provide a ground for not following it, unless its operation has been stayed by a competent court. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had correctly applied these principles by following the earlier decision of the ITAT in ITA No.33/2017 and others dated 25.08.2023. The operative direction is that the CIT(A)'s order is confirmed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order dated 30.12.2021 is barred by limitation and is liable to be quashed. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order was passed on 04.12.2020, and the penalty notice was issued on 08.12.2020. Both parties agreed that the month of initiation of penalty proceedings was December 2020. Applying Section 275(1)(c) of the Act, the two relevant dates for calculating the limitation period were 31.03.2021 (expiry of the financial year in which proceedings were completed) and 30.06.2021 (six months from the end of December 2020). The Tribunal determined that the later of these dates, 30.06.2021, was the outer limit for passing the penalty order. Since the penalty order was passed on 30.12.2021, it was well beyond the prescribed limitation period. The Tribunal also observed that the outcome regarding the limitation period remained the same whether the initiation date was considered the assessment order date or the penalty notice date, and therefore, did not decide this specific point. The penalty order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in recharacterizing the addition from Section 68 to Section 69A without putting the assessee to notice. This action was beyond the scope of the CIT(A)'s jurisdiction without affording the assessee an opportunity to explain.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to communicate a decision on the admission of additional evidence and made contradictory observations. This violated the principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is a developer entitled to deduction under Section 80IA(4) as the issue was consistently decided in its favor in previous years. The Tribunal also emphasized that subordinate authorities are bound by higher appellate orders, regardless of pending appeals.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a statutory body established by the State Government and performing public functions, is considered 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, its income is exempt from income tax under Article 289 of the Constitution.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) passed the order without considering the assessee's submissions and the assessment was ex-parte. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that once the Assessing Officer rejects the books of account in the original assessment, no further additions can be made during reassessment based on principles of settled law and judicial precedents. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned due to the tax consultant's failure to intimate the notice.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is duty-bound to dispose of an appeal on merits, even if ex-parte, after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is duty-bound to decide appeals on merits, even if disposed of ex-parte, and failed to do so in this case. Therefore, the matter needs to be remanded.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and held that the CIT(A) is duty-bound to dispose of an appeal on merits, even if ex-parte. The case was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the filing of Form No. 67 is a directory requirement and not mandatory. Relying on various judicial precedents, it was held that FTC cannot be denied solely due to the delay in filing Form No. 67, as DTAA provisions override the Act and Rules. The Assessing Officer was directed to allow the FTC.
The Tribunal held that once the AO rejects the books of account and makes an estimated assessment, no further additions can be made, especially under Section 68 of the Act. The Tribunal condoned a significant delay in filing the appeal.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not properly dealt with all the issues raised in the assessee's grounds of appeal and had not considered the assessee's submissions. Therefore, the appeal was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 98 days, finding the assessee's explanation reasonable and bona fide, citing a Supreme Court judgment for a liberal approach. The Tribunal also restored the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, directing an opportunity of being heard and a decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's reasons for delay, including old age and unfamiliarity with online procedures, constitute a reasonable cause. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Vidya Shankar Jaiswal vs. ITO was cited to support a liberal approach in condoning delays.
The Tribunal held that notices were not served properly through the ITBA portal, violating principles of natural justice. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s approach was arbitrary and unreasonable. When debtors did not respond to notices, the Assessing Officer should have called the assessee to produce the debtors for examination, which was not done. Therefore, the matter requires remand.