ITAT Hyderabad Judgments — June 2025

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking. They noted that no concrete deficiency was specified, nor a cogent reason for rejection was provided. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking. They noted that no concrete deficiency was specified, nor a cogent reason for rejection was provided. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking. They noted that no concrete deficiency was specified, nor a cogent reason for rejection was provided. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) had rejected the applications for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G on the ground that no substantial charitable activities were carried out, violating Sections 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. However, the Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had rejected the applications without considering the documentary evidence furnished by the assessee-trust. The Tribunal noted that the assessee-trust was incorporated for a noble cause to serve retired military personnel and their families and had submitted all details in response to the notices. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the learned CIT(E) to grant registration under Section 12AB and, as a consequential step, to grant approval under Section 80G. The ratio decidendi is that applications for registration and approval should not be rejected without a proper consideration of the submitted documentary evidence, especially when the trust is established for a charitable purpose.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking. They noted that no concrete deficiency was specified, nor a cogent reason for rejection was provided. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) rejected the application without properly considering the documentary evidence furnished by the assessee-trust. The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant registration u/sec.12AB and approval u/sec.80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking. They noted that no concrete deficiency was specified, nor a cogent reason for rejection was provided. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders.

For A.Ys 2017-18 and 2018-19, the Tribunal held that additions made in unabated assessments without incriminating material are not sustainable, following the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. CIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P) Ltd. For A.Ys 2019-20 and 2020-21, the Tribunal found it necessary to verify the source of deposits due to the assessee's inability to produce evidence while in judicial custody.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide any explanation or evidence regarding the share capital claimed. Consequently, the addition made by the Assessing Officer towards unexplained share capital was justified and rightly sustained by the CIT(A).

For A.Ys 2017-18 and 2018-19, the Tribunal held that additions made in unabated assessments without incriminating material are not sustainable, following the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. CIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P) Ltd. For A.Ys 2019-20 and 2020-21, the Tribunal found it necessary to verify the source of deposits due to the assessee's inability to produce evidence while in judicial custody.

The Tribunal, while noting that res judicata does not apply to income tax proceedings, upheld the principle of consistency. It ruled that since the revenue had accepted the assessee's exemption under Section 10(23BBA) for A.Y. 2019-20, and no change in facts or law was shown, a consistent approach should be adopted for A.Y. 2016-17. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order allowing the exemption was confirmed, and the revenue's appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without considering the merits. The CIT(A) has a statutory obligation to dispose of appeals on merits, and cannot summarily dismiss them for non-prosecution.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking, failing to specify any deficiency in the submitted documents or cogent reasons for rejection. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the returns, considering the medical records submitted by the appellant and the fact that all returns were filed before the due date of the subsequent quarter. Therefore, the Assessing Officer ought not to have levied the late filing fee.

For A.Ys 2017-18 and 2018-19, the Tribunal held that additions made in unabated assessments without incriminating material are not sustainable, following the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. CIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P) Ltd. For A.Ys 2019-20 and 2020-21, the Tribunal found it necessary to verify the source of deposits due to the assessee's inability to produce evidence while in judicial custody.

For A.Ys 2017-18 and 2018-19, the Tribunal held that additions made in unabated assessments without incriminating material are not sustainable, following the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. CIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P) Ltd. For A.Ys 2019-20 and 2020-21, the Tribunal found it necessary to verify the source of deposits due to the assessee's inability to produce evidence while in judicial custody.

The Tribunal held that the assessee was not given adequate opportunity to be heard and that the CIT(E) had rejected the application without fully considering the information provided earlier. Therefore, the order of the CIT(E) was set aside.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that rejecting the Section 80G application on a technicality without giving the assessee an opportunity to rectify the error was unjustified. It set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remanded the matter back for reconsideration on merits, with a direction for the assessee to correct the section mentioned in the application.

The Tribunal found that the appellant company was under Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and subsequently ordered for liquidation. The business was purchased by a new management on a going concern basis. Since the liability pertained to a period prior to the date of sale, and no specific claim was made by the Department before the Liquidator, all liabilities were extinguished.

The Tribunal held that there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the returns, considering the medical records submitted by the appellant and the fact that all returns were filed before the due date of the subsequent quarter. Therefore, the Assessing Officer ought not to have levied the late filing fee.

The Tribunal held that there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the returns, considering the medical records submitted by the appellant and the fact that all returns were filed before the due date of the subsequent quarter. Therefore, the Assessing Officer ought not to have levied the late filing fee.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking, failing to specify any deficiency in the submitted documents or cogent reasons for rejection. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking, failing to specify any deficiency in the submitted documents or cogent reasons for rejection. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) to be cryptic and non-speaking, failing to specify any deficiency in the submitted documents or cogent reasons for rejection. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matters back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the issue regarding whether the agricultural land was a capital asset under Section 2(14) required further verification of the distance of the land from the GHMC municipal limits on the date of sale. The AO was directed to verify this distance. If the land was within the 8 km limit, the CIT(A)'s view that it was a capital asset under Section 2(14)(iii)(b) would be approved. Regarding the Section 54F exemption for the new house, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s allowance of Rs. 1.62 crore based on documentary evidence. However, it disagreed with the CIT(A)'s restriction of investment to the 'due date' for filing the return, stating that investment up to the date of filing a delayed return under Section 139(4) is permissible, citing judicial precedents. The AO was directed to allow investment made up to the date of filing the delayed return. For Section 54B exemption, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s restriction of the claim to Rs. 1,01,07,115/-, considering the value in registered sale deeds. The claim for indexed cost of improvement of Rs. 82,50,632/- was denied as the assessee failed to provide substantiating material, relying only on rough notebook notings. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order on this issue. The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the term 'discontinuance' of business, not being defined in the Act, should be construed by its dictionary meaning, which includes a temporary interruption. The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's contention that 'discontinuance' implies permanent disruption with no intention to carry on the business, finding it militates against the dictionary meaning and defeats the purpose of Section 80IA r.w.s 33B. The Tribunal observed that the proviso to Section 80IA(2)(i) carves out an exception for industrial undertakings re-established, reconstructed, or revived as per Section 33B, and the Revenue's interpretation would render this concession meaningless. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s view that the assessee was entitled to the deduction. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, dismissing the Revenue's grounds of appeal. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that 'discontinuance' of business includes temporary interruption and that the damage caused by the cyclone qualified for revival under Section 33B, allowing the deduction under Section 80IA. The Revenue's grounds of appeal were dismissed.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal condoned a 192-day delay in filing the appeal, noting valid reasons. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in summarily dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without deciding it on merits, citing judicial precedents. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on specific grounds of appeal.

The Tribunal noted that the case could not be decided on merits before the CIT(E) due to non-submission of documents. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the issue to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the NHAI grant, stating it should not be reduced from the project cost for depreciation. The Tribunal also agreed with the CIT(A) on allowing the provision for maintenance. However, the assessee's cross-appeal was dismissed due to an inordinate and unexplained delay.

The Tribunal held that the benchmarking of interest on Indian Rupee denominated ECBs should be based on domestic Indian lending rates, not 'Masala Bond' rates, as the currency risk is borne by the borrower in INR. The appeal was allowed based on this and other observations.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the NHAI grant, stating it should not be reduced from the project cost for depreciation. The Tribunal also agreed with the CIT(A) on allowing the provision for maintenance. However, the assessee's cross-appeal was dismissed due to an inordinate and unexplained delay.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the NHAI grant, stating it should not be reduced from the project cost for depreciation. The Tribunal also agreed with the CIT(A) on allowing the provision for maintenance. However, the assessee's cross-appeal was dismissed due to an inordinate and unexplained delay.

The Tribunal held that 'discontinuance' of business includes temporary interruption and that the damage caused by the cyclone qualified for revival under Section 33B, allowing the deduction under Section 80IA. The Revenue's grounds of appeal were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the rejection based on the wrong form was not a valid ground, especially when the charitable nature of activities was not disproved. The CIT's order was also found to be lacking in application of mind.

The Tribunal held that the Revenue's contention regarding the interpretation of 'discontinuance' of business was not persuasive. The Tribunal adopted the dictionary meaning of 'discontinue' as an interruption, which can be temporary or permanent. They reasoned that interpreting 'discontinuance' as requiring permanent disruption with no intention to carry on would render the concession provided in the Proviso to Section 80IA(2)(i) r.w. Section 33B of the Act meaningless. The Tribunal found that the cyclone on 06/11/1996 caused extensive damage to the assessee's factory, leading to a complete stoppage of production from 06.11.1996 to 20.12.1996. This interruption fell within the circumstances envisaged in Section 33B. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s view that the assessee was entitled to the deduction under Section 80IA r.w.s 33B. Grounds of appeal 1, 2, and 3 of the Revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the claim of deduction under Section 80IA read with Section 33B of the Act. The Tribunal interpreted the term 'discontinuance' of business by referring to its dictionary meaning, which includes a temporary interruption. The Tribunal found that the Revenue's interpretation of 'discontinuance' as requiring permanent disruption with no intention to carry on the business would defeat the purpose of the concession provided in Section 80IA read with Section 33B. The Tribunal reasoned that the proviso to Section 80IA(2)(i) carves out an exception for undertakings formed by re-establishment, reconstruction, or revival of a business referred to in Section 33B. If 'discontinuance' meant permanent cessation, this concession would be rendered meaningless. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s view that the assessee's business was interrupted due to the cyclone, which falls under the circumstances envisaged in Section 33B, thus dispensing with the pre-condition of the undertaking not being formed by splitting up or reconstruction of an existing business. The grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue were dismissed.