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137 orders · Page 2 of 3
The Tribunal condoned the 84-day delay, acknowledging the assessee's genuine reasons. It ruled that the CIT(A) erred by passing an ex-parte order without providing due opportunity or considering the adjournment request, violating natural justice principles. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after allowing proper hearing.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) issued notices with inadequate time for the assessee to respond and dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without deciding on merits. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal, as the Revenue had no objection. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with a provision for the assessee to approach the Tribunal for revival if the settlement under the scheme fails for any reason.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not filed any proper petition for condonation of delay, and the explanation regarding incorrect email service was unsubstantiated. However, considering principles of natural justice, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) to allow the assessee to file a formal condonation petition.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) simply sustained the Assessing Officer's addition without providing reasons for decision and adjudication, which is contrary to the mandate of Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the matter is remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with a direction to provide adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the 55-day delay in filing the appeal, finding sufficient reason. It held that the CIT(E)'s rejection order was cryptic and non-speaking, as it failed to consider the detailed submissions and evidence of charitable activities provided by the assessee, despite the assessee holding a Section 12AB registration. The order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(E) for re-consideration after proper verification and granting an opportunity of hearing.
The ITAT found that the Ld. CIT(A) had indeed sent notices to an email ID that was no longer in use, thereby depriving the assessee of a fair opportunity to present his case. Concluding that this constituted a violation of the principles of natural justice, the ITAT remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, with instructions for both parties to cooperate.
The Tribunal condoned the 181-day delay, finding that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine. The matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification of TDS details, allowing the assessee an opportunity to present its case with relevant documents.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had summarily rejected the application without appreciating that education is a charitable activity and without examining relevant evidence. Citing Supreme Court precedent on profit motive, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) for a fresh examination of the society's activities and to grant registration under Section 12A after providing an opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had indeed disclosed the disputed amount in her ITR. Recognizing this as a factual matter requiring verification, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order and remanded the case back to the AO for fresh verification of the assessee's claim, ensuring a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The assessee sought to withdraw the appeal, stating that the rectification order addressed their concerns. The Revenue did not object. The Tribunal allowed the withdrawal.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding no error in deleting the additions. The Tribunal noted that both receipts and payments were recorded in books, subjected to TDS, and made through banking channels, and that disallowing both would lead to double addition.
The Tribunal, after hearing rival submissions and perusing the record, found that the cancellation of registration by the Ld. CIT(E) was due to non-prosecution. The assessee's contention that notices were not received was also noted. The Tribunal held that, in light of the principles of natural justice, the assessee deserved one more opportunity to be heard and to file necessary documentary support for the continuation of its registration under Section 12AB. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for de novo adjudication, with a direction to grant a due and reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to extend full cooperation and avoid unnecessary adjournments. The Tribunal explicitly noted that the case could not be decided on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the expenditure incurred by the assessee for running schools by the Singareni Educational Society, as per the Coal Wages Agreement, is an obligation in the course of business and for the purpose of business, and therefore, not disallowable under Section 40A(9) but allowable under Section 37. Regarding investment allowance under Section 32AC, the Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held electricity to be an article or thing and its production as manufacturing, thus supporting the assessee's claim. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds concerning Section 40A(9) and Section 32AC. For the Revenue's grounds, the Tribunal held that the civil works carried out by the assessee within the mines, essential for coal extraction, partake the character of 'plant and machinery' and are eligible for depreciation at 15%, not 10% as 'building'. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds challenging the treatment of these expenditures and the deletion of TDS disallowances. The Tribunal relied on its own earlier decisions in the assessee's own case and decisions of the Hon'ble AP High Court and Supreme Court.
The Tribunal has decided to restore the issues to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. This includes re-examining the applicability of Section 40A(9), the allowability of investment allowance under Section 32AC, and the classification of expenditure as capital or revenue.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in the assessee's own case, which held that payments for educational facilities to employees under the NCWA are not disallowable under Section 40A(9). The Tribunal also allowed depreciation at 15% on certain mine development expenditures, treating them as plant and machinery.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in the assessee's own case, which held that payments for educational facilities to employees under the NCWA are not disallowable under Section 40A(9). The Tribunal also allowed depreciation at 15% on certain mine development expenditures, treating them as plant and machinery.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in the assessee's own case, which held that payments for educational facilities to employees under the NCWA are not disallowable under Section 40A(9). The Tribunal also allowed depreciation at 15% on certain mine development expenditures, treating them as plant and machinery.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in the assessee's own case, which held that payments for educational facilities to employees under the NCWA are not disallowable under Section 40A(9). The Tribunal also allowed depreciation at 15% on certain mine development expenditures, treating them as plant and machinery.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 11 days in filing the audit report in Form 10DA, which was filed before the processing of the return under Section 143(1), should not be a ground for denial of deduction under Section 80JJAA. The Tribunal followed various judicial precedents and set aside the impugned order.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking, dismissed the appeal without addressing merits, and violated principles of natural justice. The matter was remanded to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing adequate opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT-DR did not object to the withdrawal. Considering the facts, the Tribunal permitted the withdrawal of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the matter required to be restored to the Assessing Officer (A.O.) for verification of the assessee's claim of investment. The Tribunal found that while the CIT(A) had allowed the appeal, his order lacked specific details regarding the documentary evidence that substantiated the investment in the construction of the new residential house within the prescribed period. The Tribunal noted the absence of references to bank statements, construction contracts, bills/vouchers, or valuation reports. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the issue to the A.O. for verification of the investment, including the purchase of the plot, based on which the exemption under Section 54F was claimed. The A.O. was directed to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit fresh documentary evidence. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the assessee transferred the new residential house in AY 2024-25 and offered the LTCG for tax in that year. The Tribunal directed the A.O. to make appropriate adjustments for the subject year (AY 2022-23) if the exemption claim is not found in order, considering the tax already realized by the Revenue on the LTCG in AY 2024-25, to avoid double taxation, citing the Supreme Court judgment in ITO, Lucknow Vs. Bachulal Kapoor.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was denied an opportunity to present their case before the CIT(A) due to notices being sent to an incorrect email address. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to improper service of notices. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. Grounds 2 and 3 were disposed of, and Ground 4 was dismissed.
The Tribunal found the CIT(E)'s orders to be cryptic and non-speaking, lacking specific reasons or identified deficiencies. It set aside the impugned orders and restored the matter to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing that the assessee be given due opportunity of hearing and permission to submit additional evidence.
The Tribunal found substance in the assessee's claim that the expenses were incurred in the normal course of business. The manner in which the salary increase was disallowed was also questioned. The Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the A.O. for fresh adjudication.
The ITAT set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal ruled that the assessee should be granted another opportunity to present her case on merits, considering the explanation that her previous counsel had passed away, thereby upholding the principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the Pr. CIT's order under Section 263, which formed the basis for the subsequent assessment order, had been quashed by the Tribunal in a previous proceeding. Therefore, the impugned assessment order could not survive on its own.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of natural justice, the assessee deserves one more opportunity to submit requisite evidence. The matter is remanded to the Assessing Officer to examine additional evidence and afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal found the CIT(E)'s orders to be cryptic and non-speaking, lacking specific reasons or identified deficiencies. It set aside the impugned orders and restored the matter to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing that the assessee be given due opportunity of hearing and permission to submit additional evidence.
The Tribunal held that the seized document was not a 'dumb document' as the assessee admitted its contents in a sworn statement. The assessee also failed to prove the source of the cash payment from known sources.
The Tribunal found the CIT's order to be cryptic and lacking definite findings. It noted that the university had already been granted approval under Section 10(23C)(vi), implying its charitable nature for education.
The Tribunal held that an unregistered sale agreement, especially between related parties without proof of genuine efforts for registration, does not constitute a valid transfer for Section 54F exemption. The assessment order allowing the claim was deemed erroneous and prejudicial to revenue.
The Tribunal held that the seized document was not a 'dumb document' as the assessee admitted its contents in a sworn statement. The assessee also failed to prove the source of the cash payment from known sources.
The Tribunal held that the assessee-corporation was not merely a nodal agency but carried out the trade itself. It further held that the privilege fees and other levies collected were income of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and thus, the disallowance under Section 40(a)(iib) was not applicable to the assessee's income.
The Tribunal held that the TPO's rejection of the TP documentation and aggregation of transactions to apply TNMM was justified, considering the interlinked nature of the business segments and lack of comparability on a standalone basis. The Tribunal also upheld the TPO's inclusion of depreciation on goodwill as operating in nature for PLI computation. Regarding Section 14A, the Tribunal rejected the assessee's argument that investments were out of own funds, noting the lack of a cash flow statement to prove this and the existence of huge borrowings. Therefore, the disallowance of interest expenditure under Rule 8D(2)(ii) was upheld. However, for the disallowance of other expenditure under Rule 8D(2)(iii), the Tribunal followed the decision in ACIT vs. Vireet Investments Private Limited (SB) and directed the Assessing Officer to consider only those investments that yielded exempt income for computing the disallowance.
The Tribunal held that privilege fees, special privilege fees, and additional privilege fees are linked to sales and are considered income of the assessee before being remitted to the state government. The method of remittance did not alter the accrual of income in the assessee's hands.
The ITAT held that the delay of 2014 days in filing the appeal before the learned CIT(A) was not liable to be condoned. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not explained any sufficient reasons for such an inordinate delay. The CIT(A) had correctly observed that the assessee was aware of the demand raised, as evidenced by the filing of a revised return on 03.05.2017, which itself was beyond the statutory time limit for filing a revised return under Section 139(5) for AY 2013-14. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s reasoning that the assessee could not show any cogent reason for the belated filing of the appeal. The ITAT emphasized that the period of limitation has to be construed strictly and that condoning delays in a mechanical manner would jeopardize the legislative intent. Relying on the principle laid down in Amar Shakti Co-operative Labour & Construction Society Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, the ITAT held that delay on account of pursuing an alternate remedy or due to gross negligence is not a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 249(3). Therefore, the ITAT found no error or illegality in the CIT(A)'s order dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation. The appeal filed by the assessee before the ITAT was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that for registration u/s 12AB, the Commissioner must consider proposed activities if the trust has not yet commenced its activities. The denial of registration solely on the ground of non-commencement of activities without considering proposed ones is not justified.
The Tribunal held that for disallowance of other expenditure under Rule 8D(2)(iii), only investments yielding exempt income should be considered. The AO erred in considering total investments. The disallowance of interest expenditure under Rule 8D(2)(ii) was upheld due to lack of evidence of own funds.
The Tribunal found the CIT(E)'s rejection order to be cryptic, non-speaking, and lacking proper application of mind, especially considering the assessee's prior Section 12AB registration. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the CIT(E) for reconsideration of the Section 80G(5) application, with directions to examine all relevant records.
The Tribunal held that for registration u/s 12AB, the Commissioner must consider proposed activities if the trust has not yet commenced its activities. The denial of registration solely on the ground of non-commencement of activities without considering proposed ones is not justified.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order rejecting the application for registration under Section 12AB was incomplete and inconclusive, as it reproduced the notice issued to the assessee but lacked any finding or concluding remarks. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the order non-est and liable to be set aside. The matter was remanded to the CIT(E) for reconsideration of the application and to decide it by a speaking order. Regarding the application for approval under Section 80G, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had given reasons for rejection, citing a lack of substantial charitable activities. However, since the Section 12AB matter was being remanded for fresh adjudication, the Tribunal also set aside the order for Section 80G approval and remanded it to the CIT(E) for reconsideration under the same terms and directions as the Section 12AB matter. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order rejecting the application for registration under Section 12AB was incomplete and inconclusive, as it reproduced the notice issued to the assessee but lacked any finding or concluding remarks. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the order non-est and liable to be set aside. The matter was remanded to the CIT(E) for reconsideration of the application and to decide it by a speaking order. Regarding the application for approval under Section 80G, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had given reasons for rejection, citing a lack of substantial charitable activities. However, since the Section 12AB matter was being remanded for fresh adjudication, the Tribunal also set aside the order for Section 80G approval and remanded it to the CIT(E) for reconsideration under the same terms and directions as the Section 12AB matter. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had sustained the addition without deciding the issue on merit, as required by Section 250(6). The assessee has filed additional evidence which needs to be verified by the lower authorities. Therefore, the matter is remitted back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by admitting additional documentary evidence without providing the AO an opportunity to examine it and without recording reasons for admission, as required by Rule 46A. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by admitting additional documentary evidence without providing the AO an opportunity to examine it and without recording reasons for admission, as required by Rule 46A. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in setting aside the assessment order by invoking powers under the amended Section 251 of the Income Tax Act. The proviso to Section 251(1)(a) allows the CIT(A) to set aside an assessment only when it is made under Section 144, not Section 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(3). Therefore, the CIT(A) had traversed beyond its jurisdiction.