ITAT Delhi Judgments — January 2026

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC had proceeded ex-parte against the assessee. While the Revenue argued that the assessee failed to provide explanations or evidence, the Tribunal considered that communication gaps between the taxpayer, auditor, and counsel could not be ruled out when an ex-parte order is passed. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The assessee is to be given three effective opportunities to plead and prove her case at her own risk and responsibility. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the merits of the disallowance/addition made by the Assessing Officer and affirmed by the CIT(A)/NFAC.

The Tribunal held that Section 80AC(ii) mandates filing the return within the due date under Section 139(1) for claiming deductions under Chapter VIA. Filing a belated return under Section 139(4) does not cure this statutory default, and the claim for deduction is therefore not allowable.

The Tribunal held that the scope of inquiry at the time of granting registration is limited to verifying the objects of the society. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's objects were found to be charitable and that the principle of consistency should be followed, as past assessments had accepted the charitable nature of the assessee's activities.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 125 days, acknowledging the assessee's submission that the delay was bonafide and due to circumstances beyond their control. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, ensuring a reasonable opportunity for the assessee to be heard.

The ITAT held that the satisfaction recorded by the AO for initiating proceedings under Section 153C must explicitly state that the seized material has a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Saksham Commodities Ltd., the Tribunal found the AO's satisfaction to be invalid as it lacked this crucial element.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not sustainable as they were based on information from public domain and foreign tax jurisdiction, and not on material found during search and seizure operations. The Tribunal also noted that the protective assessment was made prior to substantive assessment under the Black Money Act, rendering it invalid. Therefore, the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the additions.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not sustainable as they were based on information from public domain and foreign tax jurisdiction, and not on material found during search and seizure operations. The Tribunal also noted that the protective assessment was made prior to substantive assessment under the Black Money Act, rendering it invalid. Therefore, the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the additions.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 125 days, acknowledging the assessee's submission that the delay was bonafide and due to circumstances beyond their control. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, ensuring a reasonable opportunity for the assessee to be heard.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to justify its very low gross profit computations for the initial assessment years and the lower authorities did not discuss comparable segmental revenues. The Tribunal decided to allow a lump sum GP estimation of 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, for justice, but stipulated it should not be treated as a precedent.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Joint Commissioner under Section 153D was not valid as it lacked application of mind and was granted mechanically for multiple years. Therefore, the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153A were quashed.

The Tribunal observed that the issues were covered by a coordinate bench decision in the case of Real Innerspring Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal found that the loans were taken through banking channels and repaid with interest, indicating genuine transactions. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had provided all supporting documents to the AO, who had rejected them based on suspicion.

The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were not sustainable as they were based on information from public domain and foreign tax jurisdiction, and not on material found during search and seizure operations. The Tribunal also noted that the protective assessment was made prior to substantive assessment under the Black Money Act, rendering it invalid. Therefore, the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the additions.

The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted plausible inquiries and verifications regarding the commission payment to SIPL, and therefore, the assessment order was not erroneous. Consequently, the revisionary order passed by the PCIT under Section 263 was quashed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 125 days, acknowledging the assessee's submission that the delay was bonafide and due to circumstances beyond their control. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, ensuring a reasonable opportunity for the assessee to be heard.

The Tribunal held that the assessee was indeed an accommodation entry provider, as evidenced by the continuous flow of credits and debits in his bank accounts and his failure to provide supportive evidence for genuine business activity. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s conclusion on this aspect. Regarding the quantification of income, the Tribunal noted that its various decisions had held such accommodation entries assessable at profit rates ranging between 0.15% to 0.8% of the turnover. Following a coordinate bench decision in the assessee's own case for AYs 2013-14 to 2017-18, which had reduced the assessable accommodation entry turnover to 0.4% from 0.5%, the Tribunal directed the AO to assess the turnover at 0.4%. The Tribunal explicitly stated that this decision was based on the peculiar facts of the case and should not be treated as a precedent. The appeals filed by the Revenue for all assessment years were dismissed.

The Tribunal followed a coordinate bench's decision in the assessee's own case and directed that the accommodation entry turnover should be assessed at 0.4% instead of 0.5%. This decision was applied mutatis mutandis to all assessment years under appeal.

The Tribunal held that the impugned final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal noted that the cash received in excess of Rs. 20,000/- was hit by the provisions of section 269SS, particularly clause (iv) of the Explanation. The judicial citations relied upon by the assessee did not cover the facts of the case.

The CIT(A) deleted the addition of Rs. 1,09,14,500/- under section 68, relying on a previous tribunal order. The CIT(A) also deleted the addition of Rs. 13,24,861/-, finding the estimation at 4% to be arbitrary and unsustainable. However, the CIT(A) upheld the addition of Rs. 18,35,000/- for cash seized, as the books of account were not produced to justify it.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not present their case before the CIT(A) and requested a remand for fresh adjudication. The DR did not object to this request, though they pointed out the assessee's non-compliance. The Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal held that the assessee follows the Percentage of Completion Method (POCM) for revenue recognition, as advised by ICAI. It was observed that the assessee computed its income on POCM in subsequent Assessment Years (AY 2016-17 onwards), adjusting the non-refundable security against revenue and paying taxes. These returns were accepted under scrutiny assessment u/s 143(3) without additions. Therefore, making an addition for the same amount in the current year amounts to double addition. However, the Tribunal could not verify from the financial statements whether the entire non-refundable security was adjusted. Accordingly, the AO was directed to verify this fact and, if any portion remained unadjusted, to treat that portion as income for the year under appeal. Regarding the applicability of Section 194-IA, the Tribunal found that the payment of INR 69 crores to LBPPL was made on 09.04.2013, prior to the insertion of Section 194-IA w.e.f. 01.06.2013, making it not applicable. Consequently, no disallowance could be made under Section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of TDS under Section 194-IA, as the amendment to Section 40(a)(ia) including Section 194-IA was applicable from AY 2015-16 onwards. Thus, the grounds of appeal were partly allowed.

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) initiated proceedings under Section 263 of the Act, considering the AO's order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The PCIT held that the interest income was taxable under Section 56(2)(viii) read with Sections 57(iv) and 145A(b) of the Act, as per amended provisions effective from 2010-11. The Tribunal noted that the initial proposal for Section 263 proceedings lacked specific grounds and relied on the PCIT's understanding of the issue.

The Tribunal considered the reconciliation statement and the submissions of the assessee. It was noted that the assessee had declared an excess rent of Rs. 7,46,925/- till AY 2021-22, which included the disputed amount. Therefore, taxing the same income again for AY 2022-23 would result in double taxation.

The Tribunal followed a previous decision in the assessee's own case, directing that the accommodation entry turnover should be assessed at 0.4% instead of the 0.5% estimated by the lower authorities. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had made requests for adjournment before the CIT(A) which were not allowed. Therefore, to provide justice, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, ensuring the assessee is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to justify its very low gross profit computations for the initial assessment years and the lower authorities did not discuss comparable segmental revenues. The Tribunal decided to allow a lump sum GP estimation of 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, for justice, but stipulated it should not be treated as a precedent.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to justify its very low gross profit computations for the initial assessment years and the lower authorities did not discuss comparable segmental revenues. The Tribunal decided to allow a lump sum GP estimation of 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, for justice, but stipulated it should not be treated as a precedent.

The Tribunal held that the assessee was indeed an accommodation entry provider, as evidenced by the continuous flow of credits and debits in his bank accounts and his failure to provide supportive evidence for genuine business activity. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s conclusion on this aspect. Regarding the quantification of income, the Tribunal noted that its various decisions had held such accommodation entries assessable at profit rates ranging between 0.15% to 0.8% of the turnover. Following a coordinate bench decision in the assessee's own case for AYs 2013-14 to 2017-18, which had reduced the assessable accommodation entry turnover to 0.4% from 0.5%, the Tribunal directed the AO to assess the turnover at 0.4%. The Tribunal explicitly stated that this decision was based on the peculiar facts of the case and should not be treated as a precedent. The appeals filed by the Revenue for all assessment years were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage, which operates notwithstanding the general limitation period in Section 153. The assessment orders were not barred by limitation.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) relied on an un-confronted report of the Inspector to deny the genuineness of share applicants. The Tribunal found this action against the principle of natural justice as the report was not supplied to the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remit the issues back to the AO for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. AO initiated proceedings under Section 147 based on the DVO's report, which indicated suppressed sale value of properties amounting to Rs. 6,25,53,658/-. The Ld. CIT(A) deleted this addition. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) held that the AO did not reject the audited books of accounts and that the nature of inquiries made by the AO was unclear. The CIT(A) further held that the addition based on the DVO's report was not sustainable for technical/legal reasons, as there was no material/information to suggest undisclosed income, the assessee had submitted all necessary documents, and the books were audited without discrepancies. The CIT(A) also found that there was no provision in the statute at the material time for the AO to make a reference to the DVO to determine suppressed income. Consequently, the addition made by the AO was deleted. The Tribunal found the grounds of appeal to be devoid of merit and untenable.

The Tribunal held that financial assistance provided by the assessee to its member societies is subject to TDS under Section 194C. However, it also acknowledged that if the payee has already paid the tax on the income, the demand from the payer for the same tax should not be collected. The AO was directed to verify the payee's tax payment date and recalculate the demand and interest.

The Tribunal held that financial assistance provided by the assessee to its member societies is subject to TDS under Section 194C. However, it also acknowledged that if the payee has already paid the tax on the income, the demand from the payer for the same tax should not be collected. The AO was directed to verify the payee's tax payment date and recalculate the demand and interest.

The provided excerpt of the judgment does not contain the Tribunal's decision or reasoning on any of the issues. It only lists the parties, assessment years, and the fact that appeals are before the Tribunal. Therefore, it is not possible to state what the Tribunal decided, the reasoning that led to it, the ratio decidendi, or any operative directions. No issue was expressly left undecided as no decision has been rendered in the provided text.

The Tribunal held that when an employee is transferred, the gratuity liability can be transferred to the other concern, and this transfer of liability constitutes a discharge of the assessee's obligation. Therefore, such transferred gratuity liability can be claimed as an expenditure.

The Tribunal held that financial assistance provided by the assessee to its member societies is subject to TDS under Section 194C. However, it also acknowledged that if the payee has already paid the tax on the income, the demand from the payer for the same tax should not be collected. The AO was directed to verify the payee's tax payment date and recalculate the demand and interest.

The Tribunal held that the AO could not make an addition on a ground not forming the basis of the reassessment notice, especially when the original ground was dropped. Following precedent, the addition of Rs. 35,43,224/- was deleted.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed to have not been given a reasonable opportunity by the CIT(A) to produce documentary evidence and that the appeal was dismissed by relying solely on the AO's order. The Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The CIT(A) correctly rejected the assessee's contention to claim a loss of Rs.36,70,342/- resulting in an alleged refund. The grounds of appeal were found to have no substance.

The Tribunal held that the unsecured loans were genuine as they were received and repaid through banking channels with interest, supported by documentary evidence. However, the addition for belated employee PF/ESIC contributions was dismissed as the assessee did not press the issue and it was covered by a Supreme Court decision.

The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's business status but noted that not all cash sales and turnover were reconciled. A lump sum addition of Rs.10,00,000/- was considered appropriate as prima facie representing the GP element of the cash deposits, with a direction that it not be treated as a precedent.

The Tribunal noted that the lower authorities did not consider the assessee's socio-economic status and past savings. It was deemed appropriate to make a lumpsum addition of Rs. 5 lakhs, not to be taken as a precedent, providing relief of Rs. 5.80 lakhs. For section 115BBE, it was directed that the provision applies only to transactions after 01.04.2017.

The CIT(A) deleted the addition of Rs. 1,09,14,500/- under section 68, relying on a previous tribunal order. The CIT(A) also deleted the addition of Rs. 13,24,861/-, finding the estimation at 4% to be arbitrary and unsustainable. However, the CIT(A) upheld the addition of Rs. 18,35,000/- for cash seized, as the books of account were not produced to justify it.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Act by the Joint CIT was mechanical and without due application of mind. This rendered the approval proceeding an empty ritual, not mandated by the Act or supported by judicial precedents. The Tribunal relied on decisions of the Delhi High Court and Orissa High Court, whose Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, thereby attaining finality. Consequently, the assessment orders for AY 2013-14 and AY 2014-15 were quashed as void ab initio. The Tribunal allowed Ground of Appeal No. 1, stating that since the entire assessment was quashed, the adjudication of other grounds became academic and were left open. The operative direction was to quash the assessment orders.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C, which deals with the procedure for assessment in cases of eligible assessees, operates notwithstanding the general limitation period prescribed in Section 153. The special regime under Section 144C governs the time from the draft order to the final assessment order.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Act by the Joint CIT was mechanical and without due application of mind. This rendered the approval proceeding an empty ritual, not mandated by the Act or supported by judicial precedents. The Tribunal relied on decisions of the Delhi High Court and Orissa High Court, whose Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, thereby attaining finality. Consequently, the assessment orders for AY 2013-14 and AY 2014-15 were quashed as void ab initio. The Tribunal allowed Ground of Appeal No. 1, stating that since the entire assessment was quashed, the adjudication of other grounds became academic and were left open. The operative direction was to quash the assessment orders.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to justify its very low gross profit computations for the initial assessment years and the lower authorities did not discuss comparable segmental revenues. The Tribunal decided to allow a lump sum GP estimation of 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, for justice, but stipulated it should not be treated as a precedent.

The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148, issued on 05.04.2022 for AY 2015-16, was time-barred. This followed the Supreme Court's decision in UOI & Ors. Vs Rajeev Bansal, which stated that notices issued on or after 01.04.2021 for AY 2015-16 are time-barred.