Loading ITAT cases…
1,215 orders · Page 15 of 25
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on the legal ground concerning the validity of the reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal noted that for AY 2017-18, the three-year period from the end of the assessment year lapsed on 31.03.2021, which falls within the period covered by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA). This extended the time limit for granting approval till 30.06.2021. However, the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 were issued on 18.07.2022 (as per ground 2, and implied by the date of assessment order 19.05.2023 and NFAC order 09.05.2025, though the specific date of notice under 148A(d) is not explicitly stated in the facts, the argument refers to 30.07.2022 in paragraph 8.3 of the quoted text). Since this was beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the case fell under section 151(ii) of the amended law, requiring approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General. The approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, which was not the competent authority. Therefore, the notice was invalid and bad in law. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional Delhi High Court and the co-ordinate bench, quashing the reassessment order. Other grounds were rendered academic.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred in accepting additional evidence without calling for a remand report from the AO and decided the appeal in favor of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) observed that the AO drew adverse conclusions without proper verification, ignored material evidence, and relied on unsubstantiated assumptions, incorrectly invoking Section 69A. However, the Tribunal decided that the matter needed to be sent back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The CIT(A) deleted additions for a director's case based on ownership by others but sustained additions in the hands of the assessee company on a protective basis, shifting the onus to the assessee to provide particulars of the actual owners.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's deposits, including those from an NRE savings account with Yes Bank and other accounts with Canara Bank and ICICI Bank, could not be treated as unexplained. Reliance was placed on the case law Nitin Mavji Vekariya Vs. ITO.
The Tribunal held that the initial TDS return was filed within the due date as evidenced by the acknowledgement. Therefore, there was no justification for levying the fee under section 234E.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was passed by an officer without jurisdiction, rendering the entire assessment proceedings void ab initio. Consequently, the appeal was allowed on this legal ground.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special regime for assessments involving the DRP, which operates notwithstanding the general limitation period in Section 153. The time taken for the DRP process is statutorily defined and intended to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) rightly admitted additional evidence as the AO did not comment on its relevance in the remand report. The Tribunal also found that the grounds for deleting additions on account of unexplained credits and gross profit by the CIT(A) were justified.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to justify its very low gross profit computations for the initial assessment years and the lower authorities did not discuss comparable segmental revenues. The Tribunal decided to allow a lump sum GP estimation of 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, for justice, but stipulated it should not be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal in the interest of justice, acknowledging the reasonable cause presented by the assessee. While noting the assessee's non-cooperative conduct and the AO's ex-parte order, the Tribunal decided to remit the issues back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to justify its very low gross profit computations for the initial assessment years and the lower authorities did not discuss comparable segmental revenues. The Tribunal decided to allow a lump sum GP estimation of 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, for justice, but stipulated it should not be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals as infructuous. It was established that in the context of abated assessments under Section 153A/153C, an assessee is entitled to lodge new claims, similar to filing a fresh return.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to justify its very low gross profit computations for the initial assessment years and the lower authorities did not discuss comparable segmental revenues. The Tribunal decided to allow a lump sum GP estimation of 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, for justice, but stipulated it should not be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal considered the issue of disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) concerning director's remuneration. The revenue failed to provide market rate comparisons to justify the disallowance, a point supported by a precedent case.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the case of Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, stating that technicalities should not impede substantial justice. The issue of assessing enhanced land acquisition compensation interest was considered debatable.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Joint Commissioner under Section 153D was not valid as it lacked application of mind and was granted mechanically for multiple years. Therefore, the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153A were quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 19 days in filing the assessee's appeal, citing the larger interest of justice and the precedent set in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC). The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps at various levels. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the assessee's appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a fresh adjudication. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to provide three effective opportunities of hearing to the appellant, at the appellant's risk and responsibility. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the period for assessment years under Section 153C is to be calculated from the date of receipt of seized documents by the Assessing Officer of the non-searched person, not the date of the original search. Since the notice for AY 2011-12 was issued beyond the ten-year period calculated from the receipt date, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer was not tenable.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The impugned order was quashed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, holding that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was barred by limitation. The Assessment Year 2011-12 was found to be outside the ten-year period calculated from the end of the assessment year in which the seized material was received by the AO.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that the date of receipt of seized material by the assessee's AO is the relevant date for calculating the ten-year period under Section 153C. Therefore, the assessments for the years in question were beyond the prescribed limitation.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on all grounds. Regarding the addition under Section 68 (Ground No. 2), the Tribunal noted that the assessee had furnished PAN, ROC entries, audit reports, and investor confirmations. It also referred to a coordinate bench decision that deleted additions for M/s Goodluck Industries Ltd. The Tribunal did not provide a specific finding on the other investors for this ground, but the overall allowance implies satisfaction with the assessee's submissions. For the addition under Section 56(2)(viib) (Ground No. 3), the Tribunal held that the valuation done by a prescribed expert using a prescribed method cannot be rejected by the AO or CIT(A) who are not recognized as experts. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal deleted the protective addition. Regarding the enhancement of income (Ground No. 4), the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had enhanced the income without issuing a mandatory show cause notice under Section 250(1), making the action erroneous. For the disallowance of business expenses (Ground No. 6), the Tribunal held that once a business is set up and in operation, subsequent expenditure, even if business activities have reduced, is allowable as business expenditure under Section 37, citing the principle that business activity is a continuous process. Finally, concerning the difference in receipts shown in ITR vs. Form 26AS (Ground No. 7), the Tribunal noted that the AO made the addition based on a wrong amount of receipts and that the CIT(A) had not properly dealt with the issue. Therefore, the addition was deleted. The appeal was allowed in its entirety.
The Tribunal held that the assessee successfully discharged his onus by providing evidence from a voluminous paper-book, including revenue records and agricultural income receipts, to explain the cash deposit as agricultural income. The addition made by the lower authorities was deleted.
The Tribunal held that as per the proviso to Section 153C and judicial precedents, the ten-year period for assessment under Section 153C is to be calculated from the date of receipt of seized material by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person, not the date of the original search. Therefore, the assessment proceedings for AY 2011-12 were beyond the permissible period.
The Tribunal held that the period of assessment under Section 153C should be calculated based on the date of receipt of seized documents by the Assessing Officer of the non-searched person, not the date of the original search. Since the relevant assessment years in question fell outside this calculated period, the assumption of jurisdiction and the assessment orders were found to be beyond the prescribed limitation.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that the date of receipt of seized material by the assessee's AO is the relevant date for calculating the ten-year period under Section 153C. Therefore, the assessments for the years in question were beyond the prescribed limitation.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Joint Commissioner under Section 153D was not valid as it lacked application of mind and was granted mechanically for multiple years. Therefore, the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153A were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the AO did not summarily reject the assessee's explanation of cash deposits relating to regular business sales. Considering the explanation and the evidence, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to make a lump sum addition of Rs. 50 lakhs, not to be treated as a precedent. For the assessment under section 115BBE, it was held that the provision applies from 01.04.2017, and thus the assessee should be assessed under normal provisions.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps and deemed it appropriate to restore the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication in the interest of justice. The assessee was granted three effective opportunities of hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 125 days, acknowledging the assessee's submission that the delay was bonafide and due to circumstances beyond their control. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, ensuring a reasonable opportunity for the assessee to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should not be penalized for a technical lapse in not filing relevant documents at the appropriate time, especially when the tax has already been deposited. The end of justice requires allowing the assessee to file additional evidence.
The Tribunal decided that the impugned cash deposits of Rs. 25.95 lakhs were not unexplained. The reasoning was based on the fact that the assessee had withdrawn a total of Rs. 48.40 lakhs in the relevant financial year 2011-12, and the cash flow statement filed by the assessee, which was not disputed by the lower authorities, indicated that these deposits represented the assessee's cash withdrawals. The Tribunal inferred that the cash deposits were almost double the cash withdrawals made in the relevant financial year. Therefore, no merit was found in the impugned addition, and it was deleted. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 233 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC should be condoned. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), which established that technical aspects must give way to the cause of substantial justice. The reasoning was that the assessee had explained the reasons for the delay, and these were circumstances beyond his control. The Tribunal condoned the delay and restored the assessee's appeal to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The taxpayer was directed to plead and prove the case at his own risk and responsibility in the consequential proceedings. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee could support the CIT(A)'s order by raising grounds not adjudicated by the CIT(A), even if it meant raising an issue that could potentially affect the appeal. The issue of limitation for penalty imposition was considered a valid ground.
While the assessee did not fully discharge the onus of proving the source of cash deposits, a lumpsum addition of Rs.1 lakh is deemed just and proper, not to be treated as a precedent. For assessment under section 115BBE, the impugned provision applies only to transactions on or after 01.04.2017.
The Tribunal noted that the department had conceded in previous cases that the provisions of Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 ('TOLA') would not apply to AY 2014-15 and that notices issued on or after 01.04.2021 would be dropped. Following pronouncements from the Supreme Court and jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal held that the notice issued under section 148 was beyond the period of limitation.
The Tribunal held that the order of the PCIT was not sustainable. The interest received under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act is part of enhanced compensation and exempt under Section 10(37) of the Act, aligning with Supreme Court decisions.
The Tribunal acknowledged that there is no dispute that the assessee is in the business of electrical goods and that the possibility of sourcing from unregistered dealers cannot be ruled out. It also noted that the assessee's sales have not been questioned. The Tribunal observed that various recent judicial precedents on the issue of bogus purchases have shown divergent views. Faced with these circumstances, the Tribunal decided, in the larger interest of justice, to allow a lumpsum disallowance at 8% of the alleged bogus purchases, amounting to Rs. 12,73,328/-. This decision is not to be treated as a precedent. The assessee's book entries are rejected to this extent, and necessary computation will follow as per law. No other ground or argument was pressed. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the question of whether the entire purchases were bogus.
The Tribunal held that Sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive and interdependent. Consequently, the limitation period for passing the final assessment order must be considered under both sections. In all ten cases, the final assessment orders were found to be passed beyond the prescribed statutory timelines.
The Tribunal held that a return filed under Section 153C should be treated as a return under Section 139, allowing for fresh claims. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal as infructuous, which was incorrect in the context of Section 153C assessments.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C, which deals with the procedure for passing final assessment orders after draft orders and DRP directions, operates notwithstanding the general limitation period prescribed in Section 153. The special regime under Section 144C governs the time from the draft order to the final assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have confronted the additional evidence and submissions with the Assessing Officer before adjudicating. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for a fresh examination after obtaining a remand report from the AO.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have confronted the additional evidence and submissions with the Assessing Officer before adjudicating. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for a fresh examination after obtaining a remand report from the AO.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 125 days, acknowledging the assessee's submission that the delay was bonafide and due to circumstances beyond their control. The Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, ensuring a reasonable opportunity for the assessee to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's explanation of accumulated cash savings and financial assistance from siblings lacked evidentiary support and contemporaneous evidence. The affidavits from siblings were self-serving and executed much after the assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the larger interest of justice. The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps and decided to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice was invalid because the approval for its issuance was not obtained from the appropriate authority as mandated by Section 151 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the CIT(A)'s order. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's sole substantive grievance. It reasoned that the assessee had consistently pleaded and demonstrated commercial expediency in investing the impugned sum in its 100% subsidiary, which was running a power plant. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that this claim had been accepted in earlier assessment years, starting from AY 2012-13. The CIT(A) had also made a categorical finding that the assessee borrowed funds specifically for investment in this subsidiary. The Tribunal concluded that the CIT(A)'s discussion, holding that the assessee proved commercial expediency in making investments with the group company in light of the S.A. Builders (supra) decision, was sound. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings. The ratio decidendi is that advances to a subsidiary company, even if interest-free, are allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(iii) if made on grounds of commercial expediency, a principle established by the Supreme Court in S.A. Builders Ltd.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee is engaged in the business of mild steel scrap and sourcing from unregistered dealers cannot be ruled out. Considering the facts and various judicial precedents, a lumpsum disallowance of 6% of the alleged bogus purchases was deemed appropriate in the interest of justice.