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1,215 orders · Page 13 of 25
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC's discussion had proceeded ex-parte and did not find any substantive lower appellate adjudication. It was acknowledged that communication gaps might have occurred due to the faceless hearing system.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee is engaged in the construction business, where some cash turnover cannot be ruled out, and importantly, their corresponding sales have not been questioned. The Tribunal noted the existence of divergent judicial views on the issue of bogus purchases, citing several recent precedents from various High Courts and the ITAT. Faced with these facts and the divergent legal opinions, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate in the larger interest of justice to allow a lump sum disallowance at 8% of the total alleged bogus purchases, which amounted to Rs. 63,84,000/-. This decision is to be without prejudice to it being treated as a precedent. Necessary computations are to be made as per law. No other grounds were pressed.
The Tribunal held that the reopening initiated by the ITO was not sustainable in law. This was because the assessee, being a corporate entity declaring income of Rs. 30 lakh or more, should have been assessed by a Deputy or Assistant Commissioner as per CBDT Circular No. 1/2011.
The Tribunal held that the income declared by the assessee should be considered as income from business or profession. It respectfully followed the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sultan Brothers (P.) Ltd., Rayala Corporation (P.) Ltd., and PCIT vs. M.P. Entertainment and Developers (P.) Ltd. These judgments clarified that merely an entry in the object clause is not determinative; the circumstances of each case must be examined to ascertain if letting is a business. The Tribunal noted that the assessee not only leased premises but also provided essential amenities and facilities, making the space operational. Furthermore, for several past assessment years, the income was accepted as business income, supporting the principle of consistency as laid down in Radhasoami Satsang vs. CIT. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed all grounds of the Revenue and confirmed the CIT(A)'s order, holding the income as business income. The issue regarding admission of additional evidence was not explicitly decided but the primary issue of income classification was ruled in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities, including providing various services to occupants and engaging a large workforce, constituted a systematic and organized business activity. Therefore, the income derived from the IT park should be treated as business income, not rental income.
The tribunal noted that the approval for reopening was mechanical and lacking specific satisfaction from the prescribed authority. Citing a Supreme Court judgment, it was held that such mechanical approval vitiates the entire reopening process. Therefore, the reopening was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the non-maintenance of an item-wise stock register alone is not sufficient cause to reject books of accounts under Section 145(3), especially when the assessee deals with a large variety of items and physically verifies stock. The Tribunal also found that the cash deposits during demonetization were not a new phenomenon for the assessee and were supported by past and subsequent cash deposit patterns, as well as judicial precedents.
The Tribunal acknowledged that while there might not have been a reasonable cause for non-compliance with all notices, the default was the same. The penalty under Section 271(1)(b) is deterrent in nature and not for revenue generation. Therefore, the penalty should be levied only for the first default.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction note for initiating re-assessment proceedings did not explicitly state that the seized material had a "bearing on the determination of the total income of such other person." This rendered the re-opening unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the payments for AMC of equipment, including day-to-day maintenance, repairs, and upkeep, qualify as 'work' under Section 194C, not as professional or technical services under Section 194J.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after a draft order. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, making the assessment not void for limitation.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, including DRP proceedings and the final order.
The Tribunal decided to adjudicate Ground No. 11 first, which challenged the validity of the assessment order concerning the approval granted under Section 153D. The assessee argued that the approval granted by the Ld. Addl. CIT was mechanical. The Tribunal, relying on the Hon'ble Delhi High Court's judgment in Shiv Kumar Nayyar (supra) and the dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court in ACIT vs Serajuddin & Co., held that approval under Section 153D is mandatory and requires application of mind. The Tribunal found that the approval in this case was granted mechanically, with a single approval for seven assessment years and no indication of the approving authority's thought process. The approval memo was silent on the issues involved. Therefore, the assessment order, based on such ritualistic approval, was vitiated and quashed. Consequently, Ground of Appeal No. 11 was allowed. As this legal ground was decided in favour of the assessee, the Tribunal held that other grounds of appeal were not adjudicated. The same reasoning was applied to all other appeals for the subsequent assessment years, as the approval was common and the issue of Section 153D approval was identical.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment order. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had explained the source of investment amounting to Rs.13,00,000/- as a gift received from his son, which was accepted in the lower appellate proceedings. Regarding the remaining sum of Rs.3,00,000/-, the Tribunal was of the considered view that the possibility of the assessee's accumulated past savings and cash-in-hand could not be altogether denied, keeping in mind the socio-economic status in such cases. Consequently, the impugned addition of Rs.3,00,000/- was deleted. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment order. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment order. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment order. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment order. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment order. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the impugned final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and material on record. The assessee had submitted details of gold purchased from 2012 to 2017 with bills, and a Customs Export Certificate dated 20.06.2022, valuing jewellery at Rs. 1,21,57,980/- with a total weight of 3124.94 grams. The assessee also submitted details of purchases totalling 3415.553 grams at a value of Rs. 1,29,39,519/- before the impugned assessment year. The Tribunal noted a difference of 290.593 grams between the Customs declared weight and the assessee's total purchase weight. Regarding the quantity, the Tribunal agreed with the Ld. CIT(A)'s findings, considering the difference not substantial, especially since the assessee declared before Customs in a subsequent financial year. However, concerning the rate, the Tribunal found the Ld. CIT(A)'s adopted rate of Rs. 4,000 per gram to be on the higher side. The Tribunal calculated the actual cost to the assessee as Rs. 3788/- per gram (Rs. 1,29,39,519 / 3415.533 grams). Therefore, the AO was directed to adopt the value of Rs. 3788/- per gram instead of Rs. 4000/-. The ground raised by the assessee was partly allowed.
The Tribunal observed that the shares were issued to existing shareholders and based on an independent valuer's report. The rounding off of the share value to the nearest denomination and issuance to existing shareholders were considered. The Tribunal held that Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act was not applicable in this case.
The Tribunal held that the issue was squarely covered in favor of the assessee by the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT vs. Lemon Tree Hotels Ltd. The Tribunal further held that the pendency of an SLP by the department against the High Court's decision cannot be a reason to deny the claim, which is currently supported by the High Court's ruling.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT did not have the jurisdiction to cancel the assessee's registration. Following previous judgments and CBDT notifications, the Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Exemptions) was the prescribed authority for such matters.
The Tribunal held that regarding the cash deposits during demonetization, a lumpsum estimation of Rs. 1,27,92,500/- at 8% or the declared amount, whichever is higher, would be just and proper, with a rider that it should not be treated as a precedent. This decision acknowledges the cash-intensive nature of the business and the partial failure of the assessee to fully discharge its onus. For the GP estimation, the Tribunal found that there was no specific rejection of the assessee's books supporting the declared GP of 10.82%. Therefore, it deemed a GP of 11.25% to be just and proper in the larger interest of justice, also stating it should not be treated as a precedent. Regarding Section 115BBE, the Tribunal, relying on the Madras High Court decision, held that the provision comes into effect for transactions done on or after 01.04.2017. Thus, the assessee was directed to be assessed under normal provisions. The operative directions include a revised estimation of cash deposits and GP, and assessment under normal provisions for Section 115BBE.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C, which deals with the procedure for assessment in cases of eligible assessees, operates notwithstanding the general limitation period prescribed in Section 153. The special regime under Section 144C governs the time from the draft order to the final assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Joint Commissioner under Section 153D was not valid as it lacked application of mind and was granted mechanically for multiple years. Therefore, the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153A were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the denial of deduction u/s 54B was correct because the new agricultural land was purchased in the name of the assessee's wife, not in his own name. This was in line with the judgments of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court and the Supreme Court's dismissal of a related SLP.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C, which deals with the procedure for passing final assessment orders after draft orders and DRP directions, operates notwithstanding Section 153. The time taken for the DRP process is statutorily created for the benefit of the assessee and does not render the assessment void.
The Tribunal noted the CIT(A)/NFAC's clear finding that no amount of Rs. 40 lakhs formed the subject matter of any transaction between the assessee and M/s. A.K. Trading Company. This factual finding went unrebutted by the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the denial of deduction u/s 54B was correct because the new agricultural land was purchased in the name of the assessee's wife, not in his own name. This was in line with the judgments of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court and the Supreme Court's dismissal of a related SLP.
The Tribunal held that the reopening was invalid because the notice was issued by an officer who lacked the pecuniary jurisdiction as per CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011. This instruction dictates which officer can handle cases based on the income declared.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had correctly noted that the assessee had furnished details of donors, including PAN and ITR, and thus the provisions for anonymous donations were not applicable. Regarding fabrication charges, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had found that the purchase of buses and payment for fabrication were substantiated and the disallowance was made solely due to a mismatch in the name on the TDS certificate.
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps. Considering the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication.
The ITAT held that the CIT(A) had correctly set aside the penalty order. This was because a previous order by the ITAT in ITA No. 1413 & 435/Del/2021 had already set aside the original assessment order on the grounds of invalid assumption of jurisdiction. Consequently, any penalty derived from that assessment would also be unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special regime for finalization of assessments after a draft order, operating notwithstanding the general limitation period in Section 153. The time consumed in the DRP process is statutorily created for the benefit of the assessee and does not render the assessment void.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C, which deals with the procedure for passing final assessment orders after draft orders, operates notwithstanding the general limitation period prescribed under Section 153. The special regime of Section 144C governs the time from the draft order to the final assessment.
The Tribunal held that the impugned final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was quashed on this limited legal issue.
The Tribunal found that the functional profile of the assessee was not adequately analyzed by the TPO and that certain comparable companies were incorrectly included. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the AO/TPO for a fresh determination of the Arm's Length Price (ALP).
The tribunal held that the Revenue's arguments did not impress them. They noted that the assessee's Assessing Officer had not recorded any satisfaction that the seized valuables/assets had a "bearing" on the determination of the assessee's total income. The tribunal relied on the case law Saksham Commodities Ltd. Vs. ITO.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271B cannot be levied for failure to maintain books of account as contemplated by Section 44AA of the Act. If the assessee has not maintained accounts, the offense is complete under Section 44AA, and there can be no further offense contemplated by Section 44AB, making the imposition of penalty under Section 271B erroneous.
The assessee appealed to the CIT(A), who agreed with the AO and dismissed the appeal. The assessee then appealed to the ITAT. The ITAT noted that the assessee could not appear before the AO and the CIT(A) had not adequately dealt with the submissions. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the AO for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal found that the assessee could not substantiate its low GP computation for the earlier assessment years, and the lower authorities had not considered comparable segmental revenues when enhancing the GP. The Tribunal, in the interest of justice, directed a lump sum GP estimation at 8% or the declared rate, whichever is higher, with the rider that it would not be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal held that there was an apparent linkage between the cash deposit in the assessee's bank account and the alimony received from her estranged husband, as per the court order dated 05.12.2019. The lower authorities failed to appreciate this fact.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders in all ten cases were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation. Therefore, the assessment orders were quashed as being barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage. Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, including DRP proceedings.
The Tribunal found that the AO's ex-parte order and the CIT(A)'s dismissal on limitation grounds were not sustainable. In the interest of justice, the issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the AO's ex-parte order and the CIT(A)'s dismissal on limitation grounds were not sustainable. In the interest of justice, the issues were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.