Loading ITAT cases…
808 orders · Page 6 of 17
The Tribunal held that since the CIT(A)/NFAC had proceeded ex-parte against the assessee, there was a possibility of communication gaps, especially with the introduction of faceless hearings. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The assessee was granted three effective opportunities to plead and prove their case at their own risk and responsibility. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the possibility of family members having cash was not satisfactorily proved but also not entirely denied. Therefore, in the interest of justice, a lump sum addition of Rs. 2 lakhs was deemed appropriate, with a rider that it should not be treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's exercise of Section 263 jurisdiction, based on the assessee not following IND AS103 for AY 2016-17, was not legal, as clarified by Finance Act, 2021. The Finance Act confirmed that depreciation on goodwill was not applicable for the assessment year in question, rendering the PCIT's order unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order was not sustainable as the AO's view was based on Supreme Court decisions affirming that interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act is part of enhanced compensation. The Tribunal distinguished the High Court decisions relied upon by the PCIT.
The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 67 is directory and not mandatory. The assessee had subsequently complied with the filing requirement. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim for foreign tax credit, following its own precedent.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) should have heard the appeal on merits after providing the assessee with an opportunity of being heard. In the interest of justice and fair play, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The reasoning was that even though the assessee failed to appear, the appellate authority has a duty to ensure that an appeal is decided on merits after affording a proper hearing. Therefore, the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside. The operative direction was to remand the appeal back to the Ld. CIT(A) for a decision on merits after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard. No specific issue was left undecided, as the matter was sent back for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear before the AO and CIT(A) despite several notices, but also considered the assessee's plea of medical ailment. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the AO and CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the AO for a fresh decision, ensuring a fair opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions. It found that the interest on bank overdraft was for commercial expediency, and the cash deposits and credits related to genuine purchases whose trading results were accepted by the AO.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee wished to withdraw one of the appeals (ITA No. 3071/DEL/2025) and pursue the other (ITA No. 2963/DEL/2025). Since the Departmental Representative had no objection, the Tribunal allowed the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, dated 13.05.2016, was illegal. The Tribunal found that the approval was granted mechanically and without application of mind, as evidenced by the discrepancies in the returned income versus the assessed income and the lack of examination of assessment records or search material. This finding is based on the judicial precedents, including the Delhi High Court's decision in PCIT vs. Anuj Bansal's case, which emphasized the necessity of proper application of mind by the approving authority. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the approval under Section 153D as invalid and bad in law. The assessment order passed by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) was deemed unsustainable and set aside. As the penalty orders were consequential to the assessment order, they were also set aside. The Tribunal did not leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient documentation to prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the unsecured loans. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had failed to provide an opportunity to rectify procedural defects, and thus, the additions made by the AO were deleted.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT lacked the jurisdiction to cancel the registration. The reference from the Assessing Officer was made after the assessment proceedings concluded, and the relevant legal provisions for cancellation were not in existence or properly invoked at the time. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment orders themselves did not find fault with the charitable activities.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's business had commenced, citing a previous order for an earlier assessment year. Therefore, disallowance of expenses on finance cost and depreciation was invalid. The issue of restricting other expenses was to be adjudicated with a related appeal.
The Tribunal held that the AO disallowed credit card payments based on SFT information and that the assessee had provided credit card statements. The disallowance exceeding the total credit card payments made by the assessee was directed to be deleted. A disallowance of 25% of the total credit card payments was deemed appropriate on account of personal expenditure.
The Tribunal noted that the advance was received via cheque as per a receipt issued to Mr. Vinod Tyagi. The search revealed no evidence of cash receipt. The Tribunal found the source of the Rs. 50,00,000/- to be fully explained and thus deleted the addition.
The Tribunal noted that a moratorium was imposed by the NCLT. Consequently, the present appeal filed by the Assessee was held to be not maintainable and was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the penalty was not automatic upon disallowance and that the assessee had disclosed all relevant facts. It was noted that the Form 3CL was received late, and the assessee had suo motu revised the computation. The AO failed to demonstrate concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, dated 13.05.2016, was illegal. The Tribunal found that the approval was granted mechanically and without application of mind, as evidenced by the discrepancies in the returned income versus the assessed income and the lack of examination of assessment records or search material. This finding is based on the judicial precedents, including the Delhi High Court's decision in PCIT vs. Anuj Bansal's case, which emphasized the necessity of proper application of mind by the approving authority. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the approval under Section 153D as invalid and bad in law. The assessment order passed by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) was deemed unsustainable and set aside. As the penalty orders were consequential to the assessment order, they were also set aside. The Tribunal did not leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the Learned DR raised no objection to the withdrawal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to revive it if the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme application fails.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in quashing the additions made by the AO based on a circular not applicable to 'Complete Scrutiny' cases. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal considered the application for withdrawal of the appeal filed by the assessee. The assessee's stated reason for withdrawal was its decision to settle the disputed issues under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, and it had provided documentary evidence in the form of Form No. 2. The Tribunal noted that the Learned DR had no objection to the withdrawal. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's application and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The Tribunal also granted liberty to the assessee to revive the appeal in the event that its application under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, fails to mature. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal. Regarding the addition of Rs. 2,68,000, the Tribunal noted that the case was reopened based on cash deposits, and while the AO rejected the source of cash deposits out of cash withdrawals, the assessee submitted that cash withdrawals of Rs. 24,40,000 were made and re-deposited. The Tribunal observed that the assessee provided an opening cash balance of Rs. 24,40,000 as of 08.11.2016 in the cash book, which was duly deposited. The Tribunal found sufficient cash withdrawals to support the assessee's submissions and stated that if deposits are traceable to recent withdrawals, they cannot be rejected. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed. The Tribunal did not explicitly address grounds 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 but by allowing the appeal based on the reasoning for the primary additions, it implicitly set aside the consequential aspects.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, dated 13.05.2016, was illegal. The Tribunal found that the approval was granted mechanically and without application of mind, as evidenced by the discrepancies in the returned income versus the assessed income and the lack of examination of assessment records or search material. This finding is based on the judicial precedents, including the Delhi High Court's decision in PCIT vs. Anuj Bansal's case, which emphasized the necessity of proper application of mind by the approving authority. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the approval under Section 153D as invalid and bad in law. The assessment order passed by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) was deemed unsustainable and set aside. As the penalty orders were consequential to the assessment order, they were also set aside. The Tribunal did not leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the case of the assessee's brother, with similar facts, was remanded to the CIT(A). Following that precedent, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found the assessee's request to withdraw one of the appeals to be valid, given that the same appeal was filed twice through different modes. The Tribunal allowed the withdrawal.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee has opted to settle the disputed issues under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 and allowed the withdrawal of appeals with liberty to revive.
The Tribunal held that the transfer of a capital asset by a company to its wholly-owned Indian subsidiary is not regarded as a transfer under Section 47(iv) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the capital gains offered were not taxable.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee has opted to settle the disputed issues under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 and allowed the withdrawal of appeals with liberty to revive.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted to settle the issues under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and had filed for withdrawal of the appeal. The Ld. Sr. DR had no objection.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax under section 153D of the Act was mechanical and without due application of mind. The Tribunal noted that a consolidated approval for multiple assessment years and multiple cases was granted by a single order on the same day. Furthermore, the approval letter itself contained discrepancies, mentioning assessment years (2012-13 to 2018-19) that were different from the years for which approval was sought (2010-11 to 2015-16). This indicated a lack of proper scrutiny and application of mind by the approving authority. Citing precedents from its own coordinate benches, particularly the case of Sanjay Duggal Versus ACIT, the Tribunal concluded that such approvals are vitiated and deserve to be quashed. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed, and the legal ground raised by the assessee was allowed. As the assessment itself was quashed, other grounds were rendered academic and were not adjudicated upon.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax under section 153D of the Act was mechanical and without due application of mind. The Tribunal noted that a consolidated approval for multiple assessment years and multiple cases was granted by a single order on the same day. Furthermore, the approval letter itself contained discrepancies, mentioning assessment years (2012-13 to 2018-19) that were different from the years for which approval was sought (2010-11 to 2015-16). This indicated a lack of proper scrutiny and application of mind by the approving authority. Citing precedents from its own coordinate benches, particularly the case of Sanjay Duggal Versus ACIT, the Tribunal concluded that such approvals are vitiated and deserve to be quashed. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed, and the legal ground raised by the assessee was allowed. As the assessment itself was quashed, other grounds were rendered academic and were not adjudicated upon.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee has opted to settle the disputed issues under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 and allowed the withdrawal of appeals with liberty to revive.
The tribunal, relying on decisions of the jurisdictional High Court (MAKE MY TRIP INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED) and the Supreme Court (Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal), held that the notice under Section 148 for AY 2015-16 was time-barred. It concluded that the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) was not applicable for this assessment year, rendering the impugned notice and subsequent assessment proceedings void ab initio. The final assessment order passed under Sections 144, 147, and 144C(13) was quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide requisite information during assessment. However, considering the assessee's statement to cooperate and furnish all relevant material if the issue is restored, and the contention regarding GST treatment in sales, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the AO for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition. It reasoned that sales already recorded in the books of account cannot be added again under Section 68, as this would amount to double taxation. Furthermore, recorded sales are not the same as unexplained cash credits.
The Tribunal held that the issue is covered by previous decisions of the High Court and Tribunal in the assessee's own case. These prior rulings established that the receipts from data transmission services are not royalty under the Act or the DTAA.
The Tribunal noted that the Revenue had no objection to the withdrawal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to revive it if the VSVS settlement does not mature.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT wrongly assumed jurisdiction under Section 263 as the AO had made necessary inquiries and applied his mind. The assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of revenue.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, finding that the bank accounts belonged to M/s Sahara India and the Assessee was only an authorized signatory, with her PAN wrongly linked. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) as the Department provided no contrary evidence.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in assuming jurisdiction under section 263, as the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The Tribunal noted that the AO had not made any additions, and re-opening on issues that could not have led to additions was not justified. The revision directions of the PCIT were reversed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to substantiate its claim for reimbursement expenses by providing necessary bills and vouchers to the AO and CIT(A). The disallowance made by the AO was found to be reasonable and justified.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was unable to respond to notices due to illness and lack of technological knowledge. The Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer to decide the issues afresh after giving the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that communication gaps, especially with new virtual hearing mechanisms, could not be ruled out, and there was a lack of compliance with Section 250(6) in the lower appellate order. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the PCIT under Section 151 for reopening the assessment was mechanical, evidenced by phrases like 'yes I am satisfied' or 'approved', indicating a lack of application of mind. Citing High Court precedents, the Tribunal ruled that such mechanical approval invalidates the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147. Consequently, the entire reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed to have produced the ledger account, ITR acknowledgment, bank statement reflecting banking channel transactions, and balance sheet of the lender. The addition was made on the grounds of incomplete 'complete copy of return of income' and 'balance sheet' of the lender. The assessee argued that lower authorities ignored the fact that loans were taken through banking channels and that the 'source of the source' need not be proved for the year under consideration. The Department's case was that incomplete documents were provided and the director of the lender was not produced. Considering that the assessee had produced certain documents, which were claimed to be incomplete by the Department, and in the absence of material to examine the factual dispute, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice, decided to remand the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to produce complete documents to the satisfaction of the CIT(A), who was directed to adjudicate the issue afresh in accordance with law after considering all provided documents. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the appeal by the CIT(A) in ex-parte proceedings without affording a reasonable opportunity to the assessee violated principles of natural justice. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submissions regarding the delay and the timing of the appeal.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to appear before the AO and CIT(A) and did not respond to notices. However, considering the facts, the Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the AO for denovo assessment after affording a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the issue of notional income from unsold flats needed fresh factual verification by the Assessing Officer. Regarding Section 43CA, it was held that the provision is not attracted if income was already assessed in earlier years, and the addition was to be recomputed considering the DVO's valuation and a tolerance margin.
The Tribunal held that the issue of notional income from unsold flats needed fresh factual verification by the Assessing Officer. Regarding Section 43CA, it was held that the provision is not attracted if income was already assessed in earlier years, and the addition was to be recomputed considering the DVO's valuation and a tolerance margin.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had proceeded ex-parte and there might have been communication gaps due to the new faceless hearing system. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.