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808 orders · Page 16 of 17
The Tribunal held that the PCIT failed to establish that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The issues of FDR interest and Section 14A disallowance were found to have been duly examined by the AO during original assessment proceedings.
The tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Act was invalid as it was consolidated for multiple assessment years instead of being specific to each year. Additionally, for AY 2017-18, the satisfaction note was recorded after the relevant date, vitiating the assessment.
The Tribunal held that neither party's arguments could be accepted in entirety. The assessees had not been able to specifically reconcile or verify the impugned cash deposits before the Assessing Officer, nor could the Revenue's contentions brush aside the assessees' detailed explanations. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to make lump sum additions of Rs. 10 lakhs and Rs. 5 lakhs, appeal-wise, respectively, with a rider that these shall not be treated as a precedent. Regarding Section 115BBE, the Tribunal noted the Madras High Court's decision in SMILE Microfinance Ltd. v. ACIT, which held that Section 115BBE applies to transactions on or after 01.04.2017. The Assessing Officer was directed to ensure that the assessees are assessed under normal provisions for the reduced additions of Rs. 10 lakhs and Rs. 5 lakhs. No other ground or argument was raised.
The Tribunal held that the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 of the Act was invalid. The assessee had purchased the residential flat along with Ms. Rachna Gupta. The allotment letter and loan sanction letter clearly indicated co-ownership. In the absence of a definite apportionment ratio, the Tribunal construed the ownership as equal. Consequently, the value of the property in the hands of the assessee, Manoj Kumar Gupta, was less than Rs. 50 lakhs. Therefore, the reopening of the assessment beyond three years, as per Section 149(1)(b) of the Act, was not permissible. The Tribunal found that the assessee had made payments through regular banking channels, utilizing his SBI NRE account and a housing loan from PNB Housing Finance Ltd. All payments were duly reflected in the bank statements and supported by documentary evidence. The assessee, being a non-resident since 2003, had adequately explained the source of funds for the property purchase. Accordingly, the addition made under Section 69 of the Act on merits was also deleted. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that no disallowance of interest need to be made under Rule 8D(2)(ii) as the assessee had sufficient interest-free funds. It also directed the AO to restrict the disallowance under Section 14A to the amount already suo moto disallowed by the assessee. The Tribunal further held that Section 40(a)(ia) is not applicable for short deduction of tax at source, upholding the deletion of disallowance.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not dealt with the matter on merits as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits after providing the assessee with an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that Section 238 of the IBC overrides the Income Tax Act, and all claims, including those of the Income Tax Department, must be entertained by the Official Liquidator. Consequently, the appeals filed by both the Revenue and the assessee have become infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the appeal suffers from a low tax effect, being below the monetary limit fixed by the CBDT for filing appeals. The Tribunal noted that the SR.DR stated she was not authorized to argue the matter and that the appeal arises from a search action. However, without specific submissions from the authorized representative of the Revenue, and considering the low tax effect, the Tribunal found the appeal liable to be dismissed. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the appeal if the issues involved fall under any of the exceptions specified in para 3.1 and 3.2 of CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the case or whether the search action exception applied.
The Tribunal held that Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, overrides the Income Tax Act. Therefore, all claims, including those of the Income Tax Department, are to be entertained by the Official Liquidator.
The Tribunal held that Section 238 of the IBC overrides the Income Tax Act, and all claims, including those of the Income Tax Department, are to be entertained by the Official Liquidator. Consequently, the appeals filed by both the Revenue and the assessee have become infructuous.
The Tribunal held that Section 238 of the IBC overrides the Income Tax Act, and all claims, including those of the Income Tax Department, are to be entertained by the Official Liquidator. Consequently, the appeals became infructuous.
The Tribunal held that Section 238 of the IBC overrides the Income Tax Act, and all claims, including those of the Income Tax Department, must be entertained by the Official Liquidator. Consequently, the appeals filed by both the Revenue and the assessee have become infructuous.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal is in its third round of proceedings. The Tribunal addressed specific grounds raised by the assessee. Regarding additions concerning M/s Lloyd Cements Limited (LCL) and Keshlata Cancer Hospital Limited (KCHL) (Grounds 2.4, 2.6, 2.7), the assessee argued that the MOUs and related income belonged to SJAL. The AO relied on seized documents and found that the assessee could not prove these incomes were taxed in the hands of SJAL or any other entity. The Tribunal observed that the AO brought out that SJAL and other entities were controlled by the assessee, and there was no record to show these additions were made or offered in the hands of SJAL/any other entity. Therefore, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the AO's findings on these grounds. Concerning additions related to payments to Devinder Gupta and Sungold Capital Services Ltd., and cash receipts from Mr. Ohri (Grounds 2.12, 2.13, 2.21), the revenue argued that the assessee admitted seized documents in his handwriting but later retracted. The assessee also failed to provide evidence of how the cash receipts and profits on Fine Agromatics transactions were offered to tax. The AO was therefore correct in making additions for unaccounted receipts and profits. The Tribunal noted that the dates of payments to Devinder Gupta were not provided and not correlated with cash receipts. Regarding payments to Ashok Garg and Arvind Aggarwal (Grounds 2.26, 2.27), the assessee claimed these were made by SJAL/TLFL out of funds from VRL. The revenue pointed to seized documents showing cash payments but lacking source explanation or mention of SJAL. The assessee failed to prove the sources or that these were taxed in other entities' hands. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the AO's additions. For cash receipts from Ashok Mahajan (Ground 2.44), the assessee claimed these were on account of shares of HPML and tried to claim a loss on total transactions. However, the assessee failed to substantiate the sources of the cash. The AO added only the cash payment of Rs. 90,000/- from unexplained sources. The Tribunal held that the issue of granting benefit of loss on cheque transactions did not arise as the cash source was unexplained. The Tribunal also addressed additions on account of shares found from TLFL premises. The assessee argued these belonged to TLFL and others. The Tribunal noted that the warrant of authorization was in the assessee's name, he kept the documents, and admitted controlling entities like TLFL/SJAL. The burden was on the assessee to show how the shares were accounted for in other entities' balance sheets, which he failed to do. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the AO's findings on these additions. Overall, the Tribunal found no material infirmity in the assessment order and upheld the additions made by the AO.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal and that the CIT(A) had erred in dismissing it without considering the merits. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the salary and reimbursed expenses paid to Mrs. Renuka Gupta were genuine and reasonable, given her role and the assessee's scale of operations. The Tribunal emphasized that the Revenue failed to establish the payments were excessive and relied on judicial precedents that reasonable payments for services to specified persons do not trigger disallowance under Section 13(1)(c).
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that merely filing documentary evidence does not discharge the assessee's onus to prove the genuineness of unsecured loans, especially when partners disowned knowledge of supporting details. It was also noted that the onus was on the assessee to prove any illegality in the service of the Section 143(2) notice, which they failed to do.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) rejected the applications ex-parte, without appreciating the adjournment application and not dealing with the merits of the case.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) rejected the applications ex-parte, without appreciating the adjournment application and not dealing with the merits of the case.
The ITAT noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal on merits. Consequently, the ITAT remitted the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) with directions to decide the appeal afresh on merits, after granting the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The ITAT found the reasons for the 10-day delay reasonable and condoned it. It directed the CIT(A) to decide the issues of the ex parte assessment afresh, after providing the assessee adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, dismissing the Revenue's appeal. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings that the rebate/discount expenses were normal business practice and previously allowed, and the interest expenses were genuinely incurred for business purposes, as the AO had failed to provide contrary evidence.
The ITAT accepted the assessee's contention that non-appearance before the CIT(A) was unintentional due to the Director's father's grave ill-health. The Tribunal, therefore, remitted both appeals back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The ITAT accepted the assessee's contention that non-appearance before the CIT(A) was unintentional due to the Director's father's grave ill-health. The Tribunal, therefore, remitted both appeals back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The CIT(A) held that the assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Act was not sustainable and ought to have been finalized under section 153C. This was based on the proviso to section 153C(1) and various High Court decisions, which state that the date of receipt of search records should be considered the date of search for initiating proceedings under section 153C.
The Tribunal condoned the 412-day delay in filing the appeal, accepting the reasonable cause submitted. It found cogency in the assessee's argument regarding insufficient opportunity by the AO and remitted the entire matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, with directions to provide adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, as requested by the assessee. The Tribunal granted liberty to the assessee to revive the appeal if the VSVS application fails to mature, with the Registry not insisting on condonation of delay for recalling the order if the delay is due to the VSVS outcome communication.
The Tribunal noted that CBDT Circular No. 09/2024 dated 17.09.2024 revised the monetary limit for filing departmental appeals to the ITAT to Rs. 60 lakhs. As the tax effect in the present appeal was below this limit, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal as a low tax effect case, in line with CBDT Circulars Nos. 5/2024 and 9/2024, which prescribe monetary limits for filing appeals. The Department was granted the liberty to seek restoration of the appeal if it falls under specified exceptions or for any valid reason.
The Tribunal noted that the ex-parte order by the CIT(A)/NFAC might have resulted from communication gaps due to the new faceless hearing system. In the interest of justice, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee had prima facie explained the source of cash deposits from her petrol pump business. However, considering potential loopholes, a lump sum addition of Rs. 1,00,000 was deemed appropriate.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal admitted the additional evidences filed by the assessee. It remitted the issue back to the Assessing Officer with directions to consider the new evidences afresh, provide adequate opportunity to the assessee, and decide the matter in accordance with law.
The ITAT ruled that the CIT(A)'s dismissal of the appeal without deciding it on merits was impermissible. It remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity to be heard, and directed the assessee to cooperate.
The ITAT condoned the 18-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision on the merits, instructing that adequate opportunity of being heard be provided to the assessee.
The Tribunal, proceeding ex parte, upheld the CIT(A)'s decision. It affirmed that for an AOP where the share of members is not determined, tax is chargeable at the maximum marginal rate, which includes surcharge at 37% as per Section 2(29C) and Section 164 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the related grounds concerning Health and Education Cess and interest were also dismissed.
The Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition, holding that the AO had failed to discharge the onus to prove the explanation unsatisfactory and had not rejected the assessee's books of account. It was noted that once purchases and sales declared in books (and VAT returns) are accepted, subsequent sales cannot be treated as unexplained cash credits under Section 68.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that the payments to GDA were for additional benefits leading to increased constructed area and higher revenue for the assessee, not for any offense or prohibited by law. Therefore, these payments were allowable as business expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act. The tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had dismissed the assessee's appeals ex parte for non-prosecution, without delving into the merits of the additions made under Section 69A of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal noted that for the Assessment Year 2015-16, on identical facts and circumstances, it had previously restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(Appeals) for fresh adjudication after providing an adequate opportunity to the assessee. Given that all these appeals arose from proceedings under Section 153A, and considering the precedent set for AY 2015-16, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore all the present appeals to the file of the CIT(Appeals) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to provide an adequate opportunity to the assessee. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order dated 23.01.2024 was invalid. The Judicial Member, relying on the landmark decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in ACIT Vs. Hotel Blue Moon (2010) 321 ITR 362 (SC), found that the issuance of a notice under section 143(2) is a mandatory compliance. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's own assessment order tabulated the notices issued and did not mention any compliance with section 143(2). Therefore, the failure to issue this mandatory notice vitiated the assessment proceedings. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the impugned assessment order. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by a single approval for multiple assessees and assessment years without mentioning seized material. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the AO had taken a possible view and had verified the information provided by the assessee. The PCIT, in revision, was not satisfied and sought to take another view. The Tribunal found that the issues raised by the PCIT were not acceptable and directed the AO to redo the verification. The Tribunal quashed the revision order and held that the additions were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that a disallowance of expenditure on an estimated basis under Section 14A cannot automatically lead to a penalty under Section 270A for under-reporting of income. The penalty provisions require more than just a difference in opinion on expenditure claims.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and without due application of mind, as evidenced by a consolidated approval for multiple cases on the same day. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting the assessee liberty to seek restoration if they failed to avail the DTVSV Scheme benefits for bonafide reasons.
The Tribunal agreed that interest on outstanding receivables from associated enterprises (AEs) constitutes an international transaction. However, it directed the AO/TPO to re-examine whether similar services were provided to unrelated parties without charging interest, as this could impact the imputation of notional interest.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had failed to address the Assessee's specific contention that its objections were not disposed of in compliance with the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. Vs. DCIT.
The Tribunal held that the AO wrongly assumed jurisdiction under Section 147 as the reasons recorded did not allege failure to disclose material facts, and the assessment had already been completed under Section 143(3). Therefore, the notice issued under Section 148 was time-barred.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was unrepresented and could not properly explain the transactions before the lower authorities. The documentary evidence suggests the amount was returned. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for a denovo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the section 143(2) notices were issued by an Income Tax Officer who lacked the necessary pecuniary jurisdiction, rendering the subsequent assessments void ab initio. The additional ground raised by the assessee regarding jurisdictional defect was allowed.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging that the entire purchases were bogus accommodation entries, decided to restrict the disallowance to 18% of the bogus purchases. This was based on the facts, the GST rate on cement, and the costs associated with obtaining accommodation entries, aiming for a fair estimation of the profit element.