Loading ITAT cases…
194 orders · Page 4 of 4
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were passed beyond the six-month limitation period prescribed under Section 275(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. As per the settled legal position, penalty orders passed after this period are invalid. Therefore, the penalty orders are bad in law and liable to be quashed.
The Tribunal held that the penalty orders were passed beyond the six-month limitation period prescribed under Section 275(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. As per the settled legal position, penalty orders passed after this period are invalid. Therefore, the penalty orders are bad in law and liable to be quashed.
The assessee contended that the property was mortgaged to South Indian Bank and sold by the bank under SARFAESI Act due to a company's loan default, and thus no capital gain accrued to them, citing the Kerala High Court decision in CIT vs. Thressiamma Abraham. However, the CIT(A) rejected this, relying on the Supreme Court decision in CIT vs. Attili N. Rao. The Tribunal, in agreement with the Supreme Court, held that capital gain is computed on the full price realized from the property belonging to the assessee, even if sold by the bank.
The Tribunal held that the delay in e-filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was a technical breach of procedure, especially considering that e-filing became mandatory recently and extensions were granted. Therefore, the CIT(A) was not justified in refusing to condone the delay.
The Tribunal held that the delay in e-filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was a technical breach of procedure, especially considering that e-filing became mandatory recently and extensions were granted. Therefore, the CIT(A) was not justified in refusing to condone the delay.
The Tribunal held that the delay in e-filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was a technical breach of procedure, especially considering that e-filing became mandatory recently and extensions were granted. Therefore, the CIT(A) was not justified in refusing to condone the delay.
The Tribunal held that the delay in e-filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was a technical breach of procedure, especially considering that e-filing became mandatory recently and extensions were granted. Therefore, the CIT(A) was not justified in refusing to condone the delay.
The Tribunal held that for revaluation of closing stock, the opening stock must also be revalued on the same basis, citing precedent. Regarding additions on account of cash credits, due to additional evidence filed by the assessee, the matter was restored to the AO for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that the notice of hearing was not validly served on the appellant as it was sent only through the ITBA portal, which is not a prescribed method under the Income Tax Act. Citing a Punjab & Haryana High Court decision, the Tribunal found that the principles of natural justice were violated.
The Tribunal held that notices served through the ITBA portal were not valid as per section 282(1) of the Income Tax Act and Rule 127(1) of the Income-tax Rules, citing a Punjab & Haryana High Court judgment. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order was set aside. The case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to file evidence.
The Tribunal held that the material on record indicated partners had overdrawn from their accounts, and no interest was charged by the firm despite making substantial interest payments. The disallowance of interest on overdrawn amounts was justified, relying on the Allahabad High Court decision in Laxmi Ice Factory v. CIT.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was ex-parte and lacked details regarding hearing notices, indicating a failure to provide a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A).
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) issued notice through email without proof of service. When no response was received, the CIT(A) should have issued notice through physical mode as per Section 262 of the Act.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was passed without sufficient material, against principles of natural justice, and in violation of IT Rules. The assessment and subsequent relief by the CIT(A) were considered subjective and not based on historical data or proper evidence.
The Tribunal noted that no evidence was provided by the assessee to prove that the commission payment was incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. Even if accepted as payment for procurement of orders, it was considered against public policy under Explanation (2) to section 37 of the Act.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that the assessee failed to prove mechanical approval by the JCIT under section 153D, relying on the presumption of bona fide action by statutory authorities. It further affirmed that additions were rightly made based on seized incriminating material and the assessee's own admission, and that expenditure related to unexplained income cannot be allowed under section 69C. The ruling in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. was cited to support the AO's jurisdiction for additions once incriminating material is found.
The Tribunal held that the issues raised in the present appeal were additional claims made before the CIT(A) and did not emanate from the consequential assessment order passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 263. It was also held that revisionary proceedings under Section 263 are prejudicial to the assessee, and no additional or new claims are admissible in proceedings consequent to such an order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT and that the additions were justified based on seized material and the assessee's admission. The Tribunal also relied on High Court judgments regarding the validity of assessment and additions based on extrapolated sales.
The CIT(A) quashed the assessment order holding it to be barred by limitation. The Tribunal, however, found that the assessment was completed within the time limit prescribed under Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is two years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was deemed illegal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, not being a banking company or holding a banking license from RBI, does not fall under the exempted categories for Section 269SS. The contention of a bonafide belief and reasonable cause for accepting cash deposits was rejected as not substantiated and not constituting a valid reason under Section 273B.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action of initiating revision proceedings under Section 263 was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the AO had examined the loose sheets and other digital documents, and after due verification, chose not to make certain additions. Furthermore, the previous deletion of similar additions by the Tribunal, due to lack of corroborative evidence, meant the assessment order could not be termed 'erroneous'. Therefore, the PCIT's order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action of initiating revision proceedings under Section 263 was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the AO had examined the loose sheets and other digital documents, and after due verification, chose not to make certain additions. Furthermore, the previous deletion of similar additions by the Tribunal, due to lack of corroborative evidence, meant the assessment order could not be termed 'erroneous'. Therefore, the PCIT's order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT. It also found that the additions were based on incriminating material and admissions, and that expenditure to earn such income was not allowable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT. It also found that the additions were based on incriminating material and admissions, and that expenditure to earn such income was not allowable.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action of initiating revision proceedings under Section 263 was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the AO had examined the loose sheets and other digital documents, and after due verification, chose not to make certain additions. Furthermore, the previous deletion of similar additions by the Tribunal, due to lack of corroborative evidence, meant the assessment order could not be termed 'erroneous'. Therefore, the PCIT's order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action of initiating revision proceedings under Section 263 was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the AO had examined the loose sheets and other digital documents, and after due verification, chose not to make certain additions. Furthermore, the previous deletion of similar additions by the Tribunal, due to lack of corroborative evidence, meant the assessment order could not be termed 'erroneous'. Therefore, the PCIT's order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action of initiating revision proceedings under Section 263 was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the AO had examined the loose sheets and other digital documents, and after due verification, chose not to make certain additions. Furthermore, the previous deletion of similar additions by the Tribunal, due to lack of corroborative evidence, meant the assessment order could not be termed 'erroneous'. Therefore, the PCIT's order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the reasons cited by the CIT(E) for cancelling the registration were not legally sustainable. The Tribunal found that allegations regarding independence, incorrect returns, and misuse of corpus funds were not adequately proven or were issues to be addressed during assessment proceedings, not registration cancellation.
The Tribunal held that the reasons cited by the CIT(E) for cancelling the registration were not legally sustainable. The Tribunal found that allegations regarding independence, incorrect returns, and misuse of corpus funds were not adequately proven or were issues to be addressed during assessment proceedings, not registration cancellation.
The Tribunal held that the reasons cited by the CIT(E) for cancelling the registration were not legally sustainable. The Tribunal found that allegations regarding independence, incorrect returns, and misuse of corpus funds were not adequately proven or were issues to be addressed during assessment proceedings, not registration cancellation.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT. It also found that the additions were based on incriminating material and admissions, and that expenditure to earn such income was not allowable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT. It also found that additions were justified based on seized material and admissions made by the assessee during the search.
The Tribunal upheld the dismissal of appeals, finding no evidence of mechanical approval under Section 153D, thereby affirming the validity of the assessments. It clarified that once incriminating material is found during a search, the Assessing Officer gains jurisdiction to assess the 'total income'. The Tribunal further confirmed that additions were based on seized material admitted by the assessee and that the proviso to Section 69C prevented the allowance of any expenditure against unexplained income.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) dismissed the assessee's appeals, holding that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT under section 153D. The tribunal affirmed that once incriminating material is found during a search, the AO acquires jurisdiction under section 153A to assess the total income, even for unabated assessments. Furthermore, the additions were based on seized material admitted by the assessee, and no expenditure for unexplained income could be allowed under section 69C.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's action of initiating revision proceedings under Section 263 was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the AO had examined the loose sheets and other digital documents, and after due verification, chose not to make certain additions. Furthermore, the previous deletion of similar additions by the Tribunal, due to lack of corroborative evidence, meant the assessment order could not be termed 'erroneous'. Therefore, the PCIT's order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the reasons assigned by the CIT(E) for cancellation of registration were not legally sustainable. The Tribunal found that allegations like lack of independence among trusts, incorrect returns, and misuse of corpus funds were either not proven or were issues to be dealt with during assessment proceedings, not for cancellation of registration.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's contention regarding the firm being non-existent at the time of the search was not supported by conclusive evidence and that the assessee had submitted to the jurisdiction of Section 153A by filing returns. Furthermore, the Tribunal found no evidence to suggest that the JCIT's approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically. The Tribunal also ruled that additions made based on incriminating material found during the search were valid, even if some of the additions were not directly based on the seized material.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT and that the additions were based on seized material admitted by the assessee. The Tribunal also relied on jurisdictional High Court decisions regarding extrapolation of income and allowance of expenditure.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT and that the additions were based on seized material admitted by the assessee. The Tribunal also relied on jurisdictional High Court decisions regarding extrapolation of income and allowance of expenditure.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's contention regarding the firm being non-existent at the time of the search was not supported by conclusive evidence and that the assessee had submitted to the jurisdiction of Section 153A by filing returns. Furthermore, the Tribunal found no evidence to suggest that the JCIT's approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically. The Tribunal also ruled that additions made based on incriminating material found during the search were valid, even if some of the additions were not directly based on the seized material.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide evidence of mechanical approval by the JCIT and that the additions were based on seized material admitted by the assessee. The Tribunal also relied on jurisdictional High Court decisions regarding extrapolation of income and allowance of expenditure.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's contention regarding the firm being non-existent at the time of the search was not supported by conclusive evidence and that the assessee had submitted to the jurisdiction of Section 153A by filing returns. Furthermore, the Tribunal found no evidence to suggest that the JCIT's approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically. The Tribunal also ruled that additions made based on incriminating material found during the search were valid, even if some of the additions were not directly based on the seized material.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's contention regarding the firm being non-existent at the time of the search was not supported by conclusive evidence and that the assessee had submitted to the jurisdiction of Section 153A by filing returns. Furthermore, the Tribunal found no evidence to suggest that the JCIT's approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically. The Tribunal also ruled that additions made based on incriminating material found during the search were valid, even if some of the additions were not directly based on the seized material.